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V. I. LENIN

THE ISKRA PERIOD

VOLUME IV

COLLECTED WORKS

OF

V. I. LENIN

Completely revised, edited and annotated.
The only edition authorized by the
V. I. Lenin Institute, Moscow

LENIN

VOLUME IV

THE ISKRA PERIOD

1900-1902

BOOK I

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

Facsimile of First Page of Lenin's Article "How the *Spark* Was Nearly Extinguished" [See p. 23].

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION	9
FOUNDING OF THE *Iskra*	11-50
Draft Declaration by the Editorial Board of the *Iskra* and the *Zarya*	13
How the *Spark* was Nearly Extinguished	23
Declaration by the Editorial Board of the *Iskra*	38
Preface to the Pamphlet *May Days in Kharkov*	44
ARTICLES FROM THE *Iskra* AND THE *Zarya*, 1900-1901	51-180
The Urgent Tasks of our Movement	53
The Chinese War	59
The Split in the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad	65
Note Written on December 29, 1900	67
The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army	70
Casual Notes	76-100
I. Beat, but not to Death!	76
II. Why Accelerate the Vicissitude of Time?	90
III. Objective Statistics	95
The Labour Party and the Peasantry	101
Where to Begin	109
Another Massacre	117
The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism	122
A Valuable Admission	164
The Lessons of the Crisis	171
The Serf-Owners at Work	176
The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"	181-289
I. The "Law" of Diminishing Returns	183
II. The Theory of Rent	194
III. Machinery in Agriculture	203
IV. The Removal of the Antagonism Between Town and Country. The Secondary Questions Raised by the "Critics"	218
V. "Flourishing, Progressive, Modern, Small Farms." The Baden Example	230
VI. The Productivity of Small and Large Farms. An Example from East Prussia	237

PAGE

VII. The Enquiry into Peasant Farming in Baden . 250
VIII. General Statistics of German Agriculture for 1882 and 1895. The Question of the Middle Farms 261
IX. Dairy Farming and Agricultural Co-operative Societies in Germany. The Agricultural Population in Germany Divided According to Economic Position 273

Questions Submitted to the League of Russian Social-Democrats at the "Unity" Congress on October 4, 1901 290
Fighting the Famine-Stricken 291
A Reply to the St. Petersburg Committee 298
Party Affairs Abroad 300
Penal Servitude Regulations and Penal Servitude Sentences 302

Appendix: Explanatory Notes 309

ILLUSTRATIONS

V. I. Lenin, 1900 . . . . . *Frontispiece*

Facsimile of First Page of Lenin's Article, "How the *Spark* was Nearly Extinguished" 6

Facsimile of the First Page of the Draft Declaration by the Editorial Board of the *Iskra* and the *Zarya* 12

Facsimile of the First Page of the *Iskra*, No. 1, December, 1900 52

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE present volume covers the period from the spring of 1900 to the beginning of 1902—the interval during which the *Iskra* was founded and published by Lenin and his group as the militant organ of revolutionary Marxism. This was the period in which the nascent revolutionary movement, standing at the crossroads, was called upon to choose between two programmes: the programme of "Economism" seeking to confine the labour movement to pure-and-simple trade-unionism, and the programme of Marxism calling for a many-sided revolutionary activity with the aim of overthrowing tsarism and inaugurating the proletarian revolution. That the Russian working class adopted the second programme, which finally led it to victory over the bourgeoisie in the fall of 1917, is not least the achievement of the old *Iskra*, which not only gave the revolutionary movement a theoretical basis, but also became the organising centre which helped to create a centralised, firmly established party of professional revolutionists, without which this victory would have been impossible.

In addition to the articles published in the *Iskra*, this volume also includes those writings of Lenin that were published in the *Zarya*, the second, more theoretical organ of Russian Marxism during the two years between 1900 and 1902. The volume opens with the draft declaration of the Editorial Board of the *Iskra*, arguing for the necessity of a revolutionary organ and formulating its policy, and continues with an account of how the *Iskra* was founded and nearly wrecked in the process. This is followed, on the one hand, by a series of articles representing Lenin's spirited reaction to the various manifestations of Russian social and political life, including an evaluation of the Liberals and the Zemstvos; on the other hand, by an incisive polemic against the Russian revisionists of Marxism in relation to the agrarian question in Russia. The outstanding contribution by Lenin during this period was the brochure *What Is To Be Done?*, which is reproduced in full in the second half of this volume. It played an important rôle in the history of the revolutionary movement, not only because all the burning questions of proletarian Socialism were raised in it, but above all because it showed the road that the party had to take in order to become the leader of the general people's revolution against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie.

In order not to make the volume too bulky, it has been divided into two books, the first of which contains Lenin's writings from the spring of 1900 to the autumn of 1901, and the second the subsequent writings, ending with *What Is To Be Done?*, which was published in January, 1902. Besides the text of Lenin's articles, Book I carries an appendix of explanatory notes elucidating various matters which may be unfamiliar to the reader. These notes were prepared by the Lenin Institute for the new and revised edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* and have been adapted for this volume. Book II contains, in addition to the text, a number of appendices arranged in the same order as in other volumes of the *Collected Works*. These appendices consist of explanatory notes for Book II, short critico-biographical notes about persons mentioned in the text of both books, a list of books and other non-Russian publications cited by Lenin, a calendar of events, and a chronology of Lenin's life during this period.

Lenin's own notes have been reproduced as footnotes to the text. Wherever footnotes have been added by the editor, they have been designated as his. Notes by the editor in the text proper have been placed in brackets, as also Lenin's bibliographical references cited in the text. Titles of foreign books other than Russian have been given in the original while Russian titles have been given in translation. Where a foreign book was known to be available in English translation, this has been indicated and the English text quoted in citations.

As in previous volumes, the editor has refrained from supplying too many notes. These have been supplied only in cases where Russian or other foreign sayings not commonly known have been used by Lenin and it was considered advisable to give them in English equivalent. The translator has supplied many of these notes.

All dates used in the original text, which are of the former Russian old style calendar and thirteen days behind the calendar of Western Europe, have been retained in this volume.

The translation has been made by J. Fineberg who is responsible for a number of important translations from the Russian.

October, 1929.

FOUNDING OF THE *ISKRA*



Facsimile of the First Page of the Draft Declaration by the Editorial Board of the *Iskra* and the *Zarya*

DRAFT DECLARATION BY THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE *ISKRA* AND THE *ZARYA* [1]

In undertaking the publication of two Social-Democratic organs—a scientific and political journal and an All-Russian labour newspaper—we consider it necessary to say a few words concerning our programme, the objects for which we are striving, and what we understand our tasks to be.

We are at the present time passing through an extremely important period in the history of the Russian labour movement and of Russian Social-Democracy. All the evidence goes to show that our movement is in a critical stage. It has spread so widely and has struck such sound roots in the most diverse parts of Russia that it is now surging forward with unrestrained vigour to consolidate itself, assume a higher form, and mould itself into definite shape and organisation. Indeed, the past few years have been marked by an astonishingly rapid spread of Social-Democratic ideas among our intelligentsia; and meeting this tendency of public opinion is the independent movement of the industrial proletariat which is beginning to unite and fight against its oppressors and is eagerly striving towards Socialism. Circles * of workers and Social-Democratic intelligentsia are springing up everywhere; local agitation leaflets are beginning to appear; the demand for Social-Democratic literature is increasing and is far outstripping the supply, while the intensified persecution by the government is powerless to restrain the movement. The prisons and the places of exile are filled to overflowing. Hardly a month goes by without our hearing of Socialists being "discovered" [by the police.—*Ed.*] in all parts of Russia, of the capture of literature carriers, of the arrest of agitators, and the confiscation of literature and printing presses—but the movement goes on and grows, spreads to wider regions, penetrates more and more deeply into the working class and attracts increasing public attention to itself. The entire economic development of Russia, the history of the development of social ideas in Russia and of the

* Rudimentary and loose organisations for revolutionary propaganda, characteristic of the formative period of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party.—*Ed.*

Russian revolutionary movement serve as a guarantee that the Russian Social-Democratic labour movement will grow and surmount all the obstacles that confront it.

The principal feature of our movement and one which has become particularly marked in recent times is its state of disunity and its primitiveness, if one may so express it. Local circles spring up and function independently of circles in other districts and—what is particularly important—of circles which have functioned and now function simultaneously in the same districts. Traditions are not established and continuity is not maintained; the local literature entirely reflects this disunity and lack of contact with what Russian Social-Democracy has already created. The present period, therefore, seems to us to be critical precisely for the reason that the movement is growing out of this state of primitiveness and disunity and insistently demands a transition to a higher, more united, better and more organised form, and we consider it our duty to labour in the direction of bringing it about. It goes without saying that at a certain stage of the movement, at its inception, this disunity is absolutely inevitable; the absence of continuity is natural, in view of the astonishingly rapid and universal growth of the movement after a long period of revolutionary calm. Undoubtedly, there will always be diversity in local conditions; there will always be diversity in the conditions of the working class in one district as compared with another, and some diversity in views among the active workers in one district as compared with those in another will always exist. This very diversity is evidence of the virility of the movement and of its sound growth. Nevertheless, disunity and lack of organisation are not necessarily a consequence of this diversity. Maintaining the continuity and unity of the movement does not by any means exclude diversity. On the contrary, they create a much broader arena and a freer soil for it. In the present period of the movement, however, disunity is beginning to exercise positively harmful effects, and threatens to divert the movement to a false path: narrow practicality detached from the theoretical conception of the movement as a whole may destroy the contact between Socialism and the revolutionary movement in Russia on the one hand, and the spontaneous labour movement on the other. That this danger is not merely an imaginary one is proved by such literary productions as *Credo* [2]—which has already called forth legitimate protest and condemnation—and the "Special Supple-

ment" to *Rabochaya Mysl*[3] [*Worker's Thought*], September, 1899. The latter brought out in greater relief the tendency with which the *Rabochaya Mysl* is imbued. In it is revealed a peculiar tendency in Russian Social-Democracy which may cause positive harm, and which must be combated. And the Russian legal literature,* this parody of Marxism, which is capable only of corrupting public consciousness, still further intensifies the confusion and anarchy which enabled the celebrated (celebrated for his bankruptcy) Bernstein to make the untruthful statement to the world that the majority of the Social-Democrats active in Russia supported him.[4]

It is premature as yet to judge how deep the cleavage is, and how far the crystallisation of a special tendency is probable (we are not in the least inclined to answer this question in the affirmative and we have not yet lost hope of our being able to work together), but it would be more harmful to close our eyes to the seriousness of the situation than to exaggerate the cleavage, and we heartily welcome the resumption of literary activity on the part of the Emancipation of Labour[5] group, and the fight it has commenced against the attempt to corrupt and vulgarise Social-Democracy.

The practical conclusion to be drawn from all this is as follows: We Russian Social-Democrats must combine, and direct all our efforts towards the formation of a single, strong party, which must lead the struggle under the banner of a revolutionary Social-Democratic programme, which must maintain the continuity of the movement and systematically support its organisation. This conclusion is not a new one. It was arrived at by Russian Social-Democrats two years ago when the representatives of the largest Social-Democratic organisations in Russia gathered at a congress in the spring of 1898, formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published the Manifesto of the party, and recognised the *Rabochaya Gazeta* [*Worker's Gazette*] as the official party organ.[6] Regarding ourselves as members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, we entirely agree with the fundamental ideas contained in the Manifesto and attach extreme importance to it as an open and public declaration of the aims towards which our party should strive. Consequently, we, as members of the party, present the

* Would-be revolutionary literature representing what was known in Russia as legal Marxism written with the intention of not offending the censor,—the opposite of genuine revolutionary literature which was illegal and which had to be published and distributed through underground channels.—*Ed.*

question as to what our immediate and direct tasks are, as follows: What plan of activity must we adopt in order to revive the party on the firmest possible basis? Some comrades (and even some groups and organisations) are of the opinion that in order to achieve this we must resume the practice of electing the central party institution, and instruct that body to resume the publication of the party organ.[7] We consider such a plan to be a wrong one, or at all events, a risky one. To establish and consolidate the party, means to establish and consolidate unity among all Social-Democrats. Such unity cannot be decreed, it cannot be brought about by, let us say, a meeting of representatives passing a resolution. Definite work must be done to bring it about. In the first place, it is necessary to publish literature common for the whole party—common, not in the sense that it must serve the whole of the Russian movement rather than separate districts, that it must discuss the questions of the movement as a whole and assist the class-conscious proletarians in their struggle instead of dealing merely with local questions, but common in the sense that it must unite all the available literary forces, that it must express all shades of opinion and views prevailing among Social-Democrats, not as isolated workers, but as comrades united by a common programme and a common struggle in the ranks of a single organisation. Secondly, we must set up an organisation especially for the purpose of establishing and maintaining contact among all the centres of the movement, for supplying complete and timely information about the movement, and for regularly distributing the periodical press to all parts of Russia. Only when we have established such an organisation, only when we have established a Russian Socialist mailing system and the party is based on a sound foundation, only then will it become a real fact, and consequently a mighty political force. To the first half of this task, *i. e.*, establishing a common literature, we intend to devote our efforts, for we regard this as the pressing demand of the present-day movement, and as a necessary preliminary measure towards the resumption of party activity.

The character of our task naturally determines the programme according to which we must conduct the organs we publish. Much space must be devoted in them to theoretical questions, *i. e.*, to the general theory of Social-Democracy, and its application to Russian conditions. There can be no doubt about the urgency of the need for widely discussing these questions precisely at the present time,

and after what has been said above, it requires no further explanation. It goes without saying that questions of general theory are inseparably connected with the necessity for supplying information about the history and the present stage of the labour movement in the West. Furthermore, we propose systematically to discuss all political questions. The Social-Democratic Labour Party must respond to all questions that arise in all spheres of our daily life, to all questions of home and foreign politics, and we must see to it that every Social-Democrat and every class-conscious worker has definite views on all important questions. Unless we achieve this, it will be impossible to carry on wide and systematic work of propaganda and agitation. The discussion of questions of theory and policy will be connected with the work of drafting a party programme, the necessity for which was recognised at the congress in 1898, and in the near future we intend to publish a draft programme, a comprehensive discussion of which should provide sufficient material for the forthcoming congress at which a programme will have to be adopted.[8] Another urgent task, in our opinion, is the discussion of questions of organisation and practical methods of conducting our work. The lack of continuity and the disunity, to which reference has been made above, exercise particularly harmful effects upon the present state of party discipline, organisation and the technique of secrecy. It must be frankly admitted that in this respect we Social-Democrats lag behind the old workers in the Russian revolutionary movement and other organisations functioning in Russia, and we must exert all our efforts to remove this drawback. The necessity of attracting masses of workers and intellectual youth to the movement, the frequency of police discoveries and the increasing governmental persecution make the propaganda of the principles and methods of party organisation, discipline and the technique of secrecy imperatively necessary.

Such propaganda, if supported by all the various groups and by all the more experienced comrades, can and must result in young Socialists and workers being trained into capable leaders of the revolutionary movement, able to overcome all the obstacles placed in the way of our work by the tyranny of the autocratic police government, and serve all the requirements of the masses of the workers, who are spontaneously striving towards Socialism, and political struggle. Finally, one of our principal tasks in connection with the above-mentioned subject must be to analyse this spon-

taneous movement (among the masses of the workers, as well as among our intelligentsia). We must try to understand the social movement of the intelligentsia which marked the first half of the nineties in Russia and which contained various and even heterogeneous tendencies. We must carefully study the conditions of the working class in all spheres of economic life, study the forms and conditions under which it can be aroused, and study its struggles which are now beginning, in order that we may unite the Russian labour movement and Marxian Socialism—which has already begun to take deep root in Russian soil—into one inseparable whole, in order to combine the Russian revolutionary movement with the spontaneous activity of the masses of the people. Only when this contact has been established will a Social-Democratic Labour Party be established in Russia; for Social-Democracy does not exist merely to serve the spontaneous labour movement (as some of our present-day "practical workers" are sometimes inclined to think), but to combine Socialism with the labour movement. Only when this combination has been brought about will the Russian proletariat be able to fulfil its first political task—to liberate Russia from the tyranny of the autocracy.

The manner in which these subjects will be distributed between the journal and the newspaper is determined by the distinct difference that exists in the size and character of the two publications. The journal should serve mainly for propaganda, the newspaper mainly for agitation. But all aspects of the movement should be reflected in both the journal and the newspaper, and we wish particularly to emphasise our opposition to the view that a labour newspaper should devote its pages exclusively to matters that immediately and directly concern the spontaneous labour movement, and leave the theory of Socialism, science, politics, questions of party organisation, etc., to an organ for the intelligentsia. On the contrary, it is necessary to combine all the concrete facts and manifestations of the labour movement with these questions; the light of theory must be brought to bear upon every separate fact; propaganda on questions of politics and party organisation must be carried on among the broad masses of the working class; and these questions must be dealt with in the work of agitation. The kind of agitation which has prevailed almost without exception hitherto, *viz.*, agitation by means of locally published leaflets, is now inadequate. It is narrow, it deals only with local and principally with economic ques-

tions. We must try to create a higher form of agitation by means of the newspaper, which must periodically record workers' complaints, workers' strikes and other forms of the proletarian struggle, all the manifestations of political tyranny in the whole of Russia—and draw definite conclusions from each of these facts in accordance with the ultimate aim of Socialism and the political tasks of the Russian proletariat. "Push out the frame-work and broaden the content of our propaganda, agitational and organisational activity"—these words uttered by P. B. Axelrod must serve as our slogan to define the activities of Russian Social-Democrats in the immediate future, and we adopt this slogan in the programme of our publications.[9]

Here the question naturally arises as to whether the proposed publications are to serve the purpose of combining all Russian Social-Democrats into a single party. If so, then they must reflect all shades of opinion, all local peculiarities and all the various practical methods. How can we combine the varying points of view with the maintenance of a uniform editorial policy for these publications? Should these publications be merely a jumble of various views, or should they have an independent and quite definite tendency?

We hold the second view and hope that an organ having a definite tendency will prove quite suitable (as we shall show below), both for the purpose of expressing various points of view, and for comradely polemics between fellow-contributors. Our views are completely in accord with the fundamental ideas of Marxism (as expressed in the *Communist Manifesto,* and in the programme of West-European Social-Democracy), and we stand for the consistent development of these ideas in the spirit of Marx and Engels, resolutely rejecting the half-hearted and opportunist revisions which have now become so fashionable thanks to Bernstein. As we see it, the task of Social-Democracy is to organise and help to carry on the class struggle, to point out its essential ultimate aims, and to analyse the conditions which determine the methods by which this struggle should be conducted. "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves."[10] But while we do not separate Social-Democracy from the labour movement, we must not forget that the task of the former is to represent the interests of this movement in all countries as a whole, that it must not blindly worship the particular phase in which it may find itself at any particular time or place. We think that it is the duty of Social-Democ-

racy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing state and social system, and we regard its aim to be the capture of political power by the working class, the expropriation of the expropriators, and the establishment of a Socialist society. We strongly repudiate every attempt to weaken or tone down the revolutionary character of Social-Democracy, which is the party of social revolution, ruthlessly opposed to all classes standing for the present social system. In our opinion, the special task of Russian Social-Democracy is to overthrow the autocracy. Russian Social-Democracy is destined to stand in the front rank in the fight for Russian democracy; it is destined to achieve the aim which the whole social development of Russia set before it, and which it has inherited from the glorious fighters in the Russian revolutionary movement. Only by inseparably linking up the economic with the political struggles, only by spreading political propaganda and agitation among wider and wider strata of the working class can Social-Democracy fulfil the task it is called upon to perform.

We will deal with all theoretical and practical questions from this point of view, and from the standpoint of these ideas we will strive to link up all manifestations of the labour movement and democratic protest in Russia. (This point of view is outlined here only in its general features. It has been dealt with more thoroughly and in greater detail on many occasions by the Emancipation of Labour group, in the Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and in the "commentary" to the latter)[11] (the pamphlet *The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats*) * and in *Labour's Cause in Russia* (an explanation of the programme of Russian Social-Democracy).[12]

But in carrying on our literary work from the point of view of a definite tendency, we do not claim in the least that our views, in their entirety, are the views of all Russian Social-Democrats, we do not deny that differences exist, nor shall we attempt to gloss over or obliterate these differences. On the contrary, we desire our publications to become organs for the *discussion* of all questions by all Russian Social-Democrats of the most diverse shades of opinion. We will not reject polemical material sent in by comrades; on the contrary, we are prepared to give it considerable space in our columns. Open polemics, conducted in the sight and hearing of all Russian Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers, are necessary

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II.—*Ed.*

and desirable in order to explain the profoundness of the differences that exist, in order that disputed questions may be discussed from all angles, to combat the extremes into which representatives of various views, various localities or various branches of the revolutionary movement inevitably fall. Indeed, we regard one of the drawbacks of the present-day movement to be the absence of open polemics between avowedly differing views, an effort to conceal the differences that exist over extremely fundamental questions.

Moreover, recognising as we do the Russian working class and Russian Social-Democracy as the vanguard in the fight for democracy and for political liberty, we think it necessary to try to make our publications organs of *general democracy* not that we would, even for a single moment, forget about the class antagonisms that exist between the proletariat and other classes, or that we would consent to the slightest toning down of the class struggle, no,—but in order that we might bring forward and discuss *all* democratic questions, and not confine ourselves merely to narrow proletarian questions; so that we might bring forward and discuss all cases and manifestations of political oppression; show the connection between the labour movement and the political struggle in all its forms; attract all the honest fighters against the autocracy, no matter what their views may be or what class they belong to, and induce them to support the working class as the only revolutionary force irrevocably hostile to absolutism. Consequently, while appealing primarily to the Russian Socialists and class-conscious workers, we do not appeal exclusively to them. We also call upon all those who are oppressed by the present political system in Russia, to all those who are striving for the emancipation of the Russian people from their slavery to support the publications which will be devoted to the work of organising the labour movement into a revolutionary political party. We place our columns at their disposal in order that they may expose the despicability and criminality of the Russian autocracy. We make this appeal in the conviction that the banner of the political struggle raised by Russian Social-Democracy can and will become the banner of the whole people.

The tasks we set ourselves are extremely broad and all-embracing, and we would not have dared to take them up if we were not absolutely convinced from our past experience that these are the most urgent tasks of the whole movement, if we were not assured of the sympathy and promises of generous and constant support on the

part of: 1. Several organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of separate groups of Russian Social-Democrats working in various towns; 2. The Emancipation of Labour group, the founders of Russian Social-Democracy who have always stood in the forefront of its theoreticians and literary representatives; 3. A number of persons not affiliated with any organisation, but who sympathise with the Social-Democratic labour movement, and have rendered it not a little aid. We will exert every effort to carry out properly that part of the general revolutionary work that we have selected, and do our best to persuade every Russian comrade to regard our publications as his own, as organs to which *every* group can communicate information concerning the movement, in which they can express their views and literary requirements, relate their experiences and express their opinions concerning Social-Democratic publications; in fact, to make them the medium through which they can make their contribution to the movement and receive what the movement can give them. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a genuine All-Russian organ of Social-Democracy. Russian Social-Democracy is already finding the underground conditions in which the various groups and scattered circles carry on their work too narrow. It is time to come out on the road of open advocacy of Socialism, on the road of open political struggle. The establishment of an All-Russian organ of Social-Democracy must be *the first step on this road.*

Written in the spring of 1900 prior to Lenin's departure abroad.
First published in 1925 in the *Lenin Collection,* IV.

HOW THE *SPARK* WAS NEARLY EXTINGUISHED * [13]

I first went to Zurich. I arrived alone, not having previously seen Arsenyev (Potressov). In Zurich, P. B. Axelrod met me with open arms, and I spent two days in a heart-to-heart talk with him. The talk was as between long-parted friends, and we talked about everything; many things, in no particular order, and certainly not of a business character. There is not much of a business character that P. B. *mitsprechen kann* [can talk about.—*Ed.*], but it was quite evident, from the manner in which he insisted on setting up the printing plant for the journal in Geneva, that he was pulling towards G. V. Plekhanov. Generally speaking P. B. was very "flattering" (excuse the expression). He said that they have staked *everything* on our enterprise, that it meant their revival, that "we" would now be able to combat G. V.'s extremes. I took particular note of the latter remark, and the whole of the subsequent history proved how significant these words were.

I arrived in Geneva. Arsenyev warned me to be particularly cautious with G. V., who was greatly excited about the split [14] and was suspicious. My conversation with the latter did indeed show that he was really suspicious, distrustful and *rechthaberisch* to *ne plus ultra* [believed that he was always absolutely right.—*Ed.*]. I tried to be very courteous and evaded all the "tender" points, but the constant restraint that I had to place upon myself could not but greatly affect my temper. From time to time little "frictions" arose in the form of sharp retorts on the part of G. V. to any remark that might even in the least degree cool down or soothe the passions that had been aroused by the split. "Friction" also arose over questions concerning the tactics of the journal. G. V. all the time displayed absolute intolerance, incapacity and a lack of desire to understand other people's arguments, and betrayed insincerity, yes, insincerity. When we declared that we must make *every* possible allowance for Struve, for *we ourselves* bear some guilt for his evolution, that we, including *G. V.*, failed to protest when protest was necessary (1895, 1897), G. V. absolutely refused to admit even the slightest guilt, and employed transparently worthless arguments by which he *evaded* the

* A play on the title of the paper *Iskra* meaning spark.—*Ed.*

question but did not explain it. This diplomacy in the course of comradely conversations between future co-editors was extremely unpleasant. Why did he try self-deception by observing that he, G. V., in 1895, was "ordered" (?) "not to shoot" (at Struve) and that he was accustomed to do what he was ordered (*sic!*).[15] Why did he try self-deception by asserting that in 1897 (when Struve, in *Novoye Slovo* [*New Word*] wrote that his object was to refute one of the fundamental postulates of Marxism)[16] he, G. V., did not oppose it, because he absolutely could not conceive (and never would conceive) of polemics in the same journal between members of the staff? This insincerity was extremely irritating the more so that in the discussion G. V. tried to make it appear that we did not desire to carry on a ruthless fight against Struve, that we desired to "reconcile everything," etc. A heated discussion arose over the question as to whether polemics should be conducted in the journal at all. G. V. was opposed to this, and absolutely refused to listen to our arguments. He displayed a hatred towards "allies" that bordered on the indecent (suspecting them of espionage, accusing them of being *Geschäftmacher* [swindlers.—*Ed.*] and rogues, and asserting that he would not hesitate to "shoot" such "traitors," etc.). The remotest suggestion that he went to extremes (for example my hint that he published private letters,[17] and that this was an incautious thing to do) roused him to a high pitch of irritability and excitement. It became evident that he and we were becoming increasingly displeased. But with him it expressed itself, among other things, in the following: We had a draft prepared of an editorial declaration * in which we explained the tasks and the programme of the publications. This was written in an "opportunist" spirit (from G. V.'s point of view). Polemics between members of the staff were to be permitted; the tone was mild; allowance was made for the possibility of a peaceful ending of the controversy with the Economists,** etc. In the declaration, emphasis was laid on our belonging to the party and on our desire to work for its unification. G. V. had read this declaration together with Arsenyev and V. I. Zasulich before I arrived; he read it, and made no objection to the substance

* See p. 13 of this book.—*Ed.*

** The tendency which stressed the economic and denied the necessity for political struggles on the part of the workers,—a tendency characterised in the labour movement as pure and simple trade unionism. A detailed discussion of Economism will be found in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done* which is reprinted in Book II of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the ideas contained in it. He merely expressed a desire to alter the style, to give it a higher tone, without altering the trend of ideas. A. N. Potressov had left the declaration with him for this purpose. When I arrived, G. V. did not say a word to me about the matter, but when I visited him a few days later, he returned the declaration to me as if to say, "Here you are, in the presence of witnesses, I return this to you intact; you see I have not lost it." I inquired why he did not make the changes he had suggested. He replied evasively: It could after all be done later on, it would not take long and it was not worth doing at present. I took the declaration and made the alterations myself (it was a draft drawn up when I was still in Russia) and read it a second time to G. V. (in the presence of V. I. and this time I asked him *point blank* to take the thing and correct it. Again he made evasions, and threw the task on V. I., who was sitting beside him (an altogether strange suggestion, because we had never asked her to do it, and moreover, she could not make the corrections, *i. e.*, "raise" the tone, and give the declaration the character of a manifesto).

Thus matters went on until the congress (the congress of the whole Emancipation of Labour group, G. V., P. B., V. I. and we two, our third man being absent.[18] Finally P. B. arrived and the congress was arranged. On the question of our attitude towards the Jewish League (Bund),[19] G. V. displayed extreme intolerance and openly declared it to be a non-Social-Democratic organisation . . .* and that our aim was to eject this Bund from the party. . . .* None of our protests against these objectionable utterances had any effect whatever. G. V. obstinately stuck to his. . . . No resolution on this question was passed. We read the declaration together at the congress. G. V.'s behaviour was very queer. He remained silent, he suggested no alterations, he raised no objections to the proposal contained in the declaration, that polemics would be permitted, and generally behaved like an outsider, exactly like an outsider. He refused to participate, and only now and again threw in venomous, malicious remarks to the effect that he (*i. e.*, the Emancipation of Labour group in which he is dictator), of course, would not have written a declaration like that. This remark, uttered in passing, following on a remark in connection with a different matter, appeared particularly objectionable to me. Here is a conference of fellow-editors, and one of them (who has been *twice* asked to submit

* Several words omitted. See Note 13.—*Ed.*

his own draft or to suggest alterations to our own, makes no suggestions for alteration but sarcastically remarks that he, of course, would not have written a declaration like that. (He wished to say, not one so timid, modest and opportunistic.) This clearly showed that normal relations did not exist between us. Subsequently—I will not refer to the minor questions discussed at the congress—the question of our attitude towards Bobo [20] and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky came up. We were in favour of a conditional invitation (we were inevitably driven to this by the bitterness displayed by G. V.; we wanted him to see that we desired a different attitude. G. V.'s incredible bitterness seemed to drive one instinctively to protest and to defend his opponents. Vera Ivanovna [Zasulich] aptly remarked that G. V. always argued in such a manner as to arouse his readers' sympathy for his opponents). G. V. very coldly and drily declared that he utterly disagreed, and demonstratively remained silent throughout the whole of our fairly protracted conversation with P. B. and V. I., who were not disinclined to agree with us. The whole morning appears to have passed in a tense atmosphere. It became clear beyond doubt that G. V. was presenting an ultimatum to us—to choose between him and those "rogues." Seeing that things were coming to such a pass we two and Arsenyev agreed to give way and at the very opening of the evening session, we declared that "owing to the insistence of G. V." we withdraw. This declaration was greeted with silence (as if it were a matter of course that we could do nothing else but give way!). This "ultimatum atmosphere" (as Arsenyev later described it) positively irritated us. G. V.'s desire to have unlimited power became obvious. A little before that, in a private conversation about Bobo (when G. V., Arsenyev, V. I. and I were taking an evening walk in the woods), G. V., after a heated discussion said, laying his hand on my shoulders, "But, gentlemen, I am not putting any conditions; we will discuss all this together at the congress and together we will decide." I was very much touched by this at the time. But at the congress the very opposite happened. Then G. V. refused to take part in the comradely discussion, maintained an angry silence, and by his silence obviously "*put conditions.*" To me it seemed to be a sharp display of insincerity (although I have never before so clearly expressed my impressions), while Arsenyev openly declared: "I shall never forgive him this concession!"

Saturday came. I do not remember exactly what we spoke about

that day, but in the evening, when we were all walking together, a fresh conflict flared up. G. V. proposed that a certain person (who had not yet contributed anything to literature but in whom G. V. pretends to see philosophical talent; I have never seen this person—she is known for her blind worship of G. V.),[21] be commissioned to write an article on a philosophical subject, and went on to say: "I will advise her to commence the article with a criticism of Kautsky somewhat on the following lines—a nice fellow indeed! he has already become a 'critic' and publishes philosophic articles by 'critics,' in the *Neue Zeit* [22] but does not give sufficient scope to 'Marxists' [read Plekhanov]." Arsenyev, on hearing this proposal to make a sharp attack against Kautsky (who had already been invited to contribute to the journal), became very indignant and heatedly opposed it on the grounds that it was uncalled for. G. V. became highly offended and angry. I conversed with Arsenyev. P. B. and V. I. remained silent. Half an hour later, G. V. departed (we went to see him off to the steamer), and all the time previous to that he sat silent, his brow black as a cloud. As soon as he left us, we felt as if a weight had been lifted from us all and the discussion proceeded in a "friendly spirit." The next day, Sunday (to-day is September 2, Sunday! *only* a week ago!!! And to me it seems as if it were a year ago! How remote the thing seems already!) we arranged to meet, not in our cottage but at G. V.'s. We came to the place—Arsenyev arrived first, I, later. G. V. had sent P. B. and V. I. to tell Arsenyev that he, that is, G. V., declined to be co-editor and desired to be just a contributor. P. B. went away and V. I. quite put out and confused murmured to Arsenyev: "George is displeased, he declines. . . ." I entered. The door was opened for me by G. V., who offered me his hand with a rather queer smile and then walked out. I entered the room and found V. I. and Arsenyev sitting there, their faces wearing a strange expression. "Well, friends," said I, "how goes it?" G. V. entered, and invited us to go to his room. There he stated that it would be better if he were a contributor, merely a contributor; otherwise there would be continual friction; it was evident that our views differed on the subject; he understood and respected our party point of view, but he could not accept it. It would be better if we were the editors and he a contributor.

We were positively amazed to hear this, yes, positively amazed, and began to argue against it. Then G. V. said: "Well, if we are

to be together, how shall we vote; how many votes are there? Six. Six is not a convenient number. "Well, let G. V. have two votes," suggested V. I., "otherwise he will always be alone—two votes on questions of tactics." We agreed to that. On that G. V. took the reins of management in his hands and in a high editorial manner began to apportion tasks for the journal, appointing this one and that one among those present to various departments in a manner brooking no denial. We sat there as if we had been ducked; mechanically we agreed to everything, unable as yet to comprehend what had taken place. We realised that we had been made fools of; that our remarks were becoming more and more halting; that G. V. "waived them aside" (did not reject them, but disregarded them) more and more easily and carelessly, and that "the new system" was *de facto* wholly tantamount to G. V.'s complete domination, and that the latter, understanding this perfectly, did not hesitate to domineer over us without ceremony. We realised that we had been fooled and utterly beaten, but we did not yet fully realise our real position. As soon as we found ourselves alone, however, as soon as we left the steamer and walked to our cottage, it dawned upon us in a flash and we broke out in a wild and furious tirade against G. V.

Before relating the substance of this tirade and what it led to, however, I will go back a bit. Why did the idea of Plekhanov's complete domination (quite apart from the *form* this domination assumed) rouse us to such indignation? At first our idea was that we would be the editors, and they—close collaborators. I had proposed (while we were still in Russia) that the matter be formally submitted in this way, but Arsenyev had objected to proposing it formally, and suggested that we act "in a friendly way" (which would bring the same result!) and I agreed. But both of us were agreed on the point that we were to be the editors, because the "old ones" were extremely intolerant, and also because they could not properly perform the drudgery of editorial work. These were the only considerations that guided us, for we were quite ready to accept their ideological guidance. The conversations I had in Geneva with Plekhanov's younger comrades and adherents (the members of the Social-Democrat group,[23] long-standing adherents of Plekhanov, active party workers, not working men, entirely devoted to Plekhanov) these conversations strengthened me (and Arsenyev) in the conviction that this is exactly how we ought to present the matter.

These adherents told us without equivocation that it was desirable to have the editorial office in Germany, *for that would make us independent of G. V.*, and that to allow the old ones to have practical control of the editorial work would cause delay in the work, and perhaps even cause its utter collapse. For the very same reasons, Arsenyev was *absolutely* in favour of Germany.

I broke off my description of how the *Iskra* was nearly extinguished, at the point where we were returning home in the evening of August 26. As soon as we found ourselves alone, after leaving the steamer, we broke out into a flood of angry expostulation. Our pent-up feelings burst forth like a storm. Up and down our little village we paced far into the night. At intervals, the darkness around us was pierced by flashes of lightning accompanied by the rumbling of thunder. We walked, bursting with indignation. I remember that Arsenyev commenced by declaring that as far as he was concerned his personal relations with Plekhanov were broken off once and for all, never to be restored. He would maintain business relations with him, but as for personal relations—*fertig* [he was through.—*Ed.*]. His (Plekhanov's) behaviour was insulting to such a degree that one could not help suspecting him of harbouring "unclean" thoughts about ourselves (*i. e.*, that he regarded us as *Streber* [careerists.—*Ed.*]. He tramples us underfoot, etc. I fully supported these charges. My "infatuation" with Plekhanov disappeared as if by magic, and I felt offended and embittered to the highest degree. Never, never in my life, have I regarded any other man with such sincere respect and veneration. I have never stood before any man with such "humility" as I stood before him, and never before have I been so brutally "spurned." We were actually spurned. We were scared like little children when grown-ups threaten to leave them, and when we funked (shame!) we were unceremoniously brushed aside in the most incredible manner. We realised very clearly then that Plekhanov had placed a trap for us that morning when he declined to act as a co-editor; it was a deliberate chess-move, a snare for guileless "pigeons." There could be no doubt whatever about that, because, if Plekhanov had sincerely feared to act as a co-editor because he would be a stumbling-block and feared to rouse useless friction between us, he would not a moment later have revealed (and brutally revealed) the fact that his acting as a co-editor was absolutely tantamount to his being *sole* editor. And since a man with whom we desire to co-operate intimately, and with

whom we had established most intimate relations, resorts to chess-moves in dealing with comrades, there can be no doubt about the fact that he is a bad man, yes, a bad man, inspired by petty motives of personal vanity and conceit—an insincere man. This discovery—and it was indeed a discovery—struck us like a thunderbolt because up to that moment both of us had been enamoured with Plekhanov, and, as we do with our beloved, we forgave him everything; we closed our eyes to his shortcomings; we tried hard to persuade ourselves that these shortcomings were really non-existent, that these were petty things that bothered only people who had no proper regard for principles. Yet we ourselves had it forced upon us that these "petty" shortcomings were capable of repelling the most devoted friends, and even our appreciation of his theoretical rectitude could cause us to forget his *repelling* qualities. Our indignation knew no bounds. Our ideal was destroyed; gloatingly we crumpled it up and trampled it under our feet. There were no bounds to the charges we hurled against him. It cannot go on like this, we decided. We do not wish, we will not, we *cannot* work together with him under such conditions. Good-bye, journal! We will throw everything up and return to Russia. There we will start all over again, right from the very beginning, and confine ourselves to the newspaper. We refuse to be pawns in the hands of that man; he does not understand, and cannot maintain relations of comradeship. We did not dare to undertake the editorship *ourselves* and besides, it would be positively repulsive to do so now, for it would appear as if we were really hunting after the editor's job and that we were inspired by motives of vanity, but of a smaller calibre. . . .

It is difficult to describe adequately what our feelings were that night. Such mixed, heavy, confused feelings. It was a real drama; the complete abandonment of the thing which for years we had tended like a favourite child, and with which we had inseparably linked up the whole of our life's work. And all because we were formerly enamoured with Plekhanov. Had we not been so enamoured, had we regarded him more dispassionately, our conduct towards him would have been different. We would not have suffered such disaster, in the literal sense of the word. We would not have received such a "moral ducking," as Arsenyev quite rightly expressed it. We had received the most bitter lesson of our lives. Young comrades "court" an old comrade out of the great love they bear for him—and suddenly he injects into this love an atmos-

phere of intrigue! He compels us to feel not as younger brothers, but as fools to be led by the nose, pawns to be moved about at will; and still worse, as clumsy *Streber* who must be thoroughly frightened and put down! An enamoured youth receives from the object of his love a bitter lesson: To regard all persons "without sentiment"; to keep a stone in one's sling. Many more thoughts of an equally bitter nature did we give utterance to that night. The suddenness of the disaster naturally caused us to magnify it, but, in the main, the words we uttered were true. Blinded by our love, we had actually behaved like *slaves*. To be a slave is humiliating, and the sense of shame we felt was magnified a hundredfold by the fact that "he" himself had forced us to realise how humiliating our position was.

Finally, we returned to our respective rooms to go to bed with the firm determination to express our indignation to Plekhanov on the following day, to give up the journal, retain only the newspaper, and publish the material for the journal in pamphlet form. The cause would not suffer by this, we thought, and we would avoid having intimate relations with "that man."

Next morning I woke up earlier than usual. I was awakened by footsteps on the stairs and the voice of P. B., who was knocking at Arsenyev's door. I heard Arsenyev call out in reply, and open the door, and I thought to myself: Will Arsenyev have pluck enough to come out with it immediately? It would be better and necessary to speak out at once rather than drag the thing out. I washed and dressed and went to Arsenyev's room, where I found him at his toilet. Axelrod was sitting in the armchair, his face wearing a queer expression. "Listen, N. N.," said Arsenyev turning to me, "I have told P. B. of our decision to go back to Russia, and of our conviction that things cannot go on like this." I fully concurred with this, of course, and supported Arsenyev's statement. We related everything to Axelrod, quite frankly, so much so that Arsenyev went so far as to say that we suspected that Plekhanov regarded us as *Streber*. Axelrod half-sympathised with us generally, shook his head sadly, and appeared to be greatly disturbed, confused and put out. But immediately he began protesting and shouting that our accusations were unfounded; that Plekhanov had many shortcomings, but not this one; that in this matter it was not he who was unjust to us, but we who were unjust to him; that up till now he had been prepared to say to Plekhanov, "See what a mess you have

made. Clear it up yourself. I wash my hands of the whole affair," but he could not say that now, because he saw that we were unjust. His assertions made little impression upon us, as may be imagined, and poor P. B. looked pitiful when he finally realised that we were firm in our decision.

We went out together to warn V. I. It was to be expected that she would take the news of the "break" (for it did certainly look like a break) very badly. "I fear," Arsenyev had said to me the previous evening, "I do seriously fear that she will commit suicide. . . ."

I shall never forget the mood in which we three went out that morning. "It is like going to a funeral," I thought to myself. And indeed we walked as if in a funeral procession—silent, with downcast eyes, oppressed by a feeling of utter and inexplicable loss. It was like a curse! Everything was proceeding smoothly after many misfortunes and failures. Suddenly, a gust of wind—and the whole thing is shattered. I could hardly bring myself to believe it (as one refuses to believe the sudden loss of a dear one). Is it I, the fervent worshipper of Plekhanov, who am now filled with bitter thoughts about him? Is it I, with clenched teeth, and a devilish chill at the heart, hurling cold and bitter words at him in announcing what is almost our "breaking off of relations"? Perhaps it is only an ugly dream?

This impression clung to us even during our conversation with V. I. She did not reveal any strong emotion, but it was quite apparent that she was profoundly moved, and she tried to persuade us, almost pleaded with us, to abandon our intention, and to try to establish better relations with Plekhanov in the course of our work. It would not be so very difficult, after all, she pleaded, and being engaged in work the repellent features of his character would not be so apparent. . . . It was exceedingly touching to listen to the sincere pleadings of this woman, weak before Plekhanov, but absolutely sincere and passionately loyal to the cause. As Arsenyev expressed it, she bore the yoke of Plekhanovism with the "heroism of a slave." Indeed, so profoundly moved was I that at times I thought I would burst into tears. . . . Words of pity, despair, etc., easily move one to tears at a funeral. . . .

We left P. B. and V. I., dined, dispatched a letter to Germany to say we were coming and instructing them to *stop the apparatus;* we had even sent a telegram about this (*prior* to our conversation

with Plekhanov!!!), and neither of us doubted for a moment that we had done right.

After dinner, at the hour arranged, we again went to the house of P. B. and V. I., where we were to meet Plekhanov. As we approached, the three of them came out to meet us. We greeted each other in silence. Plekhanov tried to start a conversation about other things (we had asked P. B. and V. I. to warn him of our intention so that he knew all about it). We returned to the room and sat down. Arsenyev began to talk. Drily, briefly, and with restraint, he stated that we despaired of the possibility of working together in view of the relations which had revealed themselves the previous evening: that we had decided to return to Russia to consult with the comrades there, for we no longer dared to decide the matter ourselves and that we would have to abandon the idea of publishing the journal for the time being. Plekhanov was very calm and restrained, and apparently had complete command over himself; he did not betray a trace of the nervousness betrayed by Paul Borisovich and Vera Ivanovna (he has been in bigger battles than these, we thought to ourselves, gazing at him with malice and envy!) He enquired what it was all about. "We are in an atmosphere of ultimatums," replied Arsenyev, and expounded this idea at greater length. "Did you think that after the first number I would go on strike just as we were getting out the second number?" asked Plekhanov aggressively. He thought we would not dare to say a thing like that. But I, also keeping very cool, replied: "Is this very much different from what A. N. has said? That is what he said, is it not?" Plekhanov quite obviously *subsided* a little. He had not expected such a dry tone and direct accusation. "Well, you have decided to leave, what is there left then to talk about?" he said. "I have nothing to say, my position is a very curious one. All you do is to talk about impressions and nothing else. You have the impression that I am a bad man. I cannot help that."

"We may be to blame," I said, desiring to turn the conversation away from this "impossible" subject, "for our having rushed across in this headlong manner without first sounding the ford."

"Not at all," replied Plekhanov. "To speak quite frankly, you are to blame [perhaps Arsenyev's state of nervousness may have had something to do with it] for attaching too much importance to impressions to which no importance whatever should have been attached."

After a moment's silence we said: "Well, we can restrict ourselves to publishing pamphlets." Plekhanov angrily retorted: "I was not thinking about pamphlets at all. *Do not count upon me.* I shall not sit idle with folded arms if you go away. I may take up some other enterprise before you return."

Nothing so much degraded Plekhanov in my eyes as this statement when later on I recalled it, and turned it over in my mind. This was such a coarse threat and such a badly calculated attempt to scare us, that it simply "finished" Plekhanov as far as we were concerned and exposed his "policy" towards us, *i. e.*, he thought he could terrorise us. . . .

But we *absolutely ignored* this threat. I simply pressed my lips together as if to say, all right, *à la guerre comme à la guerre;* * but you must be a fool if you cannot see that we are no longer what we were last night.

Perceiving that his threats were ineffective, Plekhanov resorted to another manœuvre—for how else can it be described when a few minutes later he declared that a break with us would be tantamount to his complete abandonment of political activity? He would give up political work, and devote himself to science, he said, to purely scientific literature; for if he cannot work with us it shows that he could not work with anybody. . . . Having found that threats failed, he tried flattery! But coming as it did after *threats*, it could only produce a feeling of revulsion. . . . The conversation was very brief and nothing came of it. Perceiving this, Plekhanov changed the conversation to the cruelty of the Russians in China. Almost monopolising the conversation he kept on, repeating the same thing over and over again, and very soon we parted.

Our conversation with P. B. and V. I. after Plekhanov's departure was neither interesting nor relevant to the subject: P. B. wriggled and tried to prove that Plekhanov was also pained and that the sin would be on our heads if we went away like this, etc., etc.

In an intimate talk with Arsenyev, V. I. confessed that "George" was always like that. She confessed to her "slavish heroism," but admitted that our departure would "teach him a lesson."

We spent the rest of the evening in a state of idleness and depression.

Next day, Tuesday, August 28, we had decided to go to Geneva, and then to Germany. Early in the morning, I was awakened by

* In war you act as in war.—*Ed.*

Arsenyev (who usually rises late). I was surprised. He said that he had slept badly, and that he had thought of a last possible scheme by which the matter could be arranged somehow so that a serious party enterprise might not be ruined by spoiled *personal* relations. We will publish a collection. We have the material already arranged, and we have established contact with the printing house; let us publish this collection under the present undefined editorial relations, and see what happens later on; it will be just as easy to pass on to the publication of a journal as to the publication of pamphlets. If Plekhanov remains stubborn, then, the devil with him, we shall have the satisfaction of having done all we could. . . . This was the decision.

We went out to inform Paul Borisovich and Vera Ivanovna, and met them on the way; they were coming to see us. They, of course, readily agreed and P. B. undertook the task of negotiating with Plekhanov and of inducing him to agree.

We arrived at Geneva and had our *last interview* with Plekhanov. He adopted a tone as if to suggest that all that had happened was a sad misunderstanding due to irritability. He sympathetically enquired after Arsenyev's health, and almost embraced him—the latter almost recoiled in astonishment. Plekhanov agreed to the publication of a collection. We said that in regard to the arrangements for editing, three forms were possible, namely, (1) we to be the editors, and he a contributor; (2) all of us to be editors; and (3) he to be the editor, and we contributors. We were to discuss these three forms in Russia, draw up a plan, and bring it back with us. Plekhanov declared that he absolutely rejected the third proposal—that he insisted that this arrangement be absolutely excluded, and that he *agreed* to the *first two* proposals. We therefore decided that for the time being *until we submitted* our proposal for the new editorial régime, the old system was to remain in force, *i. e.*, the six of us to act as co-editors, Plekhanov to have two votes.

Plekhanov then expressed the desire to know precisely what it was we were dissatisfied with. I remarked that perhaps it would be better to pay attention to the future rather than to the past. But Plekhanov insisted that the question be gone into. A conversation started in which only Plekhanov and I took part—Arsenyev and P. B. remained silent. The conversation was carried on rather coolly, quite coolly. Plekhanov said that he had observed that Arsenyev was irritated by his refusal to work with Struve, and I

retorted that he, on the other hand, had put conditions, contrary to the statement he had previously made in the woods that he was not putting conditions. Plekhanov defended himself by saying that his silence did not imply that he was putting conditions, but that the matter was clear to him. I urged the necessity for permitting polemics and the necessity for voting among ourselves. Plekhanov agreed to the latter, but added that voting, of course, was permissible on secondary questions, but on fundamental questions it was impossible. I objected by saying that it would not always be easy to distinguish between fundamental and secondary questions, and that it was precisely in drawing such distinctions that we co-editors would have to take a vote. Plekhanov was stubborn. He said that this was a matter of conscience, that the distinction between fundamental and secondary questions was perfectly clear, and there would be no occasion for taking a vote. And so we got stuck on this debate as to whether voting should be permitted among the editors on the question of defining what were fundamental questions and what were secondary questions, and could make no progress. Plekhanov displayed his dexterity to the utmost; his examples, metaphors, his quips and jests, his citations were brilliant, and compelled us to laugh in spite of ourselves, and in this way he evaded the question without definitely saying "No." I became convinced that he positively could not concede the point; that he could not abandon his "individualism" and his "ultimatums"; that, if it came to the point, he would never agree to take a vote, but would present an ultimatum.

On that very day I departed without meeting any of the members of the Emancipation of Labour group again. We had agreed among ourselves not to relate what had passed to any one except our most intimate friends. We decided to keep up appearances and not give our opponents cause to triumph. On the surface everything appeared as if nothing had happened; the apparatus must continue to work as it worked before. But we felt an internal twinge—instead of friendly relations, dry, business-like relations prevailed, we were always to be on our guard, on the principle: *Si vis pacem, para bellum.**

It will be of interest, however, to mention a conversation I had that same evening with an intimate friend and adherent of Plekhanov's, a member of the Social-Democrat group. I did not mention a word to him about what had occurred. I told him that we

* If you desire peace, prepare for war.—*Ed.*

had arranged to publish a journal, that the articles had been decided on—it was time to set to work. I discussed with him the practical sides of how the work was to be arranged. He quite definitely expressed the opinion that the old ones were absolutely incapable of doing editorial work. I discussed with him the "three forms," and asked him indirectly which in his opinion was the best. Without hesitation, he answered—the first (we to be the editors, he the contributor), but in all probability, he thought, the journal would be Plekhanov's and the newspaper ours.

As this incident became more and more remote, we began to think of it more calmly, and became convinced that it was not at all reasonable to throw up the work, that we ought not to hesitate to undertake the editorship (of the *Collection*), and indeed that it was absolutely necessary for us to take it up, for there was absolutely no other way of compelling the apparatus to work properly, and of preventing the cause from being ruined by the disruptive "propensities" of Plekhanov.

By the time we arrived at N.[24] on September 4 or 5, we had already drawn up the plan of the *formal* relations that were to exist between us (I began to write it while we were on the train). According to the plan, we were to be the editors and they the contributors, with the right to vote on all editorial questions.[25] We had resolved to discuss this plan with Yegor (Martov), and then to submit it to them.

Hopes were *beginning to rise* that the spark would be rekindled.

Written abroad at the beginning of September, 1900.
First published in 1924 in the *Lenin Collection*, I.

DECLARATION BY THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ISKRA* [26]

In undertaking the publication of a political newspaper, *Iskra*, we consider it necessary to say a few words concerning our aims and our tasks.

We are at the present time passing through an extremely important period in the history of the Russian labour movement, and of Russian Social-Democracy. The past few years have been marked by an astonishingly rapid spread of Social-Democratic ideas among our intelligentsia, and meeting this tendency of public opinion is the independent movement of the industrial proletariat, which is beginning to unite and to fight against its oppressors, and is eagerly striving towards Socialism. Circles of workers and Social-Democratic intelligentsia are springing up everywhere; local agitation leaflets are beginning to appear, the demand for Social-Democratic literature is increasing, and is far outstripping the supply, while the intensified persecution by the government is powerless to restrain this movement. The prisons and the places of exile are filled to overflowing. Hardly a month goes by without our hearing of Socialists being "discovered" in all parts of Russia, of the capture of literature-carriers, and the confiscation of literature and printing presses—but the movement goes on and grows, spreads to wider regions, penetrates more and more deeply into the working class, and attracts increasing public attention to itself. The entire economic development of Russia, the history of the development of social ideas in Russia and of the Russian revolutionary movement serve as a guarantee that the Russian Social-Democratic labour movement will grow and surmount all the obstacles that confront it.

On the other hand, the principal feature of our movement, and one which has become particularly marked in recent times, is its state of disunity and its primitive character—if one may so express it. Local circles spring up and function independently of circles in other districts and—what is particularly important—of circles which have functioned and now function simultaneously in the same districts. Traditions are not established and continuity is not maintained; the local literature entirely reflects this disunity, and lacks contact with what Russian Social-Democracy has already created.

This state of disunity runs counter to the requirements called forth by the strength and breadth of the movement, and this, in our opinion, marks a critical moment in its history. In the movement itself the need is felt for consolidation and for definite form and organisation; yet active Social-Democrats do not by a long way yet realise the need for the movement's passing to a higher form. On the contrary, among wide circles there is manifested an ideological wavering, an absorption in the fashionable "criticism of Marxism" and "revisionism," * in spreading the views of the so-called Economist tendency, and what is inseparably connected with it the effort to keep the movement at its present low stage, an effort to push into the background the task of forming a revolutionary party to lead the struggle at the head of the whole people. It is a fact that such an ideological wavering is observed among Russian Social-Democrats, that narrow practical work is carried on without a theoretical conception of the movement as a whole and threatens to divert the movement to a false path. No one who has direct knowledge of the state of affairs in the majority of our organisations has any doubt whatever on that score. Moreover, literary productions exist which confirm this. It is sufficient to mention the *Credo* which has already evoked legitimate protest, the Special Supplement to *Rabochaya Mysl* (September, 1899), which brought out in such bold relief the tendency with which the *Rabochaya Mysl* is thoroughly imbued, and finally, the Manifesto of the St. Petersburg Self-Emancipation of the Working Class group,[27] drawn up in the spirit of Economism. The assertions made by *Rabocheye Dyelo* [*Worker's Cause* [28]] to the effect that the *Credo* merely represents the opinions of individuals, that the tendency represented by *Rabochaya Mysl* reflects merely the confusion of mind, and the tactlessness of its editors, and not a special tendency in the progress of the Russian labour movement, *are absolutely untrue.*

Simultaneously with this, the works of authors whom the reading public has with more or less reason regarded up till now as the

* An attack upon revolutionary or orthodox Marxism launched by Eduard Bernstein, veteran German Socialist in his *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie,* published in 1899 (English translation issued under the title *Evolutionary Socialism*). This tendency which claimed that the basic contentions by Marx were refuted by the actual development of capitalism and demanded a *revision* of fundamental Marxian principles was termed revisionism or Bernsteinism. Lenin treats Russian revisionism in detail in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done,* which will be found in Book II of this volume.—*Ed.*

prominent representatives of "legal" Marxism more and more reveal a turn towards views approaching those of bourgeois apologists. As a result of all this, we have the confusion and anarchy which enabled the ex-Marxist, or, to speak more correctly, the ex-Socialist, Bernstein, in recounting his successes, to declare unchallenged in the press that the majority of Social-Democrats active in Russia were his followers.

We do not desire to exaggerate the danger of the situation, but to shut our eyes to it would be immeasurably more harmful than exaggeration. That is why we welcome with all our heart the decision of the Emancipation of Labour group to resume its literary activity, and commence a systematic struggle against the attempts to corrupt and vulgarise Social-Democracy.

The practical conclusion to be drawn from all this is as follows: We Russian Social-Democrats must combine and direct all our efforts towards the formation of a strong party which must lead the struggle under the united banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is precisely the task that was outlined by the Congress in 1898 at which the Russian Social-Democratic Labour party was formed, and which published its Manifesto.

We regard ourselves as members of this party; we entirely agree with the fundamental ideas contained in the Manifesto, and attach extreme importance to it as a public declaration of its aims. Consequently, we, as members of the party, present the question as to what our immediate and direct tasks are, as follows: What plan of activity must we adopt in order to revive the party on the firmest possible basis?

The reply usually made to this question is that it is necessary to elect a central party institution once more and to instruct that body to resume the publication of the party organ. But, in the confused period through which we are now passing such a simple method is hardly adequate.

To establish and consolidate the party means to establish and consolidate unity among all Russian Social-Democrats, and, for the reasons indicated above, such unity cannot be brought about by simply giving orders; it cannot be brought about by, let us say, a meeting of representatives passing resolutions. Definite work must be done to bring it about. In the first place, it is necessary to bring about unity of ideas which will remove the differences of opinion and confusion that—we will be frank—reign among Russian Social-

Democrats at the present time. This unity of ideas must be fortified by a unified party programme. Secondly, an organisation must be set up especially for the purpose of maintaining contact among all the centres of the movement, for supplying complete and timely information about the movement and for supplying it regularly to the periodical press in all parts of Russia. Only when we have established such an organisation, only when we have established a Russian Socialist mailing system, will the party have a chance of permanent existence and only then will it become a real factor and consequently a mighty political force. To the first half of this task, *i. e.*, establishing a common literature, consistent in principle, and capable of ideologically uniting revolutionary Social-Democracy, we intend to devote our efforts, for we regard this to be one of the pressing tasks of the present-day movement and a necessary preliminary measure towards the resumption of party activity.

As we have said already, the intellectual unity of Russian Social-Democrats has still to be established, and in order to achieve this it is necessary, in our opinion, to have an open and thorough discussion of the fundamental principles and tactical questions raised by the present-day Economists, revisionists, and "critics." Before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all firmly and definitely draw the lines of demarcation between the various groups. Otherwise, our unity will be merely a fictitious unity, which will conceal the prevailing confusion and prevent its dispersion. Therefore, we do not intend to utilise our publication merely as a storehouse for various views. On the contrary, we shall conduct it along the lines of a strictly defined tendency. This tendency can be expressed by the word Marxism, and there is hardly need to add that we stand for the consistent development of the ideas of Marx and Engels, and utterly reject the half and half, vague and opportunistic emendations which have now become so fashionable as a result of the legerdemain of Ed. Bernstein, P. Struve and many others. But while discussing all questions from our own definite point of view, we shall give space in our columns to polemics between comrades. Open polemics within the sight and hearing of all Russian Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers are necessary and desirable, in order to explain the profound differences that exist, to obtain a comprehensive discussion of disputed questions, and to combat the extremes into which not only the representatives of various views, but also of various localities or

various "crafts" in the revolutionary movement inevitably fall. As has already been stated, we also regard one of the drawbacks of the present-day movement to be the absence of open polemics between avowedly differing views; an effort to conceal the differences that exist over extremely serious questions.

We will not enumerate in detail all the questions and themes included in the programme of our publication, for this programme automatically emerges from our conception of what a political newspaper, published under present conditions, should be.

We shall exert every effort to persuade every Russian comrade to regard our publication as his own, as one to which every group should communicate information concerning the movement, in which to relate their experiences, express their views, their literary requirements, their opinions concerning Social-Democratic publications, in fact to make it the medium through which they can make their contribution to the movement and receive what the movement can give them. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a genuine All-Russian organ of Social-Democracy. Only such an organ will be capable of leading the movement onto the high road of the political struggle. "Push out the framework and broaden the content of our propaganda, agitational and organisational activity"—these words uttered by P. B. Axelrod must serve as our slogan defining the activities of Russian Social-Democrats in the immediate future, and we adopt this slogan in the programme of our organ.

We appeal not only to Socialists and class-conscious workers; we also call upon all those who are oppressed by the present political system. We place the columns of our publication at their disposal in order that they may expose all the abominations of the Russian autocracy.

Those who regard Social-Democracy as an organisation serving exclusively the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat may remain satisfied with merely local agitation and "pure and simple" labour literature. We do not regard Social-Democracy in this way; we regard it as a revolutionary party, inseparably linked up with the labour movement and directed against absolutism. Only when organised in such a party will the proletariat—the most revolutionary class in modern Russia—be in a position to fulfil the historical task that confronts it, namely, to unite under its banner all the democratic elements in the country and to crown the stubborn fight con-

ducted by fallen generations with the final triumph over the hated régime.

The size of the newspaper will range from one to two printed signatures.* In view of the conditions under which the Russian underground press has to work, there will be no regular date of publication.

We have been promised contributions by a number of prominent representatives of international Social-Democracy, the close co-operation of the Emancipation of Labour group (G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich), the support of several organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and also of separate groups of Russian Social-Democrats.

* In referring to printed matter (books, pamphlets, magazines, etc.), Russians always calculate on the basis of sixteen-page signatures, not printed pages.—*Ed.*

Written September, 1900.
First published by *Iskra,* as a separate leaflet, October, 1900.

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *MAY DAYS IN KHARKOV* [29]

THE present pamphlet contains a description of the celebrated May Day demonstrations in Kharkov in 1900, drawn up by the Kharkov Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the basis of reports sent in by the workers themselves. It was sent to us as correspondence, but we consider it necessary to publish it as a separate pamphlet because of its bulk, and also because in this way it will be possible to secure wider distribution. In another six months, the Russian workers will celebrate the first of May of the first year of the new century, and it is time we set to work to make the arrangements for organising the celebrations in as large a number of centres as possible, and on as imposing a scale as possible, not only by the number that will take part in them, but also by their organised character, by the class-consciousness they will reveal, by the determination that will be shown to commence the irrepressible struggle for the political liberation of the Russian people, and, consequently, for a free opportunity for the class development of the proletariat and its open struggle for Socialism. It is time to prepare for the forthcoming May Day celebrations, and one of the most important measures in this work of preparation must be to get acquainted with what the Social-Democratic movement in Russia has already achieved, to examine the shortcomings of our movement in general and of the May Day movement in particular, to devise means for removing these shortcomings and obtaining better results.

The Kharkov May Day celebrations illustrate how the celebration of a labour holiday can become a great political demonstration and they reveal what it is we lack to make these celebrations a really great All-Russian demonstration of the class-conscious proletariat. What made the May Day celebrations in Kharkov an event of outstanding importance? The mass participation of the workers in the strike, the huge mass meetings in the streets, the unfurling of red flags, the presentation of demands indicated in leaflets and the revolutionary character of these demands—eight-hour day and political liberty. The legend that the Russian workers have not sufficiently grown up for the political struggle, that their principal

duty is to conduct the purely economic struggle, and only slowly and very gradually supplement it by partial political agitation, for partial political reforms; that they must not take up the struggle against the whole of the political system of Russia—that legend has been totally refuted by the Kharkov May Day celebrations. But we desire to draw attention to another aspect of the matter. Although the May Day celebrations in Kharkov have once more demonstrated the political capacities of the Russian workers, they have revealed at the same time what we lack for the complete development of these capacities.

The Kharkov Social-Democrats tried to prepare beforehand for the May Day celebrations by distributing pamphlets and leaflets, and the workers drew up a preliminary plan of the general demonstration and of the speeches that were to be delivered in the Konnaya Square. Why did this plan break down? The Kharkov comrades say because the forces of the "general staff" of the class-conscious Socialist workers were not evenly distributed; there was an abundance in one factory and a lack of them in another; because the workers' plan "was known to the authorities," who, of course, took measures to divide the workers. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: we lacked *organisation*. The masses of the workers were roused and ready to follow the Socialist leaders; but the "general staff" failed to organise a strong nucleus able to distribute properly all the available forces of the class-conscious workers, maintain proper secrecy, *i. e.*, to arrange things in such a way that the plan drawn up beforehand should be kept secret, not only from the authorities, but from all those outside the organisation. That organisation must be a *revolutionary* organisation. It must be composed of men and women who clearly understand the tasks of the Social-Democratic labour movement, and who have absolutely resolved to take up the determined struggle against the present political system. This organisation must combine within itself the Socialist knowledge and revolutionary experience which has been acquired from the activities carried on for decades by the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia and the knowledge of working-class environment and ability to agitate among and lead the masses which is characteristic of the advanced worker. Above all we must avoid drawing an artificial distinction between the intellectual and the worker; we must not form a "purely labour" organisation, but strive to unite the

workers with the intellectuals. To illustrate our point we quote the following words expressed by G. Plekhanov:

> A necessary condition for this activity (agitation) is the consolidation of the already existing revolutionary forces. Circle propaganda can be conducted by men and women who have no mutual contact with each other whatever, and who do not even suspect each other's existence. Of course, the lack of organisation always affects propaganda, but it does not make it impossible. However, in a period of great social excitement, when the political atmosphere is charged with electricity, when now here and now there, on the most varied and unforeseen pretexts, outbreaks occur with increasing frequency, heralding the approaching revolutionary storm—in a word, when it is necessary either to agitate or remain in the rear, at such a time *only organised* revolutionary forces can seriously influence the progress of events. Individuals then become impotent; the revolutionary cause can then be carried forward only on the shoulders of units of a higher order: *Revolutionary organisation.* [G. Plekhanov, *The Tasks of Socialists in the Fight Against Famine*, p. 83.]

Precisely such a period is approaching in the history of the Russian labour movement, a period of excitement and outbreaks on the most varied pretexts, and if we do not wish to remain "in the rear," we must direct all our efforts towards establishing an All-Russian organisation, capable of directing all the separate outbreaks and in this way causing the approaching storm (to which the Kharkov workers also refer at the end of the pamphlet) to become, not an elemental outburst, but a conscious movement of the proletariat, taking the lead of the whole people against the autocratic government.

In addition to demonstrating the lack of sufficient compactness and preparedness of our revolutionary organisations, the Kharkov May Day celebrations also point to another and no less important practical matter. "The first of May festival and demonstration," we read in the pamphlet, "was unexpectedly linked up with various practical demands which were presented without proper preparation and which consequently were doomed to failure." Take, for example, the demands put forward by the workers employed in the railway workshops. Of the fourteen demands put forward, eleven represent demands for minor improvements, which can quite easily be obtained even under the present political system, as for example increased wages, reduction of hours, removal of abuses. Included among these demands, as if identical with them, are three other demands as follows:

4. Introduction of an eight-hour day; 7. Guarantee against victimisation of the workers in connection with the May Day events;

10. The establishment of a joint committee of workers and employers to settle all disputes between the two.

The first of these demands (Point 4) is the general demand put forward by the proletariat in all countries. This fact that this demand was put forward indicates that the advanced workers, of Kharkov realise their solidarity with the international Socialist labour movement. But precisely for this reason a demand like this should not have been included among minor demands like better treatment by foremen, or a ten per cent increase in wages. Demands for wage increases and better treatment can be and ought to be presented by the workers to their employers in each separate trade, for these are trade demands, put forward by separate categories of workers. The demand for an eight-hour day, however, is the demand of the whole proletariat, presented, not to individual employers, but to the government as the representative of the whole of the present-day social and political system, to the capitalist class as a whole, the owners of all the means of production. The demand for an eight-hour day has assumed special significance. It is a declaration of solidarity with the international Socialist movement. We must make the workers understand this difference, and prevent them from reducing it to the level of demands like free tickets, or the dismissal of watchmen. Throughout the year the workers, first in one place and then in another, continuously present a variety of partial demands to their employers and fight for these demands. In assisting the workers in this fight, Socialists must always explain the connection it has with the proletarian struggle for emancipation in all countries. But the first of May must be the day on which the workers solemnly declare that they realise this connection and resolutely join in the struggle.

Take the tenth demand calling for the establishment of a committee for the settlement of disputes. Such a committee composed of representatives of the workers and employers may, of course, be very useful, but only if the elections are absolutely free and the elected representatives enjoy complete freedom. What would be the use of such a committee, if the workers who oppose the election of the nominees of the management, who sharply criticise the management and expose their tyranny, are discharged? Such workers would be not only discharged, but arrested. Consequently, in order that such a committee may be of any use to the workers, the delegates must be absolutely independent of the factory management.

This can be the case only when free labour unions, embracing many factories having their own funds, and prepared to protect their delegates, are formed. Such a committee can be useful only in the event of many factories, and if possible all the factories in the given trade, being organised. Secondly, it is necessary to secure guarantees for the personal safety of the delegates, *i. e.*, that they will not be arrested by the police or the gendarmerie. This demand was put forward: 7. Guarantee of the inviolability of the person of the workers. But from whom can the workers demand guarantees for the inviolability of the person and the freedom of the labour unions (which, as we have seen, are necessary for the success of the committee)? Only from the state, because the absence of inviolability of the person and freedom of labour unions is due to the character of the fundamental laws of the Russian state. More than that: It is due to the very form of government in Russia. The form of government in Russia is that of an absolute monarchy. The Tsar is an autocrat. He alone passes laws and appoints the higher officials, while the people and the people's representatives have no say in the matter at all. Under such a system of government, there can be no inviolability of the person; citizens' associations, and particularly working-class associations cannot be free. For that reason, to demand guarantees of the inviolability of the person (and freedom of association) from an autocratic state is useless; for such demands are tantamount to demanding political rights for the people, and autocratic government is called autocratic precisely for the reason that it implies that the people are deprived of political rights. It will be possible to obtain guarantees for the inviolability of the person (and freedom of association) only when *representatives of the people* will take part in the passing of laws and in the whole administration of the state. Even if the autocratic government does make certain petty concessions, it will always nullify them by some means or other, unless a body of people's representatives exists to check it. The May Day celebrations in Kharkov proved this again and again. The governor conceded to the demands of the masses of the workers, and released the workers who had been arrested. But within a day or two, receiving an order from St. Petersburg, he again arrested scores of workers. The provincial and factory officials "guarantee" immunity for delegates, while the gendarmes seize them and fling them into jail in solitary confinement or

banish them from the city. Of what use are such guarantees to the people?

Hence, the workers must demand from the Tsar the convocation of an assembly of the representatives of the people, the convocation of a national assembly. The manifestoes distributed in Kharkov on the eve of May 1 this year contained this demand, and we observe that a section of the advanced workers fully appreciated its significance.[30] We must make *all* the advanced workers understand clearly the necessity for this demand, set them to spread it not only among the masses of the workers, but among all strata of the people who come into contact with the workers, who eagerly desire to know what the Socialists and the "city" workers are fighting for. A factory inspector once asked a group of workers what they wanted, and only one solitary voice was heard to say "a constitution," and this voice sounded so isolated that the correspondent communicating this writes humourously: "One proletarian *blurted out. . . .*" Another correspondent writes, "Under the circumstances," this reply was "semi-comical" [see *Labour Movement in Kharkov*, Report of the Kharkov Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, Geneva, September, 1900, p. 14]. As a matter of fact, there was nothing comical in the reply at all. What may have seemed comical was the disproportion between this lone voice demanding a change in the whole state system and the demands for a reduction of half an hour in the working day and for payment of wages during working hours. There is, however, an indubitable connection between these latter demands and the demand for a constitution, and if we can get the masses to understand this (and we shall undoubtedly do so), then the cry "constitution!" will not come merely from one solitary voice, but from the throats of thousands and hundreds of thousands, and then it will not be comical, but challenging. It is related that a certain person driving through the streets of Kharkov during the May Day celebrations asked the droshky driver what the workers wanted, and the driver replied: "They want an eight-hour day and their own newspaper." That droshky driver understood that the workers were no longer satisfied with mere doles, but that they want to be free men, that they want to be able freely and openly to express and fight for their needs. But that reply did not yet reveal the consciousness that the workers are fighting for the liberty of the whole people and for their right to take part in the government of the

state. When the demand that the Tsar convene an assembly of people's representatives is repeated with complete consciousness and indomitable determination by the masses of the workers in all the industrial cities and factory districts in Russia, when the workers have reached the stage when the whole of the urban population, and all those rural people who come into contact with the towns, understand what the Socialists want and what the workers are fighting for, then the great day of the liberation of the people from the tyrannical autocracy will not be far distant.

Written in the first half of November, 1900.
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ARTICLES FROM THE *ISKRA* AND THE *ZARYA*

1900-1901

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЪ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ

ИСКРА

„Изъ искры возгорится пламя!"...
Отвѣтъ декабристовъ Пушкину.

№ 1. (ЦКЦП 6) ДЕКАБРЬ 1900 ГОДА. № 1.

СЪЕЗДЪ И ЗАДАЧИ НАШЕГО ДВИЖЕНІЯ.

Россія соціалъ-демократія не разъ уже заявляла, что ближайшей политической задачей русской рабочей партіи должно быть непримиримое завоеваніе политической свободы. Это заявленіе больше-в... ... ...

THE URGENT TASKS OF OUR MOVEMENT [31]

Russian Social-Democracy has more than once declared that the immediate political tasks of a Russian labour party should be to overthrow the autocracy and to secure political liberty. This was declared more than fifteen years ago by the representatives of Russian Social-Democracy—the members of the Emancipation of Labour group. It was declared two and a half years ago by the representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic organisations, which in the spring of 1898 founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

In spite of repeated declarations, however, the question of the political tasks of Social-Democracy in Russia is now coming again to the fore. Many representatives of our movement express doubt as to the efficacy of the above-mentioned solution of the question. It is claimed that the economic struggle is of predominant importance; the political tasks of the proletariat are placed in the background, narrowed down, and restricted. It is even stated that the talk about forming an independent labour party in Russia is merely an imitation of others, that the workers ought to conduct only the economic struggle and leave politics to the intelligentsia and the liberals.

The latest confession of faith (the notorious *Credo*) recently published amounts practically to a declaration that the Russian proletariat is still an infant, and to a complete rejection of the Social-Democratic programme. *Rabochaya Mysl* (more particularly in its Special Supplement) takes practically the same attitude. Russian Social-Democracy is passing through a period of vacillation and doubt which amounts to self-negation. On the one hand, the labour movement is being torn away from Socialism, the workers are being helped to carry on the economic struggle, but nothing is done to explain to them the Socialist aims and the political tasks of the movement as a whole. On the other hand, Socialism is being torn away from the labour movement; Russian Socialists once again are beginning to talk more and more about the fight against the government having to be carried on entirely by the intelligentsia, be-

cause the workers are confining themselves only to the economic struggle.

In our opinion, three circumstances have prepared the ground for this sad state of affairs. First, in the beginning of their activity, Russian Social-Democrats restricted themselves merely to work in propaganda circles. When we took up work of agitation among the masses we were not always able to restrain ourselves from going to the other extreme. Second, in the beginning of our activity we often had to fight for our right of existence against the *Narodovoltsi*,[32] who by "politics" understood activity isolated from the labour movement and who reduced politics exclusively to the struggle through conspiracies. In rejecting this sort of politics, the Social-Democrats went to the extreme of shoving politics entirely into the background. Thirdly, in working isolatedly, in small, local, workers' circles, the Social-Democrats did not devote sufficient attention to organising a revolutionary party which would combine all the activities of the local groups and make it possible to organise the revolutionary work on proper lines. The predominance of isolated work is naturally connected with the predominance of the economic struggle.

The above-mentioned circumstances caused all attention to be concentrated upon one side of the movement only. The Economist tendency (that is, if we can speak of it as a "tendency") has attempted to elevate this one-sidedness to a theory, and has tried to utilise for this purpose the now fashionable revisionism, and "criticism of Marxism," which is introducing old bourgeois ideas under a new flag. These attempts alone have given rise to the danger of weakening the connection between the Russian labour movement and Russian Social-Democracy, which is the vanguard in the struggle for political liberty. The immediate task of our movement is to strengthen this connection.

Social-Democracy is a combination of the labour movement with Socialism. Its task is not passively to serve the labour movement at each of its separate stages, but to represent the interests of the movement as a whole, to point out to this movement its ultimate aims and its political task, and to protect its political and ideological independence. Isolated from Social-Democracy, the labour movement becomes petty and inevitably becomes bourgeois: In conducting only the economic struggle, the working class loses its political independence; it becomes the tail of other parties and

runs counter to the great slogan: "The emancipation of the workers must be the task of the workers themselves."

In every country there has been a period in which the labour movement existed separately from the Socialist movement, each going its own road; and in every country this state of affairs weakened both the Socialist movement and the labour movement. Only the combination of Socialism with the labour movement in each country created a durable basis for both the one and the other. But in every country this combination of Socialism with the labour movement took place historically, was brought about in different ways, in accordance with the particular conditions prevailing at the time in each country. In Russia, the necessity for combining Socialism with the labour movement has been proclaimed in theory long ago but it is only now being carried into practice. The process of combining the two movements is an extremely difficult one, and there is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that it is accompanied by vacillations and doubts.

What lesson can be learned from the past?

The whole history of Russian Socialism has so brought it about that the most urgent task of the day is to fight against the autocratic government and for political liberty. Our Socialist movement became crystallised, so to speak, in the process of the struggle against the autocracy. On the other hand, history has shown that the isolation of Socialist thought from the vanguard of the working classes is greater in Russia than in other countries, and that if this state of affairs continues, the revolutionary movement in Russia is doomed to impotence.

From this automatically emerges the task which the Russian Social-Democracy is destined to fulfil: To imbue the masses of the proletariat with the ideas of Socialism and political consciousness, and to organise a revolutionary party closely connected with the spontaneous labour movement. Russian Social-Democracy has already done much in this direction, but much more still remains to be done. With the growth of the movement, the field of activity for Social-Democrats will become much wider; the work will become more varied, an increasing number of party workers will concentrate their efforts upon the fulfilment of various special tasks which the daily needs of propaganda and agitation bring to the front. This fact is absolutely legitimate and inevitable, but efforts must be exerted to prevent these special activities and special

methods in the struggle from becoming ends in themselves and to prevent preparatory work from being regarded as the main work, to the exclusion of all other activity.

To facilitate the political development and the political organisation of the working class is our principal and fundamental task. Those who push this task into the background, who refuse to subordinate to it all the special tasks and methods of the struggle, are straying on to the wrong path and cause serious harm to the movement. And it is precisely those who call revolutionaries to the struggle against the government through the medium of circles of conspirators isolated from the labour movement, those who restrict the content and scope of political propaganda, agitation and organisation, who think the workers ought to be treated to politics only in exceptional moments of their lives, only on festive occasions, those who so sedulously substitute for the political struggle against the autocracy, demands for partial concessions from the autocracy, and are little concerned with raising the demand for separate concessions into a systematic and determined struggle of the revolutionary party against the autocracy—it is those who push this fundamental task into the background.

"Organise!", is the appeal to the workers by the *Rabochaya Mysl*, and this appeal is set to various tunes and taken up by all the adherents of the Economist tendency. We, of course, wholly endorse this appeal but we unconditionally add to it: Organise, not only in benefit societies, strike funds and workers' circles, but organise also in a political party, organise for the determined struggle against the autocratic government and against the whole of capitalist society. Unless the proletariat organises in this way, it will never rise to the heights of the class-conscious struggle; unless the workers organise in this way, the labour movement is doomed to impotence. Merely with the aid of funds and circles and benefit societies, the working class will never be able to fulfil its great historic mission: To emancipate itself and the whole of the Russian people from political and economic slavery.

Not a single class in history achieved power without producing its political leaders, its prominent representatives able to organise a movement and lead it. And the Russian working class has already shown that it can produce such men. The struggle which has developed so widely during the past five or six years has revealed the great potential revolutionary power of the working

class; it has shown that the most ruthless government persecution does not diminish, but on the contrary, increases the number of workers who strive towards Socialism, towards political consciousness and towards the political struggle.

The congress which our comrades held in 1898 quite correctly defined our tasks and did not merely repeat other people's words, did not express merely the "enthusiasm" of the intelligentsia. We must set to work resolutely to fulfil these tasks, and discuss the question of defining the programme, organisation and tactics of the party. We have already explained our views on the fundamental postulates of our programme and, of course, this is not the place to develop them in detail. We propose to devote a series of articles in ensuing numbers to questions of organisation. This is one of the most serious questions that confront us. In this respect, we lag considerably behind the old workers in the Russian revolutionary movement. We must frankly admit this defect, and exert all our efforts to devise methods of greater secrecy in our work, to conduct systematic propaganda in favour of proper methods of conducting the work, proper methods of deceiving the gendarmes and of avoiding the snares of the police.

We must train people who shall devote to the revolution not only their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives; we must build up an organisation so large as to be able to introduce division of labour in the various forms of our work. Finally, with regard to the question of tactics we intend to confine ourselves here to the following: Social-Democracy does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some preconceived plan or method of political struggle: It recognises all methods of struggle, as long as they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the party and facilitate the achievement of the best results possible under the given conditions.

If we have a strongly organised party, a single strike may grow into a political demonstration, into a political victory over the government. If we have a strongly organised party, a rebellion in a single locality may flare up into a victorious revolution. We must bear in mind that the fight against the government for certain demands, the gain of certain concessions are merely slight skirmishes with the enemy, slight skirmishes of outposts, but that the decisive battle still lies ahead.

Before us, in all its strength, towers the fortress of the enemy

from which a hail of shells and bullets pours down upon us, mowing down our best warriors. We must capture this fortress, and we shall capture it if we combine all the forces of the awakening proletariat with all the forces of the Russian revolutionaries into a single party embracing all that is virile and honest in Russia. Only then will be fulfilled the prophecy of the great Russian worker-revolutionary, Peter Alexeyev: "The muscular arms of millions of workers will be raised, and the yoke of despotism, that is now guarded by soldiers' bayonets, will be smashed to atoms!" [33]

Iskra, No. 1, December, 1900.

THE CHINESE WAR

Russia is bringing her war with China to a close. A great number of military areas have been mobilised. Hundreds of millions of rubles have been spent. Tens of thousands of troops have been dispatched to China. A number of battles have been fought, a number of victories have been won, true, not so much over regular enemy troops, as over Chinese insurgents and, particularly, over the peaceful, unarmed, Chinese populace, who were drowned and killed. Even women and children were done to death, and palaces, homes and shops were looted. The Russian Government, together with the servile press, is celebrating a victory, and rejoicing over the fresh exploits of the gallant militarists. They are rejoicing at the victory of European culture over Chinese barbarism and over the fresh successes of Russia's "mission of civilisation" in the Far East.

But the voices of the class-conscious workers, of the advanced representatives of the many millions of the working people are not heard amid this rejoicing. And yet, it is the working people who bear the brunt of these victorious campaigns. It is the workers who are sent to the other end of the world. They have to provide in increased taxes the millions that are spent. Let us, therefore, examine the question as to what attitude the Socialists should adopt towards this war. In whose interest is it being fought? What is the real nature of the policy now being pursued by the Russian Government?

Our government asserts first of all that it is not waging war against China, that it is merely suppressing a rebellion, subduing rebels, that it is helping the lawful government of China to re-establish law and order. True, war has not been declared, but this does not alter the situation a bit, because war is actually being waged. What was the cause of the Chinese attack upon the Europeans? What was the cause of the rebellion which the British, French, Germans, Russians, Japanese, etc., are so eager to crush? "The hatred of the yellow race towards the white race"; "the Chinese hatred for European culture and civilisation," is the reply of those who support the war. Yes! It is true the Chinese hate

the Europeans, but which Europeans do they hate, and why? The Chinese do not hate the European people, they have never had any quarrel with them. They hate the European capitalists and the European governments which are obedient to the capitalists. How can the Chinese refrain from hating those who came to China solely for the sake of gain; who have utilised their boasted civilisation solely for the purpose of deception, plunder and violence; who have waged war against China in order to win the right to trade in opium with which to drug the people (the wars of England and France with China in 1856); and those who hypocritically conduct their policy of plunder under the guise of spreading Christianity? The bourgeois governments of Europe have long been conducting this policy of plunder in China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian Government. This policy of plunder has become known as colonial policy. Every country in which capitalist industry is rapidly developing has to seek colonies, *i. e.*, countries in which industry is weakly developed, in which more or less patriarchal conditions still prevail, which can serve as a market for manufactured goods and a source of high profits. In the interests of a handful of capitalists, the bourgeois governments have waged endless wars, have kept regiments of soldiers in torment in unhealthy tropical countries, have squandered millions of money extracted from the people, and have brought the people in the colonies to a state of desperate revolt or to death from starvation. Recall the rebellion of the native peoples against the British in India, and the famine that prevailed there, and also the war Britain is at present waging against the Boers.*

And now the European capitalists have placed their greedy paws upon China, and almost the first to do so was the Russian Government, which now so loudly proclaims its "disinterestedness." It "disinterestedly" took Port Arthur from China and began to build a railway to Manchuria under the protection of Russian troops. One after another the European governments began zealously to loot, or as they put it, to "lease" Chinese territory so that the rumours about the partitioning of China do not come as a surprise. If we desire to call things by their proper names, we must say that

* Reference is here made to the suppression of the two independent republics of Dutch settlers, Transvaal and Orange Free State, during the war upon the Boers in 1899-1902 and their annexation by the British imperialist government.—*Ed.*

the European governments (the Russian Government perhaps more than any other) have already started to partition China; but they have started on this partitioning not openly, but stealthily, like thieves. They began to rob China as ghouls rob corpses, and when the seeming corpse attempted to resist, they flung themselves upon him like savage beasts; they burned down whole villages, shot, bayoneted and drowned in the Amur River unarmed inhabitants, their wives and children. And all these Christian exploits are accompanied by howls against the Chinese barbarians who dared to raise their hands against the civilised Europeans. The occupation of Newchang and the Russian troops crossing the frontier into Manchuria are temporary measures, declares the autocratic Russian Government in its note to the Powers of August 12, 1900; these measures "are exclusively called forth by the necessity to repel the aggressive operations of Chinese rebels"; "they cannot in the least be regarded as evidence of any selfish plans, which are totally alien to the policy of the Imperial Government."

Poor Imperial Government! So Christianly unselfish, and yet so unjustly suspected! Several years ago it unselfishly seized Port Arthur and now it is unselfishly seizing Manchuria. It has unselfishly flooded the frontier between China and Russia with hordes of contractors, engineers and officers who, by their conduct, have roused even the Chinese, whose patience is notorious, to indignation. On the construction of the Chinese railway, the Chinese workers are paid ten kopecks a day—is not Russia proving how unselfish she is?

Why is our government conducting such a senseless policy in China? For whose benefit? For the benefit of a handful of capitalist magnates who carry on trade with China, for a handful of factory owners who manufacture goods for the Asiatic market, for a handful of contractors who are now earning piles of money on urgent war orders (a number of factories producing war equipment, supplies for the troops, etc., are now working at full capacity, and are engaging hundreds of new workers). This policy is being conducted in the interests of a handful of nobles who occupy high posts in the civil and military services. These insist on the government pursuing adventurous policies because it opens up for them opportunities for promotion, for making a career and gaining fame by their "exploits." In the interests of this handful of capitalists and bureaucratic swindlers, our government unhesitatingly

sacrifices the interests of the whole of the people. And in this case, as always, the autocratic tsarist government proves to be a government of irresponsible bureaucrats servilely cringing before the capitalist magnates and nobles.

What benefit does the Russian working class and the toilers generally obtain from the conquests in China? Thousands of ruined families whose breadwinners have been torn from them by the war, an enormous increase in the national debt and national expenditure, increased taxes, increased power of the capitalists, the exploiters of the workers, worse conditions for the workers, still greater mortality among the peasantry, famine in Siberia—this is what the Chinese war promises and is already bringing. The whole of the Russian press, all the newspapers and periodicals, are kept in a state of bondage, they dare not print anything without the permission of the government officials—and that is why we lack exact information as to what the Chinese war is costing the people, but there is no doubt about the fact that it requires the expenditure of *many hundreds of millions of rubles*. Information has been received that the government at one stroke, by an unpublished decree, granted one hundred and fifty million rubles for the purpose of conducting the war. In addition to this, the current expenditure on the war absorbs *one million rubles* every three or four days, and this money is being squandered by a government that steadily cuts down the grants in aid of the famine-stricken peasantry, and haggles over every kopeck; that can find no money for the people's education; that, like any kulak,* sweats the workers in the state factories, sweats the lower employees in the civil service, the post office, etc.!

The Minister of Finance, Witte, declared that on January 1, 1900, there were two hundred and fifty million rubles available in the treasury. Now this money is gone, it has been spent on the war. The government is seeking loans, is increasing taxes, is refusing necessary expenditures because of the lack of money. It is puttting a stop to the building of railways. The tsarist government is threatened with bankruptcy, and yet it is plunging into a policy of conquest—a policy which not only demands the expenditure of enormous sums of money, but threatens to plunge us into a still more dangerous war. The European states which have flung them-

* Literally meaning a fist—a well-to-do peasant who has enriched himself through the exploitation of the poor peasants in the village.—*Ed.*

selves upon China are already beginning to quarrel over the loot, and no one can say how this quarrel will end.

But the policy of the tsarist government in China is not only a mockery of the interests of the people—its aim is to corrupt the political consciousness of the masses of the people. Governments which maintain themselves in power only by means of the bayonet, which have constantly to restrain or suppress popular indignation, have long ago realised the truism that popular discontent can never be removed and that it is necessary to divert the discontent from the government to some other object. For example, hostility is aroused against Jews. The gutter press carries on Jew-baiting campaigns, as if the Jewish workers do not suffer in exactly the same way as the Russian workers from the oppression of capitalism and the police government. At the present time, the press is conducting a campaign against the Chinese; howls are raised against the savage yellow race and its hostility towards civilisation; the newspapers are full of laudatory articles on Russia's task of enlightenment, and of glowing descriptions of the enthusiasm with which the Russian soldiers go into battle, etc., etc. The reptile journalists, crawling on their bellies before the government and the money-bags, strain every nerve to rouse the hatred of the people against China. But the Chinese people have never in any way offended the Russian people. The Chinese people suffer from the same evils as those from which the Russian people suffer—they suffer from evils ranging from an Asiatic despotism, which squeezes taxes from the starving peasantry and which suppresses every aspiration towards liberty by military force, to the oppression of capitalism, which has penetrated into the celestial kingdom.

The Russian working class is beginning to emerge from the state of political suppression and ignorance in which the masses of the people are still submerged. Hence, the duty of all class-conscious workers is to rise with all their might against those who are stirring up national hatred and diverting the attention of the working people from their real enemies. The policy of the tsarist government in China is a criminal policy which is impoverishing, corrupting and oppressing the people more than ever. The tsarist government not only keeps our people in slavery but also sends them to subdue other peoples who rebel against their slavery (as was the case in 1849 when Russian troops suppressed the revolution in Hungary). It not only helps the Russian capitalists to exploit the Russian

workers, and binds the hands of the workers in order that they might not combine and defend themselves, but it also sends soldiers to plunder other peoples in the interests of a handful of rich men and nobles. There is only one way by which the new burden that the war is thrusting upon the working people can be removed and that is by convening an assembly of representatives of the people, which would put an end to the autocracy of the government, and compel it to have regard for the interests of others besides a gang of courtiers.

Iskra, No. 1, December, 1900.

THE SPLIT IN THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD [34]

In the spring of this year, a congress of the members of the League of Russian Social-Democrats took place in Switzerland which resulted in a split. The minority led by the Emancipation of Labour group, which founded the League, and which up to the autumn of 1898 edited the publications of the League, formed a separate organisation under the name of the Russian Revolutionary Organisation "Social-Democrat." The majority, including the editorial board of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*, continues to bear the name of the League. The congress of Russian Social-Democrats, which took place in the spring of 1898 and from which the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was formed, recognised the League as the representative of our party abroad. What must be our attitude on the question of representation, now that the split has taken place in this League? We shall not go into detail concerning the causes of the split; we shall observe merely that the severe accusation that has been spread, that Plekhanov seized the League's printing press is not true. In reality, the manager of the printing press had only refused to turn it over entirely to one part of the split League, and thereupon both parties soon divided the printing establishment between them. The most important thing from our point of view is the fact that the *Rabocheye Dyelo* was in the wrong in this controversy; it erroneously denied the existence of an Economist tendency; it advocated the wrong tactics of ignoring the extreme character of this tendency and of refraining from combating it openly.

For this reason, while not denying the service which *Rabocheye Dyelo* has rendered in publishing literature and organising its distribution, we refuse to recognise either section of the split organisation as the foreign representative of our party. This question must remain an open one until our next party congress. The official representatives of Russian Social-Democracy abroad at the present time are the Russian members of the permanent international committee set up in Paris by the International Socialist Congress in the autumn of this year.[35] Russia has two representatives on this committee: G. V. Plekhanov and B. Krichevsky (one of the editors of

the *Rabocheye Dyelo*). Until the two factions of Russian Social-Democracy become reconciled or come to an agreement, we intend to conduct all our business in connection with the representation of Russia with G. V. Plekhanov. Finally, we must express our opinion on the question as to whom we would desire to see as the Russian secretary of the permanent International Committee. At the present time, when under the cloak of the "criticism of Marxism," attempts are being made to corrupt Social-Democracy by bourgeois ideology, and by a meek and mild policy towards an enemy armed from head to foot (the bourgeois governments), it is especially necessary to have at this post a man able to stand against the tide and to put in an influential word against ideological wavering. For this reason, as well as for those already stated above, we cast our vote for G. V. Plekhanov.

Iskra, No. 1, December, 1900.

NOTE WRITTEN ON DECEMBER 29, 1900 [36]

29—XII—1900. Sunday, 2 A.M.

I WANT to write down my impressions of the conversation I had to-day with the "twin." [37] It was a remarkable and "historic" gathering; at all events it was a notable one in the history of my life (Arsenyev, Velika,[38] the twin, W.,[39] and myself). At this gathering were summed up, if not an epoch, at least a whole stage of life, determining our conduct and our path of life for a long period ahead.

As the case was first stated by Arsenyev, I understood that the twin was going toward us, and wished to take the first steps. However, the very opposite turned out to be the case. In all probability this strange error originated from the fact that Arsenyev keenly desired the very thing that the twin was "tempting" us with, *viz.*, political material, correspondence, etc. "The wish is father to the thought." Arsenyev believed in the possibility of the thing with which the twin tempted him. He wished to believe in the sincerity of the twin, and in the possibility of a decent *modus vivendi* * with him.

And this very meeting utterly and irrevocably destroyed this belief. The twin revealed himself in a totally new aspect, as a "politician" of the purest water, a politician in the worst sense of the word, a sharper and a brazen huckster. He arrived *completely convinced of our impotence*, as Arsenyev himself summed up the results of our negotiations, and this summing up was absolutely correct. Convinced of our impotence, the twin arrived for the purpose of laying down conditions of *surrender*, and he did that in an exceedingly clever manner; he did not utter a single impolite word. Nevertheless, he could not conceal the coarse huckstering nature of a regular liberal that lies concealed beneath the dapper, cultured exterior of this latest "critic."

In reply to my question (with which the business part of the evening was commenced) as to why he, the twin, did not agree to work merely as a contributor, he firmly replied that it was psychologically impossible for him to work on a journal in which he

* Mode of living together, *i. e.*, of co-operating.—*Ed.*

would be "varnished up like walnut" * (these were his exact words), and that surely we did not think that we could abuse him while he would "write political articles" (his exact words); that he could co-operate only on the condition that there be complete equality (*i. e.*, evidently equality between the critics and the orthodox); that after the publication of the Declaration,** his comrade and friend [40] refused even to meet Arsenyev; that his attitude was determined not so much by the Declaration, in fact not at all by the Declaration, but by the fact that at first he desired to confine himself to the part of "friendly abetter," but that now he did not intend to limit himself to that but wanted also to be editor (the twin almost said it like that!!!). The twin did not blurt this out all at once. The negotiations concerning his co-operation dragged on for quite a long time (too long in the opinion of Arsenyev and Velika), but it became quite clear to me that no business could be done with this gentleman.***

He then began to insist on his proposal: Why not establish a third periodical on an equal basis with the others? This would be to our and his advantage (the newspaper would get material, we would "make" something out of the resources provided for it). He proposed that on the cover we should have nothing Social-Democratic, nothing to indicate our firm, and that we were obliged (not formally but morally) to contribute to this organ all our material of a general political nature.

It became clear, and I said so openly, that the publication of a third periodical was out of the question, and that the whole matter reduced itself to the question as to whether Social-Democracy must carry on the political struggle or whether the liberals should carry it on as an independent and self-contained movement. (I expressed myself more clearly and definitely, more precisely.) The twin understood, and angrily retorted that after I had expressed myself with *anerkennenswerter Klarheit* **** (his exact words) there was nothing more to say, and all that could be discussed was the placing of orders—to place orders for the collection. "But that would be the third journal" (I put in). "Well, then place an order for just

* Translated literally. This is an obscure Russian metaphor meaning: to be well trounced in argument.—*Ed.*

** The Declaration by the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. See p. 38 of this book.—*Ed.*

*** The English word "gentleman" was used in the original.—*Ed.*

**** Commendable clarity.—*Ed.*

the one *available* pamphlet," replied the twin. "Which one?" I asked. "What do you want to know that for?" retorted W. insolently. "If you agree on principle, we shall decide, but if not, why do you want to know?" I enquired about terms of publishing. "The imprint must be N. N. and nothing more; there must be no mention of your firm, nothing except *Verlag.** There must be no connection with your firm"—declared the twin. I argued against that, and demanded that mention be made about our firm. Arsenyev began to argue against me, and the conversation was cut off.

Finally, we decided to postpone the decision. Arsenyev and Velika had another heated discussion with the twin, demanded an explanation from him, argued with him. I remained silent for the most part and laughed (the twin observed this quite clearly) and the conversation soon came to an end.

* Publishers.—*Ed.*

First published in 1924 in the *Lenin Collection*, I.

THE DRAFTING OF 183 STUDENTS INTO THE ARMY

THE newspapers of January 11 published the official announcement of the Ministry of Education * concerning the drafting into the army of 183 students of the Kiev University as a punishment for "riotous assembly." The Provisional Regulations of July 29, 1899 [41] —this menace to the student world and to society—are being put into execution less than eighteen months after their promulgation. And it seems as if the government hastens to excuse itself for applying this measure of unexampled severity by publishing an indictment in which the misdeeds of the students are painted in the blackest possible colours.

These misdeeds are worse than awful! A general students' congress was convened in the summer in Odessa to discuss a plan to organise all Russian students for the purpose of protesting against the state of affairs in academic, public and political life. As a punishment for these criminal political designs all the student delegates were arrested and deprived of their documents. But the unrest does not subside—it grows and persists in breaking out in *many* higher educational institutions. The students desire to discuss and conduct their common affairs freely and independently. Their authorities—with the soulless formalism with which Russian officials have always distinguished themselves—retaliate by petty pin-pricks, and rouse the discontent of the students to the highest pitch, and automatically stimulate the thoughts of the youths who have not yet become submerged in the morass of bourgeois stagnation, to protest against the whole system of police and official tyranny.

The Kiev students demand the dismissal of a professor who took the place vacated by his colleague. The authorities resist, provoke students to convene "assemblies and demonstrations" and . . . give way. The students call a meeting to discuss the despicable conduct of two undergraduates—scions of wealthy families—who (so rumour has it) together had outraged a young girl. The officials sentence the principal "culprits"—for convening a meeting—to soli-

* We were just going to press when the official announcement was published.

tary confinement in the students' detention room. These refuse to submit. They are expelled. A crowd of students demonstratively accompany the expelled students to the railway station. A new meeting is called. The students remain until the evening and refuse to disperse until the rector arrives. The Vice-Governor and the chief of the gendarmerie come on the scene at the head of a detachment of troops, who surround the university and occupy the main hall. The rector is called. The students demand—a constitution, perhaps? No. They demand the abolition of the punishment of solitary confinement, and the reinstatement of the expelled students. The names of the participators in the meeting are taken and then they are allowed to go home.

Ponder over this astonishing lack of proportion between the modesty and innocuousness of the demands put forward by the students and the panicky dismay of the government, which behaves as if the axe had already been laid to the pillars of the monarchy. Nothing so much exposes our "omnipotent" government as this display of consternation. By this it proves more convincingly than does any "criminal manifesto" to all those who have eyes to see and ears to hear that it realises the complete instability of its position, and that it relies only on the bayonet and the knout to save it from the indignation of the people. Decades of experience has taught the government that it is surrounded by inflammable material and that a mere spark, a mere protest against solitary confinement, is sufficient to start a conflagration. That being the case, it is clear that the government had to make an example of the students; draft hundreds of students into the army! "Put the drill sergeant in place of Voltaire." * This formula has not become obsolete; on the contrary, the twentieth century is destined to see its complete application.

This new punitive measure, new in its attempt to revive the long-obsolete past, provokes many thoughts and comparisons. Three generations ago, in the reign of Nicholas I, drafting into the army was a natural punishment entirely in keeping with the whole system of Russian serf society. Aristocrats were sent to the army so as to be compelled to serve and win their officer's spurs and in order to curb the liberties of the nobility. The peasants were drafted into the army as a form of punishment; it was a long term of penal

* This is a quotation from one of the best known comedies in the Russian language, *The Misfortune of Being Clever*, by Griboyedov.—*Ed.*

servitude, where "Green Street" * and other forms of inhuman treatment awaited them. It is now more than a quarter of a century since "universal" military service was introduced, which at the time was acclaimed as a great democratic reform. Real universal military service that is not merely on paper is undoubtedly a democratic reform; it abolishes the system by which the population is divided up into various estates and makes all citizens equal. But if real universal military service existed, would drafting into the army be employed as a punishment? When the government converts military service into a form of punishment, does it not prove by that that we are much nearer to the old recruiting system than to *universal* military service? The Provisional Regulations of 1899 tear down the pharisaical mask and expose the real Asiatic nature even of those of our institutions which most resemble European institutions. As a matter of fact, we have not and never had universal military service, because the privileges enjoyed by birth and wealth create innumerable exceptions. As a matter of fact, we have not and never had anything resembling equality of citizens in military service. On the contrary, the barracks are completely saturated with the spirit of most revolting tyranny. The working class and peasant soldiers are completely defenceless; human dignity is degraded; mental torment; and beating, beating and beating —this is the picture the barracks present. Those who have influential connections and money enjoy privileges. It is not surprising, therefore, that drafting into this school of tyranny and violence is regarded as a punishment, and even as a very severe punishment, amounting almost to deprivation of rights. The government thinks it will teach the "rebels" discipline in this school. But is it not mistaken in its calculations? Will not this school of Russian military service become the military school of the revolution? Not all the students, of course, possess the stamina to go through the whole course of training in this school. Some will break down under the heavy burden, will fall in combat with the military authorities; others—the feeble and flabby—will be cowed into silence by the barracks. But there will be those whom it will harden, whose outlook will be broadened, who will be compelled to ponder over and test their aspirations towards liberty. They will experience the whole weight of tyranny and oppression on their own backs when their human dignity will be placed in the hands of

* Running the gauntlet.—*Ed.*

a drill sergeant, who very frequently takes deliberate delight in tormenting the "educated." They will see with their own eyes what the position of the common people is, their hearts will be rent by the scenes of tyranny and violence that they will be compelled to witness every day, and they will understand that the injustices and petty tyranny from which students suffer are mere flea-bites compared with the oppression which the people are compelled to suffer. Those who will understand this will, on leaving military service, take the vow of Hannibal [42] to fight with the vanguard of the people, the working class, for the emancipation of the whole people from despotism.

The humiliating character of this new punishment is no less outrageous than its cruelty. In declaring the students who protested against arbitrariness to be mere rowdies—in the same way as it declared the exiled striking workers to be persons of depraved demeanour—the government has thrown down a challenge to all those who still possess a sense of decency. Read the government communication. It bristles with words like: disorder, brawling, outrage, shamelessness, licence. On the one hand, it sees criminal political aims and the desire for political protest; and on the other, it slanders the students as mere rowdies who must be disciplined. This is a slap in the face of Russian public opinion, whose sympathy for the students is very well known to the government. The only dignified reply the students can make is to carry out the threat of the Kiev students, to organise a determined general student strike in all higher educational institutions in support of the demand for the repeal of the Provisional Regulations of July 29, 1899.

But the government must be called to account not only by the students. The government's own conduct has caused this incident to become something ever so much greater than a mere student affair. The government turns insolently to public opinion as if boasting of the severity of the punishment it inflicts, as if in mockery of all aspirations for liberty. All conscious elements among all strata of the people must take up this challenge if they do not desire to fall to the level of dumb slaves bearing their insults in silence. At the head of these conscious elements stands the vanguard, the working class and the Social-Democratic organisations, which are inseparably linked up with it. The working class constantly suffers immeasurably greater oppression and torment at the hands of the tyrannical police with whom the students have

now come into such sharp conflict. The working class has already commenced the struggle for its emancipation. It must remember that this great struggle imposes a great duty upon it; that it cannot emancipate itself without emancipating the whole people from despotism; that it is its duty first and foremost to respond to every political protest, and render it every support. The best representatives of our educated classes have proved—and sealed the proof with the blood of thousands of revolutionaries, tortured to death by the government—their ability and readiness to shake from their feet the dust of bourgeois society, and march in the ranks of the Socialists. The worker who can look on indifferently while the government sends troops against the student youth is not worthy of the name of Socialist. The students came to the assistance of the workers—the workers must come to the aid of the students. The government wishes to deceive the people when it declares that attempt at political protest is mere brawling. The workers must publicly declare and explain to the broad masses that this is a lie; that the real hotbed of violence, outrage and licence is—the autocratic Russian Government, the tyrannical behaviour of the police and the officials.

The manner in which this protest is to be organised must be decided by the local Social-Democratic organisations and workers' groups. The most practical forms of protest are the distribution, scattering and posting up of leaflets and organising meetings to which as far as possible all classes of society should be invited. It would be desirable, however, where strong and well-established organisations exist, to attempt a broad and public protest by means of a public demonstration. The demonstration organised last December 1, outside the premises of the *Yuzhni Krai* [*Southern Section*] [43] in Kharkov, may serve as a good example of this. The jubilee of this filthy sheet, which baits everything that aspires to light and freedom, and glorifies every bestiality of our government, was being celebrated at the time. A large crowd gathered outside the premises of the *Yuzhni Krai* and solemnly tore up copies of the paper, tied them to the tails of horses, wrapped them round dogs, and threw stones and stink bombs containing sulphuric hydrogen at the windows, and shouted: "Down with the venal press!" Such celebrations are well deserved not only by the corrupt newspapers, but by all our government offices. Occasions for celebrating official benevolence occur rarely, but occasions for celebrating acts of tyranny against the people are continuously provided. Every mani-

festation of governmental tyranny and violence is a legitimate pretext for such a demonstration. The people must not let the government's announcement of its punishment of the students remain unanswered!

Iskra, No. 2, February, 1901.

CASUAL NOTES [44]

I

BEAT, BUT NOT TO DEATH!

On January 23, in Nizhni-Novgorod, a special session of the Moscow High Court of Justice, *sitting with the representatives of the estates*, tried the case of the murder of the peasant Timofei Vassilievich Vozdukhov, who was found drunk and taken to the police station "to sober up," and there assaulted by four police officers, Shelemetyev, Shulpin, Shibayev and Olkhovin, and by acting inspector, Panov, as a result of which beating Vozdukhov died in the hospital the next day.

Such is the simple story of this case, which throws a glaring light upon what usually and systematically goes on in our police stations.

As far as can be gathered from the extremely brief newspaper reports, what appears to have happened is the following: On April 20, Vozdukhov drove up in a droshky to the governor's house. The superintendent of the governor's house, giving evidence at the trial, stated that he came out and saw Vozdukhov bare-headed, under the influence of drink, but not drunk, and that he, Vozdukhov, complained to him about the steamboat booking office refusing to sell him a ticket. (?) The superintendent ordered Shelemetyev, the policeman on duty, to take him to the police station. Vozdukhov was sufficiently sober to be able to speak quietly with Shelemetyev and on arrival at the police station quite distinctly told the inspector, Panov, his name and occupation. Notwithstanding all this, Shelemetyev, no doubt with the knowledge of Panov, who had just questioned Vozdukhov, "pushed" the latter, not into the common cell, in which there were a number of other drunkards, but into the *soldiers'* cell, next door to it. In pushing him, his sword got caught on the latch of the door and slightly cut his hand, and imagining that Vozdukhov held the sword, rushed at him to strike him, shouting that he had cut his hand. He struck Vozdukhov with all his might in the face, in the chest, in the side; he struck him so hard that Vozdukhov fell, striking his forehead on the floor, begging for mercy. "Why are you beating me," he implored, according to the

statement of a witness, Semakhin, who was in the neighbouring cell at the time. "It was not my fault; forgive me for Christ's sake!" According to the evidence of this witness, it was Shelemetyev who was drunk rather than Vozdukhov. Shelemetyev's colleagues, Shulpin and Shibayev, who had been continuously drinking in the police station since the first day of Easter (April 20 was Tuesday, the third day of Easter), learned that Shelemetyev was "teaching" (the expression used in the indictment) Vozdukhov a lesson. They went into the soldiers' cell accompanied by Olkhovin, who was on a visit from another district, and attacked Vozdukhov with their fists and feet. The inspector, Panov, came on the scene and struck Vozdukhov on the head with a book, and then with his fists. "Oh! they beat and beat him so hard that my heart ached for pity," said a woman-witness, who was in one of the cells at the time. When the "lesson" was over, the inspector very coolly ordered Shibayev to wipe the blood from the victim's face—it will not look so bad then; the chief might see it—and then flung him into the common cell. "Brothers!" cried Vozdukhov to the other prisoners, "see how the police have beaten me. You be witnesses, I am going to lodge a complaint." But he never lived to lodge the complaint. The next day, he was found in a state of unconsciousness and sent to the hospital where he died within eight hours without regaining consciousness. A post-mortem examination revealed ten broken ribs, bruises all over his body, and hemorrhage of the brain.

The court sentenced Shelemetyev, Shulpin and Shibayev to four years' penal servitude, and Olkhovin and Panov to *one month's detention,* finding them guilty only of "insulting behaviour. . . ."

We shall commence our examination of the case from this sentence. The culprits were charged according to Articles 346 and 1490, Part II, of the Penal Code. The first of these Articles declares that an official inflicting wounds or injury in the exercise of his duties is liable to the greatest penalty provided "for perpetrating such a crime." Article 1490, Part II, provides for a penalty ranging from eight to ten years' hard labour for inflicting torture resulting in death. Instead of inflicting the *greatest penalty*, the court, consisting of representatives of the estates and Crown judges, *reduced* the sentence by *two degrees* (sixth degree, eight to ten years' hard labour, seventh degree, four to six years' penal servitude), *i. e.*, made the greatest reduction of sentence permitted by the law in cases of mitigating circumstances, and, moreover, inflicted the

lowest penalty in that degree. In a word, the court did all it could to let the culprits off as lightly as possible; in fact, it did more than it had the power to do, because it evaded the law concerning the "greatest penalty." Of course, we do not wish to assert that "supreme justice" demanded ten and not four years' penal servitude; the point is that the murderers were admitted to be murderers and were sentenced to penal servitude. But we cannot refrain from noting the very characteristic tendency displayed by courts of Crown judges and representatives of the estates; when they try a police official they are ready to display the greatest clemency, but when they try an act committed against the police, as is well known, they display inexorable severity.*

What could the court do? Here was a police inspector before them, how could they refuse him clemency? He met Vozdukhov and evidently ordered him to be placed in a common cell, but first, in order to teach him a lesson, he placed him in the soldiers' cell. He took part in the assault, using his fists and a book (no doubt a copy of the Penal Laws); he gave orders to have all traces of the crime removed (to wipe away the blood). On the night of April 20 he reported to the chief of the station, Mukhanov, when he returned, that "everything was in order in the section under my charge" (his exact words)—but he had nothing to do with the murderers, he was only guilty of insulting behaviour, punishable by detention. Quite naturally, this gentleman, Mr. Panov, innocent of murder, is still in the police service occupying the rank of a village police sergeant. Mr. Panov has merely transferred his useful directing activities in "educating" the common people from the town to the

* In passing, we shall quote another fact, illustrating the punishments inflicted by our courts for various crimes. A few days after the Vozdukhov murder trial, the Moscow Military Court sentenced a private in the local artillery brigade to four years' *penal servitude* for stealing fifty pairs of trousers and several pairs of boots, while on guard duty in the storeroom. A human life placed in the charge of the police is equal in value to fifty pairs of trousers and several pairs of boots placed in charge of a sentry. This peculiar "equation" reflects as in a mirror the whole of our police state system. The individual against the authorities—is nothing. Discipline within the service is everything . . . or rather "everything" only for the small fry. The petty thief is sentenced to penal servitude, but the big thieves, the magnates, cabinet ministers, bank directors, railway contractors, engineers, etc., who plunder the Treasury of hundreds of thousands of rubles are punished only on very rare occasions, and at the worst are banished to remote provinces where they may live at ease on their loot (the bank thieves in Western Siberia), and from where it is easy to escape across the frontier (colonel of gendarmes, Meranville de St. Clair).

rural districts. Now, reader, on your conscience, can Sergeant Panov understand the sentence of the court to mean anything else than advice in future to remove the traces of a crime more thoroughly, to "teach" in such a manner as to leave no trace? You did right, Mr. Panov, in wiping the blood from the face of the dying man, but you allowed him to die. That, little brother, was careless. In the future be more careful and obey the first and last commandments of the Russian police bully—"Beat, but not to death."

From the ordinary human point of view, the sentence on Panov was a mockery of justice. It reveals a cringing, servile spirit, an attempt to throw the whole blame upon the minor police officials and to shield their immediate chief with whose knowledge, approval and participation, this brutal crime was committed. From the juridical point of view, the sentence is an example of the casuistry to which bureaucratic judges, who are themselves not far removed from police inspectors, resort. The tongue is given to man to conceal his thoughts, say the diplomats. Our jurists may say that the law is given to distort the concepts of guilt and responsibility. Indeed, what subtle juridical art is required to be able to reduce complicity in torture to the charge of insulting behaviour! Panov was guilty of an offence of equal gravity to that committed by the artisan who perhaps on the morning of April 20 mischievously tipped Vozdukhov's cap off his head! In fact, milder than that: not an offence, but an "infringement." Even participation in a brawl (let alone in brutally assaulting a helpless man), if it results in a fatality, is liable to a severer punishment than that meted out to the police inspector. Legal chicanery took advantage of the fact that the law provides for various degrees of punishment for inflicting injury in the exercise of official duties, allowing the court the discretion to pronounce sentences ranging from two months' imprisonment to banishment to Siberia, according to the circumstances of the case. Of course, it is quite a reasonable rule to refrain from binding a judge to strictly formal definitions, and to allow him certain latitude. The Russian law has often been praised for this, and our professors of criminal law have emphasized its liberal character. However, in praising our law, they lose sight of a trifling thing, namely, that in order that wise laws may be applied, it is necessary to have judges who are not reduced to the rôle of mere officials. It is necessary also to have representatives of the public, and of public opinion, in the court participating in the

examination of cases. Furthermore, the assistant prosecuting attorney came to the aid of the court by *withdrawing* the charge against Panov (and Olkhovin) of torture and cruelty, and pleading only for a sentence for insulting behaviour. In his plea, the assistant prosecuting attorney called expert evidence to prove that the blows inflicted by Panov were neither numerous nor painful. As is seen, the juridical sophistry is not very ingenious: as Panov did less beating than the others, it *may be argued* that his punches were not *very* painful, and since they were not very painful, it *may* be argued that his offence was not "torture and cruelty"; and since it was not torture and cruelty, then it was merely insulting behaviour. All this works out to everybody's satisfaction, and Mr. Panov remains in the ranks of the guardians of order and decorum.*

We have just referred to the participation of representatives of the public in court trials, and of the part that should be played by public opinion. This subject is excellently illustrated by this case. In the first place, why was not this case tried by a judge and jury, but by a court of Crown judges and representatives of the estates? Because the government of Alexander III, having declared ruthless war upon every public aspiration towards liberty and independence, very soon found that trial by jury was dangerous. The reactionary

* Instead of exposing the outrage in all its horror before the court and the public, in Russia they prefer to obscure the case in the court, and satisfy themselves with circular letters and orders full of pompous but meaningless phrases. For example, a few days ago the Oryol Chief of Police sent out an order which, confirming previous orders, instructs the local police inspectors and their assistants to impress upon their subordinates that they must refrain from roughness and violence in handling drunkards in the streets when taking them to the police station to sober up. The police officers must explain to their subordinates that it is the duty of the police also to protect drunkards who cannot be left alone wihout obvious danger to themselves. Therefore, subordinate police officials, whom the law has placed in the position of the protectors and guardians of citizens, in arresting and bringing drunkards to the police-station, must not only refrain from treating them roughly and inhumanly, but on the contrary, they must do all they can to protect those who are placed in their charge until they have become sober. The order warns the subordinate police officials that only by such conscientious and lawful exercise of their duties will they earn the confidence and respect of the population and that if, on the contrary, police officials treat drunkards harshly and cruelly, or resort to any violent conduct incompatible with the duty of a police officer, who should serve as a model of respectability and good morals, they will be punished with all the vigour of the law and any subordinate police officer guilty of such conduct will be rigorously prosecuted. A good idea for a cartoon in a satirical journal. A police inspector, acquitted on a charge of murder, reading an order that he must serve as a model of respectability and good morals!

press declared trial by jury to be "trial by the street," and commenced a campaign against it, which, by the way, is continued to this day. The government adopted a reactionary programme. Having crushed the revolutionary movement of the seventies, it insolently declared to the representatives of the public that it regards them as the "street," the mob, which must not interfere in the work of legislation or in the administration of the state, and which must be driven from the sanctuary where Russian citizens are tried and punished according to the Panov method. In 1887, a law was passed removing crimes committed by and against officials from the jurisdiction of the court sitting with a jury and transferring them to the court of crown judges sitting with the representatives of the estates. As is known, these representatives of the estates, merged into a single collegium with the bureaucratic judges, are mere mute supernumeraries playing the miserable rôle of dumb witnesses ready to agree to everything the officials of the Department of Justice put before them. This is one of the whole series of laws that have been passed during the latest, reactionary period of Russian history and which are combined by the single tendency: To re-establish a strong government. Under the pressure of circumstances, the government in the latter half of the nineteenth century was compelled to come into contact with the "street"; but the character of the "street" had changed with astonishing rapidity. The ignorant and indifferent inhabitants had given place to citizens who were beginning to understand their rights, and who were capable even of producing their champions of right. Perceiving this, the government drew back in horror, and is now making convulsive efforts to surround itself by a Chinese Wall, to wall itself up in a fortress into which no manifestations of public independence can penetrate. . . . But I have strayed somewhat from my subject.

Thanks to the reactionary law, the street was deprived of the right to try representatives of the government. Officials are tried by officials. This affected not only the sentences passed by the court, but also the character of the preliminary judicial investigation and the trial. Trial by the street is valuable because it breathes a living spirit into the bureaucratic formalism which pervades our government institutions. The street is interested not so much in whether the given offence must be defined as insulting behaviour, assault, or torture, and what category of punishment should be imposed, as in exposing thoroughly and bringing to public light

the significance and all the social and political threads of the crime, in order to draw a lesson of public morals and practical politics from the trial. The street desires the court to be not "an official institution," in which officials apply certain articles of the penal code to the corresponding cases, but a public institution which exposes the sores of the present system, which provides material for criticising it, and consequently for improving it. By its intuition, by its practical knowledge of public affairs and the growth of its political consciousness, the street is approaching the truth which our official, professorial jurisprudence, weighed down as it is by its scholastic shackles, is groping for with such difficulty and timidity, namely, that in the fight against crime the reform of public and political institutions are much more important than the infliction of punishment. That is why the reactionary publicists and the reactionary governments hate, and cannot help hating, trial by the street. That is why the restriction of the competency of jury courts and the restrictions on publicity run like a thread throughout the whole of the post-reform history of Russia; and the reactionary character of the "post-reform" epoch became exposed on the very next day after the law of 1864, which reformed our "judicature," came into force.*

The absence of "trial by the street" was markedly felt in this particular case. Who in the court that tried this case was interested in its public aspects, and who tried to bring them out in bold relief? The prosecuting attorney? The official who has relations with the police—who shares responsibility for the detention of prisoners and the manner in which they are treated—who, in certain cases, is the superior officer of the police? We have seen that the prosecuting attorney withdrew the charge of torture against Panov. Perhaps Vozdukhova, the wife of the murdered man, and a witness at the trial, in the capacity of claimant for damages? But how is this simple woman to know that it is permissible to bring a claim for damages before a criminal court? But even if she knew that, and

* In their polemics in the legal press against the reactionaries the liberal advocates of trial by jury frequently and categorically deny the political significance of trial by jury, and strive to show that they favour the participation of public elements in the courts for reasons other than political. This may partly be explained by the lack of ability displayed by our jurists to think politically to a logical conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that they specialise in "political science." But chiefly, this is to be explained by the necessity to speak and write in guarded language, as it is impossible for them openly to declare their sympathies for the constitution.

was able to do so, could a lawyer have been found willing to call public attention to the system that was brought to light by this murder? And even if such a lawyer were found, would his "civic zeal" be supported by "delegates" of the public like the representatives of the estates? Picture to yourself a village elder; for example, I have in mind a provincial court—bashful in his rustic clothes, not knowing what to do with his rough, peasants' hands, awkwardly trying to conceal his feet encased in greased top-boots, gazing with awe upon his Excellency, the president of the court, sitting on the same bench with him. Or imagine a city mayor, a fat merchant, breathing heavily in his unaccustomed livery with his chain of office round his neck, trying to ape his neighbour, a marshal of the nobility, a gentleman, in nobleman's livery, looking sleek and well tended, with aristocratic manners. By his side are the judges, men who have gone through the hard grind of the school of bureaucracy, who have grown grey in the service, fully conscious of the importance of the duty they have to fulfil: to try representatives of the authorities whom the street is not worthy to try. Would not this scene dampen the ardour of the most eloquent lawyer? Would it not remind him of the proverb: "Cast not pearls before . . ."?

The case was rushed through as if by express; as if every one concerned were eager to get it off his hands as quickly as possible;* as if they feared to rake up the muck. One may get accustomed to living near a cesspool and not notice the bad odours emanating from it; but as soon as an attempt is made to clean it, the stench assails the nostrils not only of the inhabitants of the particular street, but also of those of the neighbouring streets.

Just think of the number of questions that naturally arise out of the case that no one took the trouble to clear up! Why did Vozdukhov go to the governor? The indictment—the document which was the embodiment of the effort of the prosecuting authorities to cover up the crime—not only failed to reply to this question, but deliberately obscured it with the statement that "Vozdukhov was detained in a state of intoxication in the courtyard of the governor's house by policeman Shelemetyev." It even gives ground for the assumption that Vozdukhov was brawling—and where do

* No one, however, thought of bringing the case to trial quickly. In spite of the fact that the case was a remarkably simple one, the crime, which was committed on April 20, 1899, was not tried until January 23, 1901. A *speedy*, just and merciful trial!

you think? In the courtyard of the governor's house! As a matter of fact, Vozdukhov *drove up to the governor's house on a droshky in order to lodge a complaint*—this fact was established. What did he go to complain about? Ptitsin, the superintendent of the governor's house, stated that Vozdukhov complained about a steamship booking office refusing to sell him a ticket (?). The witness Mukhanov, the inspector of the station in which Vozdukhov was assaulted (and now governor of the provincial prison in Vladimir), stated that he had heard from Vozdukhov's wife that she, with her husband, had been drinking and that in Nizhni *they had been assaulted in the river police station, and in the Rozhdestvensky police station, and that Vozdukhov went to the governor to complain about this.* Notwithstanding the fact that the witnesses obviously contradicted each other, the court made not the slightest attempt to clear up the matter. On the contrary, one has every reason to conclude that the court *did not wish* to clear up the matter. Vozdukhov's wife gave evidence at the trial. But no one was sufficiently interested to ask her: Whether her husband was really assaulted in several police stations in Nizhni? Under what circumstances they were arrested? In what premises they were assaulted? Who assaulted them? Did her husband really wish to complain to the governor? And did her husband mention his intention to do so to any one else? Being an official in the governor's office, Ptitsin very likely was not inclined to take complaints from Vozdukhov (who was not drunk, but whom, nevertheless, it was necessary to make sober) against the police official, who ordered the *intoxicated* policeman Shelemetyev to take the complainant to the police-station to be sobered up. But this interesting witness was not cross-examined. The droshky driver, Krainov, who drove Vozdukhov to the governor's house, and later drove him to the police-station, was not questioned as to whether Vozdukhov had told him why he was going to the governor, as to what he said to Ptitsin, and whether he had heard any other conversation. The court was satisfied merely to take the brief affidavit of Krainov (who did not appear in court) which testified that Vozdukhov was not drunk, but only slightly intoxicated, and the assistant prosecuting attorney did not even take the trouble to subpœna this important witness. If we bear in mind that Vozdukhov, who was a reservist sergeant, and consequently a man of experience who knew something about law and order, even after he had received the last fatal blows, had said: "I am going

to lodge a complaint," it becomes more than probable that he went to the governor to lodge a complaint against the police, and that the witness, Ptitsin, lied in order to shield the police, and that the servile judges and servile prosecuting attorney did not wish to bring this delicate story to light.

Furthermore, why was Vozdukhov beaten? Again the indictment presents the case in a manner most favourable . . . to the accused. The "motive for the torture," it is alleged, was the cutting of Shelemetyev's hand when he pushed Vozdukhov into the soldiers' cell. The question arises, why was Vozdukhov, who spoke calmly both with Shelemetyev and with Panov, pushed (we shall assume that it was really necessary to *push* him!) not into the common cell, but first of all into the soldiers' cell? He was brought to the station to be sobered up—there were already a number of drunkards in the common cell, and later on Vozdukhov was put into the common cell; why, then, did Shelemetyev, after "introducing" him to Panov, push him into the *soldiers' cell?* Evidently for the purpose of assaulting him. In the common cell, there were a number of people, but in the soldiers' cell, Vozdukhov would be alone, and Shelemetyev could call to his aid his comrades and Mr. Panov, who at the present time is "in charge" of police station No. 1. Consequently, the torture was inflicted, not for a casual reason, but deliberately and with forethought. We must assume one of two things: Either all those who are sent to the police station to be sobered up (even when they behave themselves decently and quietly)' are first put into the soldiers' cell to be "educated," or that Vozdukhov was taken in there for the deliberate purpose of being beaten up *precisely for the reason that he went to the governor to lodge a complaint against the police.*

The newspaper reports of the trial are so brief that one hesitates to express oneself categorically in favour of the latter assumption (which is not at all improbable), but the preliminary investigation and the court could have cleared this matter up entirely. Of course, the court did not pay any attention to this whatever. I say "of course," because the indifference of the court reflects not only bureaucratic formalism, but also the point of view of the Russian "man in the street." "What is there to make a fuss about? A drunken muzhik was killed in a police-station! Much worse things than that happen." And the ordinary man begins to relate a score of incomparably more revolting cases, in which the culprits have

gone scot free. The remarks of the ordinary man are absolutely just; nevertheless his attitude is absolutely wrong and by his arguments merely reveals his extreme, philistine short-sightedness. Are not more revolting cases of police tyranny possible in our country precisely because this tyranny represents the common and every-day practice in every police-station? And is not our indignation impotent against these exceptional cases because we, with customary indifference, tolerate the "normal" cases; because our indifference remains undisturbed, even when a customary practice like the assault upon a drunken (or alleged drunken) "muzhik" in a police-station rouses the protest of this very muzhik (who should be accustomed to this sort of thing), who paid with his life for his most impertinent attempt to submit a humble petition to the governor.

There is another reason why we must not ignore this very common case. It has been said long ago that the preventative significance of punishment lies not in its severity, but in its unavoidableness. What is important is not that a crime shall be severely punished, but that *not a single crime* shall pass undiscovered. From this aspect, too, this case is of interest. Illegal and savage assault is committed in police-stations in the Russian Empire—it may be said without exaggeration—daily and hourly,* and only in rare

* These lines were already written when the newspaper brought another confirmation of the correctness of this assertion. At the other end of Russia, in Odessa, a city enjoying the status of a capital—a magistrate acquitted a certain M. Klinkov who was brought up before him on the charge of Station Inspector Sadukov, of being disorderly while under arrest in the police-station. At the trial, the accused and also four of his witnesses testified to the following: Sadukov arrested M. Klinkov while the latter was drunk and took him to the police-station. When he had become sober, Klinkov demanded to be released, upon which, a policeman grabbed him by the collar and began to punch him. Then three other policemen arrived on the scene, and all four of them fell upon him, striking him in the face, head, chest and sides. Under the rain of blows and covered with blood, Klinkov fell to the floor, whereupon the policemen assaulted him with even greater fury while he was down. According to the evidence of Klinkov and his witnesses, this punishment was inflicted at the instigation and with the encouragement of Sadukov. As a result of the blows inflicted upon him, Klinkov lost consciousness, but when he revived he was released from the police-station. Immediately on his release, he went to see a doctor who examined him. The magistrate advised Klinkov to lodge a complaint against Sadukov and the policemen with the prosecuting attorney, to which Klinkov replied that he had already done so, and that he would bring twenty witnesses.

One need not be a prophet to foretell that M. Klinkov will fail to get the policemen brought to trial and punished for torture. They did not actually beat him to death—but even if they are prosecuted for it, they are sure to be let off with a light punishment.

and very exceptional cases are they brought up in court. This is not in the least surprising, because the criminals are the very police, who in Russia are charged with the duty of detecting crime. These circumstances oblige us to devote greater, if unusual, attention to such cases when the courts are compelled to raise the curtain which conceals this state of affairs.

Note, for example, how the police commit assault. There were five or six of them; they assaulted their victim with brutal savagery, most of them were drunk, all were armed with swords. But not one of them struck the victim with his sword. They are men of experience and skilled in affairs like this. A blow with a sword will leave a distinct mark, but it would not be so easy to prove that bruises resulting from punches were inflicted in the police-station. It would be quite easy for the police to say, "he was arrested during a brawl," and no evidence against them will be available. Even in the present case, when the man, as it happened, was beaten to death (The devil! a hefty muzhik like that! Who would have thought he would die!) the prosecution was obliged to bring witnesses to testify that "Vozdukhov was absolutely sound in health before he was taken to the police-station." Apparently, the murderers, who all through the trial had maintained that they had not beaten the man, stated that they brought him to the station in a battered condition. It is an extremely difficult matter to get witnesses to give evidence in a case like this. By a happy chance, the window in the common cell looking into the soldiers' cell was not completely curtained off. It is true, that instead of glass the panes consisted of sheets of tin with holes punched through, and on the side of the soldiers' cell, these holes were covered up by a leather curtain. By poking a finger through a hole it is possible to raise the curtain and thus see what is going on in the soldiers' cell. Only through this circumstance was it possible at the trial to obtain a picture of the scene of the "lesson." But such a disorderly state of things like improperly curtained-off windows could exist only in the last century. In the twentieth century, windows in the common and soldiers' cells, in the first Kremlin district police-station in Nizhni-Novgorod, are no doubt curtained so as to prevent any eavesdropping. . . . And since there are no witnesses, pity the poor fellow who finds himself in the soldiers' cell!

In no country in the world is there such a multitude of laws as in Russia. We have a law for everything. There are special regu-

lations governing detention under arrest, in which it is quite definitely stated that detention is legally permissible only in special premises, subject to special supervision. As you see, the law is observed. In the police-station, there is a special "common cell." But *before* a man is put into the common cell, it is "customary" to "push" him into the "soldiers' " cell. The fact, which became clearly evident in the course of the trial, that the soldiers' cell was nothing else than a torture chamber, did not worry the judicial authorities in the least. Nor did they take the least notice of it. Surely the prosecuting attorney cannot be expected to expose the outrages committed by our tyrannical police, or to take measures against them!

We have referred to the question of witnesses in a case like this. At best, such witnesses can only be persons in the hands of the police. Only under the most exceptional circumstances would it be possible for an outsider to witness a police "lesson" in a police-station. Those witnesses who are in the hands of the police can be quite easily influenced by the latter, and this is actually what happened. The witness Frolov, who at the time of the murder was in the common cell, stated during the preliminary investigation that Vozdukhov was assaulted by the policemen and the inspector. Later he withdrew his testimony against Inspector Panov. At the trial, however, he stated that none of the policemen struck Vozdukhov, that he was persuaded to give evidence against the police by Semakhin and Barinov (two other prisoners in the common cell who were the principal witnesses for the prosecution), and that the police did not prompt him to say this. The witnesses Fadeyev and Antonova stated that no one laid a finger on Vozdukhov in the soldiers' cell; everything was quiet there and there was no quarrelling.

As you see, quite the usual thing took place; and the judicial authorities behaved with the customary indifference. There is a law which provides very severe penalties for perjury. A prosecution instituted against these two perjurers would throw still more light upon the outrages committed by the police upon their defenceless victims who have the misfortune to fall into their hands—and hundreds of thousands of the "common" people meet with this misfortune every day. But all the court is concerned about is applying a certain article of the penal code, and is not in the least concerned about these defenceless people. This detail in the trial,

like all the rest, clearly revealed what a strong and all-embracing net it is, what a virulent canker it is. To get rid of this, it is necessary to get rid of the whole system of police tyranny and disfranchisement of the people.

About thirty-five years ago, F. M. Reshetnikov, a well-known Russian author, met with an unpleasant adventure. One evening he went to the Hall of the Nobles in St. Petersburg under the mistaken impression that a concert was to be given there. The policeman at the door barred his way, and shouted at him: "Where are you pushing to? Who are you?" "A workman," roughly replied Reshetnikov, stung to anger by this affront. What followed this reply, as related by Gleb Uspensky, was that Reshetnikov spent the night in the police-station, from which he emerged bruised and battered, bereft of his money and his ring. "I report this matter to your Excellency," wrote Reshetnikov in a petition to the St. Petersburg Chief of Police. "I seek no compensation. May I only humbly trouble you with the request that the police-officers and their subordinates *shall not beat the people.* The people suffer quite enough as it is." [45]

The modest request which a Russian writer was bold enough to make to the chief of the police of the capital so long ago has not been fulfilled yet and it will remain unfulfilled as long as the present political system lasts. At the present time, the gaze of every honest man who is moved to indignation by brutality and violence is turned towards the great new movement among the people who are gathering their forces in order to wipe all brutality from the face of Russia, and to achieve the highest ideals of mankind. During the last decade, hatred towards the police has grown and become deep-rooted in the hearts of the masses of the common people. The development of urban life, the growth of industry, the spread of literacy, all this has imbued even the uneducated masses with aspirations for a better life and a consciousness of their human dignity; the police, however, have remained as tyrannical and brutal as ever. All that it has acquired is a greater subtlety in detecting and persecuting the new, the most dangerous enemy, *i. e.*, all those who carry to the masses of the people a ray of consciousness of their rights and confidence in their strength. Fertilised by this consciousness and this confidence, popular hatred will find an outlet, not in savage revenge, but in the struggle for liberty.

II

WHY ACCELERATE THE VICISSITUDE OF TIME?

THE Assembly of Nobles of the Province of Oryol has adopted an interesting project, but more interesting is the debate that took place on this project.

The facts of the case are as follows: The provincial marshal of the nobility, M. A. Stakhovich, moved a resolution to enter into a contract with the Finance Department, by which the Oryol nobles will be appointed to the positions of excise officers. With the introduction of the liquor monopoly forty collectors are to be appointed to collect the receipts of the government vodka shops. The remuneration of these will amount to 2,180 rubles per annum (900 rubles salary, 600 rubles travelling expenses and 680 rubles for hiring watchmen). The nobles thought it would be a good thing to get these jobs, and for this purpose it was suggested that they should form a guild, and enter into a contract with the Treasury. Instead of the required deposit (3,000 to 5,000 rubles), they suggested that at first 300 rubles per annum be deducted from the pay of each collector, and with these sums establish a guarantee fund to be deposited with the liquor department.

The proposal is certainly a practical one, and proves that our upper class possesses a natural instinct for selecting the choicest bits of the Treasury pie. But it is precisely this business-like sense that seemed to many of the noble landlords to be extremely disreputable and unworthy of those holding noble rank. A heated discussion flared up on the question, in the course of which three distinct points-of-view came to light. . . .

First, the point-of-view of the practical man, *viz.*, a man must live. The nobles are in straitened circumstances. . . . Here was an opportunity to earn money . . . they cannot refuse to assist the nobility. Besides, the collectors could help to encourage sobriety among the people!

The second is the point-of-view of the romanticists, *viz.*, to serve in the Liquor Department, in a position a little higher than that of a bartender, subordinate to common store managers, "very often persons of the lower orders"! And then follows a hot stream of words about the great calling of the nobility.

We shall deal with these speeches, but first of all we shall men-

tion the third point of view—that of the statesmen, *viz.*, on the one hand, it must be admitted that it is somewhat discreditable, but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that it is lucrative. We can make money and at the same time preserve our virtue. Excise officers may be appointed without the payment of deposits; each of the forty nobles may individually obtain a post on application to the provincial marshal of the nobility, without having to form a guild or entering into contracts, for "the Minister of the Interior may refuse to endorse the decision for reasons of state in order to safeguard the existing régime." In all probability, this wise opinion would have prevailed had not the marshal of the nobility made two important statements: First, that the contract had already been submitted to the council of the Ministry of Finance, which has agreed to it in principle; and second, that "it was impossible to obtain such posts by merely applying to the provincial marshal of the nobility."

The proposal was adopted.

Poor romanticists! They were defeated. How eloquently they pleaded!

Hitherto the nobility were represented by the chiefs of their order. The proposal suggests the formation of some sort of a company. Is this worthy of the past, the present and the future of the nobility? According to the law, if a bartender embezzles any funds, the noble will have to go behind the counter. Death is preferable to a position like that!

Heavens! How noble is man!

Death is preferable to selling vodka!

To trade in corn is quite a noble occupation, particularly in years of bad harvest, when high profits can be made out of the starvation of the people. A still more noble occupation is lending grain to the peasants, to lend grain to the starving peasants in the winter on the condition that they will work in the summer at one-third of the wages paid to labourers. In the very central black earth zone, in which the Oryol province is situated, the landlords engage in this noble form of usury with particular zeal. And in order to draw a distinction between noble usury and ignoble usury, it is necessary, of course, to proclaim as loudly as possible that the position of a bartender is a degrading occupation for a nobleman.

We must strictly cherish our calling which is expressed in the celebrated imperial manifesto by the words, "unselfishly to serve the people." To serve for selfish motives, for motives of gain would contradict this. . . . "The estate

whose forefathers performed heroic feats in various wars and who were mainly instrumental in bringing about the great reforms of the Emperor Alexander II, still possesses opportunities to fulfill its duties to the state in the future."

Yes, unselfish service! The distribution of lands, the granting of estates together with their inhabitants, *i. e.*, the granting of thousands of acres of land together with thousands of serfs, the establishment of a class of large landowners possessing tens and hundreds of thousands of acres of land, and which by exploitation has reduced millions of peasants to poverty—these are the manifestations of this unselfishness. The reference to the "great" reforms of Alexander II is particularly charming. Take, for example, the emancipation of the peasantry. How unselfishly our noble aristocracy stripped these peasants to the skin, compelling them to pay for their own land and at a price three times higher than its real value; they robbed the peasants of their land by slicing off chunks of the plots they were supposed to sell to them; they exchanged their arid uncultivateable land for the peasants' good land, and now they have the insolence to boast of these exploits!

There is nothing patriotic in the liquor trade. . . . Our traditions are not based on rubles, but on service to the state. The nobility must not become stockbrokers.

Sour grapes! The nobility "must not" become stockbrokers because for that large capital is required, and our quondam slave-owners have squandered their fortunes. In the eyes of the broad masses they have long ago become, not stockbrokers, but the slaves of the Stock Exchange, the slaves of the rubles. And in their quest of the ruble, the "highest estate" has long been engaged in highly patriotic enterprises such as the manufacture of corn whiskey, in sugar-refining, in floating fictitious commercial and industrial enterprises, in waiting on the doorstep in high court circles, of grand dukes, cabinet ministers, etc., etc., in order to obtain concessions and government guarantees for such enterprises, in order to beg for doles in the form of privileges for the bank of the nobility, sugar-export bonuses, slices (thousands of acres in extent!) of Bashkir or other colonial land, lucrative jobs, etc.

"The ethics of the nobility bear the traces of history, of social position . . ." and traces of the stable in which the nobles were trained to practice violence and indignities on the muzhiks. The age-long habit of command has bred in the nobles something even

more subtle: The ability to clothe their exploiting interests in pompous phrases, calculated to deceive the ignorant "common people." Listen further:

> Why accelerate the vicissitudes of time? It may be a prejudice, but old traditions forbid us to accelerate these vicissitudes. . . .

These words, uttered by Mr. Naryshkin (one of the members of the council who advocated the state point-of-view), express true class intuition. Of course, to hesitate to accept the position of an excise officer (or even of a bartender) is, in these times, mere prejudice, but does not the unparalleled and shameless exploitation of the peasantry by the landlords in our rural districts rest on a prejudice of the benighted masses of peasantry? Prejudices are dying out anyhow; why then hasten their death by openly bringing together the noble and the bartender, and in this way helping the peasant to understand the simple truth that the noble landlord is a usurer and robber like any village blood-sucker only immeasurably more powerful because of the lands he owns, his ancient privileges and his close relations with the tsarist government, his habit to command and his ability to conceal his character of a Judas by a complete doctrine of romanticism and magnanimity?

Yes, Mr. Naryshkin is certainly a counsellor from whose lips political wisdom falls. I am not surprised that the marshal of the Oryol nobility replied to him in terms so choice that they would do honour to an English lord. He said:

> It would be mere boldness on my part to object to the authorities whom we have heard here, were I not convinced that in arguing against their opinions, I am not arguing against their convictions.

Now this is true in a much wider sense than Mr. Stakhovich, who indeed accidently let the truth slip, imagined. All the nobles, from the most practical of them to the most romantic, share the same conviction. All of them are fully convinced of their "sacred right" to possess hundreds and thousands of acres of land that their ancestors had grabbed or had granted to them by land-grabbers, to exploit the peasants, to play the dominant rôle in the state, to enjoy the fattest (and in the worst case, even not such fat) morsels of the state pie, *i. e.*, the people's money. They differ only in regard to the expediency of undertaking this or that enterprise and their discussion of these differences are as instructive for the proletariat

as is every domestic quarrel in the camp of the exploiters. Such disputes bring out the differences between the common interests of the capitalist and landlord class as a whole, and the interests of individual persons or separate groups. In the course of such disputes, they frequently blab what they usually try very carefully to conceal.

Besides this, however, the Oryol episode throws some light upon the character of the notorious liquor monopoly. What benefits our official and semi-official press expected from it! Increased revenues, improved quality, and diminution of drunkenness! But instead of that, all we have received so far is an increase in the price of spirits, confusion in the budget, inability to define the exact financial results of the whole operation; instead of improvement in quality, we have deterioration, and the government is hardly likely to make any particular impression upon the public by its reports of the successful results of the "degustation" of the new "government vodka" published in all the newspapers. Instead of diminution of drunkenness, we have an increase in the amount of illicit trading in spirits, an increase in the police revenues obtained from this trade, the opening of drink shops in the face of the protests of local inhabitants, petitioning to have them closed * and increased drunkenness in the street.** But above all what a new and gigantic field is opened for official arbitrariness, tyranny, bribery, favouritism and corruption by the creation of this new state enterprise, with millions of capital, and the creation of a whole army of new officials! It is a positive invasion of locusts, scheming, intriguing and plundering, wasting seas of ink, and reams and reams of paper. The Oryol proposal is nothing more nor less than an attempt to cloak

* For example, recently it was reported in the newspapers that as far back as 1899 the inhabitants of a number of villages in the Archangel province passed resolutions against the opening of drink shops in their villages. The government, which is precisely now introducing the liquor monopoly in that district, *of course* refused, no doubt out of regard for the sobriety of the people.

** This is quite apart from the enormous amount of money the peasant communes have lost as a result of the liquor monopoly. Hitherto the rural communes imposed a tax on drink shops. The government has deprived them of this source of revenue without a farthing compensation! In their interesting book, *Das hungernde Russland* [*Reiseeindruecke, Beobachtungen und Untersuchungen* by C. Lehmann and Parvus. Stuttgart, Dietz Verlag, 1900], Parvus quite justly describes this as *robbing the rural community funds*. He states that according to the calculations of the Samara county council, the losses incurred by the peasant communes as a result of the introduction of the liquor monopoly in the three years 1895-97 amounted to *3,150,000 rubles*.

in legal forms the effort to snatch as far as possible the fattest morsels of the state pie, which is so prevalent in our provinces, and which, in view of the unrestrained power of the officials and the gagging of the people, threatens to intensify the reign of tyranny and plunder. Here is a small illustration: Last autumn the newspapers reported "a building incident in connection with the liquor monopoly." In Moscow, three warehouses are being built for storing vodka to supply the whole of the Moscow province. The government appropriated a sum of 1,067,000 rubles for the purpose of building these warehouses. It now appears that "it has been found necessary to make a supplementary appropriation of *two-and-a-half millions.*" * Apparently the officials who had charge of this state property grabbed a little more than fifty pairs of trousers and several pairs of boots! **

III

OBJECTIVE STATISTICS

Our government is in the habit of accusing its opponents of being tendentious. This charge is hurled not only against revolutionaries, but also against liberals. Have you ever read the comments of the official press on the liberal (legal, of course) publications? The *Vestnik Finansov* [*Financial News*], the organ of the Ministry of Finance sometimes contained a review of the press, and every time the official who wrote this column referred to the comments of the liberal magazines on the budget, the famine, or on some government measure, he always referred with indignation to their "tendentiousness" and, in contrast to them, "objectively" pointed not only to "regrettable features," but also to the "gratifying features" of the measure in question. This, of course, is only a minor example, but it illustrates the habitual attitude of the government, and its habit of boasting of its "objectivity."

We shall try to give these strict and impartial judges a little pleasure. We shall deal with statistics. We shall certaintly not deal with statistics concerning isolated facts of public life. It is well known that facts are recorded by partial men and generalised by

* Author's italics, *cf. St. Petersburgskiye Vyedomosti*, No. 239, September 1, 1900.

** Reference is here made to an incident reported in the preceding article. See footnote on p. 78 of this book.—*Ed.*

institutions which sometimes are decidedly "tendentious," like the Zemstvo, for example. No, we shall deal with statistics concerning the . . . laws. The most ardent supporter of the government, we imagine would hardly dare to assert that there is anything more objective and impartial than statistics of laws,—a simple calculation of the decisions made by the government, quite apart from any consideration of the divergence between word and deed, between passing decisions and carrying them out, etc.

And now to work.

As is known, the State Senate publishes a *Compendium of the Laws and Edicts of the Government*, a periodical which announces the measures passed by the government. We shall examine these facts, and note *what* laws and edicts the government passes, that is, on what subjects. We dare not criticise the official edicts, we shall merely count up how many have been passed in this or that sphere. The January newspapers reprint the contents of this government publication taken from No. 2,905 to No. 2,929 of last year and of Nos. 1 to 60 of the present year. Thus, in the period from December 29, 1900 to January 12, 1901, the very threshold of the new century, no less than ninety-one laws and edicts were passed. The character of these ninety-one laws makes it very convenient to tabulate "statistics" of them. None of them is in any way important, not one of them stands out more prominently than the rest or in any way leaves a special impress upon the present period of internal administration. All of them are relatively petty and answer to current requirements that continuously and regularly arise. We thus see the government in its every-day garb, and this serves as a further guarantee of the objectivity of the "statistics."

Of the ninety-one laws, thirty-four, *i. e.*, more than one-third, deal with one and the same subject: Postponement of the date for calling up capital on shares or of payment for shares of various commercial and industrial joint-stock companies. These laws can be recommended to newspaper readers as a means for refreshing their memory of the list of enterprises in our industry and the names of various firms. The second group of laws are completely analogous to the first. They deal with the articles of association of commercial and industrial companies. These include fifteen acts revising the articles of association of K. and S. Popov Bros. and Co., tea dealers, A. Nauman & Co., tar-paper manufacturers, T. A. Ossipov & Co., tanners, leather and linen merchants, etc., etc. To

these must be added eleven more acts, of which six were passed to meet the requirements of trade and industry (the establishment of a public bank and a mutual credit society, fixing the prices of securities to be taken as deposit for state contracts; regulations of the movement of privately owned cars on the railways; regulations governing brokers on the Borisoglebsk Corn Exchange); and five deal with the appointment to four factories and one mine of six additional policemen and two mounted police sergeants.

Thus, sixty out of ninety-one of the laws, *i. e.*, two-thirds, directly serve the various practical needs of our capitalists and (partly) protect them from the discontent of the workers. The impartial language of figures tells us that our government, judging by the very nature of most of its every-day laws and edicts it passes, is a loyal servant of the capitalists, and that in relation to the capitalist class as a whole, it functions in exactly the same way as say, the head office of a railway combine, or the office of the sugar combine, does in relation to the capitalists in the respective branches of industry. Of course, the fact that special laws have to be passed in order to permit of some trifling alteration of the articles of association of a company or to postpone the date on which payments for shares have to be made is due simply to the unwieldiness of our state apparatus. All that is required is a "slight improvement in the mechanism" in order that all this might be referred to the local authorities. But on the other hand, the unwieldiness of the machine, the excessive centralisation, the necessity for the government to poke its nose into everything is a feature of the whole of our public life, and not merely of the sphere of commerce and industry. Hence, the examination of the number of laws of this or that kind passed gives us a pretty fair insight into what the government interests itself in, thinks and does.

For example, the government displays ever so much less interest in private societies which do not pursue aims so honourable from the moral point of view, and safe from the political point of view, as profit-making (except that it displays interest in order to hamper, prohibit, suppress, etc.). The writer of these lines is in the civil service, and he hopes, therefore, that the reader will forgive his employment of bureaucratic terms. In the period "under review," the articles of association of two societies: The Society for the Aid of Needy Students in the Vladikavkaz Male Gymnasium, and the Vladikavkaz Society for Educational Excursions and Tours, were

sanctioned, and the rules of the Employees' Saving and Mutual Aid Societies of the Lyudinovsk and Sukremensk Works and of the Maltsevsk Railway, of the First Hop-Cultivation Society, and of the Philanthropic Society for the Encouragement of Women Labour, were by imperial grace permitted to be amended. Fifty-five laws were passed in connection with commercial and industrial companies and five were miscellaneous laws. In the sphere of commercial and industrial interests, "we" use our best efforts and strive to do everything possible to facilitate unity between merchants and manufacturers (strive, but do nothing, for the unwieldiness of the machine, and the endless red tape of the police-government considerably restricts the "possibilities"). In the sphere of non-commercial associations, we adopt the principles of homeopathy. Now, hop-growing societies and societies for the encouragement of women labour are not so bad, but educational excursions! . . . God knows what may be discussed on these excursions! And will they not put the vigilance of the inspectors to a severe test? Now, you know, one must be careful in handling fire.

Schools. As many as three new schools have been established. And what kind of schools! Elementary schools for herdsmen. These were established in the village of Blagodat on the estate of His Imperial Highness, the Grand Duke Peter Nikolayevich. That the villages belonging to the Grand Dukes are all overflowing with abundance * I have long ceased to doubt.

But now I do not doubt that even the highest personages may sincerely and whole-heartedly interest themselves in the education of their younger brothers. Moreover, the rules of the Dergachev Rural Handicraft School, and of the Asanov Elementary Agricultural School have been confirmed. I regret that I have not a reference book at hand to enable me to learn whether these bounteous villages, in which popular education and landlord farming are being cultivated with such zeal, belong to some high personage. But I console myself with the thought that such questions do not enter into the duties of a statistician.

This, then, is the sum total of the laws that express "the government's solicitude for the people." As the reader will observe, I have made the greatest possible allowances in grouping these laws. Why,

* A play on the name of the village Blagodat which, literally translated, means abundance.—*Ed.*

for example, is not the Hop-Cultivation Society included in the groups of commercial companies? Perhaps because commerce is not the only thing that is discussed at its meetings. Or take the school for herdsmen. Who can tell whether it is a school or an improved stockyard?

We have still to deal with the third group of laws which deal with the government's solicitude for itself. This group consists of three times as many laws as we assigned to the last two categories, twenty-two laws, dealing with administrative reforms, each one more radical than the other! For example: Changing the name of the village Platonovsk to Nikolayevsk; changing the articles of association, staffs, lists, times of opening of meeting (of certain county conferences), etc.; increasing the salary of midwives who are attached to army units in the Caucasus military area; defining the amounts to be advanced for shoeing and doctoring Cossack mounts; changing the rules of private commercial schools in Moscow; defining the rules of the Polyakov scholarship to the Kozlov Commercial School. I am not sure whether I have classified the last-mentioned laws correctly. Do they really express the government's solicitude for itself or for commercial and industrial interests? If I have classified them wrongly, I beg the reader's indulgence because this is the first attempt that has been made to compile statistics of laws. Up till now no one has attempted to raise this sphere of knowledge to the level of strict science, not even the professors of Russian public law.

One law must be classified in a special group by itself both because of its content and the fact that it is the first measure passed in the new century. This is the law concerning the "increase in the area of forests to be devoted to the development and improvement of His Imperial Majesty's hunting." A grand début worthy of a Great Power!

Now we must sum up. Statistics would be incomplete without that.

Fifty laws and edicts are devoted to various commercial and industrial companies and enterprises; a score are devoted to administrative changes of name and reforms; two private societies have been newly established and three reorganised; three schools for the training of landlords' employees have been established; three edicts were passed appointing six policemen and two mounted ser-

geants to factories. Can there be any doubt whatever that such a wealth of many-sided legislative and administrative activity will guarantee our country a rapid and undeviating progress in the twentieth century?

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THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE PEASANTRY [47]

FORTY years have passed since the peasants were emancipated. It is quite natural that the public should celebrate February 19 [O. S.—*Ed.*]—the anniversary of the fall of feudal Russia, and the beginning of the epoch which promised Russia liberty and prosperity—with particular enthusiasm.

We must not forget that while the laudatory ceremonial speeches contain much that sincerely expresses hatred towards serfdom and all its manifestations, they also contain much hyprocrisy. The estimation of this "great" reform as "the emancipation of the peasantry with a grant of land *with the aid* of state compensation," which has become fashionable now, sounds particularly false and hypocritical. The peasants, as a matter of fact, were emancipated *from* the land, for the plots of land which they had owned for centuries were considerably whittled down. Hundreds and thousands of peasants were completely deprived of land, and settled on a fourth of an allotment, or even less, which reduced them to beggars. In fact, the peasants were doubly robbed: Not only were their allotments cut down, but they had to pay "compensation" for the portion of that which was left to them and which had always been in their possession, and, moreover, the price they had to pay was considerably higher than its actual value.

Ten years after the emancipation of the peasantry the landlords themselves admitted to the government officials, who were investigating the state of agriculture, that the peasants were compelled to pay not only for their land, but also for their personal liberty. And although the peasants paid for their liberation, they did not become free men; for twenty years they remained "provisionally under obligation"; they were left and have remained to this day the lowest order, who could be flogged, who paid special imposts, who had no right freely to leave the environs of the semi-feudal commune, had no right freely to dispose of their own land, or to settle freely in any part of the state.

Our peasant reform is not a tribute to the magnanimity of the government; on the contrary, it serves as a great historical example of how soiled everything is that leaves the hands of the autocratic

government. Owing to the military defeats, the serious financial difficulties and the menacing discontent of the peasantry, the government was *compelled* to emancipate the latter. The Tsar himself admitted that the peasants should be emancipated from above, before they emancipated themselves from below. But in undertaking the task of emancipating the peasantry, the government did all it possibly could to satisfy the greed of the "injured" serf-owners. The government did not even hesitate to play the dirty trick of reshuffling the men who were appointed to carry out the reform, although these men had been selected by the nobility themselves. The first body of arbitrators that was elected was dissolved, and replaced by men incapable of anything else but serving the serf-owners in their efforts to cheat the peasantry, even in the process of redistributing the land. The great reform could not be carried out without resort to military executions and the shooting down of the peasantry who refused to accept the new charter. It is not surprising therefore, that the best men of the time, muzzled by the censors, met this great reform with muffled curses. . . .

The peasant, "emancipated" from serf labour, emerged from the hands of the reformers a crushed, plundered, degraded man, tied to his plot of land, so much so that nothing was left for him to do except "voluntarily" accept serf labour. And the peasant began to cultivate the land of his former master by "renting" from him the very land that had been "clipped" from his own allotment, and by hiring himself in the winter for work in the summer, in payment of the loan of corn which he had borrowed from the landlord to feed his hungry family. The "free labour," for which the manifesto, drawn up by a Jesuit priest called upon the peasantry to ask the "blessing of God," turned out to be nothing more nor less than serf labour and bondage.

To the oppression of the squires, which was preserved, thanks to the magnanimity of the officials who introduced and carried out the reforms, was added the oppression of capital. The power of money, which crushed even the French peasant—who was emancipated from the power of the feudal landlords, not by miserable half-hearted reforms, but by a mighty popular revolution—this power of money bore down with all its weight upon our semi-serf muzhik. The peasant had to obtain money at all costs in order to pay the taxes increased on account of the beneficent reform, and in

order to hire land, to buy the few miserable articles of manufactured goods—which began to squeeze out the home manufactures of the peasant—to buy corn, etc.

The power of money not only crushed the peasantry, but split them up. An enormous number of peasants were steadily ruined and converted into proletarians. From the minority arose a small group of shrewd and greedy kulaks, who began to lay their avaricious hands upon the lands of the peasants, and who represented the first cadres of the rising rural bourgeoisie. The forty years that have followed the reform are marked by this constant process of "de-peasantising" the peasants, a process of slow and painful expiration of the peasantry. The peasants were reduced to the level of beggars. They lived together with their cattle, they were clothed in rags and fed on weeds (orach). The peasants fled from their allotments, if they had anywhere to go, and even *paid* to be relieved of them, if they could induce any one to take them over, and continue the compensation payments which exceeded the income derived from them. The peasants were in a state of chronic starvation, and died in hundreds of thousands from famine and epidemics during bad harvests, which recurred with increasing frequency.

This is the state of our countryside even at the present time. The question is: Where is the way out, and by what means can we seek to improve the lot of the peasantry? The small peasantry may emancipate itself from capital only by joining the labour movement, by helping the workers in their fight for the Socialist system, and for converting the land as well as all means of production (factories, works, machines, etc.), into public property. To attempt to save the peasantry by protecting their small farms and their small properties from the oppression of capitalism would mean uselessly to retard social development, and to deceive the peasantry with illusions about the possibility of achieving prosperity under capitalism; it would mean to disunite the toiling classes, and to create a privileged position for the minority at the expense of the majority.

That is why Social-Democrats will always fight against senseless and harmful institutions like those which prohibit the peasant from disposing of his land, like collective responsibility, the prohibition against freely leaving the peasant commune, and the free acceptance into the commune of persons belonging to any order. As we have seen, however, our peasants are suffering not so much

from the oppression of capital as from the oppression of the landlords and the survival of serfdom. Ruthless struggle against these shackles, which have made the lot of the peasantry immeasureably worse, and which tie them hand and foot, is not only possible but even necessary for the sake of the entire social development of the country; for the hopeless poverty, ignorance, tyranny and degradation, from which peasants suffer, leave their impress upon the whole of our country—the impress of Asiatic barbarism. Social-Democrats would not be performing their duty, if they did not render every support to this struggle. This support should take the form, to put it briefly, of *bringing the class war to the countryside.*

We have seen that, in the modern Russian countryside class antagonism bears a two-fold character: First, it is a struggle between the rural workers and the rural employers; and second, between the peasantry as a whole and the landlord class as a whole. The first antagonism is developing and becoming more acute, the second is gradually diminishing. The first is still wholly in the future; the second, to a considerable degree, already belongs to the past. And yet in spite of this, it is the second antagonism that has the most vital and most practical significance for Russian Social-Democrats at the present time. It goes without saying that we must utilise all the opportunities that present themselves to us to develop the class consciousness of the agricultural wage-workers, and that we must see to it that urban workers (for example the mechanics employed on steam-threshing machines, etc.), should be sent into the country districts and to the markets, where agricultural labourers are hired. This is an axiom for every Social-Democrat.

But our rural labourers are still too closely connected with the peasantry, they still share too closely the misfortunes of the peasantry generally to enable the movement of the rural workers to assume national significance, either now or in the immediate future. On the other hand, the question of sweeping away the survivals of serfdom, of driving the spirit of feudal inequality out of the whole of the Russian state system, and the degradation of tens of millions of the "common people," are already matters of national significance; and the party which claims to be the vanguard in the fight for liberty cannot ignore them.

The deplorable state of the peasantry has now become (in a more or less general form) almost universally recognised. The phrase about "the defects" of the reform of 1861, and about the

necessity for state aid has become a current truism. It is our duty to point out that the misfortunes of the peasantry arise precisely from the class oppression of the peasantry; that the government is the loyal champion of the oppressing classes, and that those who sincerely and seriously desire a radical improvement in the conditions of the peasantry must seek, not aid from the government, but to get rid of the oppression of the government. It is said that the compensation rates are too high; there is talk about beneficial measures to reduce these payments, and to postpone the dates of payment. Our reply to this is: That these compensation payments are nothing more nor less than robbery of the peasantry by the landlords and the government, screened by the legal forms and official phrases; that they are nothing more nor less than tribute paid to the serf-owners for emancipating their slaves.

We shall put forward the demand for the immediate and complete abolition of compensation payments, the abolition of all quit rents, and the demand for the return of the hundreds of millions which the tsarist government has extorted from the peasants to satisfy the greed of the slave-owners.

There is talk about the peasants not having sufficient land, about the necessity for state aid for providing the peasants with more land. Our reply to this will be: That it is *precisely because* of state aid (aid to the landlords, of course) that the peasants in such an enormous number of cases were deprived of land that was vitally necessary to them. We shall put forward the demand for the restoration to the peasantry of the land of which they were deprived and the lack of which keeps them still in a state of bondage and forced labour, *i. e.*, actually in a state of serfdom. We shall put forward the demand for the establishment of peasant committees, which will remove the crying injustices committed against the emancipated slaves by the committees of nobles set up by the tsarist government. We shall demand the establishment of land courts, which will have the right to reduce the excessively high rents extorted from the peasants by the landlords by taking advantage of their hopeless position. Before these courts the peasants will have the right to prosecute for usury all those who take advantage of their extreme need to impose extortionate terms upon them.

We shall take advantage of every opportunity to explain to the peasantry that the people who talk to them about the protection or the aid of the present state are either fools or charlatans—at all

events their worst enemies. What the peasants stand in need of most is relief from the tyranny and oppression of the officials. Their complete and absolute equality with all other classes must be recognised. They must obtain complete liberty to move freely from place to place, the liberty to dispose of their lands in their own way and the liberty to manage their own communal affairs (the *mir*), and freely to dispose of the communal revenues.

The most common facts in the life of any Russian village provide a thousand themes for agitation on behalf of the above demands. This agitation must be based upon local, concrete and most pressing needs of the peasantry; but they must not be confined to these needs, but steadily directed towards widening the outlook of the peasantry, towards developing their political consciousness. The peasants must be made to understand the special place occupied in the state, by the landlords and the peasants respectively, and they must be taught that the only way to emancipate the countryside from the tyranny and oppression that reigns in it, is to convene an assembly of representatives of the people; to overthrow the tyranny of the officials.

It is absurd and stupid to assert that the demands for political liberty would not be understood by the workers: Not only the workers who have experienced years of direct fighting with the factory employers and the police; who have constantly witnessed the arbitrary arrests and persecution of their best fighters, not only these workers who are already infected with Socialism, but every intelligent peasant who thinks at all about the things he sees going on around him will understand what the workers are fighting for, and will understand the significance of the *Zemsky Sobor* [National Assembly] which will emancipate the whole country from the tyranny of the hated officials. Agitation on the basis of the direct and most urgent needs of the peasants will fulfil its purpose, *i. e.*, carry the class war into the countryside—only when it succeeds in combining every exposure of some "economic" evil with definite political demands.

But the question arises whether the Social-Democratic Labour Party can include in its programme demands like those referred to above. Can it undertake to carry on agitation among the peasantry? Will it not lead to the scattering and diversion of our revolutionary forces, which are not very numerous as it is, from the principal and only reliable channel of the movement?

Such objections are based on a misunderstanding. We must unfailingly include in our programme demands for the emancipation of our countryside from all the survivals of slavery. We must include demands capable of rousing among the best section of the peasantry, if not an independent political struggle, then at all events a readiness consciously to support the working-class struggle for liberation. We would be committing a mistake if we advocated measures which may retard social development, or artificially isolate the small peasantry from the growth of capitalism, from the development of large-scale production; but it would be a much more fatal mistake if we failed to utilise the labour movement for the purpose of spreading among the peasantry the democratic demands which the reform of February 19, 1861, failed to carry out because of the manner in which it was distorted by the landlords and the officials. Our party must include such demands in its programme, if it desires to take the lead of the whole people in the struggle against the autocracy.* But to include these points in our programme does not imply that we shall transfer the active revolutionary forces from the towns into the villages. Such a thing cannot even be thought of. Without question all the fighting elements of the party must be directed towards the towns and industrial centres; for only the industrial proletariat is capable of conducting a determined and mass struggle against the autocracy, only the proletariat is capable of bearing the brunt of such work as organising public demonstrations or of issuing a *popular* political newspaper, which shall be published regularly and have a wide circulation.

We must include peasant demands in our programme not in order to transfer convinced Social-Democrats from the towns into the countryside, not in order to chain them to the village but in order to guide the activities of those forces which *cannot* find an outlet anywhere else except in the rural district, in order to utilise for the cause of democracy, and for the political struggle for liberty, those ties with rural districts which, owing to force of circumstances, are maintained by not a few loyal Social-Democratic intellectuals and workers—ties which necessarily will grow and are growing with the growth of the movement. We have long ago outgrown that

* We have already drafted a Social-Democratic programme which includes the above-mentioned demands. We hope—after this draft has been discussed and amended in conjunction with the Emancipation of Labour group—to publish it as the draft programme of our party in one of our forthcoming issues.[48]

stage when we were a small detachment of volunteers, when the reserves of Social-Democratic forces consisted of circles of young men who had all "gone to the workers." Our movement now has a whole army at its command, an army of workers, stirred by the struggle for Socialism and for liberty—an army of the intelligentsia who have taken part and are now taking part in the movement, and who are already scattered over the whole length and breadth of Russia—an army of sympathisers whose eyes are turned with faith and hope upon the labour movement, and who are prepared to render it a thousand services.

We are confronted with the great task of organising these armies in such a manner as will enable us not only to organise transient outbreaks, not only to strike casual and sporadic (and therefore not dangerous) blows, but also to pursue the enemy steadily and persistently, in a determined struggle along the whole line, harass the autocratic government wherever it sows oppression and gathers a harvest of hatred. Can this aim be achieved without sowing the seeds of the class struggle and political class consciousness among the many millions of the peasantry? Do not say it is impossible to sow these seeds among the peasantry. It is not only possible, but is already being done in a thousand ways which escape our attention and goes on apart from our influence.

This will proceed much more widely and rapidly when we issue the slogans that will have the proper effect, and when we unfurl the banner of emancipation of the Russian peasantry from all the survivals of shameful serfdom.

Country people who come into the towns already look with wonder, curiosity and interest upon the struggle of the workers that is going on there, a struggle which is unintelligible to them, and they will carry the news of the struggle to the most remote parts of the country. We can and must do our very best to convert the curiosity of spectators, if not into complete understanding, then at least into a vague consciousness that the workers are fighting for the interests of the whole people, and into increased sympathy for the struggle. And when that is done, the day of victory of the revolutionary party over the police government will come more quickly than we ourselves ever expected or even guessed.

Iskra, No. 3, April, 1901.

WHERE TO BEGIN [49]

THE question, "What is to be done?" has been very prominent before the Russian Social-Democrats in the past few years. It is not a matter of choosing the path we are to travel (as was the case at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties) but of the practical measures and the methods we must adopt on a certain path. What we have in mind is a system and plan of practical activity. It must be confessed that the question as to the character of the struggle and the means by which it is to be carried on—which is a fundamental question for a practical party—still remains unsettled, and still gives rise to serious differences which reveal a deplorable uncertainty and ideological wavering. On the one hand, the Economist tendency, which strives to curtail and restrict the work of political organisation and agitation is not dead yet by a long way. On the other hand, the tendency of shallow eclecticism, masquerading in the guise of a new "idea" and incapable of distinguishing between the requirements of the moment and the permanent needs of the movement as a whole, still proudly raises its head. Such a tendency has entrenched itself in *Rabocheye Dyelo*. The latest statement of "principles" published by that paper—a sensational article bearing the bombastic title: "A Historical Change" [*Rabocheye Dyelo Leaflet*, No. 6] strongly confirms our opinion of it. Only yesterday, we flirted with Economism, expressed our indignation at the severe condemnation of *Rabochaya Mysl*, and "modified" the Plekhanov presentation of the question of fighting against the autocracy;[50] but to-day we quote the words of Liebknecht: "If circumstances change within twenty-four hours then tactics must be changed within twenty-four hours"; now we talk about a "strong fighting organisation" for the direct attack upon and storming of the autocracy; about "extensive revolutionary, political [how strongly this is worded: revolutionary and political!] agitation among the masses"; about "unceasing calls for street protests"; for "organising street demonstrations of a sharply [*sic!*] expressed political character," etc., etc.

We might have expressed satisfaction at the *Rabocheye Dyelo* having so readily adopted the programme we advocated in the very

first number of *Iskra, viz.*, establishing a strongly organised party, for the purpose of winning, not only a few concessions, but the very fortress of the autocracy; but the absence of anything like a fixed point-of-view in the *Rabocheye Dyelo* spoils all our pleasure.

Rabocheye Dyelo takes Liebknecht's name in vain. Tactics in relation to some special question, or in relation to some detail of party organisation may be changed within twenty-four hours; but views as to whether a militant organisation, and political agitation among the masses, is necessary at all times or not cannot be changed in twenty-four hours, or even in twenty-four months for that matter. Only those who have no fixed ideas on anything might do a thing like that. It is absurd to refer to changed circumstances and succession of periods. Work for the establishment of a fighting organisation and political agitation must be carried on under all circumstances, no matter how "drab and peaceful" the times may be, and no matter how low the "depression of revolutionary spirit" has sunk. More than that, it is precisely in such conditions and in such periods that this work is particularly required; for it would be too late to start building such an organisation in the midst of uprisings and outbreaks. The organisation must be ready when that moment arrives and immediately develop its activity. "Change tactics in twenty-four hours!" In order to change tactics it is necessary first of all to have tactics, and without a strong organisation, tested in the political struggle carried on under all circumstances and in all periods, there can be no talk of a systematic plan of activity, enlightened by firm principles and unswervingly carried out, which alone is worthy of being called tactics. Think of it! We are now told that the "historical moment" has confronted our party with the "absolutely new" question of—terror! Yesterday the "absolutely new" question was the question of political organisation and agitation; to-day it is the question of terror! Does it not sound strange to hear people, who so completely fail to understand the relationship between the questions, arguing about radical changes in tactics?

Fortunately *Rabocheye Dyelo* is wrong. The question of terror is certainly not a new one, and it will be sufficient to recall briefly the long established views of Russian Social-Democracy on this question to prove it.

We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we ever do so. Terror is a form of military operations that may be usefully

applied, or may even be essential in certain moments of the battle, under certain conditions, and when the troops are in a certain condition. The point is, however, that terror is now advocated, not as one of the operations the army in the field must carry out in close contact with the main body and in harmony with the whole plan of battle, but as an individual attack, completely isolated from any army whatever. In view of the absence of a central revolutionary organisation, and the weakness of the local revolutionary organisations, terror cannot be anything else than that. That is why we declare that under present circumstances such a method of fighting is inopportune and inexpedient; it will distract the most active fighters from their present tasks, which are more important from the standpoint of the interests of the whole movement, and will disrupt, not the governmental forces, but the revolutionary forces. Recall recent events. Before our very eyes, broad masses of the urban workers and the urban "common people" rushed into battle, but the revolutionaries lacked a staff of leaders and organisers. Would not the departure of the most energetic revolutionaries to take up the work of terror under circumstances like these weaken the fighting detachments upon which alone serious hopes can be placed? Would it not threaten to break the contacts that exist between the revolutionary organisations and the disunited, discontented masses, who are expressing protest, and who are ready for the fight, but who are weak simply because they are disunited? And these contacts are the only guarantee of our success. We would not for one moment assert that individual acts of heroism are of no importance at all. But it is our duty to utter a strong warning against devoting all attention to terror, against regarding it as the principal method of struggle as so many at the present time are inclined to do. Terror can never become the regular means of warfare; at best, it can only be of use as one of the methods of a final onslaught. The question is, Can we, at the present time, *issue the call* to storm the fortress? Apparently *Rabocheye Dyelo* thinks we can. At all events, it exclaims: "Form into storming columns!" But this is merely a display of excessive zeal. Our military forces mainly consist of volunteers and rebels. We have only a few detachments of regular troops, and even these are not mobilised, not linked up with each other, and not trained to form into any kind of military column, let alone storming column. Under such circumstances, any one capable of taking a general view of the conditions

of our struggle, without losing sight of them at every "turn" in the historical progress of events, must clearly understand that at the present time our slogan cannot be "Storm the fortress," but should be "Organise properly the siege of the enemy fortress." In other words, the immediate task of our party is not to call up our available forces for an immediate attack, but to call for the establishment of a revolutionary organisation capable of combining all the forces and of leading the movement, not only in name but in deed, *i. e.*, an organisation that will be ready at any moment to support every protest and every outbreak, and to utilise these for the purpose of increasing and strengthening the military forces required for decisive battle.

The events of February and March have taught us such a thorough lesson that it is hardly likely that objection will be raised to the above conclusion on principle. But we are not called upon at the present moment to settle the question in principle but in practice. We must not only be clear in our minds as to the kind of organisation we must have and the kind of work we must do; we must also draw up a definite *plan* of organisation that will enable us to set to work to build it from all sides. In view of the urgency and importance of the question we have taken it upon ourselves to submit to our comrades the outlines of such a plan. We have described this plan in greater detail in a pamphlet now in preparation for the press.

In our opinion, the starting point of all our activities, the first practical step to take towards creating the organisation we desire, the factor which will enable us constantly to develop, broaden and deepen that organisation, is to establish a national (All-Russian) political newspaper. A paper is what we need above all; without it we cannot systematically carry on that extensive and theoretically sound propaganda and agitation which is the principal and constant duty of the Social-Democrats in general, and the essential task of the present moment in particular, when interest in politics and in questions of Socialism has been aroused among wide sections of the population. Never before has the need been so strongly felt for supplementing individual agitation in the form of personal influence, local leaflets, pamphlets, etc., by a general and regularly conducted agitation, such as can be carried on only with the assistance of a periodical press. It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that the frequency and regularity of the publication (and distribution) of the paper would serve as an exact measure of the

extent to which that primary and most essential branch of our militant activities has been firmly established. Moreover, the paper must be an All-Russian paper. Until we are able to exercise united influence upon the population and on the government with the aid of the press, it will be Utopian to think that we shall be able unitedly to exercise influence in more complex and difficult, but more effective forms. Our movement, intellectually as well as practically (organisationally), suffers most of all from being scattered, from the fact that the vast majority of Social-Democrats are almost entirely immersed in local work, which narrows their point-of-view, limits their activities and affects their conspiratorial skill and training. It is to this fact of being scattered that we must ascribe the vacillation and the hesitation to which I referred above. The *first step* towards removing this defect, and transforming several local movements into a united national (All-Russian) movement is the establishment of a national All-Russian newspaper. Finally, it is a *political* paper we need. Without a political organ, a political movement deserving that name is impossible in modern Europe. Unless we have such a paper, we shall be absolutely unable to fulfil our task, namely, to concentrate all the elements of political unrest and discontent, and with them enrich the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. The first step we have already accomplished. We have aroused in the working class a passion for "economic," factory, exposure. We have now to take the second step: To arouse in every section of the population that is at all enlightened a passion for *political* exposure. We must not allow ourselves to be discouraged by the fact that the voice of political exposure is still feeble, rare and timid. This is not because of a general submission to political despotism, but because those who are able and ready to expose have no tribune from which to speak, because there is no audience to listen eagerly to and approve of what the orators say, and because the latter can nowhere perceive among the people forces to whom it would be worth while directing their complaint against the "omnipotent" Russian government. But a change is now taking place, and a very rapid one. Such a force now exists—the revolutionary proletariat. It has demonstrated its readiness, not merely to listen to and to support an appeal for a political struggle, but to fight boldly in that struggle. We are now in a position to set up a tribune for the national exposure of the tsarist government, and it is our duty to do so. That tribune must

be a Social-Democratic paper. The Russian working class, unlike other classes and sections of Russian society, betrays a constant desire for political knowledge; they demand illegal literature, not only during periods of unusual unrest, but at all times. Given that demand, given the training of experienced revolutionary leaders which has already begun, and given the great concentration of the working class, which makes it the real master in the working-class quarters of large towns, in factory settlements and small industrial towns, the establishment of a political paper is a thing quite within the powers of the proletariat. Through the medium of the proletariat, the paper will penetrate to the urban petty bourgeoisie and to the village artisans and peasants, and will thus become a real national political paper.

But the rôle of a paper is not confined solely to the spreading of ideas, to political education, and to procuring political allies. A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser. In that respect, it can be compared to the scaffolding erected around a building in construction; it marks the contours of the structure, and facilitates communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour. With the aid of, and around, a paper, there will automatically develop an organisation that will be concerned, not only with local activities, but also with regular, general work; it will teach its members carefully to watch political events, to estimate their importance and their influence on the various sections of the population, and to devise suitable methods to influence these events through the revolutionary party. The mere technical problem of procuring a regular supply of material for the newspaper and its regular distribution will make it necessary to create a network of agents of a united party, who will be in close contact with each other, will be acquainted with the general situation, will be accustomed to fulfil the detailed functions of the national (All-Russian) work, and who will test their strength in the organisation of various kinds of revolutionary activities. This network of agents * will form the skeleton

* It is understood, of course, that these agents can act successfully only if they work in close conjunction with the local committees (groups or circles) of our party. Indeed, the whole plan we have sketched can be carried out, only with the most active support of the committees, which have already made more than one attempt to achieve a united party, and which, I am certain, sooner or later, and in one form or another, will achieve that unity.

of the organisation we need: namely, one that is sufficiently large to embrace the whole country; sufficiently wide and many-sided to effect a strict and detailed division of labour; sufficiently tried and tempered unswervingly to carry out its own work in its own way, in spite of all adversities, changes and surprises; sufficiently flexible to be able, if necessary, to renounce an open fight against overwhelming and concentrated forces, and yet capable of taking advantage of the awkwardness and immobility of the enemy and attack at a time and place where he least expects attack. To-day we are faced with the comparatively simple task of supporting students demonstrating in the streets of large towns; to-morrow, perhaps, we shall be faced with more difficult tasks, as for instance, supporting a movement of the unemployed in some locality or other. The day after to-morrow, perhaps, we may have to be ready at our posts, to take a revolutionary part in some peasants' revolt. To-day we must take advantage of the strained political situation created by the government's attack upon the Zemstvo. To-morrow, we may have to support the population in their protest against the outbreaks of some tsarist Bashi-Buzuk, and help, by boycott, agitation, demonstration, etc., to teach him such a lesson as will compel him to beat an open retreat. This stage of military preparedness can be reached only by the constant activity of a regular army. If we unite our forces for the conduct of a common paper, that work will prepare and bring forward, not only the most competent propagandists, but also the most skilled organisers and the most talented political party leaders, who will know at the right moment when to issue the call to battle, and will be capable of leading that battle.

In conclusion, we desire to say a few words in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. We have spoken all the time about systematic and methodical preparation, but we had no desire in the least to suggest that the autocracy may fall only as a result of a properly prepared *siege* or organised attack. Such a view would be stupid and doctrinaire. On the contrary, it is quite possible, and historically far more probable, that the autocracy will fall under the pressure of one of those spontaneous outbursts or unforeseen political complications which constantly threaten it from all sides. But no political party, if it desires to avoid adventurist tactics, can base its activities on expectations of such outbursts and com-

plications. We must proceed along our road, and steadily carry out our systematic work, and the less we count on the unexpected, the less likely are we to be taken by surprise by any "historical turn."

Iskra, No. 4, May, 1901.

ANOTHER MASSACRE

APPARENTLY, we are now passing through a period in which our labour movement will once again lead precipitously to acute conflicts, which terrify the government and the propertied classes, and rejoice and encourage the Socialists. Yes, we are rejoiced and encouraged by these conflicts, notwithstanding the numerous victims that fall by the hand of the military, because the working class is proving by its resistance that it is not reconciled to its position, refusing to remain in slavery, or to suffer violence and tyranny in silence. Even in the most peaceful times, the present system inevitably calls for great sacrifices on the part of the working class. Thousands and tens of thousands of men and women, toiling all their lives to create wealth for others, perish from starvation and constant under-feeding, prematurely die from diseases caused by the horrible conditions under which they work, and the wretched conditions in which they live and overwork. He who prefers death in the open struggle against those who defend and protect this horrible system, rather than the lingering death of a crushed, broken-down and submissive hag, deserves the title of hero a hundredfold. We do not say that scuffling with the police is the best form of struggle. On the contrary, we constantly tell the workers that it is in their interests to conduct the struggle in a more calm and restrained manner, and to strive to direct all discontent in support of the organised struggle of the revolutionary party. But the spirit of revolt now reigning among the working class is the principal source from which revolutionary Social-Democracy obtains its strength. In view of the environment of violence and oppression in which the workers live, this spirit cannot help breaking out from time to time in the form of desperate battles. These battles rouse the widest strata of the workers, who are oppressed by poverty and ignorance, to conscious life and stimulate in them a noble hatred of the oppressors and enemies of liberty. That is why the news of the massacre that took place at the Obukhov Works * on May 7 causes us to exclaim: "The workers' uprising has been suppressed; long live the workers' uprising!"

* A steel plant near St. Petersburg.—*Ed.*

There was a time, not very long ago, when workers' rebellions were rare exceptions, called forth only by very special circumstances. Now things have changed. A few years ago industry flourished, trade was brisk and there was a great demand for workers. Notwithstanding this, the workers organised a number of strikes in order to improve their conditions of labour. The workers realised that they must not lose the opportunity offered by the circumstances that the employers were making exceptionally high profits, that it was therefore easier to compel them to make concessions. But the boom has given way to depression. The manufacturers cannot sell their goods; their profits have declined; the number of bankruptcies has increased; production is being cut down; workers are being discharged wholesale and flung on to the street without a crust of bread. The workers have now to put up a desperate fight, not for the improvement of their conditions, but for the maintenance of the old conditions, and to resist the attacks the employers are making upon them in forcing them to bear their losses. Hence, the deepening and widening of the labour movement. At first the struggle was waged in exceptional and isolated cases. Then, during the industrial and commercial boom, followed a period of unceasing and stubborn battles, and, finally, a similar unceasing and stubborn struggle in the period of depression. Now we may say that the labour movement has become a permanent feature of our public life, and that it will grow no matter what the circumstances may be.

But the passing of the boom, and the coming of the crisis, will not only teach our workers that united struggle has now become a necessity for them, it will also destroy the harmful illusions that began to be fostered in the period of the industrial boom. In some places, the workers were able by means of strikes to compel the masters to make concessions with comparative ease, and the significance of this "economic" struggle began to be exaggerated; the workers began to forget that trade unionism and strikes, at best, can only enable them to obtain slightly better terms of sale for their commodity—labour power. Trade unions and strikes become impotent when, owing to depression, there is no demand for this "commodity." They are unable to remove the conditions which convert labour power into a commodity, and which doom the masses of the toilers to poverty and unemployment. To remove these conditions, it is necessary to conduct a revolutionary struggle against the whole existing social and political system, and the industrial

crisis will compel many, many workers to realise the truth of this.

Let us return to the massacre of May 7. We report below the information we have received concerning the May strikes and the unrest among the St. Petersburg workers.[51] Here we shall examine the police report of the massacre of May 7.[52] Lately we have learned to see somewhat through government (and police) reports of strikes, demonstrations and the conflicts with the police. We have collected enough material to enable us to judge of the accuracy of these reports, and sometimes we are able to catch glimpses of the fire of popular indignation burning behind the smoke screen of police falsehoods.

On May 7 [says the official report] about two hundred workers, employed in the Obukhov Steel Works, in the village of Alexandrovsk on the Schlüsselburg Highroad, stopped work after the dinner recess, and in the course of their interview with the chief of the Works, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov, put forward a number of groundless demands.

If the workers stopped work without giving the required two-weeks' notice—assuming that the stoppage was not caused by illegal acts committed by the employers, which is not infrequently the case —then even according to the Russian laws (which recently have become more stringent against the workers), they have merely committed a common offence liable to prosecution before a magistrate. But the Russian government is making itself more and more ridiculous by its stringency. On the one hand, laws are passed which create new crimes (for example, wilful refusal to work, or assembling in crowds, resulting in damage to property or in resistance to armed force), the penalties for strikes are increased, etc., while on the other hand, the physical and political possibility of applying these laws and imposing penalties that are reasonable, are removed. It is physically impossible to prosecute thousands and tens of thousands of men for refusing to work, for strikes, or for "assembling in crowds." It is politically impossible to try each separate case, because, however carefully the judges may be selected, and no matter what efforts are made to avoid publicity, still, it will remain a semblance of a trial, and, of course, not a "trial" of the workers, but of the government. Thus, the criminal laws passed for the special purpose of facilitating the government's *political struggle* against the proletariat (and at the same time to *conceal* its political character by "reasons of state" in regard to "public order," etc.) are unavoidably forced into the background by the *direct* political struggle and open street battles. "Justice" throws off the mask of

majesty and impartiality, and turns to flight, leaving the field to the police, the gendarmes and Cossacks, who are greeted with a hail of stones.

Take the government's reference to the "demands" of the workers. From the standpoint of the law, cessation of work is a misdemeanour, irrespective of the character of the demands put forward by the workers. But the government has thrown away its chance of standing on the law which it recently passed, and now tries to justify the punishment inflicted with "the means at its disposal" by declaring that the demands of the workers were unjustified. But who were the judges in this affair? Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov, the assistant chief of the Works, *i. e.*, one of the officials against whom the workers complained! It is not surprising, therefore, that the workers retort to such explanations by throwing stones!

Thus, when the workers poured into the street and held up the street cars, a real battle commenced. Apparently the workers fought with all their might for they *twice* succeeded in beating off the attack of the police, the gendarmes, the mounted guards, and the armed factory guard,* notwithstanding the fact that they were armed only with stones. It is true, if the police reports can be believed, "several shots" rang out from among the crowd, but no one was injured by these shots. Stones, however, fell "like hail," and the workers not only put up a stubborn resistance, but displayed resourcefulness and ability in adapting themselves to conditions and selecting the best form of fighting. They occupied the neighbouring courtyards and *from over the fences* poured a hail of stones upon the Tsar's Bashi-Buzuks, so that even *after* three volleys had been fired, as a result of which one man was killed (only one?) and eight (?) wounded (one died on the following day), even after these volleys had been fired and the crowd had fled, the fight still continued and a company of the Omsk Infantry Regiment had to be called out to "clear the neighbouring courtyards of workers."

The government emerged victorious. But victories like these will bring the government nearer to its ultimate defeat. Every fight

* The government communication states that "the armed factory guard" "were already in readiness in the factory yard," whereas the gendarmes, mounted guards and the city police were called out later. Since when and why was an *armed* guard maintained *in readiness* in the factory yard? Was it since May 1? Did they expect a labour demonstration? That we do not know; but it is beyond doubt that the government is deliberately concealing information in its possession, which explains why the discontent and indignation of the workers was roused, and grew.

with the people will tend still more to rouse the workers to indignation and stimulate them to fight; it will bring to the front more experienced, better armed, and bolder leaders. We have already had occassion to discuss the plan which these leaders should strive to carry out. We have on more than one occasion pointed to the necessity for a sound revolutionary organisation. But in connection with the events of May 7, we must take care not to lose sight of the following:

Much has been said recently about the impossibility and the hopelessness of street fighting against modern troops. This has been particularly insisted upon by the wise "critics," who have advanced the old stuff of bourgeois science in the guise of new, impartial, scientific conclusions, and in doing so distort what Engels said, with reference only to the temporary tactics of the German Social-Democrats. And even then he said this with certain reservations.[53] But even isolated battles demonstrate how absurd these arguments are. Street fighting is possible. It is not the position of the fighters, but the position of the government that is hopeless if it has to deal with larger numbers than those employed in a single factory. In the battle on May 7, the workers had no other weapons at their command than stones, and, of course, the mere prohibition of the governor of the city will not prevent them next time from securing other weapons. The workers were unprepared, and numbered only three-and-a-half thousand. Nevertheless, they repelled the attack of several hundred mounted guards, gendarmes, city police and infantry. Did the police find it an easy task to storm even *one* house, No. 63 Schlüsselburg Highroad? Will it be easy to "clear" of workers not one or two courtyards, but whole blocks in the working-class districts of St. Petersburg? When the decisive battle takes place, will it not be necessary to "*clear*" houses and courtyards of the capital, not only of workers, but of all those who have not forgotten the atrocious massacre of March 4, who have not become reconciled with the police government, but who are merely frightened for the time being, and have not yet acquired confidence in their own strength?

Comrades! Collect the names of those killed and wounded on May 7. All the workers of the capital must honour the memory of these men, and prepare for the decisive battle against the police government for the liberty of the people!

Iskra, No. 5, June, 1901.

THE PERSECUTORS OF THE ZEMSTVO AND THE HANNIBALS OF LIBERALISM [54]

It has been said of the Russian peasant that he is poorest of all in the consciousness of his poverty, and of the ordinary Russian citizen, or subject, it may be said that while he lacks civil liberties he is particularly lacking in the consciousness of being deprived of his rights. Just as the muzhik has grown accustomed to his wretched poverty, has grown accustomed to live his life without pondering over his wretchedness, or of the possibility of removing it, so the plain Russian citizen, accustomed to the omnipotence of the government, is accustomed to live on without giving a thought to the possibility of the government being able to exist much longer, and to the things going on around him which were undermining the antiquated political system. Usually, the best "antidote" against this political apathy and somnolence are the "secret documents" * which reveal that desperate cut-throats and confirmed enemies of the government are not the only ones who realise the tottering state of the autocracy, but that the members of the government itself, including the cabinet ministers and the Tsar himself, realise this and are seeking for ways and means to improve the situation which to them is totally unsatisfactory. One of these documents is the memorandum drawn up by Witte, who, having quarrelled with the Minister of the Interior, Goryemykin over the question of introducing Zemstvo institutions in the remote provinces, decided to demonstrate his penetration and loyalty to the autocracy by drawing up an indictment against the Zemstvo.**

The charge levelled against the Zemstvo is that it is incompatible with autocracy, that by its very nature it is constitutional, that its existence will inevitably give rise to friction and conflict between the representatives of the public and the government. The indictment

* I refer, of course, only to the "antidote" represented by the publications in the press which are by no means the only or even the most "powerful" antidotes.

** *The Autocracy and the Zemstvo*, A Confidential Memorandum by the Minister of Finance, S. U. Witte, with a preface and annotations by R. N. S. Published by *Zarya* [*Dawn*], Stuttgart, Verlag von J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1901, xliv-212 pp.

is drawn up on the basis of (relatively) extensive and fairly well studied material, and as it is an indictment concerning a political matter (and a rather peculiar one) we may be sure that it will be read with no less interest and benefit than the acts of indictment in political trials that used to be published in the newspapers.

I

We shall go into the question as to whether the assertion that our Zemstvo is constitutional is justified by the facts, and if so, to what extent, and in what sense.

In this matter, the epoch in which the Zemstvo was introduced is of particular importance. The fall of serfdom was a historical event of such magnitude that it inevitably tore down the police veil which concealed the class antagonisms that existed. The most united, and best educated class, and the one most accustomed to political power—the nobility—displayed a very definite striving to restrict the power of the autocracy by means of representative institutions. The reference to this fact in Witte's Memorandum is extremely instructive. He says: "Declarations concerning the necessity for 'representation for the nobility,' and concerning 'the right of the Russian nation to elect its representatives to the high councils of the state' were made at assemblies of the nobles as far back as 1859-1860." "Even the word 'Constitution' was uttered." * "Several Provincial Committees for Peasants' Affairs and individual members of committees called before the drafting committee, urged the necessity for calling the people to participate in the administration. 'Deputies are openly striving for a Constitution,' wrote Nikitenko in his diary in 1859."

When, after the promulgation of the Regulation of February 19, 1861, these hopes entertained in the autocracy proved far from being realised, and, moreover, when the Regulation was being carried out, and the more "red" elements in the administration (like N. Milyutin) were removed, the movement in favour of "Representation" became more unanimous. It found expression in resolutions moved in many assemblies of nobles in 1862, and in petitions drawn up by assemblies of nobles in Novgorod, Tula, Smolensk, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tver. The most remarkable of these petitions is the Moscow petition, which pleaded for local self-government, public trials, redemption of peasant lands, publication of budgets, freedom of the press and for the

* Dragomanov, *Zemstvo Liberalism in Russia*, p. 4. In his Memorandum, Witte sometimes fails to mention that he has quoted from Dragomanov [see, for example, pp. 36-37 and 55-56 of the Memorandum], although he refers to him in some other passages.

convening in Moscow of a *Zemskaya Duma* (National Council) representing all classes for the purpose of drawing up a complete system of reforms. The most resolute of all were the resolution passed and the petition drawn up by the nobility of Tver on February 2, urging the necessity for the introduction of a number of civil and economic reforms (for example, equality of rights for all estates, redemption of peasant lands) and the convocation of representatives of the whole nation as the only means for satisfactorily settling the questions raised, but not settled in the Regulation of February 19.*

In spite of the administrative and judicial penalties inflicted on the initiators of the Tver Petition ** [not for the petition itself, but for the sharply expressed reasons given for the collective resignation of the civil arbitrators], declarations in the same spirit were made at various assemblies of nobles in 1862 and the beginning of 1863, at which projects for local self-government were also drawn up.

At the same time, the constitutional movement was carried on among the "lower orders" and found expression there in secret societies and manifestoes more or less revolutionary: *Velikoruss* [*Great Russian*] [57] (between August and November, 1861, officers like Obruchev and others took part in its publication), *Zemskaya Duma* [1862],[58] *Zemlya i Volya* [*Land and Freedom*] [1862-63].[59] *Velikoruss* published a draft petition which, as many people said, was to have been submitted to the Tsar, as was stated by many during the celebrations of the thousandth anniversary of Russia in August, 1862. In this draft petition, it was stated *inter alia:* "May it please Your Majesty to convene in one of the capitals of our Russian motherland, in Moscow or in St. Petersburg, the representatives of the Russian nation in order that they may draw up a Constitution for Russia. . . ." ***

If we recall also the proclamation issued by Young Russia,[60] the numerous arrests and draconic punishments inflicted upon the "political" criminals (Obruchev, Mikhailov, and others) crowned by the illegal sentence of penal servitude inflicted upon Chernyshevsky after a mockery of a trial, we shall have a complete picture of the

* Dragomanov, p. 5. Cited in an abridged form in Witte's Memorandum, p. 64, with a reference to Dragomanov and to the *Kolokol* [*Bell*], No. 126,[55] quoted by Dragomanov, and to *Revue des deux Mondes*, June 15, 1862.[56]

** One of the initiators of this petition, Nikolai Alexandrovich Bakunin, the younger brother of the celebrated M. A. Bakunin, passed away recently (April 19, this year, *i. e.*, 1901) on his estate in the province of Tver. Nikolai Alexandrovich signed the petition of 1862, together with his younger brother Alexei and others. This petition, relates the author of a memoir on N. A. Bakunin, published in one of our newspapers, called down punishment upon its signatories. After a year's confinement in the fortress of Peter and Paul the signatories were released, but Nikolai Alexandrovich and his brother Alexei were not pardoned (they had not signed the petition for pardon) and as a consequence, were prohibited from holding public offices. After that, N. A. never appeared, nor could he appear in public again. . . . This is how our government punished the lawful actions of the landed nobility after "the great reforms"! And this was in 1862, prior to the Polish rebellion, at a time when even Katkov proposed the convocation of an All-Russian National Assembly.

*** See V. Burtsev, *One Hundred Years*, p. 39.

social situation which gave rise to the Zemstvo reform. In stating in his Memorandum that "the idea underlying the establishment of Zemstvo institutions was undoubtedly a political one," that governing circles "undoubtedly took into consideration" the liberal and constitutionalist aspirations of the people, Witte states only *half* the truth. The formal official attitude towards social phenomena, which the author reveals everywhere, is revealed also in this Memorandum by the fact that he ignores the *revolutionary movement*, and by the manner in which he obscures the draconic measures of repression by means of which the government *protected* itself against the attacks of the revolutionary "party." True, from our modern point-of-view, it sounds strange to speak of a revolutionary "party" and of its attacks in the beginning of the sixties. After forty years of historical experience, we have become more exacting in regard to what may be described as a revolutionary movement and revolutionary attacks. But it must not be forgotten that at that time, after thirty years of the régime of Nicholas I, no one could determine the real strength of resistance of the government, and the real strength of popular indignation.

The revival of the democratic movement in Europe, the Polish ferment, discontent in Finland, the demands for political reforms made by the whole of the press, and by the whole of the nobility, the widespread distribution over the whole of Russia by the *Kolokol* of the powerful appeals of Chernyshevsky, who revealed an ability even in censored articles to train *revolutionaries*, the appearance of leaflets, the rousing of the peasantry, who "very frequently" * were

* L. Panteleyev, *Reminiscences of the Sixties*, p. 315. Collection of essays entitled: *At the Glorious Post*.[61] This short article contains a number of very interesting facts concerning the revolutionary unrest in 1861-62 and the police reaction. . . . "In the beginning of 1862 the public atmosphere was extremely tense. The slightest incident might have given a strong impetus to the progress of events in one or another direction. This impetus was given by the great fires in St. Petersburg in May, 1862." These fires first broke out on May 16 and raged with particular severity on May 22 and 23. On the latter date, there were five conflagrations. On May 28, the Apraxin house was burnt to the ground together with a wide area surrounding it. These conflagrations were attributed by the populace to the students, and these rumours were repeated in the newspapers. The manifesto issued by Young Russia, proclaiming sanguinary war against the whole existing system and justifying every means directed towards this purpose, was taken to confirm the rumours of deliberate incendiarism. "After May 28, something in the nature of martial law was proclaimed in St. Petersburg." A special committee was established with powers to take extraordinary measures for the protection of the capital. The city was divided into three districts, each under the control of a military

compelled to accept the regulation by means of armed force and bloodshed, the refusal of the civil arbitrators among the nobility to apply *such* a regulation, and the student disorders—created conditions which would lead even the most cautious and sober politician to believe that a revolutionary outbreak was possible and a peasant revolt an extremely serious danger. Under such conditions, an autocratic government which regarded its lofty mission to be to protect at all costs the omnipotence and irresponsibility of the court camarilla and of the army of official leeches, and to support the worst representatives of the exploiting classes—such a government, *could not act otherwise* than ruthlessly destroy individuals, the conscious and indomitable enemies of tyranny and exploitation (*i. e.*, the "ringleaders," "revolutionary parties"), and terrify and bribe by small concessions the masses of the discontented. Penal servitude for those who prefer to remain silent rather than give utterance to stupid or hypocritical phrases about the "great emancipation"; reforms (*innocuous for the autocracy and the exploiting classes*) for those who spouted about the liberalism of the government, and who expressed enthusiasm for this era of progress.

We do not wish to assert that these calculated reactionary police tactics were clearly conceived and systematically pursued by all, or even by a number of the members of the ruling clique. Certain of these members could not, because of their narrowness of mind, grasp

governor. A field court-martial was set up to try cases connected with the conflagrations. The *Sovremennik* [*Contemporary*] [62] and *Russkoye Slovo* [*Russian Word*] [63] were suspended for eight months, and *Dyen* [*Day*],[64] published by Aksakov, was suppressed. Stringent temporary press regulations (these were sanctioned already on May 12, *i. e., before the fires broke out.* Consequently, "the progress of events" proceeded in the direction of reaction, also irrespectively of the fires, the opinion of M. Panteleyev notwithstanding), and regulations for the surveillance of printing offices were issued. Numerous arrests of a political nature were made (Chernishevsky and N. Serno-Solovyovich, Rymarenko and others). Sunday schools and public libraries were closed, restrictions were placed on the arrangement of public lectures in St. Petersburg, the second department of the Literature Fund and even the Chess Club were closed down.

The Committee of Enquiry failed to establish any connection between the fires and politics. One of the members of the committee, Stolbovsky, related to Panteleyev that in the committee "he succeeded in exposing the principal false witnesses who, it seems, were simply instruments of police agents" (325-326). Thus, there are weighty grounds for believing that the rumours about *the incendiarism of the students were circulated by the police.* It would appear, therefore, that the despicable exploitation of the ignorance of the people for the purpose of slandering revolutionaries and radicals was in full swing at the height of the "epoch of great reforms."

the significance of these tactics as a whole. Being childishly enthusiastic about "liberalism," they failed to observe the police mantle that covered it. Taken as a whole, however, there is no doubt that the collective experience and collective sense of the rulers compelled them to pursue these tactics unswervingly. Not in vain did the grandees and notables undergo a prolonged police training in the service of Nicholas. In fact, we may say that they were case-hardened, they went through every possible ordeal. They remembered how the sovereigns at one time flirted with liberalism, and at another acted as the executioners of the Radishchevs and "baited" the loyal Arakcheyevs. They remembered December 14, 1825, and performed the same function as the gendarme of Europe which the Russian government performed in 1848-1849. The historical experience of autocracy not only compelled the government to pursue the tactics of intimidation and corruption, but also compelled many independent liberals to recommend these tactics to the government. In proof of this, we shall quote the opinions of Koshelev and Kavelin. In his pamphlet, *Constitution, Autocracy and the National Assembly* [Leipzig, 1862], A. Koshelev expresses *opposition* to a constitution, advocates the convening of a National Advisory Council, and anticipates the following objection:

> To convene a National Council means to lead Russia towards revolution, *i. e.*, to repeat in Russia the états généraux [65] which were subsequently transformed into the Convention and which was brought to an end by the events of 1792, the proscriptions, the guillotine, the *noyades* [drownings],[66] etc. "No, gentlemen," replies Koshelev, "it will not be the convocation of a National Assembly that will prepare the ground for revolution, as you understand it. Revolution will come much more surely and rapidly as a result of the hesitating and contradictory actions of the government—one step forward, one step backward—the orders and laws impossible of execution, the restraints placed upon thought and speech; the police (open, and what is still worse, secret) surveillance over the actions of the estates and of private persons, the petty persecution of certain personalities, the plunder of the treasury, the squandering of public funds and granting of rewards, the incapacity of statesmen and their alienation from Russia, etc., etc. Revolution (again as you understand it) will come more surely in a country just awakening from centuries of oppression, military executions, casemates and banishment—for neglected wounds are incomparably more sensitive and painful than fresh wounds. But have no fear, the revolution, which, as you suppose, was brought about in France by journalists and other writers, will not break out in Russia. Let us also hope that no society of desperate hotheads, who select assassination as a means of achieving their aims, will be formed in Russia (although it is more difficult to vouch for that). What is more probable and dangerous is that, influenced by the split and unobserved by the rural urban and secret police, an alliance will be established between the peasants and townspeople to which the young and old people, writers and

adherents of the *Velikoruss,* Young Russia, etc., will flock. Such an all-destructive alliance advocating equality, not before the law, but in spite of the law [what matchless liberalism! We, of course, are in favour of equality, but not of equality *in spite of* the law—the law which destroys equality!], not the national historical commune but a monstrous progeny of it, and the rule, not of reason, which certain statesmen fear so much, but the rule of brute force, which these statesmen so readily employ—such an alliance, I say, is far more probable in Russia, and may be far more powerful than the moderate, reasonable and independent opposition to the government which our bureaucrats hate so much, and which they try so hard to restrict and suppress. Do not imagine that the party of the secret, and anonymous press at home is numerically weak; do not imagine that you have plucked it out root and branch. No! By preventing the youth from completing their education, by treating youthful pranks as if they were political crimes, by petty persecution and police surveillance you have increased the strength of this party tenfold, and have spread and multiplied it over the whole Empire. What will our statesmen do when there is an outbreak as a consequence of such an alliance? Will they resort to armed force? But will that be absolutely reliable?" [pp. 49-51].

Out of the pompous phrases of this tirade clearly emerge the following tactics: Destroy the "hotheads" and adherents of the "alliance between the peasants and the petty-bourgeois townspeople" and satisfy and disunite the "reasonable and moderate opposition" by means of concessions. But the government proved to be cleverer and more agile than Mr. Koshelev and his ilk imagined, and conceded much less than an "Advisory" National Council.

Here is an excerpt from a private letter written by K. D. Kavelin to Herzen dated August 6, 1862:

. . . The news from Russia is not so bad, in my opinion. It was not Nicholas Solovyovich that was arrested, but Alexander. The arrests do not surprise me and, I confess, do not seem to me to be outrageous. A revolutionary party considers every means to overthrow the government justified, while the government defends itself by every means at its disposal. Arrests and banishment under the reign of the despicable Nicholas were quite another thing. People then died for their ideas, for their convictions, for their faith and their utterances. I would like to see you in the place of the government, and see what you would do against a party that is secretly and openly working against you. I love Chernyshevsky very, very much, but never in my life have I seen such a brouillon (an irascible, unsociable, termagant, a sower of discord), such a tactless and cock-sure man. To perish in vain, for absolutely no reason at all! There cannot be the least doubt now that the conflagrations have some connection with the manifestoes.*

* We quote from the German translation of Dragomanov's edition of the correspondence of K. D. Kavelin and I. S. Turgenyev with A. I. Herzen[67]: *Bibliothek russischer Denkwürdigkeiten,* herausgegeben von Th. Schiemann, Stuttgart, 1894, Bd. 4, pp. 65-66.

What an example of servile-professorial profundity! The people that are to blame for everything are the revolutionaries who are conceited enough to hiss at phrasemongering liberals; who are such termagants as to work secretly and openly against the government, and are so tactless as to get themselves incarcerated in the fortress of Peter and Paul. Even he, the liberal professor, would punish people like these "with all the means at his disposal" were he in power.

II

Thus, the Zemstvo reform was one of the concessions which the storm of public indignation and of revolutionary attack has captured from the autocratic government. We have dealt with the character of this attack in detail in order to supplement and correct the picture outlined in the Memorandum by its bureaucratic author, who obscured the struggle which gave rise to this concession. Nevertheless, the half-hearted and pusillanimous character of this concession is fairly clearly described in the Memorandum:

> At first, when the Zemstvo reform was just being undertaken, it was no doubt intended as a first step toward the introduction of representative institutions * but later on, when Count Lanskoy and N. A. Milyutin replaced Count Valuyev, the desire was very distinctly revealed to act in a spirit of "conciliation," "softly and evasively," as even the ex-Minister of the Interior admits.[68] "The government did not have a clear idea of its aims, he said at the time. In a word, an attempt was made, as is unfortunately frequently done by statesmen and always ends badly for every one—an attempt to act evasively between two opposite opinions, and while satisfying liberal aspirations, to preserve the existing system. . . ."

The pharisaical word "unfortunately" is highly diverting. A minister of the police government describes as casual tactics which the government *was compelled* to pursue and which it did pursue in passing the factory inspection acts, the limitation of hours act (June 2, 1897), and which tactics it is pursuing now (1901) in General Vanovsky's flirtation with the "public."

> On the one hand, it is stated in the explanatory Memorandum attached to the regulations governing Zemstvo institutions that the purpose of the proposed law was to develop as completely and as consistently as possible the

* There is "no doubt" that the author of the Memorandum in employing the language of Leroy-Beaulieu commits the usual bureaucratic exaggeration. There is "no doubt" that neither Lanskoy nor Milyutin had anything very definite in their minds at all, and it is ridiculous to regard the evasive phrases of Milyutin ("in principle in favour of the Constitution, but regards its introduction as premature") as a "first step."

principle of local self-government, and that "the Zemstvo administration is merely a special organ of the state authority. . . ." *Severnaya Pochta,* [*Northern Post*],[69] then the organ of the Ministry of the Interior, broadly hinted that the institutions to be established were to serve as schools for representative institutions.

On the other hand . . . the Zemstvo institutions are described in the explanatory Memorandum as private and public institutions, subject to the general laws in the same way as individual societies and private persons are subject to them. . . .

The Regulation of 1864, and particularly of the subsequent measures adopted by the Ministry of the Interior in relation to the Zemstvo institutions, clearly indicate that the "independence" of the Zemstvo institutions was very much feared, and that the government hesitated to create opportunities for the proper development of these institutions, because it was *fully aware of what that would lead to.* [Our italics throughout.]. . . . There is no doubt that those who had to carry out the Zemstvo reform did so *merely as a concession to public opinion* in order, as was stated in the explanatory Memorandum, "to put a limit to the *unrealisable expectations and radical aspirations which have been roused among the various classes of the population* by the establishment of the Zemstvo institutions. At the same time these people fully understood it [the reform?] and *strove to prevent the proper development of the Zemstvo,* to give it a private character, restrict its powers, etc. While pacifying the liberals with a promise that the first step will not be the last, and declaring, or it would be more true to say, repeating to the adherents of the liberal tendency that it was necessary to grant the Zemstvo institutions real and independent powers, Count Valuyev, *in the very act of drafting the Regulation of 1864, strove in every way to restrict their powers and place them under strict administrative surveillance. . . .*

Bereft of a single guiding idea, representing a compromise between two opposite tendencies, the Zemstvo institutions, in the form in which they were established by the Regulation of 1864, proved, when the regulations began to be applied, unsuitable for the fundamental idea of local self-government, on which they were based, as well as for the administrative system into which they were mechanically placed; for the administrative system was neither reformed nor adapted to the new conditions of life. The Regulation of 1864 tried to reconcile the irreconcilable, and in that way to satisfy both the advocates and opponents of Zemstvo self-government. *The former were offered superficialities and hopes for the future, while in order to satisfy the latter the powers of the Zemstvo institutions were defined in an extremely elastic manner. . . .*

Our ministers accidently say some very apt things when they desire to put a spoke in the wheel of one of their colleagues, and to display their profundity. It would be a useful thing if every one of our large-hearted Russian folk and if all the admirers of the "great" reforms, put up on the walls of their house in a golden frame the wise police texts: "Pacify the liberals with a promise that the first step will not be the last." "Offer" them "superficialities and hopes for the future!" It would be particularly useful at the present time to refer to these texts when reading in the newspapers articles or news about General Vanovsky's "cordial solicitude."

Thus, right from the very beginning, the Zemstvo was doomed to serve as a fifth wheel in the Russian state administration, a wheel *tolerated* by the bureaucracy only in so far as it would not disturb its authority, while the rôle of the people's representatives was restricted to the simple technical fulfilment of the functions determined by this very bureaucracy. The Zemstvos had no executive organs of their own. They had to act through the police. They had no inter-communication with each other, and they were immediately placed under the control of the administration. Having made such an innocuous concession, the government, on the very day after the establishment of the Zemstvos, began systematically to impose restrictions upon them. The almighty bureaucratic clique *could not* reconcile themselves to the principle of universally elected representation, and commenced to persecute them in every possible way. The facts compiled concerning this persecution, while obviously incomplete, represent a very interesting part of the Memorandum.

We have seen how pusillanimous and senseless was the attitude of the liberals towards the revolutionary movement in the beginning of the sixties. Instead of supporting the "alliance" of the petty-bourgeois townspeople and the peasants with the adherents of *Velikoruss*, they feared this "alliance" and held it up as a bogey with which to scare the government. Instead of rising to the defence of the ringleaders of the democratic movement, who were being persecuted by the government, they pharisaically washed their hands of them, and approved the action of the government. This treacherous policy of pompous eloquence and shameful decrepitude met with just punishment. Having settled accounts with those who not only talked but *fought* for liberty, the government felt sufficiently strong to squeeze the liberals even out of the minor and inferior position which they had occupied "with the permission of the government." As long as the "alliance of the petty-bourgeois townspeople and the peasants" with the revolutionaries represented a serious menace the Minister of Internal Affairs himself mumbled words about "schools of representative institutions," but when the "tactless and cock-sure" termagants who dared to hiss at cabinet ministers had been removed, the "school boys" were unceremoniously taken in hand. Then commenced a tragi-comical epic: the Zemstvos appealed for an extension of powers; in the meantime, they were continuously being *deprived* of one right after another, and their petitions were replied to in "fatherly" homilies. But let the his-

torical dates, even as they are quoted in the Memorandum, speak for themselves.

On October 12, 1866, the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular order placing the employees of the Zemstvo in the position of complete dependence upon the government institutions. On October 21, 1866, a law was passed restricting the powers of the Zemstvo in collecting local taxes from commercial and industrial establishments. The St. Petersburg Zemstvo Assembly, in 1867, sharply criticised this law, and (on the proposal of Count A. P. Shuvalov) passed a resolution calling upon the government to arrange for a discussion of the questions touched upon by this law to take place "with the combined forces and simultaneous efforts of the central administration and the Zemstvo." The government replied to this petition by closing down the St. Petersburg Zemstvo institutions, and by acts of repression: the chairman of the St. Petersburg Zemstvo Administration, Kruse, was banished to Orenburg, Count Shuvalov was banished to Paris, Senator Luboshchinsky was ordered to resign. *Severnaya Pochta*, the organ of the Ministry of the Interior, published an article in which it was stated that "these stern measures of punishment were inflicted because the Zemstvo Assembly, from the very opening of its sessions, acted contrary to the law [contrary to what law? and why were they not brought to *trial?* Only just before that, trials,—speedy, just and merciful,—had been introduced!] and instead of supporting the Zemstvo Assemblies of other provinces, utilising for that purpose the rights which His Majesty has graciously granted them for exercising proper care over the local economic interests of the Zemstvo in their charge [*i. e.*, instead of being humbly submissive and pursuing the "aims" of the officials] they continuously displayed an effort, by misinterpreting the case and improperly interpreting the laws, *to rouse sentiments of mistrust and lack of respect towards the government.*" [70] After such a talking to, it is not surprising that "the other Zemstvos failed to support the St. Petersburg Zemstvo although the law of November 21, 1866, roused universal dissatisfaction, and at the meetings, it was stated that it was tantamount to destroying the Zemstvo."

On December 16, 1866, the Senate issued an interpretation from which it followed that provincial governors had the right to refuse to endorse any person elected by a Zemstvo Assembly that the respective governor deemed unreliable. On May 4, 1867, the Senate

issued another interpretation to the effect that the communication of Zemstvo proposals to other provinces is contrary to the law, for Zemstvo institutions must concern themselves only with local affairs. On June 13, 1867, the Council of State issued an opinion which received the sanction of the emperor, prohibiting the publication of resolutions, minutes, reports of discussions, etc., of the public meetings of rural, urban and estate assemblies without the consent of the provincial authorities. At the same time, this law extended the powers of chairmen of Zemstvo Assemblies; it granted them the right to close meetings at their discretion, and imposed upon them the obligation, *under threat of punishment,* to close any meeting at which questions were discussed contrary to the law. The public greeted this measure with hostility, and regarded it as a serious restriction of Zemstvo activity. "Every one knows," wrote Nikitenko in his diary, "that the Zemstvos are tied hand and foot by the new regulations which give the chairmen of assemblies, the provincial governors, almost unlimited powers over the Zemstvo." A circular of October 8, 1868, makes it obligatory to obtain the consent of the provincial governor for the publication even of the reports of the Zemstvo administrations and restricts inter-communication between Zemstvos. In 1869, the office of inspector of elementary schools was created for the purpose of taking the effective management of elementary education out of the hands of the Zemstvos. A regulation issued by the council of ministers on September 19, 1869, which received imperial assent, declares that "neither in their composition nor in their fundamental principles are Zemstvo institutions governmental authorities." The law of July 4, 1870, and the circular issued on October 22, 1870, confirm and increase the subordination of Zemstvo employees to the provincial governor. In 1871, instructions were issued to the inspectors of elementary schools empowering them to dismiss teachers who were deemed politically unreliable, to suspend any decision of the school councils, and to submit the case in question for decision to the school guardians. On December 25, 1873, Alexander II, in a rescript addressed to the Minister of Education, expresses the fear that *unless proper guardianship and observation is exercised over them,* the elementary schools may become converted "*into an instrument for the moral corruption of the people, towards which attempts have already been made,*" and orders the marshals of the nobility, by their close co-operation, to preserve the moral influence

of the schools. In 1874, a new regulation concerning the elementary schools was passed, which placed the management of the schools entirely in the hands of the school directors. The Zemstvo "protests,"—if a petition pleading that the law be revised, and that the representatives of the Zemstvo take part in this revision (the petition of the Kazan Zemstvo in 1874), can, without irony, be described as a protest. Of course, the petition was rejected. Etc., etc.

III

Such was the first lesson given to Russian citizens in the "school of representative institutions" opened by the Ministry of the Interior. Fortunately, in addition to the political school boys who, in connection with the constitutional declarations of the sixties wrote: "It is time to give up all nonsense, and get to business, and the business is now in the Zemstvo institutions and nowhere else," * there were in Russia the quarrelsome people, who were not satisfied with such "tact," and who carried on revolutionary propaganda among the people. Nothwithstanding the fact that they adhered to a theory, which in substance was not revolutionary, their propaganda roused a spirit of discontent and protest among broad strata of the educated youth. Despite the Utopian character of their theories, which rejected political struggle, the movement led to desperate battles between the government and a handful of heroes, to a struggle for political liberty. Thanks to this struggle, and to this struggle alone, the situation again changed; the government was compelled once again to make concessions, and once again liberal society revealed its political immaturity, its incapacity to support the fighters, and bring real pressure to bear upon the government. The constitutional aspirations of the Zemstvo became very marked, but these proved to be just a weak "impulse," in spite of the fact that Zemstvo liberalism in itself had made decided political progress. Particularly noteworthy was its attempt to establish an illegal party, and to set up its own political organ. In his Memorandum, Witte gives a list of some of these illegal productions (those written by Kennan, Dragomanov, Tikhomirov), in order to demonstrate the "slippery slope" (p. 98) upon which the Zemstvo had stepped. At the end

* A letter written by Kavelin to his relatives in 1865, in which he refers to the petition of the Moscow nobility for "the convocation of a general assembly of representatives of the land of Russia to discuss needs common to the whole state." [71]

of the seventies, several congresses of Zemstvo liberals were held. The liberals decided "to take measures to bring about at least a temporary cessation of the destructive activities of the extreme revolutionary party, for they were convinced that nothing will be achieved by peaceful means, if the terrorists continue to irritate and alarm the government by menaces and acts of violence" (p. 99). Thus, instead of making an effort to extend the struggle, to secure the widest possible public support for individual revolutionaries, organising some sort of public pressure (in the form of demonstrations, the refusal of the Zemstvo to carry out compulsory expenditures, etc.), the liberals again appealed for "tact," "not to irritate" the government! and employed the "peaceful means," which so brilliantly proved their utter uselessness in the sixties! * Of course, the revolutionaries refused to agree to any cessation or suspension of military activity. The Zemstvoists then formed a League of Oppositional Elements, which was later transformed into the Zemstvo Union and Self-Government Society, or Zemstvo Union.[72] The programme of the Zemstvo Union contained the following demands: 1. Free speech and free press; 2. Inviolability of the person; and 3. The convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The attempt to publish illegal pamphlets in Galicia failed (the Austrian police arrested the would-be publishers, and confiscated the manuscripts), and in August, 1881, the *Volnoye Slovo* [*Free Word*],[73] edited in Geneva by Dragomanov (ex-professor of the Kiev University), became the official organ of the Zemstvo Union. In the "final analysis," wrote Dragomanov in 1888, "the attempt to publish a Zemstvo organ in the shape of the *Volnoye Slovo* cannot be regarded as successful, for the reason that Zemstvo material began to be received in the editorial office at all regularly only towards the end of 1882, and in May, 1883, the paper ceased publication" [*ibid.*, p. 40]. The failure of the liberal organ was a natural result of the weakness of the liberal movement. On November 20, 1878, Alexander II delivered a speech, at a meeting of representatives of the estates in Moscow, in which he expressed the hope that "he would

* Dragomanov has quite justly remarked: "As a matter of fact, liberalism in Russia cannot employ absolutely 'peaceful means,' because every declaration in favour of changing the higher administration is prohibited by law. The Zemstvo liberals should have resolutely stepped over the bounds of this prohibition, and at least in this way have demonstrated their power to the government and to the terrorists. As the Zemstvo liberals did not demonstrate this strength, they lived to see the day when the government revealed its intention to destroy the already-truncated Zemstvo institutions" [*ibid.*, pp. 41-42].

obtain their co-operation in the effort to prevent the youth from straying onto the fatal path upon which unreliable persons are striving to lead them." Later an appeal for the co-operation of the public appeared in the *Government Journal* [No. 186, 1878]. In reply to this, five Zemstvo Assemblies (Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Samara and Tver) issued declarations urging the necessity for convening a National Assembly. "We may believe also," says Witte in his Memorandum, after relating in detail the contents of these petitions of which only three appeared in the press in full, "that the declarations of the Zemstvos calling for the convocation of a National Assembly would have been far more numerous had not the Ministry of the Interior taken timely steps to prohibit such declarations: the marshals of the nobility, and the chairmen of provincial Zemstvo assemblies received circular letters instructing them to prohibit even the reading of such petitions at meetings of the assemblies. In some places, arrests were made and deputies banished. In Chernigov the meeting hall was invaded and forcibly cleared by gendarmes" [p. 104].

The liberal magazines and newspapers supported this movement. A petition signed by "twenty-five prominent Moscow citizens" addressed to Loris-Melikov pleads for the convocation of an independent assembly of representatives of the Zemstvo, which shall be given the right to participate in the administration of the nation. In appointing Loris-Melikov Minister of the Interior, the government *seemed* to make a concession. But this only seemed to be so, for not only were no definite steps taken in this direction, but not even any positive declarations were made, permitting any misinterpretation. Loris-Melikov called together the editors of the periodical publications in St. Petersburg, and explained to them "the programme," *viz.*, to learn the wishes, needs, etc., of the population, to enable the Zemstvos, etc., to utilise their legal rights (the liberal programme guarantees to the Zemstvos the "rights" of which the law systematically deprives them!), etc. The author of the Memorandum writes:

> Through the medium of these interlocutors the Minister's programme was circulated throughout the whole of Russia [that was the purpose for which they were called together]. In point of fact, the programme did not promise anything definite. One could read into it anything one desired, *i. e.*, either everything or nothing. A leaflet that was secretly distributed at that time was right in its way [only in "its" way, certainly not in "every" way!] when it stated that the programme simultaneously wags a "fox's tail" and gnashes "wolf's fangs." [74]

This expression very aptly applies to the programme and its author, for, in communicating the programme to the respresentatives of the press, the Count strongly urged them "not to excite uselessly the public mind by their visionary illusions." But the liberal Zemstvoists refused to listen to the *truth* contained in the secret leaflet and accepted the wagging of the "fox's tail" as a "new policy" worthy of confidence.

"The Zemstvos believed and sympathised with the government," says the Memorandum, quoting the words of the secret leaflet, *The Opinion of the Zemstvo Assemblies Concerning the Present State of Russia,* "as if afraid of running too far ahead, and of pestering the government with excessive requests." Is this not a characteristic admission on the part of the adherents of the Zemstvo, who were presumed to enjoy freedom of expression? The Zemstvo Union at its congress in 1880 had just decided: "To strive to secure central popular representation with a single chamber and universal suffrage," and yet they *strive to secure* the fulfilment of this decision by the tactics of refraining from "*running too far ahead,*" and by "*believing and sympathising with*" ambiguous declarations which bind no one! With unpardonable naïveté, the Zemstvo adherents imagined that presenting petitions means "striving to secure"—and petitions poured in from the Zemstvo in abundance. On January 28, 1881, Loris-Melikov humbly submitted a Memorandum to the Tsar recommending the establishment of a commission to consist of representatives of the Zemstvos, for the purpose of drafting the laws His Majesty would be pleased to indicate, the commission to have advisory powers only. The special council set up by Alexander II approved of this measure. The decision of the council of February 17, 1881, was sanctioned by the Tsar, who also approved of the text of the government communication submitted by Loris-Melikov.

"Undoubtedly," writes Witte, "the establishment of such a purely advisory commission did not yet establish a constitution," "but," he continues, "it can hardly be denied that [after the reforms of the sixties] it represented a step forward toward a constitution and toward nothing else." The author then proceeds to repeat the statements contained in the foreign press to the effect that after reading Loris-Melikov's Memorandum, Alexander II exclaimed: "Why this is the *états généraux*" . . . "What is proposed to us is nothing more nor less than the Assembly of Notables of Louis XVI."

We would observe on our part that under certain circumstances the application of Loris-Melikov's proposal *might have been* a step toward a constitution, or might not have been; that would be determined by whichever gained the upper hand—the pressure of the revolutionary parties and the liberal public, or the resistance of the very powerful, compact parties, which steadfastly supported the autocracy and were unscrupulous in the methods they employed. If, however, we speak, not of what might have been, but of what actually happened, then we must admit the indubitable fact that the government was wavering. Some members of the government were in favour of strenuously resisting the liberals, while others were in favour of making concessions. But—and this is particularly important—even the latter wavered; they had no definite programme, and never rose above the level of scheming bureaucrats.

In his Memorandum, Wittte writes:

> Count Loris-Melikov appeared to be afraid to look the affair straight in the face and to define his programme with precision; he continued the evasive policy—in another direction, it is true—which had been adopted by Count Valuyev towards the Zemstvo institutions.
>
> As was quite rightly pointed out by the legal press at the time, the programme announced by Loris-Melikov was distinguished by its vagueness. This vagueness is observed in all the Count's subsequent actions and pronouncements. On the one hand, he declares that the autocracy is "separated from the people," that "he looks to public support as the principal force . . ." and that he regarded the proposed reform "not as something final, but merely as a first step," etc. On the other hand, the Count, at the same time, declared to the representatives of the press that " . . . the hopes roused among the people are nothing more nor less than visionary illusions . . ." and in his humble Memorandum to the Tsar, he categorically declared that a National Assembly would be "a dangerous experiment and a reversion to the past . . .",* that the measure he proposed did not in any way restrict the powers of the autocracy, because it had nothing in common with Western constitutional forms. Generally speaking, as L. Tikhomirov has quite justly remarked, the very Memorandum itself is distinguished by its remarkably confused form [p. 117].

Regarding the attitude of Loris-Melikov, this notorious hero of the "dictatorship of the heart," towards the *fighters* for liberty, it should be said that "with a cruelty unparalleled either before or since, he ordered the execution of a seventeen-year-old youth for having in his possession a printed leaflet. His persecution of the exiles suffering for their work of propaganda extended to the most remote parts of Siberia, and he did everything to worsen their

* Reference is made here to a National Assembly convoked in the seventeenth century.—*Ed.*

conditions." [V. Zasulich in *Social-Democrat*, No. 1, p. 84.] [75] In view of the government's wavering, only a force capable of undertaking a strenuous fight could have secured a constitution, but this force was lacking—the revolutionaries having exhausted themselves by their effort of March 1.* Among the working class, there was neither a broad movement nor a strong organisation. The liberal public proved on this occasion to be so politically immature that even after the assassination of Alexander II, it restricted itself merely to presenting petitions. The Zemstvos and the municipalities, the liberal press, *Poryadok* [*Order*],[76] *Strana* [*Country*],[77] *Golos* [*Voice*],[78] all presented petitions. And particularly was this the case of the loyal, artful and vague liberal authors of memoranda like the Marquis of Welepolsky, Professor Chicherin, and Professor Gradovsky—Witte in his Memorandum quotes these from a pamphlet published in London as follows: ** "Count Loris-Melikov's constitutions" (published by the Free Russian Press Fund, London, 1893) which invented "the artful device of carrying the monarch across the desired line in such a way that he himself would not notice it." [79] All these cautious petitions and artful devices proved absolutely useless, of course, without revolutionary force without any effect whatever, and the autocratic party triumphed, notwithstanding the fact that on March 8, 1881, a majority of the council of ministers (seven against five) voted *in favour* of Loris-Melikov's proposal. (So it is reported in this pamphlet, but Witte who so zealously quotes its authors for some reason or another declares in his Memorandum that: "What happened at this meeting on March 8 and what it led to is not authentically known; it would be rash to rely upon the rumours which have appeared in the foreign press," p. 124). On April 29, 1887, the Manifesto concerning the reaffirmation and defence of autocracy, which was described by Katkov as "manna from heaven," was promulgated.

For the second time since the emancipation of the peasants, the

* On March 1 (14), 1881, Tsar Alexander II was assassinated in St. Petersburg by members of the *Narodnaya Volya* under whose auspices the assassination was planned and carried out.—*Ed.*

** As we have seen, the author of the Memorandum very carefully copies from illegal pamphlets, and admits that "the underground press and literature, published abroad, correctly judged the position in regard to this question from their points of view" (p. 91). The only thing original produced by this trained "statesman" is a certain amount of raw material; all the fundamental points-of-view regarding political questions in Russia he has to borrow from the underground literature.

revolutionary tide was swept back, and following on that and as a consequence of it, the liberal movement a second time gave way to *reaction* over which Russian progressive society, of course, raised bitter lamentations. That we can do well enough: We lament the tactlessness and self-assurance of revolutionaries in harassing the government; we lament the lack of determination of the government when, realising that it is not confronted by a real force, it makes fictitious concessions and takes back with one hand what it gives with the other; we lament these "times lacking in ideas and ideals," when the government, having punished revolutionaries, whom the people failed to support, hastens to make up for what it has lost and prepares itself for a fresh struggle.

IV

The epoch of the dictatorship of the heart, as the period of office of Loris-Melikov was described, proved to our liberals that at a time when the government is wavering, and when "the first step toward reform" obtains a majority in the council of ministers, the "constitutionalism" of a single cabinet minister—even if he is the Prime Minister—guarantees nothing, if a serious public force, capable of compelling the government to surrender, is lacking. It is interesting to note also that the government of Alexander III did not immediately expose its claws even after the promulgation of the Manifesto reaffirming the autocracy, but found it necessary for a time to fool the "public." In employing the term "fool the public," we do not suggest that the government had adopted the Machiavellian [80] plan of some minister or notable. But it cannot be too much insisted upon that the system of pseudo-concessions, and certain apparently important steps taken "to meet" public opinion, has become part and parcel of the policy of every modern government, including the Russian government. For the Russian government has in the course of many generations recognised the necessity to reckon with public opinion in one way or another, and in the course of many generations has trained statesmen in the art of domestic diplomacy. Such a diplomat was Count Ignatyev, whose appointment to the Ministry of the Interior in place of Loris-Melikov was intended to cover the government's retreat towards out and out reaction. More than once Ignatyev came out as a demagogue and deceiver of the worst type, so much so that Witte in his

Memorandum reveals not a little "police magnanimity" when he describes the period of his office as an "unsuccessful attempt to create a land governing itself locally with an autocratic Tsar at the head." It is true that this very "formula" was advanced at that time by I. S. Aksakov, was utilised by the government in its coquetting with the people and picked to pieces by Katkov, who proved conclusively that there is a necessary connection between local self-government and a constitution. But it would be sheer short-sightedness to attempt to *explain* the tactics adopted by the police-government (tactics dictated to it by its very nature) by the prevalence at the moment of one political view or another.

Ignatyev issued a circular, in which he promised that the government would "take urgent measures to introduce proper methods to secure with the maximum of success the active participation of local public men in the execution of His Majesty's designs." The Zemstvos replied to this "call" by submitting petitions pleading for the convocation of an assembly "of the representatives of the people" (quoted from the Memoirs of a member of the Cherepovetsk Zemstvo. The opinion of the member of the Kirilov Zemstvo was not even allowed to be published by the governor). The government instructed the governors to "take no action" in regard to these petitions. "At the same time, measures were apparently taken to prevent similar petitions from being put forward by other assemblies." The notorious attempt was made to call a conference of "experts" who were to be selected by the ministers (for the purpose of discussing the question of reducing land annuities, of regulating migration and the reform of local government, etc.). The work of the committee of experts roused no sympathy among the public and, *notwithstanding all the precautionary measures taken,* roused the outspoken protest of the Zemstvos. Twelve Zemstvo assemblies sent in petitions pleading that Zemstvo representatives be invited to participate in legislative activity, not only on special occasions and by appointment from the government, but permanently and by election from the Zemstvos. An attempt to pass a similar petition by the Samara Zemstvo was prevented by the chairman "after which the assembly broke up as a mark of protest." [Dragomanov, *ibid.*, p. 29; Memorandum, p. 131.] That Count Ignatyev *fooled* the Zemstvos is apparent from the following fact:

The marshal of the Poltava nobility, Ustimovich, the author of the Constitutional Petition of 1879, openly declared in the Provincial Assembly of

Nobles that he had received *positive assurances* [*sic!*] from Count Ignatyev that the government will call upon the representatives of the country to take part in legislative work. [Dragomanov, *ibid.*]

These exploits of Ignatyev completed the work of covering up the government's transition to open struggle, and it is not surprising that D. A. Tolstoy, who on May 30, 1882, was appointed Minister of the Interior, was dubbed the "fighting Minister." The petitions submitted by the Zemstvos, pleading for the convening of mere private conferences, were unceremoniously rejected, and there was even a case of a government commission being put in place of a Zemstvo administration, and the members of the latter banished, on a complaint lodged by a governor against "the systematic opposition" of the Zemstvo (Cherepovetsk). D. A. Tolstoy, a faithful pupil and follower of Katkov, resolutely set to work to "reform" the Zemstvo institutions, the idea underlying this reform being that "the opposition to the government has strongly entrenched itself in the Zemstvos" (an idea which, as we have seen, was confirmed by history) (p. 139 of the Memorandum, dealing with the original plan for the reform of the Zemstvo). D. A. Tolstoy planned to abolish the Zemstvo administrations and in their place to establish bureaus, which were to be subordinated to the provincial governor, and whose decisions were to be subject to the governor's sanction. Truly a "radical" reform! But it is extremely interesting to note that even this pupil of Katkov, this "fighting Minister," as the author of the Memorandum himself expresses it, "did not abandon the usual policy of the Ministry of the Interior towards the Zemstvo. In the draft of his project, he did not openly express his idea, practically to abolish the Zemstvos; he desired to retain the external form of the latter, on the pretext of properly developing the principle of local self-government, but, at the same time, he desired to deprive them of all internal substance." This cunning "fox-tail" policy was still further supplemented and developed in the State Council, with the result that the Zemstvo regulation of 1890

proved to be another half-measure in the history of Zemstvo institutions. These regulations did not abolish the Zemstvo, but left them featureless and colourless; they did not abolish their universal character, but gave them a decided class tinge. . . . They did not convert the Zemstvo institutions into regular organs of the state . . . but they increased the power of the provincial governors over them . . . and increased the governor's power of veto. The

regulations of July 12, 1890, were, as their authors intended them to be, a step in the direction of abolishing the Zemstvo institutions, and not a radical reform of Zemstvo local government.

The author of the Memorandum then goes on to state that this new "half-measure" did not remove the opposition to the government (and, of course, it was impossible to remove the opposition to the reactionary government by intensifying reaction), but merely drove *certain* manifestations of it below the surface. The opposition manifested itself firstly in the fact that certain anti-Zemstvo laws—if one may so describe them—met with resistance and *de facto* were not carried out, and secondly, in constitutional (or at all events smacking of constitutionalism) petitions. For example, the law of June 10, 1893, which tied up the Zemstvo medical service in a tangle of detailed regulations, met with the first mentioned type of opposition. "The Zemstvo institutions put up strenuous resistance to the Ministry of the Interior which was compelled to retreat. It was compelled to suspend the regulations, which had already been drafted, and put them aside for inclusion in a complete collection of the laws, and to draft a fresh proposal on altogether different principles (*i. e.*, more acceptable to the Zemstvos)". The Assessment of Immovable Property Act of June 8, 1893, which provided for a host of regulations restricting the rights of the Zemstvos in matters regarding the assessment of taxes, also roused dissatisfaction, and in the majority of cases "is not at all being applied in practice." The strength of the medical and statistical institutions established by the Zemstvos, which have brought considerable (relatively, compared with the bureaucracy, of course) benefit to the population was sufficient to paralyse the regulations drawn up in the chancelleries of St. Petersburg.

The second form of opposition found expression in the new Zemstvos in 1894, when the Zemstvos addressed petitions to Nicholas II, in which pointed hints were made at the demand for the extension of local self-government, and which called forth the "celebrated" remark about senseless dreams.

"The political tendencies" of the Zemstvos did not disappear, to the horror of the ministers. The author of the Memorandum cites the bitter complaints of the governor of Tver (from his report of 1898) about the "closely knitted circle of people of liberal tendencies" which has concentrated in its hands the whole conduct of affairs of the provincial Zemstvos.

From this governor's report for 1895, it is apparent that the fight against the Zemstvo opposition presents a difficult task for the local administration, and that the marshals of the nobility, who act as chairmen at Zemstvo meetings, are sometimes called upon to display "civic courage" [*sic!*] in carrying out the instructions contained in the confidential circulars of the Ministry of the Interior concerning the matters in which the Zemstvo institutions must not interfere.

Further on it is related how, at one of the meetings of the assembly, the provincial marshal of the nobility resigned his post as chairman and transferred it to the county marshal (Tver), how the Tver marshal in his turn passed it on to the Novy Torzhok marshal, and how the Novy Torzhok marshal also fell sick and handed over the post to the Staritsky marshal, so that even the marshals of the nobility are in flight and refuse to carry out police functions!

The law of 1890 [laments the author of the Memorandum] gave the Zemstvo a class tinge, strengthened the government element in the assemblies, and appointed all the county marshals of the nobility and Zemstvo chiefs to the provincial Zemstvo assemblies, and the fact that these featureless, class, bureaucratic Zemstvos continue nevertheless to betray political tendencies, is a matter that should be pondered over. . . .

"Resistance has not been overcome: Deep discontent, silent opposition undoubtedly exists, and will continue to exist until the Zemstvo representing all estates dies." Such is the last word in bureaucratic wisdom: If curtailed representation gives rise to discontent, then according to simple, human logic the abolition of all representation should strengthen this discontent and opposition. Mr. Witte argues, however, that if one of the institutions which bring at least a particle of discontent to the surface is closed down, then discontent will disappear! One would think therefore, that Witte proposes something resolute like the abolition of the Zemstvo. Nothing of the kind. While condemning a policy of evasion because of the opportunity it provides for eloquent denunciations, Witte himself proposes nothing in its place, nor can he propose anything without shedding the skin of a minister of an autocratic government. Witte mumbles absolute nonsense about a "third path"—neither bureaucratic domination nor local self-government, but an administrative reform which should "properly organise" the "participation of public elements in government institutions." It is quite easy to talk nonsense like this, but after the experiments that have been made with the "experts," no one will be deceived by it. It is only too obvious that *without a constitution,* "any participation

of public elements" will be fictitious, will be the subordination of the public (or those "called" from the public) to the bureaucracy. While criticising the half-measure of the Ministry of the Interior (the establishment of Zemstvos in the border provinces), Witte cannot suggest anything new on the general question, which he himself raises, but merely advances the old half-measures, pseudo-concessions and promises of numerous benefits, and the failure to carry out any promises. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that on the general question concerning "the direction of internal politics," Witte stands in the same position as Goryemykin, and the controversy between them is merely a domestic quarrel, a controversy within a single gang. On the one hand, Witte hastens to declare that "I have never proposed nor do I now propose the abolition of Zemstvo institutions or any radical change in the present system . . . there can be no talk under present conditions of abolishing them [the existing Zemstvos]." And then he goes on to state: "I for my part think that with the establishment of strong government locally, it will be possible to place greater confidence in the Zemstvos," etc. After establishing a strong local bureaucracy to counterbalance local self-government (*i. e.*, rendering local self-government impotent), it will be possible to place greater "confidence" in the latter. It is the same old song! Mr. Witte fears only "institutions representing all the estates," but "did not have in mind and did not consider the activities of the diverse corporations, societies, unions of the estates and of trades and occupations to be dangerous to the autocracy." For example, in regard to "village communes," Mr. Witte does not doubt in the least that in view of their "conservatism" they are harmless to the autocracy. "The predominance of relationships connected with the land and the interests connected with them develops in the rural population spiritual peculiarities which render it indifferent to anything beyond the politics of the village pump. . . . Our peasants at village meetings concern themselves with the allocation of taxes . . . the distribution of allotments, etc. Moreover, they are illiterate or semi-literate, *How then can they concern themselves with politics?*" As will be seen Mr. Witte is extremely sober-minded. In regard to the unions of estates he declares that from the point-of-view of the danger they represent to the central government "their diversity of interests is of extreme importance. The government, by taking advantage of this diversity of interest, can always play off one estate against the political

claims of the others." Witte's programme: "Properly organised participation of public elements in government institutions" is nothing more nor less than another of the innumerable attempts of the police-state to "disunite" the population.

On the other hand, Mr. Goryemykin, himself, with whom Mr. Witte enters into such heated controversy, carries out this very systematic policy of disunity and persecution. He argues (in his Memorandum, to which Witte replies) that it is necessary to appoint new officials to supervise the Zemstvos; that he is opposed to permitting even simple local congresses of Zemstvo workers; he stands whole-heartedly for the Regulation of 1890—that step toward the abolition of the Zemstvos; he fears the effort of the Zemstvos to include "tendentious questions" in their programme of assessment work; he fears Zemstvo statistics generally; he is in favour of taking the elementary schools out of the hands of the Zemstvos and transferring them to government institutions; he argues that the Zemstvos are incapable of handling the questions connected with the food supply (don't you see that Zemstvo workers encourage "exaggerated notions concerning the extent of the disaster and the requirements of the famine-stricken population"!!), and that he insisted on rules fixing a limit to rural taxation "for the purpose of protecting landed property from excessive increases in land taxes." Witte is absolutely right, therefore, when he says:

> The whole policy of the Ministry of the Interior towards the Zemstvos is a policy of slowly but steadily undermining their organs, gradually weakening their significance and gradually concentrating their functions in the hands of government institutions. It may be said without the slightest exaggeration that when the measures [referred to in Goryemykin's Memorandum] "passed in recent times for the purpose of regulating the various branches of Zemstvo work and administration" will have been brought to a successful conclusion, we shall have no local self-government whatever—all that will be left for the Zemstvo institutions will be a mere shell without any real content.

Consequently, the policy of Goryemykin (and more so the policy of Sipyagin) and of Witte lead to the same goal, and the controversy over the question of the Zemstvos and constitutionalism is, we repeat, nothing more than a domestic quarrel. Lovers quarrel only to make up again, and the "fight" between Mr. Witte and Mr. Goryemykin will not end more seriously than that. As for our own views regarding the general question of the autocracy and the Zemstvos, it will be more convenient to present them in the process of analysing the preface written by R. N. S.

V

Mr. R. N. S.'s preface represents much that is of interest. It touches upon the broadest questions concerning political reforms in Russia, the various methods by which these reforms can be brought about, and the various forces leading to these reforms. On the other hand, Mr. R. N. S., who apparently has close relations with liberal circles generally, and Zemstvo liberal circles in particular, undoubtedly sounds a new chord in the chorus of our "underground" literature. Therefore, in order to clear up the question of the political significance of the Zemstvos in principle, and in order that we may become acquainted with the currents and . . . I shall not say tendencies, but the moods prevailing in circles that stand close to the liberals, it will be useful to deal in detail with this preface, and to endeavour to decide whether what is new in it is good or bad, or how much of it is good and how much bad.

The fundamental feature of R. N. S.'s arguments is the following: As is apparent from numerous passages of his essay, which we quote below, he is in favour of peaceful, gradual and strictly legal development. On the other hand, he is wholeheartedly opposed to the autocracy and thirsts for political liberty. But the autocracy is what it is, precisely because it prohibits and persecutes *all* "development" towards liberty. This contradiction permeates the whole of R. N. S.'s essay and renders his argumentation extremely illogical, hesitating and unsound. It is possible to combine constitutionalism with a regard for the strictly legal development of autocratic Russia only on the premise, or at least the assumption, that the autocratic government will *itself* understand, grow weary, yield, etc. And Mr. R. N. S. does indeed fall sometimes from the height of his civic indignation to the vulgar point-of-view of the most immature liberalism. For example, this is what Mr. R. N. S. says of himself. . . . "We who regard the vow of Hannibal taken by the men and women who are fighting for political liberties in Russia to-day as sacred as the vow taken by the men and women who fought for the emancipation of the peasants in the forties" . . . and again. . . . "However trying it is to us who have taken the 'vow of Hannibal' to fight against the autocracy," etc. Very well said! Powerful words like these would have served to ornament an essay, if such spirit of indomitable and irreconcilable struggle

("the vow of Hannibal"!) would have pervaded the whole of it. But, precisely because they are so strong, they strike a discordant note when accompanied by the strains of artificial conciliation and pacification, by attempts, however forced, to introduce the conception of peaceful, strictly legal development. Unfortunately, more than enough of such notes and such attempts are observed in R. N. S.'s essay. For example, he devotes a page and a half to a detailed "argumentation" of the idea that "the policy of the state during the reign of Nicholas II deserves *even sterner* [*our italics*] condemnation from the moral and political point-of-view than the wicked revision of the reforms of Alexander II, carried out in the reign of Alexander III." Why *sterner* condemnation? It appears because Alexander III fought against revolution, while Nicholas II fought against "the legal aspirations of Russian society"; the former fought against politically conscious forces, the latter fought against —"quite peaceful, social forces, often acting without any clear political ideas" ("hardly even realising that their conscious cultural work was undermining the state system"). To a considerable degree this is untrue in point of fact, as we shall show below. But apart from this, one cannot help taking note of the author's peculiar process of reasoning. He condemns autocracy, but condemns one autocrat *more* than another, not because of policy, for that has remained unchanged, but because he has not, as he alleges, to contend against "termagants" who "naturally" call forth sharp resistance, and, consequently, he has no justification for his acts of persecution. Is not this an obvious concession to the loyal and humble argument that our little father, the Tsar, need not fear to call together his beloved people because they have never dreamed of anything beyond the limits of peaceful strivings and strict legality? We are not surprised to find such a "process of reasoning" (or process of lying) in the works of Mr. Witte, who in his Memorandum writes:

> One would suppose that when there are no political parties and no revolution, and when the rights of the authorities are not being challenged, no contrast should be drawn between the administration and the people or society,* etc.

We are not surprised to meet with such arguments in the writings of Mr. Chicherin, who, in the Memorandum he submitted to Count

* P. 205. "This is silly," observes R. N. S., in a footnote to this passage. Quite right. But is not R. N. S.'s reasoning on pp. xi-xii of his preface, quoted above, moulded from the same clay?

Milyutin after March 1, 1881, declared that: "The authorities must first of all display their energy and show that they have not lowered the flag in the face of danger," that "the monarchical system is compatible with free institutions only when the latter are the fruit of peaceful development and the calm initiative of the supreme government itself," and recommended the establishment of a "strong and liberal" government operating with the aid of a "legislative organ strengthened and renovated by the elective element." * Now it is quite understandable that Mr. Chicherin should regard the policy of Nicholas II to be worthy of *greater* condemnation, *because* in his reign peaceful development and the calm initiative of the supreme government itself *might have led* to free institutions. But is it natural and decent to hear such reasoning from a man who took the vow of Hannibal to fight?

Mr. R. N. S. is wrong in point of fact. "Now," he says, comparing the present reign with the previous one, "no one thinks seriously of the violent revolution advocated by the adherents of *Narodnaya Volya* [*People's Will*]." *Parlez pour vous, Monsieur!* Speak only for yourself. We know quite definitely that the revolutionary movement in Russia in the present reign has not only not subsided in comparison with the movement in the previous reign, but on the contrary has revived and grown manifold. What kind of a "revolutionary" movement would it be if no one taking part in it thought seriously of a violent revolution? It may be objected that in the lines quoted, Mr. R. N. S. has in mind not violent revolution in general, but a specific, *Narodnaya Volya* revolution, *i. e.*, a revolution that will be at one and the same time a political and a social revolution, leading not only to the overthrow of the autocracy, but also to the seizure of power. Such an objection, however, would be unsound. Firstly, because from the point of view of the autocracy as such (*i. e.*, of the autocratic government and not of the "bourgeoisie" or "society"), it is not *the purpose for which* its overthrow is aimed at that matters, but *the very fact* that its overthrow is aimed at. Secondly, adherents of *Narodnaya Volya* at the very beginning of the reign of Alexander III "submitted" to the government the very alternative which Social-Democracy now submits to

* Witte's Memorandum, pp. 122-123. *The Constitution of Count Loris-Melikov*, p. 24.

Nicholas II, namely, either revolutionary struggle or the abdication of the autocracy.*

R. N. S. knows perfectly well that many people, not only among the intelligentsia, but also among the working class, "think seriously" about a violent revolution. Read page xxxix *ff* of his essay in which reference is made to "revolutionary Social-Democracy," which possesses a "mass basis and intellectual forces," which is advancing towards "determined political struggle" and towards the "sanguinary struggle of revolutionary Russia against the autocratic-bureaucratic régime" [p. xli]. There is not the slightest doubt, therefore, that R. N. S.'s "well-intentioned speeches" are merely a trick, an attempt to influence the government (or "public opinion") by demonstrating his (or other people's) modesty.

Mr. R. N. S., by the way, thinks that the term "struggle" may be given a very wide interpretation. "The abolition of the Zemstvo," he writes, "will place a trump card in the hands of revolutionary propagandists—we say this quite objectively, without that sense of revulsion that is usually roused by revolutionary action, although we are no admirers of this form [*sic!*] of struggle for political and social progress." This is a most remarkable tirade. If we remove the quasi-scientific formula, this inappropriate parading of "objectivity" (since the author himself speaks of his preference for one or another form of activity or of struggle, to speak of his objectivity is like saying, two and two = one tallow candle), we shall find the old, old argument: Gentlemen of the government! When I begin to talk about revolution, you must know things are serious, because I am not at all inclined that way. The reference to objectivity is nothing more nor less than a fig-leaf intended to conceal subjective antipathy to revolution and revolutionary activity. And Mr. R. N. S. stands in need of concealment, because such antipathy is totally incompatible with the vow of Hannibal.

By the way, are we not making a mistake about this Hannibal? Did he really take a vow to fight against the Romans, or only to fight for the progress of Carthage, which progress, of course, in the

* See the Letter of the Executive Committee of *Narodnaya Volya* to Alexander III, dated March 10, 1881, in which two conditions are put: 1. General amnesty to all political offenders; 2, the convening of an assembly of representatives of the whole of the Russian people on the basis of universal suffrage, free press, free speech, and right of assembly.[81] [The complete text of the letter is published in Vera Figner, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 311. —*Ed.*]

final analysis, would be to the injury of Rome? Why should the term "struggle" be given such a "narrow" meaning? R. N. S. thinks it can be given a broader meaning. By combining the vow of Hannibal with the above-mentioned tirade, we get the result that fighting against the autocracy manifests itself in various "forms." One form is revolutionary, illegal struggle; another form is to "fight for political and social progress" in general, in other words, peaceful legal activity, planting culture within the limits permitted by the autocracy. We do not doubt in the least that it is possible even under autocracy to carry on legal activity which will promote Russian progress: In some cases promoting technical progress rather rapidly, in a few cases promoting social progress insignificantly, and, in exceptional cases, promoting political progress in an infinitesimal degree. We may argue about the dimensions and possibilities of this infinitesimal progress, to what extent isolated cases of such progress are capable of paralysing the mass corruption which the autocracy is constantly sowing among the population everywhere. But to include, even indirectly, peaceful legal activity in the term, "to fight against the autocracy"—means to facilitate this work of corruption, and to cause the ordinary Russian people to realise still less than they do already their responsibility as citizens for *everything* the government does.

Unfortunately, Mr. R. N. S. is not alone among the illegal writers who strive to obliterate the difference between revolutionary struggle and peaceful cultural work. He has a predecessor in the person of R. M., the author of the article, "Our Realities," published in the celebrated Special Supplement to *Rabochaya Mysl* [September, 1899]. In his controversy with the Social-Democratic revolutionaries, he wrote: "The fight for rural and urban public administration, the fight for public schools, the fight for public courts, the fight for public aid to the famine-stricken population, etc., all represent the fight against the autocracy. This public struggle, which for some unexplained reason fails to attract the benevolent interest of many Russian revolutionary writers, as we have seen, is being waged by the Russian public not only since yesterday. . . . The question now is how to assist these separate social strata to carry on the fight against the autocracy in the most successful manner possible. . . . The principal question for us is how should this social struggle against the autocracy be waged by our workers, whose movement our revolutionaries regard as the best means of

overthrowing the autocracy" [pp. 8-9]. As will be seen, R. M. thinks it superfluous to conceal his antipathy for revolutionaries; he quite openly describes legal opposition as fighting the autocracy, and considers the most important question to be, how the workers should conduct *this* fight. Mr. R. N. S. is not nearly so simple and frank, but the kinship between the political tendencies of this liberal and the ardent worshippers of the labour movement pure and simple comes out very prominently.*

It should be noted that Mr. R. N. S. sometimes plainly casts off his "objectivity." He is "objective" when he speaks of the labour movement, of its organic growth, of the future inevitable struggles between revolutionary Social-Democracy and the autocracy, and when he states that the abolition of the Zemstvos will inevitably drive the liberals to organise an illegal party. All this is set forth in a very business-like and sober manner, so sober indeed that one can only rejoice that the labour movement in Russia is so well understood in liberal circles. But when Mr. R. N. S. begins to talk not about fighting the enemy but about the possibility of "pacifying" him, he immediately loses his "objectivity," gives expression to his real sentiments, and even passes from the indicative mood to the imperative.

> Only in the event of men being found among the ruling class courageous enough to submit to history, and compel the autocracy to submit to it, will the final and sanguinary struggle between revolutionary Russia and the autocratic bureaucratic régime be avoided. . . . No doubt there are men among the higher bureaucracy who do not sympathise with a reactionary policy. . . . These men, the only men who have direct approach to the throne, never dare to express their convictions openly. . . . Perhaps the enormous shadow of the inevitable, historical day of judgement, the shadow of great events, will cause the governing circle to waver and induce them to destroy the iron system of reactionary policy while there is yet time. Comparatively little is required for this now. . . . Perhaps it [the government] will understand before it is too late the fatal danger of protecting the autocratic régime at all costs. Perhaps even before it has to face revolution, it will grow weary of its fight against

* "The economic organisations of the workers," says Mr. R. N. S. in another passage, "serve as a school for the practical political training of the masses of the workers." We would advise our author to be more careful in employing the term "practical," so beloved by the knights of opportunism. It cannot be denied that under certain conditions the industrial organisations of the workers may help very considerably toward their political training (no more than it can be denied that under other circumstances they may help toward their political corruption). But the masses of the workers can obtain *real* political training only by their general participation in the revolutionary movement, including open street fighting and civil war against the champions of political and economic slavery.

the natural and historically necessary development of liberty, and will waver in its "irreconcilable" policy. Ceasing to be consistent in its fight against liberty, it will be obliged to open the door wider and wider for it. Perhaps. . . . No, not perhaps, but *so be it!* [*Author's italics.*]

Amen! is all that we need add to this well-intentioned and lofty monologue. Our Hannibal makes such rapid progress that he now appears before us in a third form. The first was—fight against the autocracy, the second—implant culture, the third—call upon the enemy to submit and attempt to frighten him with his own "shadow." What frights! We quite agree with our respected R. N. S. that nothing in the world frightens our bigoted Russian government more than "shadows." But immediately before proceeding to conjure up shadows, our author, in referring to the growth of the revolutionary forces and to the impending revolutionary outbreak, explained: "We foresee with profound sorrow the horrible price in men and cultural forces that will have to be paid for this madly aggressive, conservative policy, which lacks both political sense and moral justification." What a bottomless chasm of unction and doctrinarism is revealed by this conclusion to an argument about the revolutionary outbreak! The author completely fails to understand the enormous historical significance it would have if, for once at least, the people of Russia taught the government a good lesson. Instead of pointing to the "horrible price" the people have paid and are paying to absolutism, in order to rouse their hatred and indignation and a passion to fight the autocracy, you mention *future* sacrifices in order to frighten people away from the idea of fighting. Gentlemen! It would be far better if you refrained entirely from arguing about the "revolutionary outbreak" than spoil your arguments by such an ending. Apparently, you do not wish to *create* "great events," but merely to talk about the "shadows of great events," and then only with "persons having access to the throne."

Our legal press, as we know, is chockfull of such talk with shadows and about shadows, and in order to give substance to the shadows, it has become fashionable to refer to the "great reforms and to sing halleluiahs to them, full of conventional lies. An author writing under the surveillance of the censor may sometimes be forgiven these lies, for otherwise he would never be able to express his striving towards political reforms. But no censorship hovered over Mr. R. N. S. He writes, "The great reforms were not devised to crown

the triumph of the bureaucracy." How evasive and apologetic this is. *By whom* "devised"? By Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Unkovsky, and those who worked with them? But these people demanded ever so much more than these "reforms" provided, and because of this, they were subjected to the persecution of the government that introduced the "great" reforms. Were they devised by the government and those who blindly followed it singing halleluiahs, while turning to snarl at the "termagants"? But the government strove by every means in its power to concede as little as possible, and to curtail the democratic demands *precisely for the purpose* of "crowning the triumph of the bureaucracy." Mr. R. N. S. is perfectly well aware of these historical facts, and obscures them only for the reason that they entirely refute his magnanimous theory concerning the possibility of "pacifying" the autocracy. Pacification is impossible in politics, and only out of unbounded simplicity (and sly and unctuous simplicity) can the time-honoured police methods of—*divide et impera,* divide and rule, yield the unimportant, in order to preserve the essential; give with one hand, and take back with the other—be taken for pacification. . . . "When the government of Alexander II devised and introduced the 'great reforms,' it did not at the same time deliberately set to work to cut off the only legal path the Russian people had to political liberty; it did not carefully weigh every step and every paragraph of the law with this end in view." This is *untrue!* The government of Alexander II in "devising" the reforms, and introducing them, deliberately set out right from the very beginning to reject the demands for political liberty that were put forward at the time. From the beginning to the end it cut off every legal path to liberty; for it retorted to the most simple appeals with repressions, it never permitted freedom to be discussed freely. It is sufficient to recall the facts mentioned in Witte's Memorandum, and which we quoted above to refute Mr. R. N. S.'s pæans of praise. Concerning the persons in the government of Alexander II, Witte expresses himself as follows:

> It must be observed that the prominent statesmen of the sixties, whose celebrated names will be preserved by grateful posterity, did greater things in their time than was ever done by their successors; they toiled over the renovation of our state and social system from sincere conviction, not to frustrate the strivings of their ruler, but out of unbounded loyalty to him [p. 67 of the Memorandum].

What is true is true: From sincere conviction; not to frustrate the aspirations of their ruler, but out of unbounded loyalty to the ruler at the head of the police gang. . . .

After this we are not surprised that Mr. R. N. S. says very little about the extremely important question of the rôle of the Zemstvos in the struggle for political liberty. Apart from the usual references to the "practical" and "cultural" work of the Zemstvos, he mentions in passing their "educational-political significance." He says that the "Zemstvos have political significance" and that "the Zemstvos, as Mr. Witte clearly sees, are dangerous (to the present system) only because of the historical tendency of their development—as the embryo of the constitution." And in conclusion, from casual remarks, we get the following attack upon revolutionaries:

> We value Mr. Witte's work, not only because of the truth it tells about the autocracy, but also as a precious political testimonial to the Zemstvo granted by the bureaucracy itself. This testimonial is an excellent reply to those who, owing to their lack of political education, or because they are carried away by revolutionary phrases [*sic!*], refused and refuse to see the enormous political significance of the Russian Zemstvos and their legal cultural activity.

Who has revealed a lack of education? Who is carried away by political phrases? Where and when? With whom does Mr. R. N. S. disagree? And why? To these questions no reply is forthcoming, for our author's attack is nothing more than an expression of his hostility towards revolutionaries which has been revealed to us by other passages in his essay. The following queer explanatory note still leaves the subject obscure. "We do not by these words desire [?!] to insult revolutionaries whose moral courage and struggle against tyranny cannot be too highly appraised." What is the purpose of this remark? What connection is there between moral courage and lack of ability to appreciate the value of the Zemstvos? Mr. R. N. S. has indeed fallen out of the frying pan into the fire. First of all he "insults" revolutionaries by making an unsupported and "anonymous" (*i. e.*, it is not known against whom it is levelled) charge of ignorance and phrasemongering, and then he again "insults" them by the assumption that they can be made to swallow the pill of the charge of ignorance if it is gilded with the recognition of their moral courage. To complete the confusion, Mr. R. N. S. contradicts himself by declaring, in one breath as it were with those "carried away by revolutionary phrases," that "the modern Russian

Zemstvo . . . has not sufficient political weight to impress or frighten any one by its own direct power. . . . It can barely maintain its own modest position. . . ." "Such institutions [like the Zemstvo] . . . may become a menace to this [autocratic] system only in the remote future and only as a result of the cultural development of the whole country."

VI

Let us, however, try to analyse the subject about which Mr. R. N. S. speaks so angrily and vapidly. The facts we have quoted above show that the "political significance" of the Zemstvos, *i. e.*, their significance as a factor in the struggle for political liberty, lies principally in the following: Firstly, these organisations which represent our propertied classes (and particularly the landed aristocracy) serve to strike the contrast between elected institutions and the bureaucracy; they give rise to constant conflicts between these two; they expose at every step the reactionary character of irresponsible tsarist officialdom, and foster discontent and opposition to the autocratic government.* Secondly, the Zemstvos, attached to the bureaucratic chariot like a superfluous fifth wheel, strive to consolidate their position, enlarge their significance and, as Witte himself expresses it, "unconsciously march towards," a constitution by petitioning for it. For that reason they prove to be unsuitable as allies for the government in its fight against the revolutionaries; they maintain a benevolent neutrality towards the latter and render them undoubted, if indirect, service by causing the government to waver in its measures of repression at critical moments. Of course, institutions which at best have proved capable up till now of making only liberal petitions and of maintaining benevolent neutrality, cannot be regarded as an "important," or to any degree an independent, factor in the political struggle; but it cannot be denied that the Zemstvos represent one of the *auxiliary* factors in the struggle. In this sense we are prepared, if you will, even to regard the Zemstvos as a piece of the constitution. Perhaps the reader will say: Then you agree with Mr. R. N. S., who does not claim any more for

* See the extremely detailed treatment of this aspect of the question in the pamphlet by P. B. Axelrod, *The Historical Position and the Mutual Relations between Liberal and Social-Democracy in Russia*, Geneva, 1898. See particularly pp. 5, 8, 11-12, 17-19.

them? Not at all. This is where our difference with him commences.

We shall admit for the sake of argument that the Zemstvos are—a piece of a constitution. But it is a piece that was used to *cheat* Russian "society" out of a constitution. It is the relatively unimportant sop which the autocracy threw to growing democracy in order to retain its hold on its principal positions, in order to divide and disunite those who demanded political reforms. We have seen how this policy of disuniting succeeded in the sixties and in the year 1880-81 on the basis of "confidence" in the Zemstvos ("the embryo of the constitution"). The question of the relation between the Zemstvos and political liberty is an incident in the general question of the relation between reform and revolution, and this incident serves to illustrate the narrow-mindedness and stupidity of the fashionable revisionist theory, which substitutes reforms for revolutionary struggle, and declares (for example, through the lips of Mr. Berdyaev) that the "principle of progress is: the better things are, the better." [82] This principle in its general form is as untrue as its reverse: the worse things are, the better. Revolutionaries, of course, will never abstain from fighting for reforms, from capturing even minor and unimportant enemy positions, *if* they will serve to strengthen the attack and help to achieve complete victory. But they will never forget that sometimes the enemy surrenders positions in order to disunite the attacking party, and thus defeat them more easily. They will never forget that only by having the "ultimate aim" in view, only by appraising every "movement" and every reform from the point of view of the general revolutionary struggle, will it be possible to guard the movement against false steps and shameful mistakes.

Now this aspect of the question—the significance of the Zemstvo as an instrument for *strengthening* the autocracy by means of half-hearted concessions, as a means of bringing over a certain section of the liberal public to the side of the autocracy—Mr. R. N. S. has completely failed to understand. He preferred to invent for his own use a doctrinaire scheme by which the Zemstvos and the constitution were joined by the straight line "formula": the better things are, the better. "If you first of all abolish the Zemstvos in Russia," he says, addressing himself to Mr. Witte, "and then increase the rights of the individual, you will throw away the best opportunity you had of giving the country a moderate constitution,

which would be the historical outgrowth of local self-government with a class tinge. At all events you will render the cause of conservatism a very bad service." What a beautiful and harmonious conception! Local self-government with a class tinge—a wise conservative, having access to the throne—a moderate constitution. The unfortunate thing about it is that in actual practice, the wise conservatives have on more than one occasion, thanks to the Zemstvos, found "good opportunities" to *withhold* the constitution from the country.

Mr. R. N. S.'s peaceful "conception" had its effect also on the slogan with which he concludes his essay and which is printed precisely as a slogan, on a separate line and in heavy type: "Rights, and an Authoritative All-Russian Zemstvo"! It must be frankly confessed that this is as much an unworthy coquetting with the political prejudices of the broad masses of Russian liberals as is *Rabochaya Mysl's* coquetting with the political prejudices of the broad masses of the workers. We feel compelled to protest against the one and the other. The idea that the government of Alexander II did not cut off the legal path to liberty, that the Zemstvos provide a good opportunity for granting a moderate constitution to the country, and that the slogan, "Rights, and an Authoritative All-Russian Zemstvo," can serve as the banner of, we shall not say the revolutionary, but at least the constitutional movement, is a prejudice. It is not a banner that can serve to separate enemies from allies, or help to direct and guide the movement; it is but a rag which can help only to attract the most unreliable characters to the movement, and help the government to make still another attempt to pass off high-sounding promises and half-hearted reforms. One need not be an inspired prophet to be able to prophesy this. Our revolutionary movement will reach its apogee, the liberal ferment in society will increase tenfold, other Loris-Melikovs and Ignatyevs will appear in the government and will inscribe on their banner: "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo." But if it came to pass, it would be to the extreme disadvantage of Russia and to the extreme advantage of the government. If a considerable section of the liberals put their faith in this banner, and, allowing themselves to be carried away by it, attack the "termagants" in the rear, the latter may find themselves cut off, and the government will try to restrict itself to a minimum of concessions in the form of an advisory and aristocratic constitution. Whether this attempt will

be successful or not, depends upon the outcome of the decisive battle between the revolutionary proletariat and the government. But of one thing we may be certain, and that is that the liberals will be cheated. With the aid of slogans like those advanced by Mr. R. N. S. ("Authoritative Zemstvo," etc.), the government will decoy them like puppies away from the revolutionaries, and then will take them by the scruff of the neck, and thrash them with the whip of reaction. And when that happens, gentlemen, we shall say: *Serves you right!*

Why, instead of demanding the abolition of absolutism, are such moderate and carefully worded desiderata put forward in the form of concluding slogans? First of all, for the sake of the philistine doctrinairism which desires to render a "service to conservatism," and which believes that the government will be softened by such moderation and become "pacified" by it. Secondly, in order to "unite the liberals." Indeed, the slogan: "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo" perhaps can serve to unite *all* liberals in the same way as (in the opinion of the Economists) the slogan "a kopeck on the ruble" will unite *all* the workers. But will not *such* unity be a loss rather than a gain? Unity is an advantage when it raises all those who unite to the level of an intelligent and resolute programme of unity. Unity is a disadvantage when it depresses those who unite to the level of the prejudices of the masses. And among Russian liberals there is undoubtedly a widespread prejudice that the Zemstvo is indeed the "embryo of the constitution," * the "natu-

* In regard to what may be expected from the Zemstvo, it may not be without interest to cite the following opinion expressed by Prince P. B. Dolgorukov in his *Listok* [*Leaflet*] [83] published in the sixties. [Burtsev, pp. 63-66.] "In examining the principal regulations governing the Zemstvo institutions, we again come across the secret thought of the government continuously breaking out into the light, *viz.*, overwhelm with generosity; loudly proclaim: 'See how much I am giving you!' but give as little as possible, and even impose restrictions upon the enjoyment of the little that is given. . . . Under the present autocratic system, the Zemstvo institutions do not and cannot bring any benefits, and will not and cannot have any significance, but they are pregnant with the embryo of fruitful development in the future. . . . But as long as Russia lacks a constitutional system of government, as long as the autocracy exists, and as long as freedom of the press is denied, the Zemstvo institutions will be doomed to remain political phantoms, *mute* assemblies of those who should voice the interests of the people."

Thus even in the sixties, Dolgorukov was not very optimistic. The forty years that have passed since then have taught us much, and have demonstrated that the Zemstvos were destined by "fate" (and also by the government) to serve as the basis for a whole series of measures which have *overwhelmed* the constitutionalists.

ral," peaceful and gradual growth of which is accidently retarded by the intrigues of certain evil time-servers, that only a few petitions are necessary in order to "pacify" the autocrat, that legal cultural work generally and Zemstvo work in particular, has "considerable political significance" which relieves those who express mere verbal hostility to the autocracy of the obligation of actively supporting the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy in one way or another, etc. Undoubtedly, it would be very useful and desirable to unite the liberals, but only a unity which has for its aim to combat outworn prejudices and not to play up to them, and to raise the general level of our political development (or rather undevelopment) and not to sanction it, in a word, only unity for the purpose of supporting the illegal struggle and not for the purpose of opportunistic phrasemongering about the political significance of legal activity can be of any use. To issue the slogan, "An Authoritative Zemstvo," to liberals, can no more be justified than issuing the political slogan, "Freedom to strike," etc., to the workers. *Under the Autocracy* every kind of Zemstvo, however "authoritative" it may be, will inevitably be a deformity, incapable of development, while *under a constitution* the Zemstvo will immediately lose its present-day "political" significance.

The unity of liberals may be brought about in two ways: by forming an independent liberal party (illegal, of course), or by organising liberal aid for revolutionaries. Mr. R. N. S. points to the first form, but . . . if what he says in this connection is to be taken as a genuine expression of the views and prospects of liberalism, then they do not give ground for very great optimism. He writes: "Without a Zemstvo, the Zemstvo liberals will have to form a liberal party, or abandon the historical stage as an organised force. We are convinced that the organisation of liberals in an illegal party, even if it has a very moderate programme and adopts very moderate methods, will be the inevitable result of the abolition of the Zemstvo." If the "abolition" of the Zemstvos is the only thing that will stimulate the organisation of the liberals, we shall have to wait a long time for it, for even Witte does not wish to abolish them, while the Russian government is very much concerned in preserving their outward appearance, even if their internal content is completely extracted. That a liberal party will be a very moderate one is quite natural, and it is useless to expect that the movement among the bourgeoisie (for only on that movement can a

liberal party be based) will give rise to any other. But what should be the activities and the "methods" of such a party? Mr. R. N. S. does not explain. He says: "It goes without saying that an illegal liberal party, being an organisation consisting of the most moderate and least mobile of the opposition elements, cannot develop particularly wide, or particularly intense, activity. . . ." We think, however, that in a certain sphere, say within the restricted limits of local and above all of Zemstvo interests, the liberal party could very well develop wide and intensive activity, for example, the organisation of political exposures. . . . "But with such activity being carried on by other parties, especially by the Social-Democratic or Labour Party, the liberal party, even without entering into any direct agreement with the Social-Democrats, can become a very important factor. . . ." Very true; and the reader will naturally expect that the author would, at least, in general outline, describe the work of this "factor." But instead of doing so, Mr. R. N. S. describes the growth of revolutionary Social-Democracy and concludes: "With the existence of a pronounced political movement . . . a liberal opposition, if it is in the least organised, can play an important political rôle; if proper tactics are adopted, a moderate party always stands to gain from the growing acuteness of the struggle between the extreme elements in society. . . ." And that is all! The "rôle" of the "factor" (which has already managed to convert itself from a party into an "opposition") is to "take advantage" of the growing acuteness of the struggle. Mention is made of what the liberals stand to gain, but not a word is said about the liberals taking part in the fight. An oversight; a providential one in fact. . . .

Russian Social-Democrats never closed their eyes to the fact that the political liberties for which they are fighting will *first and foremost* benefit the bourgeoisie. Only a Socialist who is steeped in the worst prejudices of Utopianism, or reactionary Populism would object to carrying on the fight against the autocracy for that reason. The bourgeoisie will benefit by these liberties and rest on its laurels. The proletariat, however, needs liberty in order to develop the fight for Socialism to the utmost. And Social-Democracy will persistently carry on the fight for liberation, no matter what the attitude of the various strata of the bourgeoisie towards this fight may be. In the interest of the political struggle, we must support every opposition that is raised against the oppression of autocracy,

no matter on what grounds it may be raised, and by what social stratum it is expressed. For that reason, we are by no means indifferent to the opposition expressed by our liberal bourgeoisie generally, and by our Zemstvo liberals in particular. If the liberals succeed in organising themselves in an illegal party, so much the better. We shall welcome the growth of political consciousness among the propertied classes; we shall support their demands, we shall endeavour to work so that the activities of the Social-Democrats and the liberals mutually supplement each other.* But even if they fail to do so (which is more probable), we shall not give them up in disgust. We shall try to establish contacts with individual liberals, make them acquainted with our movement, support them by exposing in the labour press all the despicable acts of the government and the local authorities, and try to induce them to support the revolutionaries. Such an exchange of services between liberals and Social-Democrats is going on already; it must be extended and made permanent. But while being always ready to carry on this exchange of services, we shall never, under any circumstances, cease to carry on a determined struggle against the illusions which are so widespread in the politically undeveloped Russian society generally and in Russian liberal society in particular. In regard to the Russian revolutionary movement we may say, paraphrasing the celebrated statement of Marx, in regard to the revolution of 1848, that its progress lies not so much in the achievement of positive gains, as in emancipation from harmful illusions.[85] We have emancipated ourselves from the illusions of Anarchism and Socialism of the Narodniks, from our contempt for politics, from the belief that Russia will develop quite differently from all other countries, from the conviction that the people are ready for revolution, and from the theory of the seizure of power in single combat between the heroic intelligentsia and the autocracy.

It is time our liberals emancipated themselves from the illusion that would appear to be theoretically bankrupt, but which reveals

* The present writer had occasion to point out the utility of a liberal party four years ago, in commenting upon the Narodnoye Pravo [People's Right] Party.[84] [See *The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats*, Geneva, 1898, p. 26; also V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II.—*Ed.*] We said: ". . . But if this party (Narodnoye Pravo) consists, not of masquerade but of real non-Socialist democrats, then it can render considerable service by striving to establish contact with the political opposition elements among our bourgeoisie. . . ."

extreme vitality in practice, *viz.*, that dealings with the Russian autocracy are possible, that some kind of a Zemstvo is the embryo of the constitution, and that the sincere adherents of the latter can fulfil their vow of Hannibal by patient legal activity and patient appeals to the enemy to become pacified.

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A VALUABLE ADMISSION

Labour unrest has once again given rise to widespread comment. The governing classes have become thoroughly scared. This may be seen from the fact that it was considered necessary to "punish" even the *Novoye Vremya* [*New Time*], that extremely loyal and well-intentioned newspaper, for an article published in its issue of May 11, No. 9051. The paper was suspended for one week. Of course, the penalty was not inflicted because of the nature of the article, which was replete with the kindest sentiments towards the government, and a most sincere concern for its interests. What was considered dangerous was the very discussion of the events which were "disturbing society," and the mere reference to their importance and widespread character. Below we give extracts from the secret circular [86] dated May 11, *i. e.*, the very date on which the offending article appeared in *Novoye Vremya*, ordering that articles in the press, dealing with the disorders in the factories, and with the attitude of the workers towards the employers, be published *only with the permission of the department of police*, which proves better than all arguments that our government is inclined to regard the labour unrest as a matter of state importance. The article in *Novoye Vremya* is of special interest for the reason that it contains the outline of a complete government programme, which in effect amounts to allaying the discontent by a few petty and in part fictitious doles to which are attached prominent labels about solicitude, cordiality, etc., and which provide pretexts for increasing the surveillance of the officials. But this programme, which is not a new one, embodies, one may say, the "acme" of wisdom of modern statesmen, not only in Russia, but also in the West. In a society based on private property, and the enslavement of millions of propertyless toilers by a handful of rich, the government cannot be anything else than the loyal friend and ally of exploiters, and the most trusty guardian of their power. In order to serve as a reliable guardian in these times, guns, bayonets and knouts are not sufficient; it is necessary to convince the exploited that the government stands above class, that it serves the interests, not of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, but the interests of justice, that it is concerned in protecting the weak

and the poor against the rich and the powerful, etc. Napoleon III, in France and Bismarck and Wilhelm II in Germany have exerted not a little effort to flirt with the workers in this way. But in Europe, where there is, more or less, a free press, democratic government, elections and well established political parties, these hypocritical tricks can be very quickly exposed. In Asia, however, which includes Russia, where the masses of the people are so wretched and ignorant, and where prejudices, which foster faith in the Little Father —the Tsar, are so strong, these tricks can be passed off very easily. One of the very characteristic symptoms of the fact that the European spirit is beginning to penetrate even into Russia is the *failure* that this policy has met with in the last ten or twelve years. This policy has been tried over and over again, but every time, within a few years after the passing of some "protective" (alleged protective) labour law, things reverted to the old position—the number of discontented workers increased, ferment grew, unrest increased—again the "protective" policy is announced with a blast of trumpets, again pompous phrases are heard about cordial solicitude for the workers; another law is passed providing for a penny's worth of benefit to the workers and a pound's worth of empty and lying words, and in a few years' time, the whole thing is gone over again. The government runs around, like a squirrel in a cage, frantically throwing a sop, now here and now there, to allay the discontent of the workers—but the discontent continues to break out with increasing vigour.

We shall recall the most important landmarks in the history of "labour legislation" in Russia. Towards the end of the seventies, a very big strike broke out in St. Petersburg, and the Socialists tried to take advantage of the situation to intensify their work of agitation. In his so-called "democratic" (but in fact aristocratic-police) policy, Alexander III included factory legislation. In 1882, a system of factory inspection was introduced and in the beginning, the factory inspectors' reports were even published. The government, of course, was not pleased with these reports, and *ceased to publish them.* The Factory Inspection Act proved to be merely a rag with which to stop the gap through which the discontent of the workers flowed. Then came the years 1884-1885; the industrial crisis gave rise to a powerful movement among the workers, and a number of extremely turbulent strikes broke out in the central district (the Morozov cotton-mill strike was particularly noteworthy). Again

the "protection" policy was brought to the front, advocated with particular zeal by Katkov in *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti.*[87] Katkov stormed and raved over the fact that the Morozov strikers were tried before a jury, and he described the hundred and one questions submitted by the judge to the jury, as "a hundred and one guns of salute in honour of the appearance of the labour question in Russia." At the same time, he called upon the "government" to come to the defence of the workers, to prohibit the monstrous system of fines that prevailed in the Morozov cotton-mills, and which finally roused the cotton weavers to revolt. The law of 1886 was passed, which greatly widened the powers of the factory inspectors, and prohibited the imposition of arbitrary fines by the mill-owners. Ten years passed, and again there was an outbreak of labour unrest. The strikes of 1895, and particularly the great strike of 1896, caused the government to tremble with fear (especially because the Social-Democrats were already systematically marching hand in hand with the workers), and with a celerity hitherto unprecedented, passed the "protective" law (June 2, 1897), curtailing the working day. During the discussion on this act in committee the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, including the director of the Department of Police, loudly declared in one voice that the factory workers must be taught to regard the government as their constant defender, and just and merciful protector [see the pamphlet, *The Secret Documents Concerning the Law of June 2, 1897*]. Although the Act was passed, it was secretly curtailed and substituted by circulars issued by the very government that passed it. Another industrial crisis breaks out. The workers for the hundredth time are convinced that the "protection" of the police-government cannot give them liberty or materially alleviate their conditions, nor does it enable them to look after themselves. Again unrest and street fighting, again the government is disturbed, again we hear police speeches about "state protection," this time delivered in the pages of *Novoye Vremya.* Gentlemen! Will you never get tired of carrying water in a sieve?

No! Of course, the government will never get tired of repeating its attempts to intimidate the irreconcilable workers, and by means of a dole to decoy the weaker, the more timid and more cowardly. But we shall never tire of exposing the real meaning of these attempts of exposing "statesmen" who only yesterday ordered soldiers to shoot down the workers, and to-day shout about protection; who yesterday talked about their justice towards and protection of the

workers and to-day are seizing one after another the best among the workers and the intellectuals to be punished by the police without any trial. Therefore we consider it necessary to dwell on the "state programme" of the *Novoye Vremya,* before some new "protective" law is promulgated. And the admission made in this connection by an organ so "authoritative" in the sphere of home politics as *Novoye Vremyà* is worthy of attention.

Novoye Vremya is compelled to admit that the "regrettable incidents that have taken place in the sphere of the labour problem" are not accidental. Of course, the Socialists are responsible for this (the newspaper avoids mentioning the awful word "Socialist," but employs the term "pernicious pseudo-doctrines" and the "propaganda of anti-state and anti-social ideas"), but why are the Socialists so successful among the workers? *Novoye Vremya,* of course, does not allow the opportunity to slip by to hurl abuse at the workers: They are so "ignorant and unintelligent" that they willingly listen to the pernicious propaganda of the Socialists which is so harmful to the welfare of the police-state. Consequently, the Socialists and the workers are responsible, and against these the gendarmes have for a long time been carrying on a desperate war, filling the prisons and places of exile. But this fight is a futile one. Apparently, there is something *in the conditions of the workers in the factories* which "gives rise to and fosters discontent with their present conditions," and, consequently, "facilitates the success" of Socialism. "The severe toil of the factory workers and their extremely unfavourable conditions of life provide them with a bare subsistence for as long as they are able to work, and in every emergency when they have no work for any length of time, they find themselves in desperate straits, such as, for example, those described in the newspapers in regard to the workers in the Baku oilfields." Thus, the supporters of the government are compelled to admit that the success of Socialism is due to the really bad conditions of the workers. But this admission is made in a very vague and evasive form, and with so many reservations, that it is clear that these people do not in the least intend to touch the "sacred property" of the capitalists which oppresses the workers. "Unfortunately," writes *Novoye Vremya,* "we know too little about the actual state of affairs in regard to the labour problem in Russia." Yes, unfortunately indeed! And "we" know little, precisely because we permit the police-government to keep the whole press in slavery, and to gag every one who honestly

attempts to expose the scandalous state of affairs in our country. On the other hand, "we" try to turn the hatred of the workers, not against the Asiatic government, but against the non-Russian. *Novoye Vremya* broadly hints at the "non-Russian factory managers," and calls them "coarse and greedy." Only the most ignorant and undeveloped workers, those who believe that all their misfortunes come from the "Germans" or the "Jews" and who do not know that the German and Jewish workers also combine to fight their German and Jewish exploiters, would be caught with a bait like that. But even the workers who do not know this have learned from thousands of examples that the Russian capitalists are the "greediest" and most unceremonious of all capitalists, and that the Russian police and the Russian government are the "coarsest" of all police and all governments.

Interesting, also, are *Novoye Vremya's* regrets that the workers are not so ignorant and submissive as are the peasantry. It wails about the fact that the workers "are abandoning their rural nests," that the "factory districts become the gathering centres of mixed masses," that the "rural workers are abandoning their villages with their modest [that is the whole point], but independent, social and economic interests and relationships." Indeed, they have something to wail about. "The rural workers" are tied to their nests, and out of fear of losing them, dare not submit demands to their landlord, threaten him with strikes, etc. The rural workers do not know what is going on in other places and are interested only in the affairs of their own village (the supporters of the government call this, "independent interests" of the rural workers; knowing his place, not poking his nose into politics—what can please the authorities more?), and in his village, the local leech, the landlord or kulak knows every single individual; all the peasants have inherited from their fathers and grandfathers the servile lesson of submission, and there is no one there to rouse them to class consciousness. In the factory, however, there is a "mixed" crowd of workers who are not tied to their nests (it is all the same to them where they work), who have seen and learned things, who are bold and interested in all things.

Notwithstanding this deplorable transformation of the humble muzhik into a class-conscious worker, our police wiseacres still hope to lead the masses of the workers by the nose with phrases about "the state's solicitude for the welfare of the workers." The *Novoye*

Vremya fortifies this hope by the following outworn argument: Proud and all-powerful in the West, capitalism in our country is still a weak infant, it can walk only in leading strings, and these leading strings are provided by the government. . . . Now only a humble peasant will believe this old song about the omnipotence of the authorities. The workers, however, see too frequently that the capitalists keep the police, the church, and the military and civil officials in "leading strings." And so, continues *Novoye Vremya*, the government *must insist* upon the conditions of the workers being improved, *i. e.*, it must order the employers to improve the conditions of the workers. Simple, is it not? Issue an order, and the thing is done. But it is easy to talk; as a matter of fact, the orders of the authorities, even the most "modest" of them, like the one about the establishment of dispensaries at the factories, have been ignored by the capitalists for whole decades. Moreover, the government would not dare to order the capitalists to do anything that would seriously affect the "sacred" right of private property. More than that, the government does not wish seriously to improve the conditions of the workers, because in thousands of instances it acts as an employer itself; it defrauds and oppresses the workers in the Obukhov Works and hundreds of other places, and tens of thousands of postal and railway employees, etc., etc. *Novoye Vremya* realises that no one would take the orders of the government seriously, and tries to take refuge in lofty historical examples. This should be done, it says in regard to the improvement in the conditions of the workers, "in the same way as half a century ago the government, guided by the wise conviction that it would be better, by wise reforms from above, to avert the presentation of demands for such reforms from below and not to wait for those demands to come from below, took the peasant question in hand."

Now, this is really a valuable admission. Just before the emancipation of the peasants, the Tsar hinted to the nobility the possibility of a popular rebellion and said: It would be better to emancipate from above, rather than wait until they began to emancipate themselves from below. And now this cringing newspaper admits that the temper of the workers fills it with a fear no less than the temper of the peasants did "on the eve of freedom." "It is preferable from above rather than from below!" This journalistic lackey of the autocracy is profoundly mistaken if it thinks that there is anything "similar" between the demands for reforms to-day and

those of that time. The peasants demanded the abolition of serfdom, without being opposed to the Tsar's rule; they believed in the Tsar. The workers to-day are roused first and foremost against the government, they realise that their lack of rights under the police-autocracy binds them hand and foot in the fight against capitalism and for that reason they demand liberation from governmental tyranny and outrage. The workers are also in a state of unrest on the "eve of freedom," but this will be the freedom of the whole people; they will compel the despots to grant political freedom.

Do you know what great reform is proposed in order to allay the discontent of the workers and to demonstrate to them the "government's protection"? If persistent rumour is to believed, a struggle is proceeding between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior. The latter demands the transfer to its hands of the inspectorship of factories, for then, it argues, the factory inspectors will be less likely to serve the capitalists and will show more regard for the interests of the workers and in this way avert unrest. Let the workers prepare for this new act of the Tsar's grace: The factory inspectors will don different uniforms, and will be placed on the staff of another department (and in all probability receive a higher salary) namely, the very department (especially the Department of Police), which for such a long time past was demonstrating its love and solicitude for the workers in so striking a manner.

Iskra, No. 6, July, 1901.

THE LESSONS OF THE CRISIS

THE commercial and industrial crisis has dragged on for almost two years already. Apparently it is still growing, spreading to new branches of industry and to new districts and is becoming more acute as a result of the failure of a number of other banks. Every issue of our newspaper since last December has contained information indicating the development of the crisis and its disastrous effects. The time has come for the general question of the causes and significance of this phenomenon to be raised. For Russia, this phenomenon is comparatively a new one, just as Russian capitalism itself is new. In the older capitalist countries—*i. e.*, in those countries in which goods are mainly produced for sale, and in which the great majority of the workers own neither land nor instruments of production, but sell their labour power to employers, to the owners of land, factories, machinery, etc.—in capitalist countries, crises are an old phenomenon, and recur from time to time, like attacks of a chronic disease. Hence, crises may be foretold and when capitalism began to develop with particular rapidity in Russia, the present crisis was foretold in Social-Democratic literature. In the pamphlet —*The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats*—written at the end of 1897, was said:

> Apparently, we are at the present time passing through that period of a capitalist cycle (rotation, a repetition of one and the same event, in the same way as winter follows summer), in which industry is "prosperous": Trade is brisk, factories are working at full capacity, and innumerable new factories, new enterprises, joint stock companies, railway enterprises, etc., etc., spring up like mushrooms. One need not be a prophet, however, to be able to forecast the inevitable crash (more or less severe) which must follow this industrial "prosperity." This crash will ruin masses of small masters, and throw masses of workers into the ranks of the unemployed. . . .*

And the crash came with a severity unparalleled in Russia before. What is the cause of this horrible, chronic disease of capitalist society, which recurs so regularly that its coming can be foretold?

Capitalist production cannot develop otherwise than in leaps—two steps forward and one step (and sometimes two) back. As we have already observed, capitalist production is production for sale,

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II.—*Ed.*

the production of commodities for the market. Production is carried on by individual capitalists, each producing on his own, and none of them can say exactly what kind of commodities, and in what quantities, are required on the market. Production is carried on haphazardly; each producer is concerned only in excelling the others. Quite naturally, therefore, the quantity of commodities produced may not correspond to the demand on the market. The probability of this being the case becomes particularly great when an enormous market is suddenly opened up in new unexplored and extensive territories. This is exactly what happened during the industrial "boom" we experienced not so long ago. The capitalists of the whole of Europe stretched out their paws towards those parts of the globe which are inhabited by hundreds of millions of people, towards Asia, of which up till recently, only India and a small section of the outlying territories had been closely connected with the world market. The Trans-Caspian Railroad began to "open up" Central Asia for the capitalists; the Great Siberian Railroad (great, not only because of its length, but because of the unrestricted plunder of the treasury by the contractors, and the unrestricted exploitation of the workers who built it) opened up Siberia. Japan began to develop into an industrial nation; it strove to make a breach in the Chinese Wall, and opened the way to a dainty morsel, into which the capitalists of England, Germany, France, Russia, and even Italy, immediately plunged their teeth. The construction of gigantic railways, the expansion of the world market and the growth of commerce, all stimulated an unexpected revival of industry, the increase of new enterprises, a wild hunt for markets for sale and profits, the floating of new companies and the attraction to industry of masses of fresh capital, consisting partly also of the small savings of small capitalists. It is not surprising that this wild world-hunt for new and unknown markets led to an enormous crash.

To obtain a clear idea of the nature of this hunt for markets and profits, we must know what giants took part in it. When we speak of "separate enterprises" and "individual capitalists," we sometimes forget that, strictly speaking, these terms are inexact. As a matter of fact, only the taking of profits has remained individualistic, while production has become social. Gigantic crashes have become possible and inevitable, only because powerful *social* productive forces have become subordinated to a gang of rich men, whose only concern is to make profits. We shall illustrate this by an example from

Russian industry. Recently the crisis has spread to the oil industry. Now in this industry are engaged companies like Nobel Brothers. In 1899, this company sold 163,000,000 poods * of oil products to the value of 53,500,000 rubles, while in 1900, it sold 192,000,000 poods of oil to the value of 72,000,000 rubles. In one year, a single enterprise increased output by 18,500,000 rubles! This "single enterprise" is maintained by the combined labour of tens and hundreds of thousands of workers, engaged in extracting oil, refining it, delivering it by pipe line, railroad, seas and rivers, in constructing the necessary machinery, stores, materials, barges, steamers, etc. These tens of thousands of workers work for the benefit of the whole of society, but the fruit of their labour is controlled by a handful of millionaires, who take to themselves the whole of the profit earned by the organised labour of this mass of workers. (In 1899, the Nobel Company made a net profit of 4,000,000 rubles, and in 1900, it made a net profit of 6,000,000 rubles, out of which the shareholders received 1,300 rubles per share, costing 5,000 rubles each. Five members of the board of directors received bonuses amounting to 528,000 rubles!) When several enterprises like these fling themselves into the wild chase after places in an unknown market, is it surprising that a crisis comes about?

In order that an enterprise may make a profit the goods produced in it must be sold, a purchaser must be found for them. Now the purchasers of these goods must be the vast mass of the population, because these enormous enterprises produce enormous quantities of goods. But nine-tenths of the population of all capitalist countries are poor; they consist of workers who receive miserable wages and of peasants who, in the main, live even under worse conditions than the workers. Now, when, in the period of a boom, the large industrial enterprises set out to produce as large a quantity of goods as possible, they throw on the market such a huge quantity of these goods that the majority of the people, being poor, are unable to purchase them all. The number of machines, tools, warehouses, railroads, etc., continues to grow. From time to time, however, this process of growth is interrupted because the masses of the people for whom, in the last analysis these improved instruments of production are intended, remain in poverty, which verges on beggary. The crisis shows that modern society can produce immeasureably more goods than it does, which could be used to improve the con-

* One pood = 36 lbs.—*Ed.*

ditions of life of the whole of the toiling people, if the land, factories, machines, etc., did not belong to a handful of private owners, who extract millions of profits out of the poverty of the people. The crisis shows that the workers must not confine themselves to the struggle for minor concessions from the capitalists. While industry is flourishing, such concessions may be won (on more than one occasion between 1894-1898, the Russian workers won such concessions by their energetic struggles), but when the crash comes, the capitalists not only take back the concessions they made, but take advantage of the helpless position of the workers to force wages down still lower. And so things will inevitably continue until the army of the Socialist proletariat will overthrow the domination of capital and of private property. The crisis shows how near-sighted were those Socialists (who call themselves "critics," probably because they borrow the doctrines of bourgeois economists without criticism) who two years ago declared that crashes were becoming less and less probable.

The lesson of the crisis, which has proved how stupid it is to subordinate social production to private property, is so instructive that even the bourgeois press is now demanding stronger supervision —for example, over the banks. But no supervision will prevent the capitalists from establishing enterprises in times of boom which must inevitably become bankrupt later on. Alchevsky, the founder of the Land and Commercial Bank in Kharkov, which has gone bankrupt, acquired millions of rubles, by foul means and fair, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining mining enterprises which promised wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. A slight hitch in industry, and these banks and mining enterprises came crashing to the ground (the Donets-Yuryev Company). But what does the "crash" of enterprises mean in capitalist society? It means that the smaller capitalists, the second-rank capitalists are forced to the wall by the big millionaires. The place of Alchevsky, the Kharkov millionaire, is taken by the Moscow millionaire, Ryabushinsky, who, being a richer capitalist, will oppress the workers still more. Big capitalists take the place of the smaller capitalists, the power of capital increases, masses of small property-owners are ruined (for example, small investors, who lose all their property in a bank crash), frightful impoverishment of the workers—all this follows as the result of a crisis. We recall also the cases described in *Iskra* in which the capitalists lengthened the working day and dis-

charged class-conscious workers taking in their places more submissive rustics.[88]

The effect of a crisis in Russia is ever so much greater than in any other country. Stagnation in industry is accompanied by famine among the peasantry. Unemployed workers are sent from the cities into the country, but where can the unemployed peasants go? By sending the workers into the country, the authorities desire to clear the discontented out of the cities; but perhaps these migrants will be able to rouse at least a part of the peasantry from their age-long submission, and induce them not only to plead, but to *demand*. The workers and peasants are being drawn closer to each other, not only by unemployment and starvation, but also by police tyranny, which deprives the workers of the possibility of combination and defence, and prevents even the voluntary aid that is given from reaching the peasantry. The heavy paws of the police are becoming still heavier for millions of people who have lost all means of livelihood. The gendarmes and the police in the cities, the Zemstvo chiefs and police in the rural districts, see clearly that hatred against them is growing and they are beginning to fear not only village kitchens, but even advertisements in the newspapers appealing for funds. Fancy being afraid of voluntary contributions! A guilty conscience, indeed! When a thief sees a passer-by offering a donation to the man he has robbed, he begins to think that both are stretching forth their hands to join together to punish him.

Iskra, No. 7, August, 1901.

THE SERF-OWNERS AT WORK

On July 8, 1901, an act was passed granting state lands in Siberia to private persons.[89] The future will show how this new act will be applied; but its passing is so instructive, it so strikingly demonstrates the undisguised character and real strivings of the tsarist government that it is worth while examining it, and making it as widely known among the working class and the peasantry as possible.

Our government is continually granting doles to the noble, aristocratic landlords. It established for them the Bank of the Nobility; it gave them all sorts of facilities in obtaining loans and relief in the payment of arrears; it helped the millionaire sugar-refiners to arrange a strike in order to raise prices and increase their profits; it takes care to provide soft jobs as Zemstvo chiefs for the ruined sons of the aristocracy, and it is now arranging for the purchase of vodka by the state on terms very favourable for the noble vodka distillers. By this new land act, however, it not only makes a gift to the richest and most highly placed exploiters, but it creates a *new* class of exploiters, and dooms millions of peasants and workers to permanent bondage to new landlords.

Let us examine the principal features of the new act. It must be observed first of all that before the Minister of Agriculture and State Property introduced it in the council of state, the act was discussed *at a special conference called to discuss the affairs of the nobility.* It is generally known that it is not the workers and peasants who suffer most from poverty in Russia, but the landed nobility, and so this "special conference" hastened to devise measures by which the poverty of these noble landlords could be relieved. State lands in Siberia will be sold and leased to "private persons" for the purpose of "private enterprise." At the same time, foreign subjects and non-Russians (in which are included Jews) are prohibited *forever* from acquiring these lands in any way. The lands may be leased (and we shall see in a moment that this is the most advantageous transaction for the future landlords) exclusively to the nobility, "who," as the law states, "owing to their economic reliability, are the most desirable landowners to have in Siberia from the point-of-view of the state." Thus, the point-of-view of the govern-

ment is that the toiling population must be enslaved to the big landed aristocracy. How big can be seen from the fact that allotments to be sold may not exceed *three-thousand desyatinas,** while no limit at all is placed to the area of lands to be leased and the term of the leases may be for a period up to *ninety-nine years.* According to the government's calculations, a poor landlord needs *two hundred times* as much land as a peasant, who is given fifteen desyatinas of land in Siberia for himself and his family.

The easy terms and exceptions to the rule that are provided for the landowners by the law are truly astonishing! In the first five years of his lease, the lessee pays nothing. If he purchases the land he has leased (and the new law gives him the *right* to do so), the purchase price is spread over a period of thirty-seven years. If special permission is obtained, an area of land exceeding 3,000 desyatinas may be purchased at the market price, not by public auction, while arrears may be postponed for one or even three years. It must not be forgotten that the new law will be taken advantage of only by the higher dignitaries and persons connected with the court, etc.—and these people obtain these easy terms and relief quite casually, in the course of a conversation in the drawing-room with a provincial governor or a cabinet minister.

But here is the rub! What is the use of these scraps of land three thousand desyatinas in dimension to the land-owning generals if muzhiks are not compelled to work for them. Although poverty is increasing among the people in Siberia, nevertheless the Siberian peasant is ever so much more independent than the "Russian" peasant, and cannot be compelled to work under the whip. The new law is intended to train him to do so. "The lands allotted for purpose of private enterprises *shall, as far as possible, be divided into lots alternating with the allotments* held by the peasant allotment holders" says par. 4 of the new act. The tsarist government displays its solicitude for the poor peasants, and tries to provide "work" for them. Ten years ago, this same Mr. Yermolov who, now as Minister of Agriculture and State Property, in the council of state introduced the new Siberian land act providing for the disposal of state lands to private persons, wrote a book (which did not bear his name), entitled, *The Failure of the Harvest and the Famine.* In this book he openly declared that there was no reason for permitting peasants who can obtain "work" with their local landlords

* One desyatina = 2.70 acres.—*Ed.*

to migrate to Siberia. Russian statesmen quite unceremoniously give expression to the purest feudal views; peasants were created to work for the landlords. Therefore, peasants must not be "permitted" to migrate to whatever place they like, if by that the landlords will be deprived of cheap labour. And if in spite of all the red tape, and even downright prohibition, the peasants continue to migrate to Siberia in hundreds of thousands, the tsarist government, acting precisely as if it were the steward of an old feudal baron, hastens after them to lay its hold upon them, even in their new habitations. On the one hand, if "alternating" between the modest peasant allotments (the best of these are already occupied), there will be lots belonging to the noble landlords, three thousand desyatinas in extent, then all temptation to migrate to Siberia will disappear very soon. On the other hand, the more restricted the conditions of the surrounding peasants become, the more the new landlords' land will increase in value. The peasants will be obliged to hire themselves out cheaply, or lease land from the landlords at three times its value—just as is done at home in "Russia." The new law deliberately sets out to create a new paradise for the landlords as soon as possible and a new hell for the peasants as quickly as possible. Special mention is made in the act concerning the leasing of land for *a single* season. While special permission is required to sublease state lands, subleasing for one season is permitted quite freely. All that the landlord need trouble about is to engage a steward. The latter will sublease land in desyatina lots to the peasants living on the allotments "alternating" with the landlord's land, and send his master the net profit.

Probably many nobles will not care to carry on even such an "enterprise." In that case, they can make a nice little pile at one stroke by reselling the state land to its real owners. It is not an accident that this new law was passed just at the time when a railroad is being laid down in Siberia, when banishment to Siberia has been abolished, and when migration to Siberia has increased to an enormous extent, for all this will inevitably lead and has led already, to a rise in land values. Hence, the granting of lands to private persons at the present time is nothing more nor less than the plunder of the Treasury by the nobles. The value of land is rising, and yet these lands are leased and sold to generals and people of that ilk, who get all the benefit of the increasing value of the land. For example, in the Ufa province, in one county alone, the nobles and

officials made the following transaction in land that was sold to them (this they did on the basis of a similar law): they paid the government 60,000 rubles for the land, and within two years they sold this very same land for 580,000 rubles, *i. e.*, received for the mere resale of land *more than a half a million rubles!* This example is sufficient to give us an idea of the millions of rubles that will pass into the pockets of the poverty-stricken landlords out of the grants of lands they obtain over the whole of Siberia.

In order to cover up this naked robbery the government and its adherents advances all sorts of lofty arguments. They talk about the development of culture in Siberia, and of the enormous importance of model farms. As a matter of fact, the large estates, which will place the neighbouring peasants in a hopeless position, can at the present time only serve to develop the most uncultured methods of exploitation. Model farms are not established by robbing the Treasury, and the grant of lands will lead simply to land speculation among the nobles and officials, or to a system in which bondage and usury will flourish. The noble aristocracy, in alliance with the government, prohibited Jews and other non-Russians (whom they picture to the ignorant people as being particularly outrageous exploiters) from acquiring state lands in Siberia in order that they may themselves engage in this lowest type of usury without hindrance.

There is talk also about the political significance of having the noble and landlord estate established in Siberia. Among the intelligentsia, it is said, there are a very large number of former exiles, unreliable people in Siberia, and it is necessary, therefore, in order to counteract them, to establish there a reliable bulwark of the state, a reliable "land-owning" element. This talk contains a much larger share of and more profound truth than *Grazhdanin* [*Citizen*] [90] and *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti* imagine. The police-state is rousing so much hostility against itself among the people that it finds it necessary artificially to create a group that will serve as a pillar of the fatherland. It is essential for the government to create a class of big exploiters, who would be under extreme obligation to it, and dependent upon its grace, who would make enormous profits by the lowest methods (speculation and usury), and, consequently, could always be relied upon to support tyranny and oppression. The Asiatic government must seek support in Asiatic large land-ownership and a feudal system of "granting lands." Since it is impossible

at the present time to grant "populated estates," it is possible at all events to grant estates *alternating* with the lands of peasants who are becoming more and more destitute. If it does not look the proper thing to grant gratis at one stroke thousands of desyatinas of land to the court lickspittles, it is possible to cover up this wholesale disbursement of lands by thousands of reservations granting ridiculouly easy terms of sale and "lease" (for 99 years). When we compare this land policy with the land policy of modern progressive countries like America, for example, can we call it anything else but feudal? In America, no one would *dare* talk about permitting or not permitting migration, for in that country, every citizen has the right to go where he pleases. In that country every one who desires to engage in agriculture has the right *by law* to occupy vacant land in the outlying parts of the country. In America, they are not creating a class of Asiatic satraps, but a class of energetic farmers who are developing the productive forces of the country. Thanks to the large amount of vacant land there, the working class in America enjoy the highest standard of living in the world.

In what period has the government passed this serf-owners' law? In a period of the most acute industrial crisis, when tens and hundreds of thousands are unemployed, in a period when millions of peasants are again in a state of famine. The government exerts all its efforts to prevent "a noise" being made about the disaster. That is why it has sent the unemployed workers back to their homes in the country; that is why it has transferred the work of food distribution from the hands of the Zemstvos to the police officials, that is why it has prohibited private persons from organising food kitchens for the famine-stricken, and that is why it has gagged the press. But when the "noise" about the famine, so unpleasant to the ears of the well-fed, died down, the little father, the Tsar, set to work to assist the poverty-stricken landlords and poor unfortunate, courtier generals. We repeat, our task at the present time is simply—to make this new land act as widely known as possible. The most uneducated sections of the workers, and the most raw and wretched peasants, when they get to hear of it, will understand whom the present government serves, and what kind of government the people must have.

Iskra, No. 8, September 10, 1901.

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE "CRITICS OF MARX" [91]

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE "CRITICS OF MARX"

". . . To set out to prove . . . that dogmatic Marxism has been forced from its position on the agrarian question—would be like trying to force an open door. . . ." This statement was made last year by Mr. V. Chernov, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* [*Russian Wealth*] (1900, No. 8, p. 204).[93] Thus "dogmatic Marxism" possesses a most peculiar quality! For many years already, the most highly educated people in Europe have gravely declared (and newspaper scribes and journalists have repeated it after them over and over again) that Marxism has been forced from its position by "criticism"—and yet every new critic that comes along starts from the very beginning, all over again, to bombard this alleged already-destroyed position. Mr. V. Chernov, for example, in his review of Hertz's book, in the periodical *Russkoye Bogatstvo,* and also in his symposium, *At the Glorious Post,* is engaged for the space of *two hundred and forty whole pages* in "forcing an open door." Hertz's book, which Chernov reviews so extensively, is in itself a review of Kautsky's book, and has already been translated into Russian. Mr. Bulgakov, in fulfilling his promise to refute Kautsky, has published a two-volume book of research. Now, surely, nothing is left undone, and the remnants of "dogmatic Marxism" lie crushed to death beneath this mountain of critical printed matter!

I

THE "LAW" OF DIMINISHING RETURNS

Let us first of all examine the general theoretical features of the critics. Mr. Bulgakov, in the periodical *Nachalo* [*Beginning*],[94] wrote an article criticising Kautsky's *Agrarfrage* and in this article, he glaringly exposes his "critical" tricks. He charges down on Kautsky with the dash and abandon of a true cavalier, and "scatters" him to the winds—he puts into Kautsky's mouth what he did not say, he accuses him of ignoring the very arguments and circumstances with which he, Kautsky, deals in detail, and presents to the reader *as his own,* the critical conclusions drawn by Kautsky.

With the air of an expert, Mr. Bulgakov accuses Kautsky of confusing technical questions with economics, and in doing so not only betrays incredible confusion himself, but also a disinclination to read to the end the page from his opponent's book that he quotes. Needless to say, this article, from the pen of a future professor, is replete with outworn jibes against Socialists, against the "cataclysmic theory," against Utopianism, belief in miracles, etc.*

Now, in his doctoral dissertation on *Capitalism and Agriculture* [St. Petersburg, 1900], Mr. Bulgakov settles all his accounts with Marxism, and brings his "critical" evolution to its logical conclusion.

Mr. Bulgakov uses the "law of the diminishing returns" as the cornerstone of his "Theory of Agrarian Development." He cites the works of the classical economists who established this "law" (according to which each additional investment of labour and capital in land produces not a corresponding, but a diminishing quantity of products). We are given a list of the names of English economists who recognise this law. We are assured that it "has universal significance," that it is "quite an obvious and absolutely undeniable truth," "that it is sufficient merely to state it clearly," etc., etc. The stronger Mr. Bulgakov expresses himself, the clearer it becomes that he is *retreating* towards bourgeois political economy, which obscures social relationships by imaginary "eternal laws." What does the "obviousness" of the celebrated law of diminishing returns amount to? It amounts to this, that if each additional investment of labour and capital in land produced not a diminishing but an equal quantity of products, then there would be no sense in extending the area of land under cultivation; additional quantities of grain would be produced with each fresh investment on the same plot of land, however small it may be, and "it would be possible to carry on the agriculture of the whole globe upon one desyatina of land." This is the customary (*and the only*) argument advanced in favour of this "universal law." A little thought, however, will prove to any one that this argument is nothing more than an empty abstraction which leaves out of sight the most important thing—the level of technical development, and the state of productive

* I replied at once to Bulgakov's article in *Nachalo*, in an article entitled "Capitalism and Agriculture." Owing to the *Nachalo* ceasing publication, my article was published in *Zhizn* [*Life*] [95] (1900, Nos. 1 and 2). [See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II.—*Ed.*]

forces. Indeed, the very term "additional" (or successive) "investments of labour and capital" *presupposes* changes in the method of production and reforms in technique. In order that the quantity of capital invested in land may be increased to any degree, *the invention* of new machinery, new systems of land cultivation, new methods of stock-breeding, transport of products, etc., etc., is required. It is true that in relatively small measures "additional investments of labour and capital" may take place (and do take place) even when the technique of production has remained unchanged. In such cases, the law of diminishing returns is applicable *to a certain degree, i. e.,* it is applicable within the comparatively very narrow limits which the unchanged technique of production imposes upon the investment of additional labour and capital. Consequently, instead of a "universal law," we have what is to a high degree a relative "law"—so relative indeed that it can hardly be called a law or even a cardinal feature of agriculture. Let us take for granted: The three-field system, the cultivation of traditional grain crops, the maintenance of cattle for purposes of obtaining manure, lack of improved meadows and of improved implements. Obviously, assuming that these conditions remain unchanged, the possibilities of investing additional labour and capital in the land are extremely limited. But even within these narrow limits, *i. e.,* within the limits in which the investment of additional labour and capital is still possible, the diminution of the productivity of such additional capital and labour *will not always be observed as an absolute rule.* Take industry, for example, a flour mill, or a blacksmith's forge, in the period preceding world trade and the invention of the steam engine. At that level of technical development, the limits to which additional labour and capital could be invested in a blacksmith's forge or a wind or water mill, were very restricted. The inevitable thing that happened was that small blacksmiths' shops and flour mills continued to multiply and increase in number until the changes in the methods of production created a basis for new forms of industry.

Hence, the law of diminishing returns does not apply at all to the case in which technique is progressing and methods of production change; it has only an extremely relative and restricted application to the cases in which technique remains unchanged. That is why neither Marx nor the Marxists refer to this "law" and why so much noise about it is made only by representatives of bourgeois econom-

ics, like Brentano, who cannot abandon the prejudices of the old political economy, with its abstract, eternal, and natural laws.

Mr. Bulgakov defends the "universal law" by arguments, deserving only of ridicule:

> What was formerly a free gift of nature must now be produced by man: The wind and the rain broke up the soil, which was full of nutritious elements, and only the exertion of a little effort was required on the part of man to produce what was required. In the course of time, a larger and larger share of the productive work fell to man. As is the case everywhere, artificial processes more and more take the place of natural processes. But while in industry this expresses man's victory over nature, in agriculture, it indicates the increasing difficulties of existence for which nature is diminishing her gifts.
>
> In the present case it is immaterial whether this increasing difficulty of producing food finds expression in an increase in the human labour expended or in an increase in the employment of implements which man has produced, for example, instruments of production, manures, etc.; [Mr. Bulgakov wishes to say: It is immaterial whether the increasing difficulty of producing food finds expression in an increased expenditure of human labour or of those things produced by human labour]; what is important is that food becomes more and more costly to man. The substitution of human labour for the forces of nature, and of the natural factors of production by artificial factors is the law of diminishing returns [p. 16].

Apparently, Mr. Bulgakov is envious of the laurels of Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky, who came to the brilliant conclusion that it is not man that works with the aid of machines, but machines that work with the aid of man, and when he talks about the *substitution* of the forces of nature by human labour, etc., he, like these critics, sinks to the level of vulgar economics. Speaking generally, it is as impossible to substitute the forces of nature by human labour as it is impossible to substitute arshins by poods.* Both in industry and in agriculture, man can only utilise the forces of nature, if he has learned how they operate, and facilitate this utilisation by means of machinery, tools, etc. The story that primitive man obtained all his requirements as a free gift of nature is a silly fable that would call forth jeers and ridicule from first-year students, if Mr. Bulgakov attempted to relate it to them. Our age was not preceded by a Golden Age, and primitive man was absolutely crushed by the burden of existence, by the difficulties of fighting against nature. The introduction of machinery and improved methods of production immeasureably eased the labour of man in his fight against nature generally and in the production of

* Russian measures of length and weight, respectively. An arshin is about 27 inches, and a pood about 36 pounds.—*Ed.*

food in particular. It has not become more difficult to produce food; it has become more difficult for the workers to obtain it. And this is because capitalist development inflated ground rent and land values, concentrated agriculture in the hands of large and small capitalists, and particularly, concentrated in their hands machinery, implements and money, without which successful production is impossible. To explain the fact that the conditions of the workers have become worsened by the argument that nature has ceased to shower her gifts implies that one has become a bourgeois apologist.

> In accepting this law [continues Mr. Bulgakov] we do not in the least assert that there is an uninterrupted increase in the difficulty of producing food, nor do we deny the progress that has been made in agriculture. To assert the first, and to deny the second, would be contrary to obvious facts. This difficulty does not grow uninterruptedly, of course; development proceeds in zigzag fashion. Discoveries in agronomy and technical improvements convert barren lands into fertile lands and temporarily remove the tendencies indicated by the law of diminishing returns.

Profound, is it not?

Technical progress—"temporary" tendency, and the law of the diminishing returns, *i. e.*, diminishing (and that not always) productivity of additional investments of capital on the basis of unchanging technique, "has universal significance"! This is equal to saying that: The stopping of trains at stations represents the universal law of steam transport, while the motion of trains between stations is a temporary tendency which paralyses the operation of the universal law of stopping.

A multitude of facts refute the universality of the law of diminishing returns: facts concerning the agricultural as well as the non-agricultural population. Mr. Bulgakov himself admits that "if each country were restricted to its own natural resources, the procuring of food would demand an uninterrupted, relative increase" [mark this!] "in the quantity of labour, and consequently in the agricultural population" [p. 19]. The diminution in the agricultural population of Western Europe therefore, is to be explained by the fact that the operation of the law of diminishing returns has been modified by increased importation of grain. An excellent explanation, indeed! Our pundit has forgotten a detail, namely, that a relative diminution in the agricultural population is observed in all capitalist countries, including agricultural countries, even those which export grain. The agricultural population is relatively diminishing in America as well as in Russia. It has been diminishing

in France since the end of the eighteenth century. [See figures in Mr. Bulgakov's own book, Part II, p. 168.] Moreover, the relative diminution of the agricultural population sometimes becomes an absolute diminution, whereas the excess of imports over exports of grain was still negligible in the thirties and forties, and *only after* 1878 do we cease to find years in which the exports of grain exceed that of imports.* In Prussia there was a relative diminution in the agricultural population from 73.5 per cent in 1816 to 71.7 per cent in 1849, and 67.5 per cent in 1871, whereas the importation of rye commenced only at the beginning of the sixties, and the importation of wheat at the beginning of the seventies. [*Ibid.*, Part II, pp. 70-88.] Finally, if we take the European grain-importing countries, for example, France and Germany during the last decade, we shall find that there has been *undoubted progress* in agriculture side by side with *an absolute diminution* in the number of workers employed in agriculture. In France, the number diminished from 6,913,504 in 1882 to 6,663,135 in 1892 [*Statist. Agric.*, Vol. 2, pp. 248-251], and in Germany the diminution was from 8,064,000 in 1882 to 8,045,000 in 1905.** Thus it may be said that the whole history of the nineteenth century by a multitude of facts concerning countries of most varied character irrefutably proves that the "universal" law of diminishing returns *is absolutely paralysed* by a "temporary" tendency of technical progress which enables a relatively (and sometimes absolutely) diminishing agricultural population to produce an increasing quantity of agricultural produce for an increasing mass of population.

It would be opportune here to state that this mass of statistical

* *Statistique agricole de la France, Enquête de 1892*, Paris, 1897, p. 113.

** *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Neue Folge, Vol. 112; "Die Landwirtschaft im Deutschen Reich," Berlin, 1898, p. 6. The evidence of technical progress accompanied by a diminution in the agricultural population is not at all pleasing to Mr. Bulgakov, for it utterly destroys his Malthusianism. Our "strict scientist," therefore, resorts to the following trick: Instead of taking agriculture in the strict sense of the word (land cultivation, stock-breeding, etc.), he (after quoting the statistics concerning the increase in quantity of *agricultural* produce obtained per hectare) takes "agriculture in the broad sense of the term," by which German statistics include hot-house cultivation, market gardening, *and forestry and fisheries!* In this way, we get an increase in the sum total of persons actually engaged in "agriculture"!! [Bulgakov, Part II, p. 133.] The figures quoted above apply to persons for whom agriculture is the *principal* occupation. The number of persons engaged in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation increased from 3,144,000 to 3,578,000. To add these figures to the previous figures is not altogether correct, but even if we do this the increase is very negligible: from 11,208,000 to 11,623,000.

information completely refutes also the two following main points of Mr. Bulgakov's "theory," namely, his assertion that the theory concerning the more rapid growth of constant capital (instruments and materials of production) as compared with variable capital (labour power) "is absolutely inapplicable to agriculture." Mr. Bulgakov very gravely declares that this theory is wrong, and in proof of his opinion he refers to: (*a*) Professor A. Skvortsov (celebrated mostly for the reason that he described Marx's theory of average rate of profit as pernicious propaganda), and (*b*) the fact that with the intensification of agriculture the number of workers employed per unit of land increases. This is an example of the deliberate refusal to understand Marx which the modern critics constantly display. Think of it: The theory of the more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital is refuted by the increase of *variable capital* per unit of land! And Mr. Bulgakov *fails to observe* that the very statistics that he himself quotes in such abundance confirm Marx's theory. In German agriculture the number of workers employed diminished from 8,064,000 in 1882 to 8,045,000 in 1895 (and if the number of persons engaged in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation is added, increased from 11,208,000 to 11,623,000, *i. e.*, only by 3.7 per cent). In the same period the number of cattle increased from 23,000,000 to 25,400,000 (all kinds of cattle expressed in terms of large-horned cattle), *i. e.*, by more than 10 per cent; the cases in which the five most important agricultural machines were employed increased from 458,000 to 922,000, *i. e.*, more than doubled; the quantity of fertilisers imported increased from 636,000 tons (1883) to 1,961,000 tons (1892), and the quantity of caustic soda imported increased from 304,000 double zentners to 2,400,000.* Does not all this prove that constant capital has increased in relation to variable capital? And this is apart from the fact that quoting these figures in this wholesale manner entirely conceals the progress of large-scale production. We shall deal with this point later.

Secondly, the progress of agriculture simultaneously with a diminution, or a negligible absolute increase in the agricultural population completely refutes Mr. Bulgakov's absurd attempt to revive Malthusianism. The first of the Russian ex-Marxists to make this attempt was probably Struve in his *Critical Remarks*,

* *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Neue Folge, Vol. 112, p. 36; Bulgakov, Part II, p. 135.

but he, as always, never went beyond hesitating, half-expressed and ambiguous remarks, which he never carried to their logical conclusion or rounded off into a complete system of views. Mr. Bulgakov, however, is bolder and more consistent. He, without hesitating for a moment, converts the law of diminishing returns into "one of the most important laws of the history of civilisation" (*sic!*) [p. 18]. "The whole history of the nineteenth century . . . with its problems of riches and poverty would never have been understood without this law." "I have not the least doubt that the social problem in its present-day form is materially linked up with this law." [Our strict scientist makes this declaration already on page 18 of his "Investigation"! . . .] "There is no doubt," he declares at the end of his work, "that where over-population exists, a certain part of the poverty that prevails must be put under the heading of *absolute poverty*, the poverty of production and not of distribution" [Part II, p. 221]. "The population problem, in the special form in which it presents itself to us as a result of the conditions of agricultural production is, in my opinion, the principal obstacle—at the present time at any rate—in the way of any extensive application of the principles of collectivism or co-operation in agricultural enterprises" [Part II, p. 265]. "The past leaves to the future a heritage in the shape of a grain problem more terrible and more difficult than the social problem—the problem of production and not of distribution" [Part II, p. 455], etc., etc., etc. There is no need for us to discuss the scientific significance of this "theory," which is inseparably linked up with the universal law of the diminishing returns since we have already examined this law. But the fact that critical flirtation with Malthusianism, in its logical development, inevitably results in a descent to the most vulgar bourgeois apologies, is proved by the above-quoted arguments, which Mr. Bulgakov has presented with a frankness which leaves nothing to be desired.

In a subsequent chapter we will examine the facts quoted by our critics (who are constantly buzzing into our ears that orthodox Marxists fear detailisation) from certain other sources, and will show that Mr. Bulgakov stereotypes the phrase "over-production," which relieves him of the necessity of making any kind of analysis, and particularly of analysing the class antagonisms among the "peasantry." Here we shall confine ourselves to the general theoretical aspect of the agrarian problem, and deal with the theory of rent.

"As for Marx," writes Mr. B., "we must say that in Volume III of *Capital*, in the form in which we have it now, he adds nothing that is worth noting to Ricardo's theory of differential rent" [p. 87]. We must take note of this: "Nothing worth noting," and compare it with the following verdict pronounced by our critic before making the above declaration: "Notwithstanding his obvious opposition to this law [the law of diminishing returns], Marx, in his fundamental principles, appropriates Ricardo's theory of rent which is based on this law" [p. 13]. Thus, according to Mr. Bulgakov, Marx failed to observe the connection between Ricardo's theory of rent and the law of diminishing returns, and therefore left his arguments stranded! In regard to a statement like this we can say but one thing, *viz.*, that the ex-Marxists excel everybody else in distorting Marx and in unceremoniously attributing to the writer they are criticising a thousand and one mortal sins that he never committed.

Mr. Bulgakov's assertion is a glaring distortion of the truth. As a matter of fact Marx not only observed the connection between Ricardo's theory of rent and his erroneous doctrine of diminishing returns, but quite definitely exposed Ricardo's error. Any one who has read Volume III of *Capital* with any attention at all could not but have observed the fact very much "worthy of attention," that Marx *liberated* the theory of differential rent from *all connection* with the notorious law of diminishing returns. Marx demonstrated that the unequal productivity of unequal investments of capital in land was all that was necessary for the formation of differential rent. The question as to whether the transition from better land to worse land or vice versa, whether the productivity of the additional investments of capital in land diminishes or increases is absolutely immaterial. In actual practice, all sorts of combinations of these varying cases take place, and it is utterly impossible to subject these combinations to a single general rule. For example, Marx first of all describes the first form of differential rent arising from the inequality of productivity of capital invested in unequal plots of land, and explains his case by tables (concerning which Mr. B. takes Marx severely to task for his "excessive predilection for clothing what very often are very simple ideas in a complicated mathematical garb." This complicated mathematical garb is simply the four rules of arithmetic, and the very simple ideas, as we shall see, were completely misunderstood by our learned professor). Having analysed these tables Marx draws the conclusion:

This does away with the primitive misconception of differential rent still found among men like West, Malthus, Ricardo, to the effect that it necessarily requires a progress toward worse and worse soil, or an ever-decreasing productivity of agriculture. It rather may exist, as we have seen, with a progress to a better and better soil; it may exist when a better soil takes the lowest position formerly occupied by the worst soil; it may be accompanied with a progressive improvement of agriculture. Its premise is merely the inequality of the different kinds of soil.

(Marx does not speak here of the unequal productivity of successive investments of capital in land, because this gives rise to the *second* form of differential rent, and in this chapter he speaks only of the first form of differential rent.)

So far as the development of productivity is concerned, it implies that the increase of absolute fertility of the total area does not do away with this inequality, but either increases it, or leaves it unchanged, or merely reduces it somewhat. [*Capital*, Vol. III, Part VI, p. 772.] *

Mr. Bulgakov *failed to observe* the radical difference between Marx's theory of differential rent and Ricardo's theory of rent. He preferred to rummage among the pages of Volume III of *Capital* in search of "fragments which suggest the idea that Marx was by no means opposed to the law of diminishing returns" [p. 13, footnote]. We beg the reader's forgiveness for devoting so much space to a fragment which is immaterial to the question that interests us and Mr. Bulgakov. But what can one do when the heroes of modern criticism (who have the insolence to charge orthodox Marxists with resorting to tricks of speech) distort the absolutely clear ideas of a doctrine to which they are opposed by citing passages torn from their context and from faulty translations? Mr. Bulgakov quotes the following fragment that he found: "From the point of view of the capitalist mode of production there is always a relative increase in the price of (*agricultural*) products, *for*" [we ask the reader to pay particular attention to the words *we* have italicised] "a product cannot be secured unless an expense is incurred, a payment made, something which did not have to be made formerly." And Marx goes on to say that the natural elements passing into production as agencies, costing nothing, represent free gifts of nature, that is, free natural productivity of labour power; but if for the production of an additional product it would be necessary to work without the

* The English translations of the passages from *Capital*, quoted by Lenin in the present book, are taken from Unterman's translation, published by Charles H. Kerr & Co.—*Ed.*

help of this natural power, a relatively larger investment of capital is required, which leads to an increase in the price of the product.

We have three remarks to make concerning this mode of "translating." First *Mr. Bulgakov himself introduced the word* "for" which gives his tirade the definite sense of establishing some kind of a "law." *In the original* [*Capital*, Vol. III, Part VI, p. 865] *Marx does not say "for" but "when."* [96] *When* something has to be paid for, which formerly had not to be paid for, a relative increase in the price of the product takes place. Is *this* postulate anything like a recognition of the "law" of diminishing returns? Secondly, Mr. Bulgakov inserts the word "agricultural" in parenthesis. *In the original text the word does not appear at all.* In all probability, with the frivolousness characteristic of Messrs. the critics, Mr. Bulgakov decided that Marx in this passage could have in mind only agricultural produce and therefore hastened to "explain" the text to his readers and succeeded in completely distorting the sense of it. As a matter of fact, Marx in this passage speaks of products generally; in the original, the fragment quoted by Mr. Bulgakov is preceded by the words: "But in a general way, the following remarks may be made." Gifts of nature may enter also into industrial production. In this very section on rent, Marx gives the example of a waterfall, which for a certain factory takes the place of steam-power, and if a larger quantity of products is demanded that has to be produced without the aid of these free gifts of nature a relative increase in the price of the product *will always* take place. Thirdly, we must examine the context to which this fragment belongs. In this chapter Marx discusses differential rent obtained from the worst soil, and *as he always does,* examines two *absolutely equally possible* cases: first case—increased productivity of successive investments of capital [pp. 856-858]; and second case—diminishing productivity of such investments [pp. 858-865]. In regard to the second of the possible cases, Marx says: "Concerning the decreasing productivity of the soil with successive investments of capital, see Liebig. . . . But in a *general* way, the following remarks may be made." (Our italics.)

Then follows the fragment "translated" by Mr. Bulgakov stating that if that which was formerly obtained gratis has now to be paid for, then *there is always* a relative increase in the price of the product.

We shall leave it to the reader to judge the scientific conscientiousness of the critic who distorted Marx's remark concerning one of the possible cases in such a way as to make it appear that Marx recognised this as some sort of a general "law."

And here is the conclusion that Mr. Bulgakov arrives at concerning the fragment he has discovered:

"This fragment, of course, is vague. . . ." [Of course! By substituting one word for another Mr. Bulgakov deprived it of all sense whatever!] ". . . but it cannot be understood otherwise than as an indirect or even direct recognition" [listen to it!] "of the law of the diminishing returns. I am not aware that Marx has expressed himself openly concerning the latter in any other place." [Part I, p. 14.] As an ex-Marxist, Mr. Bulgakov is "unaware" that Marx has openly declared the suppositions advanced by West, Malthus and Ricardo—that differential rent presupposes a transition to worse land or diminishing returns to be absolutely incorrect.* He is "unaware" that Marx, throughout the whole course of his exhaustive analysis of rent, points out *a score of times* that he regards diminishing and increasing productivity of additional investment of capital as equally possible cases.

II

THE THEORY OF RENT

Mr. Bulgakov totally failed to understand the Marxian theory of rent. He imagines that he has smashed this theory by the two following arguments:

1. According to Marx, agricultural capital enters into the equalisation of the rate of profit, so that rent is created by surplus profit exceeding the average rate of profit. Mr. Bulgakov thinks this is incorrect because the monopoly of land abolishes free competition, which is necessary for the process of equalising the rate of profit. Agricultural capital, he thinks, does not enter into the process of equalising the rate of profit.

* This incorrect supposition of classical economy, refuted by Marx, was adopted by the "critic" Mr. Bulgakov, without criticism, of course, following on the heels of his teacher, Brentano. "The condition for the existence of rent," Mr. Bulgakov writes, "was the law of the diminishing returns" [Part I, p. 90.] ". . . English rent . . . as a matter of fact, distinguishes successive investments of capital of varying, and as a rule, diminishing productivity." [Part I, p. 30.]

2. Absolute rent is merely a special case of differential rent, and it is wrong to distinguish the one from the other. The distinction that is drawn is based upon an absolutely arbitrary two-fold interpretation of one and the same fact, namely, the monopoly ownership of one of the factors of production. Mr. Bulgakov is so sure of the crushing effect of his argument that he cannot refrain from pouring out a whole stream of strong expressions against Marx, such as, *petitio principii* * non-Marxism, logical fetishism, Marx's loss of capacity for mental flights, etc. And yet both these arguments are based on rather crude errors. The very same one-sided vulgarisation of the subject, which induced Mr. Bulgakov to interpret one of the possible cases (diminishing productivity of additional investments of capital) as the universal law of diminishing returns, forces him in the present case to utilise the term "monopoly" uncritically, and convert it also into something universal. In doing so, he confuses the results which, under the capitalist organisation of agriculture, comes from the fact that *land is limited* on the one hand, and from *private property in land* on the other. These are two different things. We shall explain this.

"The *condition*, although not the source of the rise of rent," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "is the same as that which gave rise to the possibility of the monopolisation of land—the fact that the productive powers of the land are limited, while man's growing need for them is limitless" [Part I, p. 90]. Instead of saying "the productive powers of the land are limited" he should have said "*land is limited*" (as we have shown already limitation of the productive powers of the land implies "limitation" of the given level of technique, the given state of productive forces). Under the capitalist system of society, the limitation of land does indeed presuppose monopolisation of land, but *land as an object of enterprise and not as an object of property rights.* The assumption of capitalist organisation of agriculture necessarily includes the assumption that all the land is occupied by separate private enterprises, *but it certainly does not include the assumption* that the whole of the land is the private property of these entrepreneurs, or of other persons, or that it is private property generally. The monopoly of the right to the ownership of the soil, and the monopoly of the usufruct of the soil are two altogether different things, not only logically but historically. Logically, we

* A begging of the question.—*Ed.*

can quite easily picture to ourselves a purely capitalist organisation of agriculture in which private property in land is entirely absent, when the land is the property of the state or of a village commune, etc. In actual practice we see that in all developed capitalist countries the whole of the land is occupied by separate, private enterprises, but these enterprises are conducted by the entrepreneurs not only on their own land but also on land leased from other landowners; from the state or from village communes (for example, in Russia where, as is well known, the private enterprises established on peasant communal lands are principally capitalist peasant enterprises). It is not for nothing that Marx at the very beginning of his analysis of rent observes that the capitalist mode of production meets in its first stages (and subordinates to itself) the most varied forms of landed property: from tribal property, feudal landed property down to peasant communal lands.

Thus, the limitation of land necessarily presupposes only the monopolisation of the usufruct of the land (under the domination of capitalism). The question arises: What are the necessary consequences of *this* monopolisation in relation to the problem of rent? The limitation of land results in the price of grain being determined by the conditions of production not on the average land but on the worst land under cultivation. The price of this grain enables the farmer (the capitalist entrepreneur in agriculture) to cover his cost of production, and gives him the average rate of profit on his capital. The farmer on the better land obtains an additional profit, and this forms *differential rent.* The question as to whether private property in land exists has absolutely nothing to do with the question of the formation of differential rent, which is inevitable in capitalist agriculture even on communal, state and ownerless lands. The only consequence of the limitation of land under capitalism is the formation of differential rent, which results from the difference in the productivity of different investments of capital. Mr. Bulgakov sees a second consequence, *viz.*, the removal of free competition in agriculture—when he says that the absence of this free competition prevents agricultural capital from participating in the formation of average profit. Obviously, he confuses the question of cultivating the land with the right of ownership of land. The only thing that logically follows from the limitation of land (irrespective of private property in land) is that the land will be entirely occupied by capitalist farmers; but it by no means follows that free competition

among these farmers will necessarily be restricted in any way. The limitation of land is a general phenomenon which inevitably leaves its impress upon the whole of capitalist agriculture. The unsoundness of confusing these two different things is demonstratively confirmed by history. There is no question about England. There the separation of land ownership from land cultivation is obvious. Free competition among farmers is almost universal. Capital obtained from trade and industry circulated and circulates in agriculture on an extremely extensive scale. But in all other capitalist countries (notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Bulgakov who, following Mr. Struve, vainly strives to place "English" rent in a special category) *the same process* of the separation of land ownership from land cultivation is taking place, but in extremely varied forms (leases, mortgages). In failing to observe this process (strongly emphasised by Marx) Mr. Bulgakov failed to observe the main feature. In all European countries, after the fall of feudalism, we observe the decay of feudal land ownership, the mobilisation of landed property, the investment of commercial and industrial capital in agriculture, and the rise in rents and an increased indebtedness on mortgages. In Russia also, notwithstanding the pronounced survivals of feudalism still existing, we see after the reform,* increased purchasing of land by the peasantry, by the common people and by merchants, and the development of leasing of privately owned, state and *village communal* lands, etc. What do all these phenomena prove? They prove that free competition has entered into *land-cultivation—notwithstanding* the monopoly *of landed property,* and nothwithstanding the infinitely varied forms of landed property. In all capitalist countries at the present time, every owner of capital can invest his capital in agriculture (by purchasing or leasing land) as freely as he can invest in any branch of commerce or industry.

In arguing against Marx's theory of differential rent, Mr. Bulgakov says that "all these differences [differences in the conditions of production of agricultural products] are contradictory and *may*" [our italics] "mutually eliminate each other—as Rodbertus has already pointed out, distance may counteract fertility, different degrees of fertility may be levelled by more intense cultivation of the more fertile plots" [Part I, p. 81]. It is a pity, however, that our strict scientists forgot that Marx noted this fact, and was able to appraise it not so one-sidedly.

* Abolition of serfdom.—*Ed.*

> . . . It is evident [writes Marx] that these two different causes of differential rent, fertility and location [of lots of land], may work in opposite directions. A certain soil may be very favourably located and yet be very poor in fertility, and vice versa. This circumstance is important, for it explains how it is that the work of opening up the soil of a certain country to cultivation may equally well proceed from the worse to the better soil, instead of vice versa. Finally, it is clear that the progress of social production has on the one hand the general effect of levelling the differences arising from location as a cause of [differential] ground rent by creating local markets and improving locations by means of facilities for communication and transportation; and that, on the other hand, it increases the differences of the individual locations in a certain district by separating agriculture from manufacture, and forming great centres of production on the one hand, while relatively isolating the agricultural districts on the other hand [*Capital*, Vol. III, Part VI, p. 762].

Thus, while Mr. Bulgakov repeats with an air of triumph the hackneyed references to the *possibility* of differences mutually eliminating each other, Marx presents the *further* problem of this possibility becoming a reality, and shows that simultaneously with levelling influences are observed also differential influences. The final result of these mutually antagonistic influences is, as every one knows, that in all countries plots of land *differ* considerably both in fertility and location. Mr. Bulgakov's objection merely reveals that he has not thought out his observations sufficiently.

Continuing his argument, Mr. Bulgakov says that the term, least productive investment of labour and capital is "employed without criticism both by Ricardo and Marx. It is not difficult to see what an arbitrary element is introduced by this term: Let the amount of capital invested in land represent $10a$ and let each successive a represent a diminishing productivity; the total product of the soil will be A. Obviously, the average productivity of each a will be equal to A over 10, and if the total capital is regarded as one whole then the price will be determined by average productivity" [Part I, p. 82]. In reply to this, we say that behind his florid phrases about the "limited productive power of land" Mr. Bulgakov obviously failed to observe a *small matter:* the limitedness of land. This limitedness—which is quite independent of *property* in land, creates a certain kind of monopoly, *i. e.*, since all the land is entirely occupied by farmers, and since there is a demand for the whole of the grain produced on the whole of the land—including the worst land and that most remote from the market, then it is clear that the price of grain is determined by the price of the product of the worst land (or the price of the product produced with the least productive investment of capital). Mr. Bulgakov's "average productivity" is a

purposeless calculation, for the limitedness of land prevents the formation of the real average. In order that this "average productivity" may be formed and determine the price, every capitalist must be able, not only to invest capital in agriculture generally (as we have said already, free competition exists to that extent in agriculture), but also every capitalist must always be able to establish *new* agricultural enterprises in addition to those already existing. If that were the case, there would be no difference whatever between agriculture and industry, and rent could not arise. But precisely because land is limited this is not the case.

To proceed. Up till now we have carried on our discussion completely leaving aside the question of property in land; we have seen that this method was absolutely necessary for logical considerations, and also for the reason that the facts of history go to show that capitalist agriculture developed under all forms of land-ownership. We shall now introduce this new condition into our discussion. We shall suppose that all land is privately owned. How will this affect rent? Differential rent will be collected by the landowner from the farmer on the basis of his right of ownership. As differential rent is the surplus profit over and above the normal, average profit on capital, and as free competition in the sense of the free investment of capital in agriculture exists (or is being created by capitalist development), then the landowner will always find a farmer who will be satisfied with the average profit and who will give him, the landowner, the surplus profit. Private property in land does not create differential rent, it merely transfers it from the hands of the farmer to the hands of the landowner. Is the influence of private land-ownership restricted by this? Can we assume that the landowner will permit the farmer to exploit the worse and badly located land, which only produces the average profit on capital, *gratis?* Of course not. Land-ownership is a monopoly, and on the basis of this monopoly, the landowner demands payment from the farmer for his land. This payment will be *absolute rent* which has no connection whatever with the differing productivity of different investments of capital, and which *originates in private ownership of land.* In accusing Marx of making an arbitrary, two-fold interpretation of the same monopoly, Mr. Bulgakov did not take the trouble to think about the fact that we are actually dealing with a two-fold monopoly: in the first place, we have the monopoly of the use (capitalist) of the land. This monopoly originates in the limitedness of land,

and is therefore inevitable in any capitalist society. *This* monopoly leads to the price of grain being determined by the conditions of production on the worst land; the surplus profit obtained by the investment of capital on the best land, or by a more productive investment of capital forms differential rent. This rent arises quite independently of private property in land, which simply enables the landowner to collect it from the farmer. In the second place, we have the monopoly of private property in land. Neither logically nor historically is this monopoly inseparably linked up with the previous monopoly.*

This kind of monopoly is not *essential* for capitalist society and for capitalist organisation of agriculture. On the one hand, we can quite easily imagine capitalist agriculture without private property in land, and many consistent bourgeois economists demanded the nationalisation of land. On the other hand, even in practice we have capitalist organisation of agriculture without private ownership in land, for example, on state and communal lands. Consequently, it is absolutely essential to draw a distinction between these two kinds of monopolies, and consequently, it is also necessary to recognise that absolute rent, which is *created* by private property in land, exists side by side with differential rent.**

* It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that we are dealing here with the general theory of rent and the capitalist organisation of agriculture; we do not, therefore, concern ourselves with facts like the antiquity and widespread character of private property in land, and the undermining of the latter form of monopoly, and partly even of both its forms by trans-oceanic competition, etc.

** In Part II of Volume II of *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, published in 1905, Marx gives an explanation of absolute rent which confirms the correctness of my interpretation (particularly in regard to the two forms of monopoly). The following is the passage from Marx referring to it: "If the earth represented an unlimited element, not only in relation to capital and to the population but in actual fact, *i. e.*, if it was as 'unlimited' as 'air and water,' if it existed in unlimited quantities [a quotation from Ricardo], then the appropriation of land by one person could not in practice in any way exclude the appropriation of land by another person. In that case, private property in land could not exist (and not only private but also 'public' and state property in land). If, in addition, the land everywhere was of the same quality, no rent could be obtained from land. . . . The whole point lies in the following: If land in relation to capital existed like every other natural element then capital in the sphere of agriculture would operate in the same way as it does in every other sphere of industry. In that case, there would be no property in land and no rent. . . . On the other hand, if land is: (1) limited; and (2) is held as property—if property in land is a condition for the rise of capital—and that is precisely the case in countries where capitalist production is developing, and in countries where this condition did not prevail

Marx explains the possibility of absolute rent originating from the surplus value of agricultural capital by the fact that in agriculture the share of variable capital, in the total composition of capital, is above the average (a quite natural supposition in view of the undoubted backwardness of agricultural technique as compared with industry). That being the case, it follows that the value of agricultural products, generally speaking, is higher than their price of production and that surplus value is higher than profits. Nevertheless, the monopoly of private property in land prevents this surplus from passing wholly into the process of equalising profits, and absolute rent is taken from this surplus.*

Mr. Bulgakov is utterly dissatisfied with this explanation and exclaims: "What kind of thing is this surplus value, which, like cloth or cotton, or some other commodity, can suffice or not suffice to cover a possible demand? First of all, it is not a material thing, it is a concept which serves to express a definite social relationship of production" [Part I, p. 105]. This contrasting of "a material thing" to a "concept" is a striking example of the scholasticism which at the present time is so freely offered in the guise of "criticism." What would be the use of a "concept" of the share of the social product if this concept did not correspond to definite, "material things"? Surplus value is the money equivalent to the sur-

formerly (as in old Europe), capitalist production itself creates it: for example, the United States—then land does not represent a field of activity accessible to capital in an elementary way. That is why absolute rent exists independently of differential rent" [pp. 80-81]. Marx quite definitely draws a distinction here between the limitedness of land and the fact that land is private property. [Author's note to 1908 edition.—*Ed.*]

* We desire to say in passing that we have considered it necessary to deal in particular detail with Marx's theory of rent in view of the fact that we find an erroneous interpretation of it also on the part of Mr. P. Maslov, in an article, entitled "The Agrarian Question," in *Zhizn*, Nos. 3 and 4, 1901, in which he regards the diminishing productivity of successive investments of capital, if not as a law, then at all events as a "usual" and normal phenomenon; he links this up with the phenomenon of differential rent, and rejects the theory of absolute rent. Mr. P. Maslov's interesting article contains many true remarks concerning the critics, but it suffers very much from the author's erroneous theory just referred to (while defending Marxism he has not taken the trouble clearly to define the difference between "his own" theory and that of Marx), as well as from a number of careless and absolutely unjust assertions as, for example, that Mr. Berdyaev "is completely liberating himself from the influence of bourgeois authors" and is distinguished for his "consistent class point of view, maintained without sacrifice to objectivity"; that "in many respects Kautsky's analysis is in places . . . tendentious"; that Kautsky "has completely failed to indicate in what direction the development of the productive forces in agriculture is proceeding," etc.

plus product which consists of a definite share of cloth, cotton, grain, and of all other commodities (the word "definite" must not, of course, be understood in the sense that science can concretely define this share, but in the sense that the conditions, which, in general outline, define the dimensions of this share, are known). In agriculture, the surplus product is larger (in proportion to capital) than in other branches of industry, and this surplus (which does not enter into the equalisation of profit owing to the monopoly of private property in land) may, naturally, "suffice or not suffice to cover the demand" of the monopolist landowner.

We shall not burden the reader with a detailed exposition of the theory of rent which Mr. Bulgakov has created, as he modestly remarks, "by his own efforts," "going along his own way" [Part I, p. 111]. A few remarks will be sufficient to characterise this product of the "least productive investment" of professorial "labour." The "new" theory of rent is made up according to the ancient recipe: "Know your place and keep it." Since free competition exists—there must be absolutely no restriction to it (although absolutely free competition has never existed anywhere). Since monopoly exists—there is nothing more to be said. Consequently, rent is not taken from surplus value, and not even from the agricultural product; it is taken from the product of non-agricultural labour; it is simply a tribute, a tax, a subtraction from the total social product, a promissory note in favour of the landlord. "Agricultural capital, with its profit, and agricultural labour, agriculture in general, as a sphere of investment for capital and labour, represents, therefore, a *status in statu* * in the kingdom of capitalism. . . . All [*sic!*] definitions of capital, surplus value, wages and value generally represent imaginary quantities when applied to agriculture." [Part I, p. 99].

Yes, yes. Now everything is clear. Capitalists and wage workers are all imaginary quantities in agriculture. Mr. Bulgakov sometimes wanders away into the clouds, but sometimes he argues in a not altogether unreasonable manner. Fourteen pages later we read: "The production of agricultural products costs society a certain quantity of labour; that is their—value." Excellent! Consequently, at least the "definition" of value—is not altogether an imaginary quantity. To continue: "Since production is organised on a capitalist basis, and since capital stands at the head of production, the

* A state within a state.—*Ed.*

price of grain will be determined by the price of production, that is, the productivity of the given labour and capital invested will be calculated according to average social productivity." Excellent! Consequently, the "definition" of capital, surplus value and wages are not altogether imaginary quantities. Consequently, free competition (although not absolutely free) exists, for unless capital can flow from agriculture into industry and vice versa, the "calculation of productivity according to average social productivity" is impossible. Further on he says: "Thanks to the monopoly of land, price rises above value to the limits permitted by the conditions of the market." Excellent! But where has Mr. Bulgakov learned that tribute, taxes, promissory notes, etc., are dependent upon the conditions of the market? If, thanks to monopoly, price rises to the limits permitted by the conditions of the market, then the only difference between the "new" theory of rent and the "old" theory lies in this: that the author, in his "own way," failed to understand the difference between the influence of limitation of land and the influence of private property in land on the one hand, and the connection between the concept "monopoly" and the concept "the last and least productive investment of labour and capital." Is it surprising, therefore, that Mr. Bulgakov, another seven pages later [Part I, p. 120], should altogether lose sight of "his own theory" and begin to argue about the "method of distributing this (agricultural) product among the landowner, the capitalist farmer and the agricultural labourers"? A brilliant finale to a brilliant criticism! A remarkable result of the new *Bulgakov theory of rent*, which, from now on, will enrich the science of political economy!

III

MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

We shall now take up what Mr. Bulgakov regards as the "remarkable" work of Hertz [*Die agrarischen Fragen in Verhältniss zum Sozialismus*, Wien, 1899]. We shall have to spend a little time in simultaneously examining the arguments of both these authors, which are similar.

The question of machinery in agriculture, and the question of large- and small-scale production in agriculture, which is closely

bound up with the former, most frequently provide our "critics" with the occasion to "refute" Marxism. Further on we shall examine in detail some of the facts they quote. At present we shall examine the general arguments concerning the subject. The critics devote whole pages to arguing in detail that the employment of machinery encounters greater obstacles in agriculture than in industry, and for that reason is employed to a smaller degree and has smaller significance. All this is indisputable, and is quite definitely shown, for example, by that very Kautsky whose very name rouses Messrs. Bulgakov, Hertz and Chernov to a pitch bordering on frenzy. But this indisputable fact does not in the least controvert the other fact that machinery is developing rapidly in agriculture also, and is exercising a powerful transforming influence upon it. All the critics can do is merely to "evade" this inevitable conclusion by profound arguments, as for example . . . "Agriculture is characterised by the domination of nature in the process of production, and the lack of freedom of the human will" [Bulgakov, Part I, p. 43] ". . . Instead of the uncertain and inexact work of man, it" [machinery in industry] "carries out both micrometric as well as colossal work with mathematical precision. Machinery cannot do anything like this [?] in the production of agricultural products because, up till now, the working instrument is not in the hands of man, but in the hands of mother nature. This is not a metaphor" [*ibid.*]. Indeed it is not a metaphor; it is merely an empty phrase, for everybody knows that the steam plough, the multiple sower, the threshing machine, etc., *perform* work *more* "surely and with *greater* precision" than man, and consequently to say "cannot do anything like this," is simply to talk nonsense! Similarly, how can it be said that machinery in agriculture "cannot to any degree [*sic!*] revolutionise *production*" (Bulgakov, Part I, pp. 43-44, in which he quotes the opinion of agricultural machinery experts, who, however, merely refer to the relative difference between agricultural machinery and industrial machinery), or that "machinery here not only cannot convert the worker into its accessory [?] but the worker retains his previous rôle of guide of the process" [p. 44]—as feeder of the threshing machine, perhaps? Mr. Bulgakov tries to minimise the superiority of the steam plough by references to Stumpfe and Kutzleb (who wrote about the ability of the small farms to compete with the large farms) as against the opinions of experts in agricultural machinery and agricultural economics (Fühling, Perels). He uses

arguments to the effect that steam ploughs require a special soil * and "extremely extensive estates" (in the opinion of Mr. Bulgakov, this is not an argument against small farming but against the steam plough!), and that with *twelve-inch furrows* the work of cattle is *cheaper* than steam, etc. Whole volumes of arguments like these may be written without, however, in the least refuting the fact that the steam plough has made deep ploughing possible (deeper than 12-inch furrows), or the fact that its employment has rapidly developed: in England, in 1867, only 135 farms were using steam ploughs, whereas in 1871, 2,000 steam ploughs were already employed (Kautsky); in Germany the number of farms employing steam ploughs increased from 836 in 1882 to 1,696 in 1895.

On this question of agricultural machinery Mr. Bulgakov frequently cites Franz Bensing, whom he recommends as "the author of a special monograph on agricultural machinery" [Part I, p. 44]. It would be extremely unfair if we did not in the present case show *how* Mr. Bulgakov cites his authors, and *how* the very witnesses he calls testify against him.

In arguing that Marx's "concept" of the more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital is inapplicable to agriculture, Mr. Bulgakov points to the necessity for greater expenditure of labour power in proportion as the productivity of agriculture increases and among others, quotes the calculations made by Bensing. "The general requirements of human labour in the various systems of agriculture are expressed as follows: the three-field system—712 worker days; the Norfolk rotation of crop system—1,615 worker days; the rotation of crops with a considerable production of sugar beets—3,179 worker days per 60 hectares" [97] [Franz Bensing, *Der Einfluss der landwirtschaftlichen Maschinen auf Volks- und Privatwirtschaft*, Breslau, 1898, p. 42, quoted by Bulgakov, Part I, p. 32]. The unfortunate thing for Bulgakov, however, is, that by this calculation Bensing desired to prove that the rôle of machinery was growing. Applying these figures to the whole of agriculture in Germany, Bensing calculates that the available agricultural workers would be sufficient to cultivate the land only on the three-field system, and that consequently the introduction of the

* Hertz, with a particularly "triumphant" air, insists upon this, and argues that the "absolute" judgement [p. 65] that the steam plough is superior to the horse plough "under all circumstances" is wrong. This is precisely what is called trying to force an open door!

rotation of crops system would have been altogether *impossible* if machinery were not employed. It is well known that when the old three-field system prevailed, machinery was hardly utilised at all; consequently, Bensing's calculations prove *the very opposite* to that which Mr. Bulgakov tries to prove, *i. e.*, this calculation proves that the growth of productivity of agriculture must necessarily be accompanied by a more rapid growth of constant capital compared with variable capital.

In another place, Mr. Bulgakov, after asserting that "a radical [*sic!*] difference exists between the rôle of machinery in industry and that in agriculture," cites the words of Bensing: "Agricultural machinery is incapable of bringing about an unlimited increase in production as machinery in industry is able to do . . ." [Part I, p. 44]. Again Mr. Bulgakov is unfortunate in the selection of his witnesses. Bensing points to this by no means "radical" difference between agricultural and industrial machinery in the beginning of Chap. VI of his book, which is entitled: "The Influence of Agricultural Machinery on the Gross Income." After making a detailed analysis of the facts concerning each special type of machine published in agricultural literature, and also obtained by him in a special investigation, Bensing obtains the following general result: The increase in the gross earnings obtained by the employment of a steam plough is—ten per cent; multiple sower—ten per cent; threshing machine—fifteen per cent; moreover, the multiple sower makes a saving of twenty per cent on seeds, and only in the employment of machinery for digging potatoes is a decline of five per cent in the gross earnings observed. Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that: "At all events, the steam plough is the only agricultural machine concerning which anything favourable can be said from the technical point of view" [Part I, p. 47-48] is *at all events* refuted by the very Bensing to whom he refers so cautiously.

In order to present a more precise and complete idea of the significance of machinery in agriculture, Bensing makes a number of detailed calculations of the results of farming carried on without machinery, with one machine, with two machines, etc., and finally with the employment of all the important machines, including the steam plough and light field railways (*Feldbahnen*). These calculations show that farming without the aid of machinery brought the following results: Gross income, 69,040 marks; expenditure, 68,615 marks; net income, 425 marks, or 1.37 marks per hectare. The

results of farming with the employment of all the important machinery was as follows: Gross income, 81,078 marks, expenditure, 62,-551.5 marks, net income, 18,526.5 marks, or 59.76 marks per hectare, *i. e., more than forty times as much.* This is the effect of machinery alone, because the system of cultivation is assumed to have remained unchanged! It goes without saying that the application of machinery is accompanied, as is shown by Bensing's calculations, by an enormous growth of constant capital and a *diminution* of variable capital (*i. e.*, the capital expended on labour power), and of the number of workers employed. In a word, Bensing's work entirely refutes Mr. Bulgakov, and proves the superiority of large-scale production in agriculture, as well as the fact that the law of the more rapid growth of constant capital compared with variable capital is applicable to agriculture.

One thing alone draws Mr. Bulgakov close to Bensing, and that is that the latter adopts the purely bourgeois point-of-view, completely fails to understand the contradictions inherent in capitalism, and smugly closes his eyes to the fact that machinery squeezes out the worker, etc. This moderate and exact pupil of the German professors speaks of Marx with the same hatred that Mr. Bulgakov speaks of him, only Bensing is more consistent—he calls Marx "an opponent of machinery" in both agriculture and industry because, as he says, Marx "distorts the facts" when he talks about the pernicious effect machinery has upon the workers and when he attributes all sorts of misfortunes to machinery. [Bensing, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5 and 11.] Mr. Bulgakov's attitude towards Bensing reveals to us what Messrs. the "critics" take from the bourgeois scientists and what they close their eyes to.

The kind of "critic" Hertz is, is sufficiently revealed by the following: On page 149 of his book (Russian translation) he charges Kautsky with employing "feuilleton methods" and on page 150 "refutes" the fact that large-scale production excels small-scale production in the employment of machinery by the following arguments: 1. Machinery *may be purchased* by small farmers through the medium of co-operative societies. This, if you please, is supposed to refute the *fact* that machinery is employed on a larger scale on large farms than on small farms! The question as to who *can purchase* machines through the medium of co-operative societies we shall discuss with Hertz in another place. 2. David has shown in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* [Vol. 3, No. 2] [98] that "machinery

is being extensively employed on small farms and is rapidly increasing . . . that multiple sowers are frequently [*sic!*] to be found on even very small farms. The same thing applies to mowing and other machines" [p. 63]. But if the reader will turn to David's article he will see that the author takes the *absolute figures* of the number of farms employing machinery, and not the percentage of these farms in relation to the total number of farms in the given category (as Kautsky does, of course).

The following are the figures for the whole of Germany for 1895:

Farms Employing Machinery

Categories of Farms (Hectares)	Total No. of Farms	Sowers	Per Cent	Multiple Sowers	Per Cent	Mowers & Reapers	Per Cent
Up to 2	3,236,367	214	0.01	14,735	0.46	245	0.01
From 2 to 5	1,016,318	551	0.05	13,088	1.29	600	0.06
From 5 to 20 ...	998,804	3,252	0.33	48,751	4.88	6,746	0.68
From 20 to 100 ..	281,767	12,091	4.29	49,852	17.69	19,535	6.93
100 and over	25,061	12,565	50.14	14,366	57.32	7,958	31.75
TOTAL	5,558,317	28,673	0.52	140,792	2.54	35,084	0.63

The above figures confirm what David and Hertz have said: that sowers and mowers are "frequently" found "even on very small farms," do they not? Hertz draws the "conclusion" that "judged by statistics, Kautsky's assertion does not stand criticism," but who is it that really employs feuilleton methods?

As a curiosity, we would point out that while denying that large-scale farming employs machinery to a larger extent than small-scale farming, and while denying the excessive toil and inadequate employment of machinery in small farming the "critics" outrageously contradict themselves when compelled to deal with the actual facts of the situation (and when they forget about their "principal task"—to refute "orthodox" Marxism). For example, Mr. Bulgakov in his book [Part II, p. 115] says: "Large-scale farming always works with larger investments of capital than small farming, and therefore naturally gives preference to the mechanical factors of production over living labour power." That Mr. Bulgakov as a "critic" should follow Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky, in their inclinations towards vulgar political economy when contrasting mechanical "*factors* of production" to living factors—is indeed quite "natural." But is it natural that he should so carelessly deny the superiority of large-scale farming?

Mr. Bulgakov can find no other words with which to express himself concerning concentration in agricultural production than "the mystical law of concentration," etc. But he comes up against the figures concerning England, which show him that tendencies towards the concentration of farms were observed from the fifties right up to the end of the seventies.

> Small consuming farms combined into large farms [writes Mr. Bulgakov]. *This* consolidation of allotments of land is by no means the result of the conflict between large-scale and small-scale production [?] but of a conscious [?] striving on the part of the landlords to increase their rents by combining several small farms which provided them with very low rents into large farms capable of paying them larger rents [Part II, p. 239].

Do you understand, reader? There is *no* competition between large and small farming; the former *merely* squeezes out the latter, because it is less remunerative. "Since farming is established on a capitalist basis, it is indisputable that within certain limits large-scale capitalist farming possesses undoubted advantages over small capitalist farming." [Part I, pp. 239-240.] If this is indisputable, then what is Mr. Bulgakov making a fuss about, and why did he raise such a howl (in *Nachalo*) against Kautsky, who *commences* his chapter on large and small production (in his *Agrarfrage*) with the statement: "The more capitalistic agriculture becomes, the more a qualitative difference in technique develops between large and small production?"

But the disadvantages of small farming are revealed not only in the period of prosperity of English agriculture, but also in periods of crisis. The reports of commissions published during recent years "with astonishing persistence assert that the crisis most severely affected the small farmers." [Part I, p. 311.] One report dealing with small owners says: "Their homes are worse than the cottages of the average labourer. . . . All of them work astonishingly hard and for many more hours than the labourers, and many of them say that their material conditions are not as good as those of the latter, that they do not live as well, and rarely eat fresh meat. . . ." "The yeomen, burdened with mortgages were the first to perish. . . ." [Part I, p. 316.] "They stint themselves in all things in a way that only few labourers do. . . ." "The small farmers keep going as long as they are able to avail themselves of the unpaid labour of the members of their families. . . ." "It is hardly necessary to add that the conditions of life of the small farm-

ers are ever so much worse than those of the labourers." [Part I, p. 321.] *

We have quoted these passages in order that the reader may judge of the correctness of the following conclusion drawn by Mr. Bulgakov:

> The severe ruination of the farms which survived up to the epoch of the agrarian crisis merely indicates [!!!] that in such circumstances small producers perish more quickly than large producers—and nothing more. [*Sic!!*] It is absolutely impossible to draw any general conclusion from this concerning the general economic vitality of small farms, for in that epoch the whole of English agriculture was in a state of bankruptcy [Part I, p. 333].

Well said, is it not? And in the chapter dealing with the general conditions of development of peasant farming, Mr. Bulgakov even generalises this remarkable method of reasoning in the following manner:

> A sudden drop in prices severely affects all forms of production, but peasant production, having less capital at its disposal, is naturally less stable than large-scale production (which does not in the least affect the question of its general vitality). [Part II, p. 247.]

Thus, in capitalist society enterprises having less capital at their disposal are less stable than large enterprises, but this does not affect their "general" vitality!

Hertz is not more consistent in his reasoning. He "refutes" Kautsky (in the manner described above), but when he discusses America, he admits the superiority of large-scale farming in that country, which permits of "the employment of machinery on a far larger scale than that permitted by our parcelled out farming" [p. 36]. He admits that "the European peasant frequently employs antiquated, routine methods of production, toiling (*robotend*) for a crust of bread like a labourer, without striving for anything better" [*ibid.*]. Hertz admits generally that "small production demands the application of a relatively larger amount of labour than large scale production" [page 74]. He would do very well to communicate to Mr. Bulgakov the facts he quotes concerning the increase in the yield of the harvest as a result of the introduction of the steam plough [pp. 67-68].

The natural concomitant of our critics' faulty theoretical reasoning concerning the insignificance of agricultural machinery is their

* The above excerpts from English reports were quoted by Bulgakov and retranslated from the Russian.—*Ed.*

helpless repetition of the views of downright reactionary agrarians who are opposed to machinery. Hertz, it is true, still hesitates on this delicate point, and in speaking of the "difficulties" in the way of introducing machinery in agriculture, he remarks: "Opinions are expressed that so much free time is left in the winter that hand-threshing is more advantageous" [p. 65]. Apparently, with his peculiar logic, Hertz is inclined to the opinion that this is not an argument against small production, not an argument against the capitalistic hindrances to the introduction of machinery, but an argument against machinery. Hence Mr. Bulgakov is right when he says in regard to Hertz that he is "too closely bound by the opinion of his party" [Part II, p. 87]. The Russian professor, of course, stands above such degrading "ties" and proudly declares: "I am sufficiently free from the widespread prejudice—particularly in Marxian literature—which claims to regard every machine as a step towards progress." [Part I, p. 48.] Unfortunately, the flight of mind revealed in this magnificent piece of reasoning totally fails to correspond to the concrete conclusion that is drawn. "The steam-threshing machine," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "which deprives many, many workers of their winter occupation, was an undoubted evil for the labourers which was not compensated by technical advantages.* Goltz, by the way, also points this out and gives expression to rather Utopian desires" [Part II, p. 103], *i. e.*, gives expression to the desire to *restrict* the employment of threshing machines, particularly steam-threshing machines, "in order to improve the conditions of the agricultural labourers," adds Goltz, "and also to diminish emigration and— migration" (and we shall add that by migration Goltz in all probability means migration to the cities).

We shall remind the reader that in his *Agrarfrage*, Kautsky also noted Goltz's idea. It will not be without interest, therefore, to compare the attitude of a narrow-minded orthodox Marxian, steeped in Marxian prejudices, towards the concrete question of the economics (the significance of the machines) and politics (should they be restricted?) of machinery, with that of the modern critic who has excellently appreciated the whole spirit of "criticism."

Kautsky, in his *Agrarfrage* [p. 41], says that Goltz ascribed a particularly "pernicious influence" to the threshing machine: It

* *Cf.* Part I, p. 51: ". . . The steam-threshing machine . . . performs the work principally done in the winter period when there is a scarcity of work as it is (consequently, the usefulness of the machine for agriculture as a whole [*sic!!*] is more than doubtful; we shall come across this fact later on."

deprives the agricultural labourers of their principal winter occupation, drives them into the cities, and intensifies the depopulation of the countryside. Goltz proposes to restrict the employment of the threshing machine, and Kautsky adds, proposes this "ostensibly in the interest of the agricultural labourers, but in fact in the interest of the landlords for whom," as Goltz himself says, "the loss resulting from such restriction will be amply compensated—if not immediately, then in the future—by the larger number of workers they will be able to obtain in the summer time."

> Fortunately [continues Kautsky] this conservative friendship for the labourers is nothing more nor less than reactionary Utopianism. The threshing machine is of too great an "immediate" advantage to induce the landlord to abandon the use of it for the sake of profits in the "future." Consequently, the threshing machine will continue to perform its revolutionary work; it will continue to drive the agricultural labourers into the cities, and as a result will become a mighty instrument for raising wages in the rural districts on the one hand, and for the further development of machinery in agriculture on the other.

Mr. Bulgakov's attitude towards the problem as presented by a Social-Democrat and an agrarian respectively, is to a high degree characteristic; it is an example in miniature of the position which all the contemporary "critics" occupy midway between the party of the proletariat and the party of the bourgeoisie. The critic, of course, is not so narrow-minded and stereotyped as to adopt the point of view of the class struggle and of the revolution that capitalism brings about in all social relationships. On the other hand, however, although our critic "has grown wiser," the recollection of the time when he was "young and foolish," and shared the prejudices of Marxism, prevents him from adopting the programme of his new comrade, the agrarian, which quite reasonably and consistently passes from the conclusion that machinery is harmful "for the *whole* of agriculture" to the desire to prohibit the employment of machinery! And our good critic finds himself in the position of Buridanov's ass, between two bunches of hay: On the one hand, he has lost all understanding of the class struggle and has descended to talking about the harmful character of machinery for "the *whole* of agriculture," forgetting that the *whole* of modern agriculture is being conducted principally by farmers who are concerned only about their profit—he has so far forgotten "the years of his youth," when he was a Marxist, that he now raises the extremely absurd question as to whether the technical advantage of machinery will

"compensate" for the pernicious effects it has upon the labourers (but this pernicious influence is exercised not by the steam-threshing machine alone but also by the steam-plough, the mowing-machine, seed-sorting machines, etc.). He even fails to observe that the agrarian desires in fact to enslave the labourer still more both in winter and in summer. On the other hand, he vaguely recalls the obsolete, "dogmatic" prejudice that prohibiting machinery is Utopian. Poor Mr. Bulgakov! Will he manage to extricate himself from this unpleasant situation?

It is interesting to observe that in trying in every way to disparage the significance of agricultural machinery, and in advancing the "law of diminishing returns," our critics have forgotten to mention (or have deliberately refrained from doing so) the latest technical revolution which electrical engineering is preparing in agriculture. Kautsky, who, according to the extremely unfair judgement of Mr. P. Maslov, "committed a very material error in completely failing to define in which direction the development of productive forces in agriculture is proceeding" [*Zhizn*, 1901, No. 3, p. 171]—pointed to the significance of electricity in agriculture as far back as 1899 [in *Agrarfrage*]. At the present time, the symptoms of the approaching technical revolution are much more distinct. Attempts are being made theoretically to determine the significance of electricity in agriculture. [*Cf.* Dr. Otto Pringsheim, "Landwirtschaftliche Manufaktur und elektrische Landwirtschaft," *Brauns Archiv*,[99] XV, 1900, pp. 406-418; and Kautsky's article in the *Neue Zeit*, XIX, 1, 1900-1901, No. 18, "Die Elektrizität in der Landwirtschaft."] Practical landlord farmers are describing their experiments in the application of electricity (Pringsheim cites the work of Adolph Seufferheld in which he describes the experiments he has made on his own farm). These landlords see in electricity a means of making agriculture once more remunerative. They call upon the government and the landlords to establish central power stations, and mass production of electrical power for farmers (last year a book was published in Koenigsberg, written by P. Mack, a landlord in East Prussia, entitled *Der Aufschwung unseres Landwirtschaftsbetriebes durch Verbilligung der Produktionskosten. Eine Untersuchung über den Dienst, den Maschinentechnik und Elektrizität der Landwirtschaft bieten*).

Pringsheim makes what in our opinion is a very true remark that, in its general technical level, and perhaps even economic level,

modern agriculture is in a similar stage of development to that of industry in the stage which Marx described as "manufacture." The predominance of hand labour and simple co-operation, the sporadic employment of machines, relatively small output (counting the total, annual volume of products sold by a single enterprise), the relatively small, in a majority of cases, dimensions of the market, the contacts between large and small production (the latter, like the home industry worker in his relation to the big master manufacturer, supplies the former with labour power—or else the former buys up the "semi-finished article" from the latter, for example, the big farmers buy beets, cattle, etc., from the small farmers)—all these are symptoms of the fact that agriculture has not yet reached the stage of real "large-scale machine industry" in the sense that Marx understood it. In agriculture, there is not yet "the system of machines" linked up into one productive mechanism.

Of course, this comparison must not be carried too far. On the one hand, agriculture possesses certain peculiar features which cannot possibly be removed (if we leave aside the extremely remote and problematical possibility of producing albumen and foods by artificial processes). Owing to these special features, large-scale machinery in agriculture will never bear *all* the features it bears in industry. On the other hand, even in the manufacture stage of development, large-scale production in industry reached predominance and considerable technical superiority over small production. The small producer for a long time tried to counteract this superiority by working longer hours and cutting down his requirements, which is so characteristic both for the home industry worker and the modern small peasant. The predominance of hand labour in the manufacture stage enabled the small producer to hold his own for a time by "heroic" measures such as these. But those who were deceived by this, and talked about the vitality of the handicraftsmen (in the same way as our contemporary critics talk about the vitality of the peasant) very soon found themselves refuted by the "temporary tendencies" which paralysed the "universal law" of technical stagnation. As an example, we shall recall the Russian investigators into the handicraft weaving industry in the Moscow province in the seventies. As far as cotton weaving is concerned, they said, the hand weaver is doomed; the machine has triumphed, but the handicraft silk weaver may still hold his own for a time, for machinery in this branch of the industry is far from perfected yet.

Two decades have passed and machinery has driven the small producer from still another of his last refuges, as if telling those who have ears to hear and eyes to see that the economist must always look ahead, in the direction of the progress of technique, otherwise he will be left behind at once; for those who refuse to look ahead turn their backs on history: there is not and there cannot be any middle path.

"Writers who, like Hertz, talked about competition between small- and large-scale production in agriculture, and in doing so ignored electrical engineering, must commence their investigations all over again," aptly remarked Pringsheim, and this remark applies with still greater force to the two-volume work of Mr. Bulgakov.

Electrical power is much cheaper than steam power. It is easily divisible into small units, it can be more easily transmitted over very long distances; machinery, with its aid, works more smoothly and accurately, and for that reason it is more conveniently employed both in threshing, ploughing, or milking cows, cutting fodder, etc.* Kautsky describes a certain Hungarian latifundia ** in which electrical power is conducted from a central station in all directions to the remote parts of the estate, is employed for running agricultural machinery, for cutting beet root, for raising water, for illumination, etc., etc. "In order to pump 300 hectolitres per day from a well 29 metres deep into a reservoir 10 metres high, and in order to prepare fodder for 240 cows, 200 calves, and 60 oxen and horses, *i. e.*, for reaping and cutting beet root, etc., two pairs of horses were required in the winter and one pair in the summer, which cost 1,500 guldens. Now, instead of the horses they have a two or three horse-power motor which costs altogether 700 guldens to maintain, *i. e.*, a saving of 800 guldens." [Kautsky, *ibid.*] Mack calculates the cost of a horse working-day at 3 marks and that the same amount of work is performed by electricity at a cost of 40 to 75 pfennigs, *i. e.*, 400 per cent to 700 per cent cheaper. If in 50 years' time or more, he says, the 1,750,000 horses used in German agriculture will be supplanted by electrical power (in 1895, 2,600,000 horses, 1,000,000 oxen, 2,300,000 cows were employed for field work in German

* This is for the information of our bold Mr. Bulgakov who, boldly and without reason, speaks of "such branches of agricultural production in which machinery cannot be employed at all, as, for example, stock breeding." [Part I, p. 49.]

** Again for the information of Mr. Bulgakov, who talks about "the latifundiary degeneration of large-scale farming"!

agriculture, of these farms exceeding 20 hectares in area employed 1,400,000 horses and 400,000 oxen) the cost will be reduced from 1,003,000,000 marks to 261,000,000, *i. e.*, a reduction of 742 million marks. An enormous area of land now utilised for raising fodder for cattle could then be turned for the production of food for human beings—for the improvement of the food of the workers, whom Mr. Bulgakov tries so much to scare with the gloomy prospect of the "diminution of the gifts of nature," "the grain problem," etc. Mack strongly recommends the amalgamation of agriculture with industry for the permanent exploitation of electrical energy, and the cutting of a Mazurian Canal, which would provide power for five electrical stations that would distribute electrical energy to farmers within a radius of from 20 to 25 kilometres. He recommends the utilisation of peat for the same purpose and demands the amalgamation of farmers: "Only in co-operative organisation with industry and big capital is it possible to make our branch of industry profitable once again." [Mack, p. 48.] Of course, the application of new methods of production will encounter many difficulties; it will not proceed in a straight line but in zigzag fashion; but that it will be employed, that the revolution in agriculture is inevitable, can hardly be doubted. "The substitution of electrical motors in place of the greater part of horses means," rightly says Pringsheim, "opening up the possibility of the machine system in agriculture. . . . What could not be achieved by steam power will certainly be achieved by electrical engineering, namely, the conversion of agriculture from the old manufacture stage to modern large-scale production" [*ibid.*, p. 414].

We shall not dwell on the enormous victory the introduction of electrical engineering into agriculture will represent (partly already represents) for large-scale production—it is too obvious to be insisted upon. We prefer to investigate the number of modern farms in which the embryo of this "machine system" already exists, and which are already run with power supplied from central power stations. Before the machine system can be fully introduced, it is first of all necessary to test various kinds of machinery and make experiments in the simultaneous employment of many machines. The information we require can be found in the agricultural census of Germany taken on July 14, 1895. Here we have figures showing the number of farms in each category employing their own or hired machinery. (Mr. Bulgakov, when quoting these figures, erroneously

thinks they apply to the number of *machines* employed. In passing, it may be said that the statistics concerning the number of farms employing machinery, their own or hired, show that large-scale farming is superior to small-scale farming, which in fact is the case. Large farmers own their own machines more frequently than small farmers, while the latter are obliged to pay exorbitant prices for the hire of them.—Part II, p. 114.) The figures show the number of farms employing machinery generally, or a certain kind of machine, so that we are not able to determine *how many* machines the farms in each group employ. But if in each group we add up the total number of farms employing each separate kind of machine, we shall get *the total number of cases* in which agricultural machinery of all kinds are employed. The following table presents these figures drawn up in this manner and shows how the ground is being prepared for the "machine system" in agriculture.

Size of Farms (Hectares)	Per Hundred Farms	
	Number of farms employing agricultural machinery generally (1895)	Number of cases employing some kind of agricultural machine (1895)
Up to 2	2.03	2.30
From 2 to 5	13.81	15.46
From 5 to 20	45.80	56.04
From 20 to 100	78.79	128.46
100 and over	94.16	352.34
TOTAL	16.36	22.36

Thus, in small farms up to five hectares in extent (these number more than three-fourths of the total, *i. e.*, 4,100,000 out of 5,500,000 or 75.5 per cent; but they comprise only 5,000,000 hectares of the total land under cultivation, amounting to 32,500,000 hectares, *i. e.*, 15.6 per cent)—the number of *cases* in which some kind of agricultural machine or other is employed (we have included in this machinery for dairy farming) is quite infinitesimal. In the middle farms (from 5 to 20 hectares) more than half the number employ machinery generally and only in 56 per hundred cases is agricultural machinery employed. Only in large capitalist production *

* Over 20 hectares; only 0.3 million farms out of 5.5 millions, *i. e.*, only 5.5 per cent of the total, but they occupy 17.7 million hectares of land out of 32.5 million or 54.4 per cent of the total land under cultivation.

do the majority of farms (from ¾ to 9/10) employ machinery, and *the machine system is beginning to be established:* On every farm there is more than one case of machinery being employed, which means that several machines are employed on a single farm; for example, farms over 100 hectares in extent employ *about four machines* (352 per cent as compared with 94 per cent employing machinery generally). Out of 572 latifundia (farms 1,000 hectares and more in extent), 555 employ machinery, and the number of cases of employment of machinery is equal to 2,800, *i. e.*, each farm employed *five machines each.* It is clear from this what kind of farms are preparing the ground for the "electrical" revolution and what kind of farms will primarily benefit by it.

IV

THE REMOVAL OF THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

The Secondary Questions Raised by the "Critics"

FROM Hertz, we shall pass to Mr. Chernov. As the latter merely "talks with his readers" about the former, we shall limit ourselves to a brief description of Hertz's method of argument (and Chernov's method of paraphrasing him) in order, in a subsequent chapter, to take up certain new facts advanced by the "critics."

It will be sufficient to cite *a single* example to illustrate the kind of theoretician Hertz is. At the very beginning of his book, we find a paragraph under the pretentious sub-heading: "The Concept of National Capitalism." Hertz desires nothing more nor less than to define capitalism. He writes: "We can, of course, describe it as a system of national economy which *juridically* is based upon the complete application of the principles of the liberty of the subject and of property; *technically*, upon production on a wide [large?] scale;* *socially*, on the alienation of the means of production from the direct producers; *politically*, on the possession by the capitalists of the central political power [the concentrated political power of the state?] as a consequence of the existence of a single economic basis for the distribution of property" [Russian translation, p. 37]. These definitions are incomplete and certain reservations must be

* Mr. V. Chernov translates it [*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 4, 132]: "On production which has achieved a high state of development." That is how he managed to "understand" the German expression, "auf grosser Stufenleiter"!!

made, says Hertz; for example, home industry and small tenant farming still exist everywhere side by side with large-scale production. "The *realistic* [*sic!*] definition of capitalism as a system in which production is under the control [domination and control] of the capitalists" [of owners of capital] is also unsuitable. This "realistic" definition of capitalism as the domination of capitalists is magnificent, is it not? And how characteristic this fashionable, quasi-realistic, but in fact eclectic quest for an exhaustive enumeration of all the separate symptoms and separate "factors" is at the present time. The result, of course, is that this senseless attempt to include into a general concept all the partial symptoms of single phenomena or, on the contrary, to "avoid a conflict between extremely varied phenomena"—an attempt which merely reveals an elementary failure to understand what science is—leads the "theoretician" to a position where he cannot see the wood for the trees. Hertz, for example, lost sight of a detail like commodity production and the transformation of labour power into a commodity. Instead, however, he invented the following *genetic* definition which —as a punishment to the inventor—ought to be quoted in full: Capitalism is "a state of national economy in which the application of the principles of free exchange, liberty of the subject and of property have reached the highest (relatively) point determined by the economic development of the empirical conditions of each separate national economy" [p. 10]. Of course, Mr. V. Chernov, filled with awe and admiration, transcribes and describes these soap bubbles and, moreover, treats the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for the space of thirty whole pages to an "analysis" of the types of national capitalism. From this highly instructive analysis, we may extract a number of extremely valuable and by no means stereotyped references. For example, to the "independent, proud and energetic character of the Briton," to the "substantial" British bourgeoisie and the "unsympathetic character" of their foreign politics, to the passionate and impulsive temperament of the Latin race and to the "accuracy" of the Germans [*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 4, p. 152]. "Dogmatic" Marxism, of course, is utterly annihilated by this analysis.

Hertz's analysis of the mortgage statistics are no less annihilating. At all events, Mr. Chernov goes into ecstasies over it. "The fact is," he writes, " . . . Hertz's figures have not been refuted by any one yet. Kautsky, in his reply to Hertz, dwelt at extreme length

upon certain details" [for example, he tried to prove that Hertz *distorted the facts!* A nice "detail"!] "but to Hertz's argument on the question of mortgages *he made no reply whatever*" [*Russkoye Bogatstvo,* No. 10, p. 217. *Chernov's italics*]. As can be seen from the reference on page 228 in the same number of *Russkoye Bogatstvo,* Mr. Chernov is aware of the article Kautsky wrote in reply ["Zwei Kritiker meiner Agrarfrage," in the *Neue Zeit,* XVIII, 1, 1899-1900]. Mr. Chernov could not but know also that the periodical in which this article was written is prohibited in Russia by the censorship. What is more remarkably characteristic of the modern "critics" is the fact that the very words which Chernov himself underlines represent a *deliberate untruth,* for on the question of mortgages Kautsky *replied* to Hertz, David, Bernstein, Schippel, Bulgakov, *e tutti quanti,* on pp. 472-477, *in the very article to which Mr. Chernov refers.* To restore distorted truth is a tedious duty, but since we have to deal with people like the Chernovs, it is a duty that cannot be neglected.

Kautsky, of course, replied to Hertz with ridicule, for on this question Hertz revealed his inability or unwillingness to understand what is what and an inclination to repeat the outworn arguments of bourgeois economists. Kautsky's *Agrarfrage* [pp. 88-89] dealt with the concentration of mortgages. "Numerous petty rural usurers," wrote Kautsky, "are being more and more forced into the background to give place to big centralised capitalist or public institutions which monopolise mortgage credit." Kautsky enumerates certain capitalist and public institutions of this kind; he speaks of public mutual land credit institutions (*Genossenschaftliche Bodenkreditinstitute*) and points to the fact that *savings banks,* insurance companies and many corporations [p. 89] invest their funds in mortgages, etc. For example, in Prussia in 1887, seventeen mutual credit societies issued mortgage bonds to the amount of 1,650,000,000 marks. "These figures already show how enormously ground rent is concentrated in the hands *of a few central institutions*" [*our italics*], "but this concentration is rapidly increasing. In 1875, German mortgage banks issued mortgage bonds to the amount of 900,000,000 marks, in 1888 to the amount of 2,500,000,000 marks, and in 1892 to the amount of 2,400,000,000 marks, concentrated in 31 (in 1875 in 27) banks" [p. 89]. This concentration of ground rent is a clear indication of the concentration of *landed property.*

"No!" retort Hertz, Bulgakov, Chernov & Co., "we find very de-

cided tendencies towards decentralisation and the break-up of property" [*Russkoye Bogatstvo,* No. 10, p. 216] for "more than one-fourth of the mortgage credits are concentrated in the hands of democratic [*sic!*] credit institutions having a large mass of small depositors" [*ibid.*]. Quoting a number of tales, Hertz tries with extraordinary zeal to prove that the *small depositors* represent the majority of the depositors in savings banks, etc. What is the purpose of this argument? we ask. Kautsky himself referred to the mutual credit societies and savings banks (while not, of course, imagining, as does Chernov, that these are a special kind of "democratic" institutions). Kautsky talks about the centralisation of rent in the hands of a few central institutions, and his attention is called to the large number of small depositors in savings banks! And this they call "the breaking up of property"! What has the number of depositors in mortgage banks to do with agriculture? (we refer to the concentration of rent). Does a large enterprise cease to represent centralised production because the shares in it are distributed among a large number of small capitalists? "Until Hertz and David informed me," wrote Kautsky in reply to Hertz, "I had not the slightest idea where the savings banks obtained their money. I thought they operated with the savings of the Rothschilds and the Vanderbilts."

In regard to the transfer of mortgages to the state, Hertz says: "This would be a very bad method of fighting against big capital and, of course, an excellent method of rousing against those who propose such a reform a large and increasing army of small property owners, particularly the agricultural labourers included among them" [p. 29]. Mr. Chernov smugly repeats this on pp. 217-218 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo.*

So these are the "property owners" concerning whose increase in numbers Bernstein & Co., are making so much fuss!—replies Kautsky. Servant girls with twenty marks in the savings banks! And how old and outworn is the argument used against the Socialists, that by "expropriation" they will rob an enormous army of toilers! None other than Eugen Richter very zealously advanced this argument in the pamphlet he published after the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws (and which the capitalists bought up in thousands in order to distribute gratis among their workers).[100] In this pamphlet Eugen Richter introduces his "thrifty Agnes": a poor seamstress who had a couple of score of marks in the savings bank, and who

was robbed by the wicked Socialists when they seized political power, and nationalised the banks. This is the source from which the Bulgakovs,* Hertzes and Chernovs obtain their "critical" arguments.

At that time [says Kautsky, concerning Eugen Richter's "celebrated" pamphlet] Eugen Richter was ridiculed by all Social-Democrats. And now among the latter are persons who, in our central organ [this, I think, refers to David writing in the *Vorwaerts*] [101] "sing hymns of praise to a work in which these very ideas are reproduced: Hertz, we extol thy deeds!"

For poor Eugen, in the decline of his years, this is indeed a triumph, and I cannot refrain from quoting for his pleasure the following passage taken from the very same page in Hertz's book: "We see that the small peasant, the urban house-owners, and especially the big landowners, are expropriated by the lower and middle classes, and the majority of these undoubtedly consist of the rural population" [Hertz, p. 29. Retold with rapture in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, pp. 216-217]. David's theory about "sapping" (*Aushohlung*) capitalism by collective wage agreements (*Tarifgemeinschaften*) and consumers' co-operative societies is now excelled. It pales into insignificance before Hertz's expropriation of the expropriators by means of savings banks. [Kautsky, *ibid.*, p. 475.]

And Russian "critics" together with the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* hastened to transplant this resurrected "thrifty Agnes" to Russian soil in order to throw disgrace upon "orthodox" Social-Democracy.

And this V. Chernov, who splutters with enthusiasm over Hertz's repetition of Eugen Richter's arguments, "flattens out" Kautsky in the pages of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, and in the symposium, *At the Glorious Post*, dedicated to N. Mikhailovsky. It would be unfair not to quote a few of the gems of this tirade.

Kautsky, again following Marx [writes Mr. Chernov, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 229], admits that the progress of capitalist agriculture leads to the soil becoming impoverished of nutritive materials: something is continually being taken from the soil, in the form of produce which is sent to the cities, and never restored to it. . . . As you see, on the question of the laws of the fertility of the soil, Kautsky helplessly [*sic!*] repeats the words of Marx, who bases himself upon the theory of Liebig. But when Marx wrote his first volume Liebig's "law of restoration" was the last word in agronomy. Half a century has elapsed since that discovery was made. A complete revolution has taken place in our knowledge of the laws governing the fertility of the soil. And what do we see? The whole post-Liebig period, all the subsequent discoveries of Pasteur and Wille, Solari's experiments with nitrates, the discoveries of Berthelot, Hellriegel, Wilfarth and Vinogradsky in the domain of bacteriology of the soil—all this is beyond Kautsky's ken. . . .

* Bulgakov advanced the same arguments about mortgages against Kautsky in *Nachalo*, and in German in *Brauns Archiv*.

Dear Mr. Chernov! How surprisingly he resembles Turgenev's Voroshilov: you remember him in *Smoke*, the young Russian privat-docent who went on a tour abroad. This Voroshilov was a very taciturn young man, but now and again he would pour out a stream of scores and hundreds of names of celebrated scientists. Our learned Mr. Chernov, who has utterly destroyed that ignoramus Kautsky, behaves in exactly the same way. Only . . . but had we not better refer to Kautsky's book ourselves? Had we not better glance at least at its chapter headings? Look at Chapter IV. You will find: "Modern Agriculture" (Paragraph *d*) "Fertilisers, *Bacteria.*" We look down paragraph *d*, and we read:

> In the second half of the last decade the discovery was made that siliceous plants, unlike other cultivated plants, obtain nearly the whole of their supply of nitrates not out of the soil but from the air, and that not only do they not rob the soil of nitrates, but enrich it with it. But they possess this property only when the soil contains certain micro-organisms which adhere to their roots. Where these micro-organisms do not exist, it is possible by means of certain injections to give these siliceous plants the property of converting soil poor in nitrates into soil rich in nitrates, and in this way to fertilise this soil to a certain extent for other crops. As a general rule, by injecting bacteria into these siliceous plants, and the use of a suitable mineral fertiliser (phosphoric acid salts and potash fertilisers), it is possible constantly to obtain from the soil the highest yields even without manures. Only thanks to this discovery has "free farming" acquired a thoroughly firm basis. [Kautsky, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52.]

Who gave a theoretical basis to the remarkable discovery of the bacteria which collect nitrates? Hellriegel. . . .

Kautsky's fault lies in that he has the bad habit (possessed by many narrow, orthodox Marxians) of never forgetting that members of a militant Socialist party must in their scientific works keep the working-class reader in mind, must strive to write *simply* without employing the unnecessary clever turns of phrase, and those outer symptoms of "erudition" which so captivate the decadent and acknowledged representatives of official science. And in this work, Kautsky preferred to relate in a clear and simple manner the latest discoveries in agronomy, and to leave out scientific names, which mean nothing to nine-tenths of the public. The Voroshilovs, however, act in precisely the opposite manner: they prefer to pour out a whole stream of scientific names in the domain of agronomy, political economy, critical philosophy, etc., and thus obscure essentials by this scientific lumber.

For example, Voroshilov-Chernov, in his slanderous accusation

that Kautsky is not acquainted with scientific names and scientific discoveries, obscured an extremely interesting and instructive episode in fashionable criticism, namely, the attack made by bourgeois economics upon the Socialist idea of abolishing the antagonism between town and country. Prof. Lujo Brentano, for example, asserts that migration from the country into the towns is not caused by the given social conditions but by *natural necessity*, by the law of diminishing returns.* Mr. Bulgakov, following in the footsteps of his teacher pronounced already in *Nachalo* [March, 1899, p. 29] the idea that the antagonisms between town and country could be abolished, to be "an absolute fantasy" which will "raise a smile among agronomists." Hertz in his book writes:

> The abolition of the distinction between town and country is, it is true, the principal striving, of the old Utopians (and even of the *Manifesto*)—nevertheless, we do not believe that a social system which contains all the conditions for directing human culture to higher achievable aims would really abolish such great centres of energy and culture as the great cities, nor would it, to soothe offended æsthetic sentiments, abandon the abundant depositories of science and art, without which progress is impossible [p. 76].

* *Cf.* Kautsky's article in the *Neue Zeit*, XIX, 2, 1900-1901, No. 27: "Tolstoy and Brentano." Kautsky compares modern scientific Socialism with the doctrines of Leo Tolstoy—who has always been a profound observer and critic of the capitalist system notwithstanding the reactionary naïveté of his theories—and bourgeois economics, whose "star" Brentano (the teacher of Mr. Struve, Bulgakov, Hertz *e tutti quanti*) reveals the most incredible confusion in confounding the phenomena of nature with social phenomena, and in mixing up the concepts productivity and profit, value and price, etc. "This is not so characteristic of Brentano personally," Kautsky says justly, "as of the *school* to which he belongs. The *historical school* of bourgeois economics, in its modern form, regards a striving towards an integral conception of the social mechanism as being a superseded standpoint (*überwundener Standpunkt*). According to this view economic science must not investigate social laws and combine them into an integral system but it must confine itself to the formal description of separate social facts of the past and the present. Thus, it accustoms one merely to deal with the superficial aspects of phenomena, and when a representative of this school, nevertheless, submits to the temptation of examining the more profound causes of phenomena, he proves to be totally unable to keep his bearings and wanders helplessly round and round. Even in our party a striving has been observed for some time to substitute the Marxian theory, not by some other theory, but by that absence of all theory (*Theorielosigkeit*) which distinguishes the historical school—a striving to reduce the theoretician to the position of a mere reporter. To those who desire, not simply an aimless leaping (*Fortwurschteln*) from case to case, but a purposeful, energetic movement towards a great goal, the Brentano confusion which we have exposed must serve as a warning against the present methods of the historical school" [p. 25].

The Russian translator, on p. 182 of the translation, translated the word "potenziert" * as "potential." Those Russian translations are an awful nuisance. On page 270, the same translator translates the sentence: *Wer isst zuletzt das Schwein?*" ** as "Who, after all, is a pig?"

As you see, Hertz defends the bourgeois system from Socialist "fantasies" with phrases which express the "fight for idealism" no less than the writings of Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev! But his defence is not in the least strengthened by this turgid, idealistic phrasemongering.

The Social-Democrats have proved that they appreciate the historical services of the great centres of energy and culture by their irreconcilable struggle against all that which binds the population generally, and the peasants and agricultural labourers in particular, to one place. And for that reason, unlike the critics, no agrarian can catch them with a bait of providing the "muzhik" with winter "employment." The fact that we definitely recognise the progressive character of the great cities in capitalist society, however, does not in the least prevent us from including in our ideals (and in our programme of action, for we leave impracticable ideals to Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev) the abolition of the antagonism between town and country. It is not true to say that this is tantamount to abandoning the depositories of science and art. Quite the opposite: this is necessary in order that these depositories may be *opened up to the whole of the people*, in order to bridge the gulf that separates culture from the millions of the rural population, whose lives Marx aptly described as "the idiocy of rural life." [102] And at the present time, when it is possible to transmit electrical power over long distances, when the technique of transport has been so greatly improved that it is possible at relatively less cost (than at present) to carry passengers at a speed of more than 200 versts an hour,*** there are absolutely no technical hindrances to the depositories of science and art, which for centuries have been concentrated in a few centres, becoming accessible to the whole of the population, spread more or less evenly over the whole country.

And if there is nothing to prevent the abolition of the antagonism

* Exalted in degree, plentiful.—*Ed.*

** Who finally eats the pork?—*Ed.*

*** The proposal to construct such a road between Manchester and Liverpool was rejected by parliament only because of the selfish opposition of the big railway magnates who feared that the old companies would be ruined.

between town and country (and, of course it must not be imagined that it will be abolished by a single act; it will be the result of a series of measures), it is not an "æsthetic sentiment" alone that demands that it should be done. In the big cities people wallow in their own refuse, to use Engels' expression, and periodically, all those who can, flee from the cities in search of fresh air and pure water.[103] Industry is also spreading over the country, for it, too, requires pure water. The exploitation of waterfalls, canals and rivers for the purpose of obtaining electrical power will give a fresh impetus to this "spreading out of industry." Finally—last, but not least *—the rational utilisation of city refuse generally, and human excrement particularly, which is so essential for agriculture, also calls for the abolition of the antagonism between town and country. And it is against this point in the theory of Marx and Engels that Messrs. the critics decided to direct their agronomical arguments (Messrs. the critics preferred to refrain from analysing the theory, which is dealt with in great detail in Engels' *Anti-Dühring*,** and as they always do, restricted themselves to simply paraphrasing fragments of the thoughts of Brentano). Their line of reasoning is as follows: Liebig proved that it was necessary to restore to the soil as much as was taken from it. He therefore considered that to throw city refuse into the sea and rivers was a stupid and barbarous waste of materials essential for agriculture. Kautsky agreed with Liebig's theory. *But*, modern agronomy have proved fully that it is possible to restore the productive power of the soil without the use of stable manure, by means of artificial fertilisers, by the injection of certain bacteria which collect nitrates in siliceous plants, etc. *Consequently*, Kautsky, and all "orthodox" Marxists, are merely people with obsolete ideas.

Consequently—we reply—Messrs. the critics here too commit one of their innumerable and endless *distortions*. After explaining Liebig's theory, Kautsky *immediately* showed that modern agronomy has proved that it is quite possible "to dispense altogether with stable manure" [*Agrarfrage*, p. 50; *cf.* above quoted passage], but added that this was a *palliative* compared with the waste of human excrement entailed by the present system of city drainage. Now if the critics were at all capable of discussing the essential points of the

* Lenin uses these words in English.—*Ed.*

** The abridged title of Engels' classic, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft.—Ed.*

question they should have proved that this was not a palliative. But they did not even think of doing so. Needless to say, the possibility of substituting artificial manures for natural manures, and the fact that this is already being done (*partly*), does not in the least refute the fact that it is irrational to waste natural fertilisers, and in doing so *pollute* the rivers and the air in suburban and factory districts. Even at the present time there are sewage farms in the vicinity of large cities which utilise city refuse with enormous benefits for agriculture; but by this system only an infinitesimal part of the refuse is utilised. Artificial fertilisers—says Kautsky, on page 211 of his book, in reply to the objection that modern agronomics has refuted the argument that the cities agronomically exploit the countryside which Messrs. the critics bring forward as something new—"renders it possible to avoid the diminution of the fertility of the soil, but the fact that it is necessary to employ these artificial manures to an increasing extent merely indicates still another of those numerous burdens which agriculture has to bear, which *are by no means a natural necessity but a product of existing social relations.*" *

The words we have emphasised represent the "crux" of the question which the critics so zealously obscure. Writers who, like Mr. Bulgakov, scare the proletariat with the bogey of the "grain question," more terrible and important than the social question, who are enthusiastic over birth control and argue that the "regulation of the increase of the population" is becoming "the fundamental [*sic!*] economic condition" for the prosperity of the peasantry [Part II, p. 261], that this regulation is worthy of "respect" and that "much hypocritical indignation" [is it only hypocritical and not legitimate indignation against the present social system?] "is roused among sentimental [!?] moralists by the increase in births among the peasant population, as if unrestrained lust [*sic!*] were in itself a virtue" [*ibid.*]—such writers naturally and inevitably must strive to obscure the *capitalist* hindrances to agricultural progress in order to throw the whole blame for everything upon the natural law of the diminishing returns, and in order to present the idea of abolishing the antagonism between town and country as being an "absolute fantasy." But what boundless frivolity the Messrs. Chernovs betray

* It goes without saying—continues Kautsky—that artificial fertilisers will not disappear with the fall of capitalism; but they will enrich the soil with special materials and not fulfil *the whole* task of restoring the fertility of the soil.

when they repeat such arguments, and at the same time accuse the critics of Marxism of "lacking principles and with being eclectics and opportunists" ?! [*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 11, p. 246]. Can a more comical scene be imagined than that of Mr. Chernov reproving others for their lack of principles and their opportunism?

All the other critical exploits of our Voroshilov exactly resemble the one we have just examined.

When Voroshilov asserts that Kautsky failed to understand the difference between capitalist credit and usury he betrays a complete failure, or unwillingness, to understand Marx. When he says that the peasantry fulfil the functions of capitalists and as such occupy in relation to the proletariat the same place as that occupied by the factory owner, and, if while doing so, Voroshilov, beating his breast cries out: "I say this boldly because I feel [*sic!*] the ground firmly under my feet" [*At the Glorious Post*, p. 169]—remain calm: Voroshilov is merely mixing up things and boasting as usual. He "failed to observe" the passages in Kautsky's book dealing with usury as such [*Agrarfrage*, pp. 11, 102-104, and especially pp. 118, 290-292], and tries with all his might to force an open door, shouting as usual about Kautsky's "doctrinaire formalism," "moral hard-heartedness," "mockery at human sufferings," etc. In regard to the peasant fulfilling the functions of the capitalist, apparently this astonishingly complicated thing is beyond Voroshilov's comprehension. In the next chapter, we shall try to explain this to him with the most concrete examples.

When Voroshilov desires to prove that he is a real representative of the "interests of labour," and abuses Kautsky for "driving numerous genuine workers from the ranks of the proletariat" [*Ibid.*, p. 167] like the *lumpenproletariat*, domestic servants, handicraftsmen, etc.,—then, know that Voroshilov is mixing things up again. Kautsky here examines the symptoms that distinguish the "modern proletariat," which has created the modern "Social-Democratic proletarian movement" [*Agrarfrage*, p. 306], while the Voroshilovs have not yet been able to show that tramps, handicraftsmen and domestic servants created a Social-Democratic movement. The reproach hurled at Kautsky that he is capable of "driving" domestic servants (who in Germany are now beginning to join the movement), handicraftsmen, etc., from the ranks of the proletariat, merely exposes to the full light the impudence of the Voroshilovs whose display of friendship for the "genuine workers" increases in directly

inverse proportion to the practical significance of such phrases, and to the danger of attacking Part II of the *Agrarfrage*—which, being prohibited by the Russian censorship cannot be obtained in Russia. We can quote still another gem to illustrate their impudence: in praising Mr. N. and Mr. Kablukov—while completely ignoring the Marxian criticism directed against them—Mr. Chernov with pretended naïveté asks: Whom do the German Social-Democrats refer to when they speak of their Russian "comrades"? If, reader, you cannot believe that such questions are asked in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, turn to No. 7, p. 166, and see for yourself.

When Voroshilov asserts that Engels' "prediction," that the Belgian labour movement will prove barren owing to the influence of Proudhon, "has been proved entirely false," then know that Voroshilov, self-assured in his, so to speak, "irresponsibilty," is again distorting facts. Here are his words: "It is not surprising that Belgium has never been orthodox Marxian, and it is not surprising that Engels, being displeased with her, predicted that the Belgian movement, owing to the influence of 'Proudhonist principles' would pass *von nichts durch nichts zu nichts.** Alas this prediction has proved false and the extent and the many-sidedness of the Belgian movement enables it to serve as a model from which many orthodox countries have much to learn" [*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, p. 234]. The facts are as follows: In 1872 (seventy-two!), Engels was engaged in a controversy in the columns of the Social-Democratic paper *Volksstaat* [104] with the German Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in objecting to the exaggerated importance attached to Proudhonism, he wrote:

> The only country in which the labour movement is directly influenced by Proudhonist "principles" is Belgium, and precisely for that reason the Belgian labour movement is proceeding, to use Hegel's expression, "from nothing, through nothing, to nothing." **

Thus, it is a *direct untruth* to say that Engels "predicted" or "prophesied" anything. He merely spoke about *the facts as they were, i. e.*, he spoke of the condition as it was in 1872. And it is an undoubted historical fact that *at that time* the Belgian movement was marking time, making no progress, precisely because of the predominance of Proudhonism, whose leaders were opposed to

* "From nothing, through nothing, to nothing."—*Ed.*

** *Cf.* the pamphlet *Zur Wohnungsfrage*, Zurich, 1887, in which Engels' article against Mühlberger, written in 1872, is reproduced and also the introduction dated January 10, 1887. The passage quoted will be found on p. 56.

Collectivism and independent proletarian political action. Only in 1879 was a Belgian Socialist Party formed, and only from that time onwards was a campaign conducted for universal suffrage—which marked the victory of Marxism over Proudhonism (the recognition of the political struggle of the proletariat organised in an independent class party and the establishment of an independent class party)—and the pronounced successes of the movement achieved.

In its present programme the Belgian Labour Party has adopted *all* the fundamental ideas of Marxism (apart from certain minor points). In 1887, in a preface to the second edition of his articles on the housing question, Engels laid special emphasis upon the "gigantic progress made by the international labour movement during the past 14 years." This progress, he says, is largely due to the elimination of Proudhonism, which *at that time* predominated and which *now* has been almost forgotten. "In Belgium," Engels observes, "the Flemings squeezed out the Walloons from the leadership of the movement, swept away (*abgesetzt*) Proudhonism, and raised the movement to a high level" [Preface, p. 4, of the same pamphlet]. How truly *Russkoye Bogatstvo* described the facts, did it not?

When Voroshilov . . . but enough! It is no use our attempting to scotch the lies this legal journal pours out so shamelessly month after month about "orthodox" Marxism.

V

"FLOURISHING, PROGRESSIVE, MODERN, SMALL FARMS" THE BADEN EXAMPLE

DETAILS, details! cries Mr. Bulgakov in *Nachalo* (No. 1, pp. 7 and 13), and this cry is repeated a hundred times in a hundred different sharps and flats by all the "critics."

Very well, gentlemen, let us examine the details.

It was absolutely absurd of you to hurl this cry against Kautsky, because the principal task of the scientific investigation of the agrarian question, which teems with an infinite number of disconnected details, was to present a general picture of the whole of the modern agrarian system and its development. Your cry was intended merely to conceal your complete lack of scientific principle and your

opportunistic dread of any integral and thought-out philosophy. Had you not read Kautsky's book after the manner of a Voroshilov, you would have been able to obtain from it a mass of information of how to handle detailed statistics and how to utilise them. We shall be able to prove in a moment by the examples *that you yourselves select* that you have yet to learn how to handle detailed statistics.

In his article entitled "Peasant Barbarians," directed against Kautsky and published in the magazine of the Messrs. Voroshilov's, *Sozialistische* [*??*] *Monatshefte* [*Socialist Monthly*], III, 1899, No. 2, E. David very solemnly refers to "a most *thorough and interesting monograph*" on peasant farming which has appeared recently, namely, that of Moritz Hecht entitled *Drei Dörfer der badischen Hard* [Leipzig, 1895]. Hertz clutched at this reference, and following David quoted several figures from this "excellent work" [p. 68] and "strongly recommended" [p. 69] the perusal of the original, or the extracts from it quoted by David. Mr. Chernov in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* hastened to repeat what both David and Hertz wrote, and contrasted Kautsky's statements with Hecht's "striking pictures of the flourishing, progressive, modern, small farms" [No. 8, pp. 206, 209].

We shall turn to Hecht.

Hecht describes three Baden villages situated from four to fourteen kilometres from Karlsruhe: Hagsfeld, Blankenloch and Friedrichstal. Notwithstanding the small allotments worked by each farmer, from one to three hectares, the peasants are living prosperously and culturally and collect an extremely large yield from their land. David (followed by Chernov) compares this yield with the average yield for the whole of Germany (in double zentners per hectare: potatoes, 150 to 160 in the villages mentioned, and 87.8 general average; rye and wheat, 20 to 23 and 10 to 13 respectively; hay, 50 to 60 and 28.6 respectively), and exclaims: What do you think of that as an example of "backward, small peasants"! In the first place, we reply, in so far as no comparison is made between small and large farming conducted under the same conditions, it is ridiculous to use this as an argument against Kautsky. It is still more ridiculous when this very Mr. Chernov, who on page 229 of No. 8 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* asserts that Kautsky's rudimentary view [regarding the agronomic exploitation of the country by the towns] even exaggerates the shady aspects of capital-

ism,"—on page 209 of the same number brings forward as an argument *against Kautsky* an example in which the capitalist hindrances to the progress of agriculture are *eliminated* by the fact that the villages he selects are situated close to the cities. While the overwhelming majority of the agricultural population lose an enormous quantity of natural fertilisers as a result of the depopulation of the rural districts by capitalism, and the concentration of the population in the cities, an insignificant minority of suburban peasants obtain special benefits from their situation, and become enriched at the expense of the masses. It is not surprising that the yield in the villages described is so high when we know that they obtain manure amounting to the value of 41,000 marks per annum from the military stables in the three neighbouring garrison towns (Karlsruhe, Bruchsal and Durlach), and the liquid refuse from the urban drainage systems [Hecht, p. 65]; moreover, artificial manures are purchased only to the amount of 7,000 marks per annum.* To attempt to refute the technical superiority of large farming over small farming by quoting examples of small farms situated in such conditions means merely to expose one's impotence. Secondly, to what extent do these examples really represent "real small peasants," *echte und rechte Kleinbauern* as David says, and as Hertz and Chernov repeat after him? These mention only the size of the farms, and in this way prove only their inability to handle detailed statistics. As every one knows a hectare of land to a suburban peasant has a value equal to ten hectares to a peasant living in a remote district, and, moreover, the *type* of farms adjacent to towns differs extremely from those in more remote districts. For example, the price of land in the smallest but most prosperous of these suburban villages, namely Friedrichsthal, ranges from 9,000 to 10,000 marks, *i. e., five times* higher than the average price of land in Baden (1,938 marks), and *twenty times* higher than the price of land in remote districts in

* Mr. Chernov assures the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* that "hardly any difference" exists *in the size of the farms* in these villages. But if the demand for details is not an empty phrase on his lips, then he cannot forget that for these suburban peasants the quantity of land is of much less importance than the quantity of fertilisers used; and in this respect the difference is extremely marked. The highest yields per hectare are obtained, and the peasants are more prosperous in the village of Friedrichsthal, although the farms in that village are the smallest. Out of a total of 47,000 marks spent on fertilisers this village spends 28,000 marks which, given an area of 258 hectares of land, represents 108 marks per hectare. Hagsfeld spends only 30 marks per hectare (12,000 marks for 397 hectares) and Blankenloch spends only 11 marks per hectare (8,000 marks for 736 hectares).

East Prussia. Consequently, measured by the size of output (the only exact index of the size of the farm) these are by no means "small" peasants. In regard to the *type* of farm, we see here a remarkably high stage of development of the *money* system and the *specialisation* of agriculture, which is particularly emphasised by Hecht. They cultivate tobacco (45 per cent of the area under cultivation in Friedrichsthal); high quality potatoes (used partly for seed and partly for the table of the "gentry" [Hecht, p. 17]—in Karlsruhe; they sell milk, meat, suckling pigs and pigs to the towns, and themselves buy grain and hay. Agriculture here has assumed a completely commercial character, and the suburban peasant is the purest type of *petty bourgeois*, so that had Mr. Chernov made himself fully acquainted with the details which he borrows from others, he might have made some approach to understanding what this, to him mysterious, "petty-bourgeois" category of the peasant, is. [*Cf. Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 163.] It is extremely curious indeed that both Hertz and Mr. Chernov, while declaring that they are totally unable to understand how the peasant fulfils the functions of the capitalist, how he is able to function at one moment as a worker and at another as a capitalist, refer to the detailed investigations of an author, who says:

> The peasant of the eighteenth century, with his eight to ten hectares of land, was a peasant ["*was* a peasant," Mr. Chernov!] and a manual labourer; the dwarf peasant of the nineteenth century with his one or two hectares of land is a brain worker, a capitalist and a merchant. [Hecht, p. 69, *cf.* with p. 12: "The farmer has become a *merchant* and a *capitalist*." Hecht's italics.]

Well, have not Hertz and Mr. Chernov "flattened out" Kautsky in the Voroshilov manner for mixing up the peasant with the capitalist?

The most pronounced symptom of being a "capitalist" is the employment of wage labour. And it is to a high degree characteristic that not one of the quasi-Socialists who refer to the work of Hecht *uttered a single word* about this fact. Hecht, a typical petty bourgeois of the most respectable type, who waxes enthusiastic over the piety of the peasants and the "fatherly care" exercised over them by the officials of the grand duchy—which finds particular expression in the "important" measure they have adopted of establishing cooking schools—naturally tries to obscure these facts, and to show that no "social gulf" separates the rich from the poor, the peasant from the agricultural labourer, and the peasant from the factory worker.

No agricultural *day labourer* class exists [writes Hecht]. The majority of the peasants are able themselves, with the help of their families, to cultivate their allotments; only a few in these three villages experience the need for outside help during the harvest or threshing time; such families "invite" (*bitten*) to use the local expression, certain men and women, who would never dream of calling themselves "day labourers," to help them [p. 31].

There is nothing surprising in the fact that only a few farmers in the three villages mentioned engage hired day labourers because many "farmers," as we shall see, are also factory workers. What proportion of pure farmers employ hired labour Hecht does not say; he prefers to pack his doctoral dissertation which is devoted only to three villages (of one of which he himself is a native) not with exact statistics concerning the various categories of peasants but with considerations on the high moral significance of diligence and thrift. (Notwithstanding this, perhaps because of it, Hertz and David praise Hecht's work to the skies.) All that we learn is that the wages of day labourers are lowest in the most prosperous and purely agricultural village, Friedrichsthal, which is farthest away from Karlsruhe (14 kilometres). In Friedrichsthal a day labourer gets two marks per day, while in Hagsfeld (4 kilometres from Karlsruhe and inhabited by factory workers) the wages of a day labourer are three marks per day. Such is one of the conditions of the "prosperity" of the "real small peasants" so much admired by the critics.

In these villages [Hecht informs us] purely patriarchal relations still exist between the masters and their *servants* [*Gesinde* in German is synonymous with domestic servant and labourer]. The "master," *i. e.*, the peasant with 304 hectares of land, addresses his men or women labourers as "thou," calls them by their Christian names, and they call the peasant "uncle" and the peasant's wife "auntie," and address them as "you." . . . The labourers eat at the same table with the family and are regarded as members of the family [p. 93].

Our "most thorough" Hecht maintains silence regarding the extent to which hired labour is employed on the tobacco plantations, which are so widely developed in that district, and which require a particularly large number of labourers. But since he has said something about wage labour, then even this very respectable little bourgeois must be regarded as being much better able to handle the "details" of an investigation than the Voroshilovs of "critical" Socialism.

Thirdly, Hecht's investigation was used to refute the fact that the peasantry suffered from overwork and underfeeding. Here, too, it turns out, however, that the critics preferred to *ignore* the same

kind of facts *mentioned* by Hecht. They cleverly utilised the conception of the term "middle" peasant, which the Russian Narodniki and the Western European bourgeois economists use so extensively in order to present the conditions of the "peasantry" in a favourable light. Speaking "generally" the peasants in the three villages mentioned are very prosperous. But even from Hecht's, not very thorough, monograph it is apparent that the peasants must be divided into three distinct categories. About one-third (or 30 per cent) of the farmers (the majority in Friedrichsthal and a few in Blankenloch) are prosperous petty-bourgeois, who have grown wealthy as a result of their proximity to the capital, who run remunerative dairy farms (they sell from 10 to 12 litres of milk per day), and tobacco-growing (one example: gross earnings 1,825 marks from 1.05 hectares of land under tobacco), fatten pigs for sale (in Friedrichsthal 1,140 inhabitants keep 497 pigs, in Blankenloch, 1,684 inhabitants keep 445 pigs, and Hagsfeld 1,273 inhabitants keep 220 pigs), etc. This minority (who alone possess the features of "prosperity" so much admired by the critics) without a doubt employ hired labour frequently. In the next group, to which the majority of farmers in Blankenloch belong, the state of prosperity is very much lower, less fertilisers are used, the yield is lower, there are fewer cattle (in Friedrichsthal, the number of cattle in equivalents of large horned cattle is 599 head on 258 hectares; in Blankenloch, 842 on 736 hectares; and in Hagsfeld, 324 head on 397 hectares); "clean rooms" are more rarely seen in the houses, meat is not eaten every day, and among many families is observed (what is so familiar to us Russians) the practice of selling grain in the autumn—when they are hard pressed for money—and buying grain again in the spring.* In this group the centre of gravity is constantly shifting from *agriculture to industry*, and already 103 Blankenloch peasants work as factory labourers in Karlsruhe. These latter, together with almost the whole of the inhabitants of Hagsfeld, form the third category (forty to fifty per cent of the total

* In passing, Hecht explains the economic backwardness of Blankenloch by the predominance of natural economy and the *existence of common lands* as a result of which every one on reaching the age of 32 is guaranteed a strip of land (*Almendgut*) of 36 ares [one are = 1/100 of a hectare.—*Ed.*] irrespective of whether he is "lazy or diligent, thrifty or not [p. 30]. Hecht for all that is opposed to dividing up the common lands. This, he says, is a sort of public charity institution (*Altersversorgung*) for aged factory workers whose numbers are increasing in Blankenloch.

number of farms). In this category agriculture is a subsidiary occupation in which it is mostly women who are engaged. The standard of living is higher than in Blankenloch (the result of the influence of the capital city, but poverty is already strongly felt nevertheless. They sell their milk and for themselves purchase "cheaper margarine" [p. 24]. The number of goats kept is rapidly increasing: from nine in 1855 to ninety-three in 1893. "This increase," writes Hecht, "can be explained only by the disappearance of farms that are strictly speaking peasant farms, and the transformation (*Auflösung*) of the peasant class into a class of rural factory workers with extremely parcelled out agriculture" [p. 27]. In parentheses it should be said that the number of goats in Germany between 1882 and 1895 increased enormously: from 2,400,000 to 3,100,000, which clearly reveals the reverse side of the progress of the "sturdy peasant" which the Messrs. Bulgakovs and the petty-bourgeois Socialist "critics" laud to the skies. The majority of the workers walk three and a half kilometres every day to their factory in the town, because they cannot afford to spend even one mark fare per week on the railway. Nearly 150 workers out of the 300 in Hagsfeld find it even too dear to dine in the "popular dining-room" as a dinner there costs from 40 to 50 pfennigs, and have their dinners brought to them from home. "Precisely at eleven o'clock in the morning," writes Hecht, "the poor women folk put the dinners in their baskets and carry them to the factory" [p. 79]. The working women are also employed in the factory ten hours per day and receive for this from 1.10 marks to 1.50 marks (the men receive 2.50 marks to 2.70 marks), and for piece work earn nearly 1.70 to 2.00 marks.

A number of the working women try to supplement their meagre wages by some subsidiary employment. In Blankenloch four girls are employed in the paper mill in Karlsruhe, and after the day's work take work home. Working from eight P.M. till eleven P.M. they can make 300 paper bags for which they receive from forty-five to fifty pfennigs, and this goes to supplement their small daily earnings so as to pay their railway fares to and from work. In Hagsfeld several women who worked in factories when they were girls earn supplementary wages by polishing silver goods on winter evenings [p. 36]. The Hagsfeld worker [says Hecht affectedly] has a permanent residence not by an imperial order, but as a result of his own energy; he has a house which he is not compelled to share with others, and has a small plot of land. But what is more important than these real possessions is the consciousness that they have been acquired by his own diligence. The Hagsfeld worker is both a factory worker and a peasant at one and the same time. Those who have no land of their own, rent at least a few strips in order to

supplement their income by *working in their spare time.* In the summer, when work in the factory commences only [only!] at seven o'clock, the worker rises at four in order to dig potatoes in his field, or to carry fodder to the cattle. Or when he returns from work at seven in the evening, what is he to do, particularly in the summer? Well, he works for an hour or an hour and a half in his field; he does not want a high rent from his land—he merely desires to make full use [*sic!*] of his labour power . . . [p. 387].

Hecht says much more in a similarly pious strain and concludes his book with the words:

The dwarf peasant and the factory worker—both [*sic!*] have raised themselves to the position of the middle class, not as a result of artificial and coercive measures, but as a result of their own diligence, their own energy and the higher morality in which they have trained themselves.*

"The three villages of the Baden-Hard now represent one *great and broad middle class*" (Hecht's italics).

There is nothing astonishing in the fact that Hecht writes in this way for he is a bourgeois apologist of the common garden variety. But what name do those people deserve who, to deceive others, call themselves Socialists, who paint realities in still brighter colours than Hecht does, and who point to the prosperity of a bourgeois minority as general progress, and conceal the *proletarianisation* of the majority by means of old cries like: "Combining agriculture with industry"?

VI

THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SMALL AND LARGE FARMS AN EXAMPLE FROM EAST PRUSSIA

For the sake of variety we shall transport ourselves from distant South Germany to East Prussia, nearer to Russia. We have before us a highly instructive and *detailed* investigation which Mr. Bulgakov, who cries so loudly for details, has been unable to make use of.

* Hecht says very much more about this "higher morality," and no less than Mr. Bulgakov, admires their "sober marital policy," their "iron diligence," "thrift," and "temperance," and even quotes a "well-known peasant proverb": *Man sieht nicht auf die Goschen (d. h. Mund) sondern auf die Groschen,* which freely translated means, we don't work so much for our mouths as for our pockets. We suggest that this proverb be compared with the "doctrine" of the Kiev Professor Bulgakov: that peasant farming (since it seeks neither rent nor profit) is "the most advantageous form of organisation of agriculture that society [*sic!*] can have" (Bulgakov, Part I, p. 154).

A comparison of the figures concerning the real productivity of large and small farming [writes Mr. Bulgakov] cannot provide an answer to the question of their technical advantages because the farms compared may be situated in different economic conditions. The most that can be obtained from these figures is the practical confirmation of the negative conclusion that large-scale production possesses no technical advantages over small-scale production, not only theoretically, but under certain conditions, also practically. Such comparisons were frequently made in economic literature; at all events frequently enough to undermine the belief of the unprejudiced reader in the advantages of large-scale production generally [Part I, p. 58].

In a footnote he quotes two examples. The first is the very book by Auhagen [105] quoted by Kautsky in his *Agrarfrage* [p. 111] and also by Hertz [p. 69] in which a comparison is made between two farms in Hanover, one of 4.6 hectares and one of 26.5 hectares. In this example, the small farm has a higher yield per hectare than the large one and Auhagen calculated that the income of the small farm is higher than that of the big farm. Kautsky, however, has shown that this higher income is the result of *under-consumption*. Hertz attempted to refute this, but with his usual success. And as Hertz's book is translated into Russian and Kautsky's reply to Hertz is unknown in Russia, we shall, in a few words, give the substance of this reply (in the article in the *Neue Zeit*) mentioned above. . . . As usual Hertz distorts Kautsky's arguments, and alleges that he refers only to the fact that the owner of the big farm is able to send his son to college. As a matter of fact Kautsky mentioned this merely to illustrate the higher standard of living of the big farmer, and had Hertz quoted *the whole of the budget* of the two families in question (each consisting of five persons), he would have obtained the following figures: 1,158.50 marks for the small farm, and 2,739.25 marks for the big farm. If both families enjoyed the *same* standard of living, the small farm would prove *less* profitable than the big one. Auhagen calculates the income of the small farm at 1,806 marks, *i. e.*, 5.45 per cent of the capital invested (33,651 marks) and that of the large farm at 2,720 marks, or 1.82 per cent of the capital invested (149,559 marks). Make allowance for the under-consumption of the small farmer, and you will find that his pro-profit is equal to 258 marks, or 0.80 per cent. And this when the amount of labour employed is disproportionately high: on the small farm three labourers are employed on 4.6 hectares, that is, one labourer per 1.5 hectares, while on the large farm eleven labourers are employed on 26.5 hectares, that is, one worker per 2.4 hectares [*cf.* Hertz, p. 75]. We shall not dwell on the circumstance—

upon which Kautsky so justly pours ridicule—that the alleged Socialist Hertz compares the labour of the children of modern peasants with that of the biblical Ruth, the gleaner. Mr. Bulgakov restricts himself merely to quoting the figures of the yields of the harvest, but *says not a word* about the respective standards of living of the small and big farmers.

We find another example—continues our advocate of details—in the latest researches of Karl Klawki [*Ueber Konkurrenzfähigkeit des landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetriebs.* Thiel's *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, 1899, Nos. 3-4]. His examples are taken from East Prussia. The author compares large, middle, and small farms by taking four of each kind. The peculiar feature of his comparisons lies firstly in the fact that expenditure and income are expressed in money, and secondly, the author translates into money and places to the expenditure account the cost of labour power on the small farms where it is not purchased; such a method is hardly correct for our purpose" [*sic!*]. [M. Bulgakov forgets to add that Klawki translates into money the cost of labour on *all* the farms and from the outset values the labour on the small farms at a cheaper rate!]; "Nevertheless we have . . ."

And then follows a table which for the moment we shall merely summarise: The average net profit per 1 morgen (one-fourth of a hectare) on the large farm is ten marks, on the medium sized farm eighteen marks, on the small farm twelve marks. "Thus," concludes M. Bulgakov, "the highest profits are obtained on the medium sized farms, the next highest on the small farms, while the big farms lag behind the others."

Category of Farms	Income and Consumption per Morgen in Marks												Expend. on produce (in 100 marks)		Per 100 morgens	
	Total Income			Income from the sale of produce			Consumption of own produce			Totals			Marks			
	Agriculture	Stock breeding	Total	Agriculture	Stock breeding	Total	Agriculture	Stock breeding	Total	Income	Expenses	Net profit	a.*	b.**	Hired work-days	Total work-days
Large ...	17	16	33	11	14	25	6	2	8	33	23	10	65	70	887	887
Middle ...	18	27	45	12	17	29	6	10	16	45	27	18	35	60	744	924
Small ...	23	41	64	9	27	36	14	14	28	64	52	12	8	80	—	—

* Not including the labour of the farmer and his family.
** Including the labour of the farmer and his family.

We have purposely quoted the *whole* passage in which Mr. Bulgakov makes his comparison between large and small farms. Now let us examine Klawki's interesting work, of which 120 pages are devoted to a description of twelve farms existing under equal conditions, and see what it proves. First of all, we shall quote the statistics concerning these farms and for the sake of space and clarity, we shall confine ourselves to the *average* statistics concerning the large, medium sized and small farms (the average size of the farms in each category is 358, 50 and 5 ha.). [See table, p. 239.—*Ed.*]

It would appear, therefore, that *all* Mr. Bulgakov's conclusions are wholly confirmed by Klawki's work: The smaller the farm the higher the gross income and the higher even the income from sales per morgen! We think that with the methods employed by Klawki —and these methods are widely employed in their main features by all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists—in all or nearly all cases the superiority of small farming is proved. Consequently *the essential thing* in this matter, which the Voroshilovs completely fail to see, *is to analyse these methods*, and it is for this reason that the partial researches of Klawki are of such enormous general interest.

We shall start with the harvests. It turns out that the harvest of the great majority of cereals regularly and very considerably *diminishes* in proportion as the farms decrease in size. The yield (in zentners per one morgen) on the large, medium sized and small farms respectively is as follows:

wheat, 8.7-7.3-6.4; rye, 9.9-8.7-7.7; barley, 9.4-7.1-6.5; oats, 8.5-8.7-8; peas, 8.0-7.7-9.2 *; potatoes, 63-55-42; swedes, 190-156-117. Only in flax, which the large farms do not grow at all, do the small farms (three out of the four) collect a greater yield than the medium sized farms (two out of the four), namely, 6.2 *stein* (18.5 pounds) as against 5.5.

What is the higher yield on the large farms due to? Klawki ascribes decisive importance to the following causes: 1. Drainage is almost altogether absent on the small farms and even where it exists the drain pipes are laid by the farmer himself and laid badly; 2. The small farmers do not plough their land deep enough, as their horses are weak; 3. The small farmer is not able to give his cattle sufficient fodder; 4. The manure produced by the small farmer is of

* These are grown only in two out of the four farms in that category. In the large and middle categories, three out of four grow peas.

inferior quality, his straw is shorter, a great part of the straw is used as cattle fodder (which means that the feed is inferior, and less straw is used for bedding the cattle-sheds).

Thus, the small farmers' cattle is weaker, inferior in quality, and kept in a worse condition. This circumstance explains the strange and striking fact that notwithstanding the high yield per morgen on the large farms, income from agriculture per morgen, according to Klawki's calculations, is less on the large farms than on the medium sized and small farms. The reason for this is that Klawki *does not include cattle fodder*, either in expenditure or income. In this way, the very factor which creates the material difference between the large and the small farms, to the disadvantage of the latter, is left out of account. By this system of calculation large farming appears to be less remunerative than small farming, *because* a greater portion of the land is devoted to the cultivation of cattle fodder (although the large farms possess a much smaller number of cattle per unit of land) whereas the small farmers "make shift" with straw for cattle fodder. Consequently, the "superiority" of small farming lies in that it *wastefully exploits* the land (inferior fertiliser) and the *cattle* (inferior fodder). Needless to say, such a comparison of the profitableness of various kinds of farming lacks all scientific significance.*

Another cause for the higher yield on large farms is that in most cases (and apparently almost in every case) the big farmers marl the soil, utilise larger quantities of artificial fertilisers (the expenditure per morgen is: 0.81 marks, 0.38 marks and 0.33 marks respectively) and *Kraftfuttermittel* ** (in large farms two marks per morgen and in the others nil). "Our peasant farms," says Klawki, who included the middle farms in the category of the big farms, "spend nothing on *Kraftfuttermittel.* They are very slow to adopt progressive methods, and are particularly chary of spending cash"

* It must be observed that a similar false equalisation of obviously unequal quantities in small and large farming is to be found not only in separate monographs, but also in the great bulk of contemporary agrarian statistics. Both French and German statistics deal with "average" live weight, and "average" price per head of cattle in all categories of farming, irrespective of their size. German statistics go so far in this method as to define the gross value of the whole of the cattle in various categories of farms (differing in area), and at the same time, however, the reservation is made that the presumed equal value per head of cattle in different categories of farms "does not correspond with the actual situation" [p. 35].

** Concentrated fodder.—*Ed.*

[p. 461]. The large farms are superior also in the method of cultivating the soil: we observe improved rotation of crops in all the four large farms, and in three of the medium sized farms (in one the old three-field system prevails), and only in one of the small farms (in the other three the three-field system prevails). Finally, the large farmers employ machinery to a far greater extent. It is true that Klawki himself is of the opinion that machinery is of no great consequence, but we shall not be satisfied with his "opinion" and examine the statistics. The following eight kinds of machines —steam-threshers, horse-threshers, seed-sorting machines, sifters, multiple sowing machines, machines for scattering manure, horse-drawn raking machines, and stacking machines are distributed among the categories of farms enumerated as follows: in the four big farms—twenty-nine (including one steam thresher); in the four medium sized farms—eleven (not a single steam-driven machine); and in the four small farms one machine (a horse-driven thresher). No "opinion" of any admirer of peasant farming can compel us to believe that seed-sorting machines, multiple sowers and stacking machines, etc., do not affect the yield of the harvest. Besides, unlike the usual run of German statistics, which usually record only cases of the employment of machines, irrespective of whether they are owned or hired, we have here the statistics of the machines belonging to certain definite farmers. Obviously, such usual German statistics will also have the effect of minimising the superiority of large-scale farming and obscure forms of "borrowing" machines like the following described by Klawki: "The big farmers willingly lend the small farmers their stacking machines, horse rakes and grain sorting machines, if the latter promises to supply a man to do the mowing for him in the hay season" [p. 443]. Consequently, a certain number of the cases in which machines are employed on small farms, which, as we have shown are rare, represent a special method of hiring labour power.

To continue. Another example of making false comparisons between obviously unequal quantities is Klawki's trick of calculating the price of a product on the market as being equal for all the categories of farms. Instead of taking actual transactions, the author takes as a basis his own assumptions, which he himself admits are inexact. The peasants sell most of their grain in their own locality, and merchants in small towns force down prices very considerably. "The large estates are better situated in this respect, for they can

send large quantities of grain to the principal city in the province. In doing so, they usually calculate on receiving 20 per cent to 30 per cent more per zentner than they could get in the small town" [p. 373]. The big farmers are better able to value their grain [p. 451], and sell it not by measure, as the peasants do to their disadvantage, but by weight. Similarly, the big farmer sells his cattle by weight, whereas the price of the cattle of the small farmer is fixed haphazardly by their appearance. The big farmers can also make better arrangements for selling their dairy products, for they can send their milk to the towns, and obtain a higher price than the middle farmers, who convert their milk into butter and sell it to merchants. Moreover, the butter produced on the medium sized farms is superior to that produced on the small farms (the former use separators, make a fresh supply every day, etc.), and fetches from five to ten pfennigs per pound more. The small farmers have to sell their fatted cattle sooner (less mature) than the middle farmers because they have a smaller supply of fodder [p. 444]. Klawki, in his monograph, leaves out all these advantages possessed by the large farms as sellers on the market, advantages which in their totality are by no means unimportant, from his calculations in the same way as the theoreticians who admire small farming leave out this *fact* and refer to the *possible* benefits of co-operation. We do not wish to confound the realities of capitalism with the possibilities of a petty-bourgeois co-operative paradise. Below we shall quote *facts* showing who really gets the most advantage out of co-operation.

We shall note also that Klawki "does not include in his calculations" the labour of the poor and middle farmers themselves in draining the soil and all kinds of repair work ("the peasants do the work themselves"), etc. The "Socialist" calls this "advantage" enjoyed by the small farmer as "*Ueberarbeit*," surplus labor, and the bourgeois economist refers to it—as one of the advantageous ("for *society*"*!*) aspects of peasant farming. We shall note also that, as Klawki points out, on the medium sized farms the hired labourers get better pay and board than on the big farms, but that they work more intensively: "the example" set by the farmer stimulates "greater diligence and care" [p. 465]. Which of these two capitalist masters—the landlord or his "fellow" peasant—squeezes more labour out of the labourer for the given wages, Klawki does not attempt to determine. We shall therefore confine ourselves to stat-

ing that the expenditure of the big farmers on accident and old-age insurance for their labourers represents 0.29 marks per morgen and that of the middle farmer 0.13 marks (the small farmer here, too, enjoys an advantage in that he does not insure himself at all, needless to say, to the "great advantage of the society" of capitalists and landlords). We shall quote one other example from Russian agricultural capitalism. The reader who is acquainted with Shakhovskoy's book, *Migratory Agricultural Employment*, will probably remember the following characteristic observation: the muzhik farmer and the German colonists (in the South) "select" their labourers, and pay them from 15 to 20 per cent more than do the big employers; but they squeeze out of their labourers 50 per cent more labour. Shakhovskoy reported this in 1896, and this year we read, in the *Torgovo-Promyshlenaya Gazeta* [*Commercial and Industrial Gazette*] for example, the following communication from Kakhovka: ". . . The peasants and farmers, as is the custom, paid higher wages (than those paid on the big estates) for they require the best workers and those possessing the greatest endurance" [No. 109, May 16, 1901]. There are hardly any grounds for believing that this is characteristic only of Russia.

In the table quoted * the reader observed two methods of calculation: One that takes into account the money value of the labour power of the farmer, and one that leaves it out. Mr. Bulgakov considers that to include this money value "is hardly correct." Of course, an exact budget of expenditure of the farmers and labourers both in money and in kind would be far more correct, but since we have not these facts, we are obliged to make an *approximate* estimate of the family expenditure. The *manner* in which Klawki makes this approximate calculation is extremely interesting. The big farmers do not work themselves, of course; they even have special managers who, for a salary, carry out all the work of guidance and supervision (of four estates three are managed by managers and one is not. Klawki would consider it more correct to describe the latter estate consisting of 125 hectares as a large peasant estate). Klawki "puts to the account" of the owners of two large estates 2,000 marks per annum each "for their labour" (which consists, for example, of travelling from the principal estate once a month and staying for a few days in order to see how the manager does his work). To the account of the farmer of the 125

* See p. 239 of this book.—*Ed.*

hectares (the first-mentioned estate consisted of 513 hectares) he "enters" only 1,900 marks for the work of the farmer himself and of his three sons. Is it not "natural" that a smaller quantity of land should "make shift" with a smaller budget? The smaller farmers Klawki allows from 1,200 to 1,716 marks for the labour of the husband and wife, and in three cases also of the children. The small farmers he allows from 800 to 1,000 marks for the work of four to five (*sic!*) persons, *i. e.*, a little more (if at all) than a labourer who, with his family earns only from 800 to 900 marks. Thus, here we observe another big step forward: first of all a comparison is made between the obviously incomparable; now it is declared that the standard of living *must* decline correspondingly to the diminishing size of the farm. But this means the recognition beforehand of the fact that capitalism degrades the small peasants, which is supposed to have been refuted by the calculations of the amount of "net profits"!

And while the author *assumes* that the money income diminishes with the diminishing size of the farm, the diminution of consumption is directly proved by the facts. The value of the home-grown products consumed per person (counting two children as one adult) in the respective categories of farms is as follows: Large farm—227 marks (average of two figures), medium sized farm—218 marks (average of four figures), small farm 135 [*sic!*] marks (average of four figures). And the larger the farm, the larger is the quantity of additional food products purchased [p. 453]. Klawki himself observes that here it is necessary to raise the question of the *Unterkonsumption* (under-consumption) which Mr. Bulgakov denied, and which here he preferred to *ignore*, thus proving that he is more of an apologist than Klawki. Klawki strives to minimise the significance of this fact. "Whether there is any under-consumption among the small farmers or not, we cannot say," he says, "but we think it is probable in the case of small farm IV" [97 marks per head]. "The fact is that the small peasants live very thriftily [!] and sell much of what they, so to speak, save out of their mouths (*sich sozusagen vom Munde absparen*").* An attempt is made to argue

* It is interesting to note that the income from the sale of milk and butter on the big farms is equal to seven marks per morgen, on the middle farms, three marks, and on the *small farms*—seven marks. The point is, however, that the small peasants consume "very little butter and whole milk . . . while the inhabitants of small farms (on which the consumption of products produced on the farm amounts only to 97 marks per head) do not consume

that this fact does not disprove the higher "productivity" of small farming. If consumption were increased to 170 marks—which is quite adequate (for the "younger brother" but not for the capitalist farmer, as we shall see)—the amount of consumption per morgen would have to be increased and the income from sales would have to be reduced by six or seven marks. If this is subtracted (*cf.* the table *) we shall get 29 to 30 marks, *i. e.*, a sum still higher than that obtained on the big farms [p. 453]. But if we increase consumption not to a figure taken haphazardly (and a lower figure at that, because "it's quite enough for him") but to 218 marks (equal to the actual figure on the medium sized farms), the income from the sale of products will drop on the small farms to *20 marks* per morgen, as against 29 marks on the medium sized farms, and 25 marks on the big farms. That is to say, the correction of *this one error* (of the numerous errors indicated above) in Klawki's calculations destroys *all* the "advantages" of the small peasant.

But Klawki is untiring in his quest for advantages. The small peasants "combine agriculture with other occupations": three small peasants (out of four) "diligently work as day labourers and receive board in addition to their pay" [p. 435]. But the advantages of small farming are particularly marked during periods of crisis (as Russian readers have known for a long time from the numerous exercises in this subject made by the Narodniks, and now being repeated by the Messrs. Chernovs):

> During crises in agriculture, and also at other times, it is the small farms that come out best; they are able to sell a larger quantity of products than other categories of farms by severely cutting down domestic expenditure which, it is true, must lead to a certain amount of under-consumption [p. 481—for the last conclusions of Klawki, see p. 464]. Unfortunately, many small farms are reduced to it by the high rates of interest for loans. But in this way—although at the cost of great effort—they are able to keep on their feet and eke out a livelihood. Probably it is precisely the diminution in consumption that explains principally the increase in the number of small peasant farms in our locality, which is indicated in the statistics of the Empire.

And Klawki quotes figures for the Koenigsberg District in which, in the period between 1882 and 1895, the number of farms up to two hectares in area increased from 56,000 to 79,000, those from

these things at all" [p. 450]. Let the reader compare this fact (which, by the by, has been long known to all except the "critics") with Hertz's excellent reasoning [p. 113]: "But does not the peasant get anything for his milk?" "Does not the peasant eat pork fed on milk?" These statements can serve as an example of embellishing poverty unexcelled for its vulgarity.

* See p. 239 of this book.—*Ed.*

two to five hectares from 12,000 to 14,000, and those from five to twenty hectares from 16,000 to 19,000. This is in East Prussia, the very place in which the Messrs. Bulgakovs claim to see the "squeezing out" of large-scale farming by small-scale farming. And these gentlemen, who quote the bare statistics of the area of farms in this astonishingly provincial manner, have the impudence to shout for "details"! Naturally, Klawki considers "the most important task of modern agrarian policy for the solution of the problem of the agricultural labourers to be to encourage the most efficient labourers to settle down by affording them the possibility of acquiring, if not in the first, then at least in the second [*sic!*] generation, a piece of land as their own property" [p. 476]. There is no harm in the fact that the labourers who purchase a scrap of land out of their savings "in the majority of cases prove to be worse off financially; they are fully aware of that themselves, but they are tempted by the greater freedom they enjoy"—and the main task of the bourgeois economists (and now apparently, of the "critics" also) is to foster this illusion among the most backward sections of the proletariat.

Thus, on every point Klawki's investigations refute Mr. Bulgakov, who himself referred to Klawki. These investigations have proved the technical superiority of large-scale farming, the excessive toil and under-consumption of the small peasant, his transformation into a day-labourer for the big landlord, and they prove that there is a connection between the increase in the number of small peasant farms, and the increase of poverty, and the proletarianisation of the small farmers. Two conclusions drawn from these investigations are of exceptional significance from the point-of-view of principle. First, we see clearly the obstacles that exist to the introduction of machinery in agriculture: these are the infinite degradation of the small farmer, who is ready "to leave out of account" his own toil, and who makes manual labour cheaper for the capitalist than machinery. Notwithstanding Mr. Bulgakov's assertions to the contrary, the facts quite definitely prove that the position of the small peasant in agriculture is *completely analogous* to the handicraftsmen in industry under the capitalist system. Notwithstanding Mr. Bulgakov's assertions to the contrary, we see in agriculture a still further diminution in consumption and still further intensification of labour employed as methods of competing with large-scale production. Secondly, in regard to all and sundry comparisons between

the remunerativeness of small farms and that of big farms, we must once and for all admit that conclusions which leave out of account the following three circumstances are absolutely useless, vulgar and apologetic, *viz.:* 1. How does the *farmer* feed, live and work? 2. How are the *cattle* maintained and worked? 3. How is the *land* fertilised, and is it tilled in a rational manner? Small-scale farming manages to exist by methods of sheer waste—waste of labour and the vital energy of the farmer, waste of strength and the quality of the cattle, and waste of the productive powers of the land. Consequently, any investigation which fails to examine these circumstances thoroughly is nothing more nor less than bourgeois sophistry.*

It is not surprising therefore that the "theory" of the excessive labour and inadequate consumption of the small peasants in modern society was so severely attacked by Messrs. the critics. Mr. Bulgakov already in *Nachalo* [No. 1, p. 10] "undertook" to give any number of "quotations" proving the opposite to that which was asserted by Kautsky.

In his attempt to galvanise the corpse [*sic!*] of the obsolete dogma into life again [says Mr. Bulgakov in his book], Kautsky selected certain facts from the investigations of the Social Politics League [106]—published in *Bäuerliche Zustände*—showing the depressed condition of peasant farming, which is quite understandable at the present time. Let him see for himself, and he will find there evidence of a somewhat different character [Part II, p. 282].

* Leo Huschke, in his book, *Landwirtschaftliche Reinertragsberechnungen bei Klein-, Mittel- und Grossbetrieb dargelegt an typischen Beispielen Mittelthüringens*" [Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1902], justly points out that "it is possible by merely reducing the valuation" of the labour power of the small farmer to obtain a calculation that will prove his superiority over the medium and large farmer, and his ability to compete with them [p. 126]. Unfortunately, the author did not carry his idea to its logical conclusion, and therefore did not give systematic data showing the manner in which the cattle were maintained, the method of fertilising the soil, and the cost of maintenance of the farmer's household in the various categories of farms. We hope to return to Huschke's interesting book again. For the moment we shall merely note his reference to the fact that small farming fetches lower prices for its products compared with the products of the large farms [pp. 146, 155], and his conclusion that: "The small and medium-sized farms strove to overcome the crisis which set in after 1892 [the fall in the price of agricultural produce] by cutting down cash expenditure as much as possible, while the large farms met the crisis by increasing their yields by increased expenditure on their farms" [p. 144]. Expenditure on seeds, fodder and fertilisers in the period 1887-91 to 1893-97 was reduced on the small and medium-sized farms, and increased on the large farms. On the small farms, this expenditure represented seventeen marks per hectare, and on the large farms, forty-four marks per hectare.

We shall "see" for ourselves and verify the "quotations" cited by this strict scientist, who in part merely repeats the quotation cited by Hertz [p. 77].

> Evidence is obtained from Eisenach of improvements in stock-breeding, in fertilising the soil, and in the employment of machinery, and general progress in agricultural production. . . .

We turn to the article on Eisenach [*Bäuerliche Zustände*, Vol. I]. The conditions of the owners of less than five hectares (of these there are 887 out of the 1,116 farms described in this district) "in the main are not very good" [p. 66]. "In so far as they can obtain work from the big farmers as reapers, day-labourers, etc., their conditions are relatively good . . ." [p. 67]. Generally speaking, material technical progress has been made in the past twenty years, but "much is left to be desired, particularly in regard to the smaller farms" [p. 72]. ". . . The smaller farmers partly employ weak cows for field work. . . ." Subsidiary employments: lumbering, carting wood; the latter "divert the attention of the farmers from agriculture" and lead to "worsened conditions" [p. 69]. "Nor does lumbering provide adequate earnings. In several districts the small landowners (*Grundstücksbesitzer*) engage in weaving, which is not very well (*leidlich*) paid. In isolated cases—work is obtained at cigar-making at home. Generally speaking, there is a shortage of subsidiary employments . . ." [p. 73] and the author, the Economic-Commissar Dittenberger concludes with the remark that, in view of their "simple lives" and their "modest requirements," the peasants are strong and healthy which "is astonishing considering the low nutritive value of the food consumed by the poorest class, among whom potatoes represent the principal article of food . . ." [p. 74].

This is how the "scientific" Voroshilovs refute the "obsolete Marxist prejudice, that peasant farming is incapable of technical progress."

". . . In regard to the Kingdom of Saxony, General Secretary Langedorf says that in whole districts, and particularly in the more fertile localities, hardly any difference is to be found in the intensivity of cultivation between the large and small farms." This is how Kautsky is refuted by the Austrian Voroshilov [Hertz, p. 77], followed by the Russian Voroshilov [Bulgakov, Part II, p. 282, referring to *Bäuerliche Zustände*, Part I, p. 222]. We turn to

page 222 of the book from which the critics quote, and immediately after the words quoted by Hertz we read the following:

> The difference is more marked in the hilly districts where the large farms operate with comparatively larger working capital. But here, too, very frequently the peasant farms make no less profit than the big farms, because the smaller income is compensated by greater thrift which at the prevailing low level of requirements (*bei der vorhandenen grossen Bedürfnislosigkeit*), is so low that the conditions of the peasant are very often worse than that of the industrial worker, who has become accustomed to greater requirements.

And then it goes on to state that the prevailing system of land-cultivation is the rotation of crop system, which is the predominant system among the middle farmers, while "the three-field system is met with almost exclusively among the small peasant-owned farms." In regard to stock-breeding, progress is observed everywhere. "Only in regard to the breeding of horned cattle and in the utilisation of dairy products does the peasant usually lag behind the big landlord" [p. 223].

"Professor Ranke," continues Mr. Bulgakov, "testifies to the technical progress in peasant farming in the environs of Munich, which, he says, is typical for the whole of Upper Bavaria." We turn to Ranke's article: Three *Grossbauer* communes, farming with the aid of hired labourers: 69 peasants out of 119 hold more than 20 hectares each, comprising three-fourths of the land. Moreover, 38 of these "peasants" hold more than 40 hectares each, with an average of 59 hectares each, and between them own nearly 60 per cent of the land in the district. . . .

We think this is sufficient for the purpose of revealing the manner of citing "quotations" adopted by Messrs. Bulgakov and Hertz.

VII

THE ENQUIRY INTO PEASANT FARMING IN BADEN

> Owing to the lack of space [writes Hertz] we cannot quote in detail the interesting facts established by the enquiry into thirty-seven communes in Baden. In the majority of cases, the facts are analogous to those quoted above: side by side with favourable facts, we find unfavourable and indifferent facts, *but nowhere in the whole of these three volumes of the report of the enquiry do the detailed budgets of expenditure quoted give any grounds for the conclusion that "underconsumption"* (*Unterkonsumption*), and "filthy and degrading poverty," etc., are prevalent [p. 79].

The words we have underscored as is usual with Hertz, contain a *deliberate untruth*. The very Baden enquiry to which he refers

contains documentary evidence *proving* that there is "under-consumption" precisely among the *poor peasantry*. Hertz's distortion of the facts is similar to the trick that was cultivated by the Russian Narodniks, and now practised by all the "critics" on the agrarian question, *i. e.*, broad general statements are made about the "peasantry." As the term "peasantry" is still more vague in the West than it is in Russia (in the West, there is no sharp division into orders) and as "average" facts and conclusions conceal the relative "prosperity" (or at all events, the absence of starvation) of the minority, and the privations suffered by the majority, apologists have wide scope for their activity. As a matter of fact the Baden investigation enables us to draw a distinction between various categories of peasants, which Hertz, as an advocate of "details" preferred not to see. Out of 37 typical communes a selection was made of typical homesteads of big peasants (*Grossbauer*), middle peasants and small peasants, and also of day labourers, making a total of 70 peasants (31 big, 21 middle and 18 small) and 17 day labourers' households; and the budgets of these households were subjected to a very detailed investigation. We have not been able to analyse *all* the figures, but the *principal results* quoted below will be sufficient to enable us to draw some very definite conclusions.

First of all we shall quote the facts concerning the general economic type of (a) big, (b) middle and (c) small peasant households (*Anlage VI: "Uebersichtliche Darstellung der Ergebnisse der in dem Erhebungsgemeinden angestellten Ertragsberechnungen"*). In addition we have divided this table into groups for the big, middle and small farmers respectively. Size of holdings—average in each group: (a) 33.34 hectares; (b) 13.5 hectares; and (c) 6.96 hectares—which is relatively high for a country of small farmers like Baden. But if we take the ten farms in communes No. 20, 22, and 30, in which exceptionally large farms are the rule (up to 43 hectares among the small peasants and up to 170 hectares among the big peasants we shall get the figures which are more normal for Baden: (a) 17.8 hectares, (b) 10.0 hectares, and (c) 4.25 hectares. Size of families: (a) 6.4 persons, (b) 5.8, and (c) 5.9. (Unless otherwise stated, these and subsequent figures apply to all the 70 farms.) Consequently, the families of the large farmers are considerably the larger; nevertheless, they employ hired labour to a far greater extent than the other farmers. Of the 70 farmers, 54 employ hired labour, *i. e.*, more than three-fourths of the total.

Divided according to category, the number of farmers employing hired labour is as follows: 29 big farmers (of 31), 15 middle farmers (of 21) and 10 small farmers (of 18). Thus, of the big farmers 93 per cent employ hired labour, while of the small farmers only 55 per cent do so. These figures are very useful as a test of the fashionable opinion (accepted without criticism by the "critics") that the employment of hired labour is negligible in contemporary peasant farming. Among the big farmers (whose farms of 18 hectares are included in the category of 5 to 20 hectares and who in general descriptions are described as real peasant farmers), we observe pure capitalist farming: 24 farms employ 71 labourers,—almost 3 labourers per farm, and 27 farms employ day labourers for an aggregate of 4,347 days (161 worker-days per farm). Compare this with the size of the farms among the big peasants in the environs of Munich whose "progress" the brave Mr. Bulgakov used as an argument to refute the "Marxian prejudice" about the peasants being degraded by capitalism!

For the middle peasants we have the following figures: 8 peasants employ 12 labourers, and 14 employ day-labourers for an aggregate of 956 days. The figures for the small peasants are as follows: 2 peasants employ 2 day-labourers, and 9 employ labourers for an aggregate of 453 worker-days. One-half of the *small peasants* employ hired labour during the course of 2 months (543 : 9 = 60 days), *i. e.*, in the busiest season in agriculture (notwithstanding the fact that their farms are considerably larger, the production of these small peasants is immeasureably lower than that of the Friedrichsthal peasants concerning whom Messrs. Chernov, David and Hertz betray such emotion).

The results of this farming are as follows: 31 big peasants made a profit of 21,329 marks and a loss of 2,113 marks, making a net profit for this category of 19,216 marks, or 692.9 marks per farm (if 5 farms in communes No. 20, 22 and 30 are excluded, the amount per farm will be 523.5 marks). For the medium farms the corresponding amount will be 243.3 marks (272.2 marks if 3 communes are excluded), and for the small farms 35.3 marks (37.1 marks if 3 communes are excluded). Consequently, the small peasant, literally speaking, *can barely make ends meet and only just manages to do so by cutting down consumption.* In the enquiry [*Ergebnisse,* etc., in Vol. IV of *Erhebungen,* p. 138] figures are

quoted showing the consumption of the most important products in each category of farm. Below we quote these figures worked out in averages for each category of peasants:

Category of Peasant	Consumption per person per day				Expenditure per person	
	Bread and fruit	Potatoes	Meat	Milk	Groceries, heating, lighting, etc., per day	Clothing per year
	pounds		grammes	litres	pfennigs	marks
Big peasants	1.84	1.82	138	1.05	72	66
Middle peasants	1.59	1.90	111	0.95	62	47
Small peasants	1.49	1.94	72	1.11	57	38
Day-labourers	1.69	2.14	56	0.85	51	32

These are the figures our brave Hertz "failed to observe"—no under-consumption, no poverty! We see that the small peasants cut down consumption enormously compared with the middle and big farmer, and that his food and clothing are almost no better than that of the day-labourer. For example, he consumes about two-thirds of the amount of meat consumed by the middle peasant and about one-half of the amount consumed by the big peasant. These figures prove once again how useless are general descriptions, and how false are all calculations of income which leave variations in standard of living out of account. If, for example, we take *only* the two last columns of our table (in order to avoid the complicated calculation of translating food products into terms of money), we shall observe that the "net profit" of the middle, as well as of the small peasant is a *pure fiction* which only pure bourgeois people, like Hecht and Klawki, or pure Voroshilovs like our critics can take seriously. Indeed, if we were to assume that the small peasant spends in money as much as the middle peasant does for food, his expenditure would be increased by about one hundred *marks*, and

we would get an enormous *deficit*. If the medium peasant spent as much as the big peasant his expenditure would be increased by 220 marks, and unless he "stinted himself" in food, he, too, would have a deficit.* Is it not obvious that the diminution in the consumption of the small peasant is inseparably bound up with the inferior feeding of his cattle and the inadequate restoration (and frequently the complete exhaustion) of the productive powers of the land? And does it not entirely confirm the truth of the very words of Marx, which cause the modern critics to shrug their shoulders in lofty contempt:

> An infinite dissipation of means of production and an isolation of the producers themselves go with it. Also an enormous waste of human energy. A progressive deterioration of the conditions of production, and a raising of the price of means of production is a necessary law of small peasants' property [*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 938].

In regard to the Baden enquiry we shall note one other distortion committed by Mr. Bulgakov (the critics mutually supplement each other; while one distorts the information contained in a certain source in one direction, another critic distorts it in another direction). Mr. Bulgakov frequently quotes from the Baden enquiry. It would *appear*, therefore, that he is acquainted with it. And yet he writes a thing like this:

> The exceptional and apparently fatal indebtedness of the peasant [so it is stated in the overture, Part II, p. 271], represented one of the immutable dogmas in the mythology which was created around peasant farming in literature. . . .
>
> Investigations at our disposal reveal considerable indebtedness only among the smallest farms which have not yet been firmly established (*Tagelöhn-*

* Mr. Chernov "argues" as follows: And does not the big farmer stint his labourer still more in food and other expenses? (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1900, No. 8, p. 212). This argument is a mere repetition of the old Krivenkovsko-Vorontsovsky trick, if one may say so, of *foisting* liberal bourgeois arguments upon Marxists. This argument would be valid against those who say that large-scale production is superior not only technically, but also because it improves (or at least makes tolerable) the condition of the workers. Marxists do not say that. They merely expose the false trick of *painting* the conditions of the small farmer *in rosy colours*, either by general statements about prosperity (Mr. Chernov on Hecht), or by making calculations of "income" which leave reduction in consumption out of account. The bourgeoisie cannot help trying to paint things in rosy colours, cannot help fostering the illusion among the workers of being able to become "masters," and of small "masters" being able to obtain high incomes. It is the business of Socialists to expose these falsehoods, and to explain to the small peasants that there is no salvation for them outside of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

ergüter). Thus, Sprenger expresses the general impression obtained from the results of the extensive investigation carried out in Baden [reference is made to the investigation in a footnote] in the following manner: ". . . Only the indebtedness of the day-labourers and of the small peasant farmers is relatively speaking considerable in the districts we have investigated, but even among these, in the majority of cases, the indebtedness is not so great as to cause alarm. . . ." [p. 272.]

This is astonishing! First *there is a reference to an investigation and then* the "general impression" of a certain Sprenger who has written about this enquiry and that is all. And as if to spite him, this Sprenger says what is untrue (at least in the passage quoted by Mr. Bulgakov. We have not read Sprenger's book).[107] The authors of the enquiry assert that, in the majority of cases, it is precisely the indebtedness of the small peasant farmer that *reaches* alarming dimensions. Secondly, they assert that not only is the position of the small peasant worse than that of the middle and big peasant (which Sprenger noted) *but also worse than that of the day-labourer.*

It must be noted that the authors of the Baden enquiry established the extremely important fact that in the large farms *the limits of indebtedness* (*i. e.*, the limits to which the farmer may go without risking bankruptcy) *are higher than on the small farms.* After the figures we have quoted above showing the results of the farming of the big, middle and small peasants respectively, this does not require any further explanation. The authors regard indebtedness within the limits of safety (*unbedenklich*) for the big and medium farms at from 40 to 70 per cent of the value of the land, or an average of 55 per cent. In regard to the small farms (which they define as those between four and seven hectares for agriculture, and between two and four hectares of vineyards and commercial crops), they consider that "the limits of indebtedness . . . must not exceed 30 per cent of the value of the land, even if it is assumed that the debts are *fully* secured, and the interest and principal is paid *regularly* (Vol. IV, p. 66). In the communes investigated (with the exception of those where Anerbenrecht * prevails—for example, in Unadingen and Neukirch), the percentage of indebtedness in proportion to the value of the estate steadily diminishes as the farms increase in size. In the commune of Ditwar, the percentage of indebtedness of farms up to one-fourth of a hectare equals 180.65; from one to two hectares, 73.07; from two to

* Right of inheritance.—*Ed.*

five hectares, 45.73; from five to ten hectares, 25.34; and from ten to twenty hectares 3.02 [*ibid.*, pp. 89-90]. But the percentage of indebtedness alone tells us nothing, and the authors of the enquiry draw the following conclusions:

> The above-quoted statistics, therefore, confirm the widespread opinion that those peasant farms which are on the border line between the day-labourers and the middle peasants (in the rural districts the farmers of this category are usually called the "middle class"—*Mittelstand*) are frequently in a worse position than those which are above them as well as below [*sic!*] them, in the size of their farms, because, although they are able to cope with their *moderate* indebtedness if it is kept at a certain and not very high limit, they find it very difficult to meet their obligations, as they are unable to obtain *regular* subsidiary employment (as day-labourers, etc.), and by this means increase their income. . . ." "In so far as they have regular subsidiary employment, day-labourers are frequently in a materially better position than the farmers belonging to the "middle class," for in numerous cases it has been shown that subsidiary employment produces such a high net (*i. e.*, money) income as to enable them to repay even *big* debts [*ibid.*, p. 67].*

Finally, the authors state once again that the indebtedness of the small peasant farmers in relation to the permissible limit is "frequently unsafe," hence the *small* peasant and the day-labouring population must exercise "particular business-like caution when purchasing land" [p. 98].

Such is the bourgeois adviser of the small peasantry! On the one hand, he fosters in the proletariat and semi-proletariat the hope that they will be able to purchase land, "if not in the first then in the second generation," and by diligence and moderation obtain from it an enormous percentage of "pure income," while, on the other hand, he especially recommends the poor peasants to exercise "particular caution" in purchasing land if they have no "regular employment," that is to say when my lords the capitalists have no need for settled workers. And yet there are "critical" simpletons who accept these interested lies and outworn banalities as the findings of real modern science!

One would think that the detailed statistics we have quoted concerning the large, medium and small farms would be sufficient to make even Mr. V. Chernov understand the meaning of the term "petty bourgeois" as applied to the peasantry, which seems to inspire him with such horror. Capitalist evolution has not only introduced simi-

* The authors quite justly say: The small peasant sells very little for cash, yet his need for money is very considerable and, owing to his lack of capital, outbreaks of disease among cattle, hailstorms, or other calamities hit him very hard.

larity in the *general* economic system of Western European states, but it has brought Russia closer to Western Europe so that *in their main features*, the economics of peasant farming in Germany are similar to those in Russia, with this difference, however, that the process of disintegration among the Russian peasantry, which has been dealt with in detail in Russian Marxian literature, is in the first stage of development—it has not yet assumed anything like a finished form, it has not yet given rise to a distinct class of big peasants (*Grossbauer*). In Russia the mass expropriation and extinction of an enormous section of the peasantry still overshadow the "first steps" our peasant bourgeoisie is taking. In the West, however, this process, which commenced even before the abolition of serfdom [*cf.* Kautsky, *Agrarfrage*, p. 27], long ago led to the abolition of class distinctions between peasant and "privately owned" (as we call it) farming on the one hand, and to the formation of a class of agricultural wage-workers which has already acquired fairly definite features.* It would be a great mistake to assume, however, that this process came to a stop after more or less definitely new types of rural population had arisen. On the contrary, this process goes on continuously, now rapidly, now slowly, according to numerous and varying circumstances, assuming most varied forms in accordance with the varying agronomic conditions, etc. The proletarianisation of the peasantry continues—this we shall prove below by a mass of German and French statistics, and besides, it is already clear from the facts quoted above about the small peasantry. The increasing migration, not only of the agricultural labourers but of the peasants as well, from the villages into the towns, is in itself a striking evidence of this growing proletarianisation. But the peasants' flight to the cities is inevitably preceded by their ruin; and ruin is preceded by a desperate fight for economic independence. The figures showing the extent of employment of hired labour, the amount of "net income," the amount of food consumed by the peasantry in the various categories, bring out this fight in striking relief. The principal weapon in this fight is—"iron diligence" and thrift—thrift that means "toiling not so much for our mouths as for our pockets." The inevitable result of the struggle is: the rise of a minority of

* "The peasantry," writes Mr. Bulgakov in regard to France in the nineteenth century, "split up into two sections, each sharply distinguished from the other, namely, the proletariat and small property owners" [Part II, p. 176]. The author is mistaken, however, in believing that the process ended with this "splitting up"—this process is a continuous one.

wealthy farmers (an insignificant minority in most cases—and in every case, when particularly favourable conditions are absent, such as proximity to the capital, the construction of a railroad, or the opening up of some new, remunerative branch of agricultural commerce, etc.), the increasing impoverishment of the majority which is steadily undermining the forces of the workers by chronic starvation and exhausting toil, and deteriorates their land and cattle. The inevitable result of the struggle is: the rise of a minority of *capitalist* farms based on wage labour, and the increasing necessity for the majority to seek "subsidiary employments," *i. e.*, their conversion into industrial and agricultural wage-workers. The statistics of wage labour very clearly reveal the inherent tendency, which is inevitable under the present system of society, for all small producers to become transformed into small capitalists.

We quite understand why bourgeois economists and opportunists of various shades ignore this aspect of the matter and why they cannot help doing so. The disintegration of the peasantry reveals to us the *most profound* contradictions of capitalism in their very process of *origination* and further growth. A complete evaluation of these contradictions inevitably leads to the recognition of the hopelessness of the position of the small peasantry (hopeless, that is—unless they take part in the revolutionary proletarian struggle against the whole capitalist system). It is not surprising that these most profound and most undeveloped contradictions are ignored; attempts are made to evade the fact of the excessive toil and inadequate consumption of the small peasants, which, however, only those completely lacking in conscience, or who are profoundly ignorant, can deny. The question of the hired labour employed by the peasant bourgeoisie, and of the conversion of the village poor into wage labourers is left in the shade.

For example, Mr. Bulgakov submitted an *Essay on the Theory of Agrarian Development* which eloquently ignores both these questions! *

* Or utilises a no less eloquent evasion like the following: ". . . The numerous cases of industry being combined with agriculture, when industrial wage-workers own small plots of land . . ." represent "no more than a detail [!?] in the economic system. There are as yet [??] no grounds for regarding this as a new manifestation of the industrialisation of agriculture, or its loss of independent development—this phenomenon is extremely insignificant in extent (in Germany, for example, only 4.09 per cent of agricultural land is held by industrial workers)" [*sic!*] [Part II, pp. 254-255]. In the first place, the fact that an insignificant *share* of the land is held by hundreds of thou-

Peasant farming [he says] may be defined as that form of farming which completely or mainly employs the labour of the peasant's own family, only very rarely do even peasant farms dispense altogether with outside labour—they obtain either the help of neighbours or casual hired labour—but this does not change [of course not!] its economic features [Part I, p. 141].

Hertz is more naïve, and at the very beginning of his book makes the following reservation:

Hereinafter, by small or peasant farms I shall always assume a form of farming in which the farmer, the members of his family and not more than one or two workers are employed [p. 6].

When they discuss the hiring of "labourers" our *Kleinbürger* (*i. e.*, our petty bourgeoisie) forget the very "peculiarities" of argiculture which they are continually fussing around with in season and out of season. In agriculture one or two labourers is by no means a small number, even if they work only in the summer. But the principal thing is not whether many or few are employed, but that it is the wealthier peasants, whose "progress" and "prosperity" our knights of petty-bourgeoisdom are so fond of presenting as the prosperity of the mass of the population, who employ hired labourers. And in order to put a better appearance on this distortion, these knights majestically declare: "The peasant is a working man no less than the proletarian" [Bulgakov, Part II, p. 288] and the author expresses satisfaction at the fact that "labour parties are more and more losing the anti-peasant tinge that has been characteristic of them hitherto" (characteristic hitherto!) [p. 289]. "Hitherto," you see, they "have ignored the fact that peasant property is not an in-

sands of workers does not prove that this "phenomenon is extremely insignificant in extent," but proves the degradation and proletarianisation of the small farmer by capitalism. Of the total number of farmers holding farms of less than two hectares (although their number is enormous: 3,200,000 out of 5,500,000, *i. e.*, 58.2 per cent) almost *three-fifths* own "altogether" 5.6 per cent of the total area of agricultural land! Will our clever Mr. Bulgakov draw the inference from this that all "phenomena" of small land-ownership and small farming are a mere "detail" and "are extremely insignificant in extent"? Of the 5,500,000 farmers in Germany, 791,000, *i. e.*, 14.4 per cent are industrial wage workers, and the overwhelming majority of these own less than two hectares of land each, namely, 743,000, which represents 22.9 per cent of the total number of farmers owning farms of less than two hectares. Secondly, according to his usual practice, Mr. Bulgakov *distorted the statistics he quoted.*

By an oversight he took from the page of the German enquiry he quoted [*Statistik des deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 112, p. 49] the figure of the area of land owned by *independent* trading farmers. The non-independent trading farmers (*i. e.*, industrial wage labourers), have *only* 1.84 per cent of the total area of agricultural land. 791,000 wage workers own 1.84 per cent of the total area of land, while 25,000 landowners own 24 per cent. A very insignificant "detail," is it not?

strument of exploitation, but a condition for the application of labour." And that is how history is written! Frankly we cannot refrain from saying: Gentlemen, if you must distort facts, do it within reason! This very Mr. Bulgakov has written a two-volume "Investigation" of 800 pages filled with "quotations" (the correctness of which we have repeatedly pointed out) from all sorts of enquiries, descriptions, monographs, etc. But *never once* has he attempted even to examine the relations between those peasants whose property are instruments of exploitation and those peasants whose property is "simply" a "condition for the application of labour." *Not once* has he quoted systematic statistics (which, as we have shown, were contained in the very sources from which he quoted) concerning the types of farms, and the standard of living, etc., of the farmers employing hired labour, of the farmers not employing hired labour and not hiring themselves out as labourers, and of the farmers who hire themselves out as labourers. More than that. We have seen that to prove the "progress of peasant farming" (peasant farming *in general!*) he has quoted facts and opinions concerning the big plants which prove the progress of some and the impoverishment and proletarianisation of others. He even sees a general "social regeneration" [*sic!*] in the rise of well to do peasant farms" [Part II, p. 138; for general conclusion, see p. 456] as if the well to do peasant farms were not synonymous with bourgeois capitalist peasant farming! His single attempt to extricate himself from this tangle of contradictions was the following still more entangled argument:

> The peasantry, of course, does not represent a homogeneous mass; this was shown above [probably in his argument about the petty detail of industrial wage-labour in agriculture?]; a constant struggle goes on between two conflicting tendencies: a differentiating tendency and a levelling tendency. But are these differences and even antagonisms of individual interests greater than those among the various strata of the working class, between urban and rural workers, between skilled and unskilled labour, between trade unionists and non-trade unionists? It is only by completely ignoring these differences within the worker estate [which causes certain investigators to see the existence of a fifth estate in addition to the fourth] that a distinction can be drawn between the alleged homogeneous working class and the heterogeneous peasantry [p. 288].

What a remarkably profound analysis! Fancy confusing differences in trades with differences between classes; fancy confusing differences in living conditions with the different positions occupied by the various classes in the system of social production—and how

strikingly it does illustrate the complete absence of scientific principles in modern "criticism," * and its practical tendency to obliterate the very concept of "class," and to eliminate the very idea of the class struggle. The agricultural labourer earns fifty kopecks per day; the thrifty farmer who employs day-labourers earns one ruble per day; the factory worker in the capital earns two rubles per day; the small provincial masterman earns one and one-half rubles per day. Any more or less intelligent worker would be able to say without any difficulty to which class the representatives of these various "strata" belong, and in what direction the public activities of these various "strata" will tend. But for the representatives of university science or for modern "critics" this is so profound, that they are totally incapable of understanding it.

VIII

GENERAL STATISTICS OF GERMAN AGRICULTURE FOR 1882 AND 1895 THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE FARMS

HAVING examined the detailed statistics of peasant farming—which are particularly important for us because peasant farming is the crux of the modern agrarian problem—we shall now pass to the general statistics of German agriculture and verify the conclusions drawn from them by the "critics." We shall briefly summarise the principal returns of the census of 1882 and of 1895. [See p. 262.—*Ed.*]

Three circumstances must be examined in connection with this picture of change which is variously interpreted by Marxists and

* We shall recall the fact that the reference to the *alleged* homogeneity of the working class was a favourite argument of Eduard Bernstein and of all his adherents. And in regard to "differentiation" even Mr. Struve in his *Critical Remarks* profoundly observed: there is a differentiating tendency, and there is also a levelling tendency, and both these processes are of equal importance for an objective investigator (in the same way as for Shchedrin's objective historian it made no difference whether—Isyaslav defeated Yaroslav, or whether Yaroslav defeated Isyaslav). [Two princes in mediæval Russia. Yaroslav was victorious.—*Ed.*]. There is a development of the money system, but there are also reversions to natural self-sufficing economy. There is the development of large-scale factory production, but there is also the development of capitalist home industry [Bulgakov, Part II, p. 88, "*Hausindustrie* is not anywhere near extinction in Germany"]. An "objective" scientist must strive hard to collect facts and observe little things, "on the one hand" show one thing, and "on the other hand" show another—and like Goethe's Wagner "pass from book to book, and leaf to leaf" without making the least attempt to obtain a consistent view and to work out for himself a general idea of the process as a whole.

Category of farms (hectares)	No. of farms (in thousands)		Cultivated area (in thousand hectares)		Relative Numbers				Absolute increase or decrease	
					Farms		Area			
	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	Farms	Area
Up to 2	3,062	3,236	1,826	1,808	58.0	58.2	5.7	5.6	+ 174	— 18
From 2 to 5	981	1,016	3,190	3,286	18.6	18.3	10.0	10.1	+ 35	+ 96
From 5 to 20 ...	927	999	9,158	9,722	17.6	18.0	28.7	29.9	+ 72	+ 564
From 20 to 100 .	281	282	9,908	9,870	5.3	5.1	31.1	30.3	+ 1	— 38
100 and over ...	25	25	8,787	7,832	0.5	0.4	24.5	24.1	± 0	+ 45
TOTAL	5,276	5,558	32,869	32,518	100	100	100	100	+ 282	+ 649

the "critics" respectively: the increase in the number of the smallest farms, the increase in latifundia, *i. e.*, farms of one thousand hectares and over, and in our table placed in the category of farms of over one hundred hectares, and finally, the increase in the number of medium peasant farms (of from five to twenty hectares), the most striking fact and the one giving rise to the most heated discussion.

The increase in the number of the smallest farms indicates an enormous increase in poverty and proletarianisation, for the overwhelming majority of the owners of less than two hectares cannot obtain a livelihood from agriculture alone and are obliged to seek subsidiary employment, *i. e.*, work for wages. Of course, there are exceptions: the cultivation of special crops, vineyards, market gardening, crops for industry, suburban farming generally, etc., enables farmers (sometimes even not small) of even one and a half hectares to remain independent. But out of a total of three million *farms*, these exceptions are insignificant. The fact that the mass of these small "farmers" (representing three-fifths of the total number of farmers) *are wage labourers* is strikingly proved by the German statistics showing the principal occupations of the farmers in the various categories. The following is a brief summary of these statistics:

Category of Farmers (hectares)	Farmers according to *principal* occupation (in percentages)					Per cent of Independent Farmers with subsidiary occupations
	Independent		Non-independent labour	Other occupations	Total	
	Agriculture	Trade, etc.				
Up to 2	17.4	22.5	50.3	9.8	100	26.1
2 to 5	72.2	16.3	8.6	2.9	100	25.5
5 to 20	90.8	7.0	1.1	1.1	100	15.5
20 to 100	96.2	2.5	0.2	1.1	100	8.8
100 and over	93.9	1.5	0.4	4.2	100	23.5
TOTALS	45.0	17.5	31.1	6.4	100	20.1

We see, therefore, that out of the total number of German farmers only 45 per cent, *i. e., less than half* are independent farmers with farming as their *principal occupation.* And even of these independent farmers *one-fifth* (20.1 per cent) are engaged in subsidiary occupations. The principal occupation of 17.5 per cent of the

farmers is: trading, industrial ocupations, market gardening, etc. (in these occupations they are "independent," *i. e.*, occupy the position of masters and not that of wage-workers). *Almost one-third* (31.3 per cent) are wage-workers ("not independent," employed in all branches of agriculture and industry). The principal occupations of 6.4 per cent of the farmers is government service (military service, civil service, etc.), the liberal professions, etc. Of the farmers having farms up to two hectares, *one-half* of the number are wage-workers; the "independent" farmers among these 3,200,000 "masters" represent a small minority, *only* 17.4 per cent of the total, and of this 17 per cent, *one-fourth* (26.1 per cent) are engaged in *subsidiary* occupations, *i. e.*, are wage-workers, not in their principal occupations (like the above-mentioned 50.3 per cent) but in their subsidiary occupations. Even among the farmers having farms of two to five hectares, only a little more than half (546,000 out of 1,016,000) represent independent farmers without subsidiary occupations.

This clearly shows how amazingly untrue is the picture presented by Mr. Bulgakov when he asserts (as has been shown, erroneously) that the total number of persons actually engaged in agriculture has increased, and when he explains this by the "increase in the number of independent farms—as we already know, principally among the medium peasant farms, which have increased at the expense of the big farms" [Part II, p. 133]. The fact that the number of medium peasant farms has increased in proportion to the total number of farms (from 17.6 per cent to 18 per cent, *i. e.*, an increase of 0.4 per cent) does not in the least prove that the increase in the agricultural population is due principally to the increase in the number of medium peasant farms. On the question as to which category has increased most out of the general increase in the number of farms, we have direct statistics which leave no room for two opinions: the total number of farms has increased by 282,000, of which the number of farms up to two hectares increased by 174,000. Consequently, the increase in the agricultural population (if and in so far as it has increased at all) is to be explained precisely by the increase in the non-independent farms) for the mass of the farmers having farms up to two hectares are not independent). The increase is greatest in the small allotment farms, which indicates an increase in the process of *proletarianisation.* Even the increase (by 35,000) in the number of farms from two to five hectares cannot

be wholly attributed to the increase in the number of *independent* farms, for of these only 546,000 out of the total of 1,016,000 are owned by independent farmers without subsidiary occupations.

Coming now to the large farms we have to observe first of all the following characteristic fact (and a very important one for the refutation of all apologists): The combination of agriculture with other occupations have different and opposite significance for the different categories of farmers. Among the small farmers, it signifies proletarianisation and curtailed independence, for in this category agriculture is combined with occupations like that of hired labourers, petty artisans, trade, etc. Among the big farmers, it signifies either a rise in the political significance of large-scale farming through the medium of government service, military service, etc., or a combination of agriculture with forestry and technical crops, and as is well known, this latter phenomenon is one of the most characteristic symptoms of the *capitalistic* progress of agriculture. That is why the percentage of farmers who regard "independent" farming as their principal occupation (*i. e.*, carry on farming as masters and not as labourers), sharply increases with the increase in the size of the farms: 17-72-90-96 per cent, but drops to 93 per cent in the category of farms of 100 hectares and over: in the latter group 4.2 per cent of the farmers regard office employment (in the column entitled: "Other occupations") as their principal employment, 0.4 per cent of the farmers regard "non-independent" occupations as their principal occupations (these are not wage-workers but managers, inspectors, etc. [*cf. Stat. d. D. R.*, Vol. 112, p. 49]. Similarly, we see that the percentage of independent farmers who still engage in subsidiary occupations sharply diminishes with the increase in the size of the farms (26-25-15-9 per cent) but greatly increases among the farmers having 1,000 hectares and over (23 per cent).

In regard to the number of big farms (100 hectares and over) and the area of land they occupy, the above quoted statistics indicate a *diminution* in their proportion to the total number of farms and to the total cultivated area. The question arises: does this infer that big farming is being squeezed out by small and medium sized farming, as Mr. Bulgakov hastens to do? We think not, and by his angry attacks upon Kautsky on this point, Mr. Bulgakov merely exposes his inability to refute Kautsky's opinion on the essentials of this subject. In the first place, the diminution

in the proportion of the large farms is extremely small (from 0.47 to 0.45 per cent, *i. e.*, by two hundredths per cent. In proportion to the total number of farms, the decline was from 24.88 to 24.43 per cent, *i. e.*, 45 hundredths per cent in proportion to the total area). It is a well-known fact that with the intensification of farming, *it is necessary* sometimes to diminish the area of the farm, and that the big farmers let parts of their land remote from the centre of the estate in small lots in order to secure labourers. We have shown above that the author of the detailed description of the big and small farms in East Prussia openly admits the auxiliary rôle played by small farming in relation to large-scale farming, and strongly advises the settlement of labourers. Secondly, there can be no talk of big farming being squeezed out by small farming for the reason that the statistics concerning the *size* of farms are still too inadequate to enable us to judge of the *extent of production.* The fact that in this respect large farming has made considerable progress is irrefutably proved by the statistics concerning the employment of machinery (see above), and concerning the production of technical crops (we shall examine this more in detail below, because Mr. Bulgakov gives an astonishingly incorrect interpretation of the German statistics on this subject). Thirdly, in the group of farms of 100 hectares and over, a prominent place is occupied by *latifundia, i. e.,* farms of 1,000 hectares and over, the number of which has increased greater in proportion than the number of middle peasant farms, *i. e.,* from 515 to 572, that is, by 11 per cent while the number of medium peasant farms has increased from 926,000 to 998,000, *i. e.,* by 7.8 per cent. The area of latifundia has *increased* from 708,000 hectares to 802,000 hectares, *i. e.,* an increase of 94,000 hectares: in 1882, latifundia occupied 2.22 per cent of the total land under cultivation, while in 1895 they occupied 2.46 per cent. On this point Mr. Bulgakov supplements his unsound arguments against Kautsky in *Nachalo* with the following still less sound generalisation in his book: "A symptom of the decline of large-scale farming," he says, "is the . . . increase of latifundia, for the progress of agriculture and the growth of intensive farming should be accompanied by the break up of farms" (Part II, p. 126), and with bland self-assurance, Mr. Bulgakov begins to talk about the "latifundia [!] degeneration" of large-scale farming. [Part II, pp. 190 and 363.] Observe the remarkable logic of our "scientist": *As* the diminution in the size of

farms with the intensification of farming *sometimes* implies an increase of production, *therefore* an increase in the number and in the area of latifundia implies *general* decline! But since his logic is so bad, why not turn to statistics? The very source from which Mr. Bulgakov obtains his information contains a mass of statistics on latifundia farming. We shall quote a few of these statistics: in 1895, 572 of the largest agricultural enterprises occupied an area of 1,159,674 hectares; of this area 802,000 hectares were occupied by agricultural farms and 298 by forestry enterprises (a section of the owners of latifundia were principally timber merchants and not farmers). Cattle of all kinds is kept by 97.9 per cent of them, and working cattle by 97.7. Machines are employed by 555 of these farmers and as we have seen already, it is in this group that the *maximum number of cases* of the employment of machines of various types occurs; steam ploughs are employed by 81 farms, *i. e.*, 14 per cent of the total number of latifundia farms. The number of cattle owned by them is as follows: horned cattle 148,678 head; horses 55,591; sheep 703,813; and pigs 53,543. Sixteen of these farms are combined with sugar refineries, 228 with distilleries, 6 with breweries, 16 with starch factories, and 64 with flour mills. The extent of intensification of farming may be judged from the fact that 211 of these farms cultivate sugar beets (26,000 hectares are devoted to this crop), and 302 cultivate potatoes for industrial purposes. In the same category of farms, 21 sell milk to the cities (obtained from 1,882 cows, *i. e.*, 87 cows per farm), and 204 belong to dairy co-operative societies (produce obtained from 18,273 cows or 89 per farm). This looks like "latifundia degeneration" does it not?

We come now to the medium peasant farms (from five to twenty hectares). This category of farms has increased in proportion to the total number of farms from 17.6 per cent to 18.0 per cent (an increase of 0.4 per cent), and in proportion to the total area of land under cultivation from 28.7 to 29.9 per cent (an increase of 1.2 per cent). Quite naturally, every "annihilator of Marxism" regards these figures as his trump card. Mr. Bulgakov draws from them the conclusion that "large-scale farming is being squeezed out by small-scale farming," that there is a "tendency towards decentralisation," etc., etc. We have already pointed out above that particularly in regard to the "peasantry" general statistics are unsuitable, and most likely to lead one into error: It is precisely in

this sphere that the processes of the formation of small enterprises and the "progress" of the peasant bourgeoisie is most likely to conceal the proletarianisation and the impoverishment of the majority. In German agriculture as a whole, we observe an undoubted development of large-scale capitalist farming (the growth of latifundia, the development of the employment of machinery, and the increase in the cultivation of technical crops) on the one hand, and on the other hand there is undoubtedly an increase in proletarianisation and impoverishment (flight to the cities, increased dividing up of the land, increase in the number of small allotment holdings, increase in subsidiary wage-labour, deterioration in the food consumed by the petty peasants, etc.), so that it is absolutely improbable and impossible that these processes should not be observed among the "peasantry." Moreover, the detailed statistics quite definitely indicate these processes and confirm the opinion that statistics of the size of farms alone are totally inadequate for the elucidation of this subject. Hence, Kautsky was quite right when, on the basis of the general picture he had in his mind of the capitalist development of German agriculture, he argued that it was utterly wrong to draw the conclusion from these statistics that small production was gaining over large-scale production.

But we have direct and voluminous statistics which prove that the increase in the number of "medium sized peasant farms" is an indication of the *increase in poverty* and not in wealth and prosperity. We refer to the very statistics of working cattle which Mr. Bulgakov utilised so clumsily both in *Nachalo* and in his book. "If this required further proof" wrote Mr. Bulgakov in reference to his assertion that medium farming was progressing and large-scale farming declining, "then to the evidence of the amount of labour power could be added the evidence of the number of working cattle. Here is an eloquent table" *:

Number of Enterprises Employing Cattle for Field Work

	1882	1895	Increase or decrease
0 to 2 hectares	325,005	306,340	— 18,665
2 to 5 hectares	733,967	725,584	— 8,383
5 to 20 hectares	894,696	925,103	+ 30,407
20 to 100 hectares	279,284	275,220	— 4,064
100 and more hectares	24,845	24,485	— 360
Totals	2,257,797	2,256,732	— 1,065

* We reproduce the entire table quoted by Mr. Bulgakov but have added the total figures.

"The number of farms employing working cattle declined both on the large as well as on the small farms, and increased only on the medium farms" [*Nachalo*, No. 1, p. 20].

Mr. Bulgakov might be forgiven for having, in a hurriedly written magazine article, committed the mistake of drawing a conclusion from these statistics *directly opposite* to the one they logically lead to. But our "strict scientist" repeated this error in his "investigation" (Part II, p. 127, where, moreover, he put the figure +30,407 and —360 as applying to the number of cattle, whereas it applies to the number of farms employing working cattle. But this is a trivial matter).

We ask our "strict scientist" who talks so boldly about the "decline of large-scale farming" (Part II, p. 127): What is the significance of the increase in the number of medium peasant farms employing working cattle by 30,000 when *the total number of* medium peasant farms has increased by 72,000 (Part II, p. 134)? Is it not clear from this that the *percentage* of the medium peasant farms employing working cattle is *declining?* That being the case, should he not have looked to see *what percentage* of farms in the various categories kept working cattle in 1882 and in 1895, the more so that the figures for this are given on the very page and in the very table from which Mr. Bulgakov took his absolute figures [*Stat. d. D. R.*, Vol. 112, p. 31]? * Here are the figures:

PERCENTAGE OF FARMS EMPLOYING WORKING CATTLE

	1882	1895	Increase or decrease
0 to 2 hectares	10.61	9.46	—1.15
2 to 5 hectares	74.79	71.39	—3.40
5 to 20 hectares	96.56	92.62	—3.94
20 to 100 hectares	99.21	97.68	—1.53
100 and more hectares	99.42	97.70	—1.72
AVERAGES	42.79	40.60	—2.19

Thus, the percentage of farms *as a whole*, employing working cattle, diminished by over 2 per cent, but the reduction is *above the*

* The smallest reduction took place among the smallest farms, only an insignificant proportion of which keep working cattle. We shall see later on that it is precisely among these farms (and *only* among these) that the condition of the working cattle improved, *i. e.*, a larger number of horses and oxen were being employed and a relatively smaller number of cows. As the authors of the German investigation [p. 32] have quite justly remarked, the farmers of the smallest allotments maintain working cattle not only for tilling the land, but also for "subsidiary work for wages." Consequently, it would be wrong to take these small allotments into account in discussing the question of working cattle, for they are placed in altogether exceptional conditions.

average among the small and medium peasant farms, and *below the average* among the large farms. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that "it is precisely on the big farms that animal labour power is frequently displaced by mechanical power in the form of machines of various kinds, and particularly of steam-driven machines (steam-ploughs, etc.)." [*Stat. d. D. R.*, Vol. 112, p. 32.] Therefore, if in the group of big farms (100 hectares and over), the number of farms employing working cattle diminished by 360, and if at the same time the number of farms employing steam ploughs *increased* by 615 (710 in 1882 and 1,325 in 1895), it is clear that taken as a whole, big farming has not lost but gained ground. Consequently, we come to the conclusion that the only group of German farmers who have *improved* their methods of farming (in regard to the employment of cattle for field work or the substitution of cattle by steam) *are the big farmers* with farms of 100 hectares and over. In all the remaining groups the conditions of farming have deteriorated *and they have deteriorated most in the group of medium farms* in which the percentage of farms employing working cattle *has diminished to the greatest extent.* Formerly, the difference between the big farms (of 100 hectares and over) and the medium farms (of 5-20 hectares) in regard to the percentage employing working cattle was less than 3 per cent (99.42 per cent—96.56 per cent); now the difference is more than 5 per cent (97.70 per cent and 92.62 per cent).

This conclusion is still more strongly confirmed by the statistics concerning the kind of working cattle employed. The smaller the farm the worse the type of working cattle employed: a relatively smaller number of oxen and horses are employed for field work and a larger number of *cows* are employed which are much weaker. The following figures show what the situation was in this respect in the years 1882 and 1895:

Number and kind of cattle per hundred farms employing working cattle:

	Cows only		Increase or	Cows, Horses or Oxen		Increase or
	1882	1895	Decrease	1882	1895	Decrease
0 to 2 hectares	83.74	82.10	— 1.64	85.21	83.95	— 1.26
2 to 5 hectares	68.29	69.42	+ 1.13	72.95	74.93	+ 1.98
5 to 20 hectares	18.49	20.30	+ 1.81	29.71	34.75	+ 5.04
20 to 100 hectares ..	0.25	0.28	+ 0.03	3.42	6.02	+ 2.60
100 and more hectares	0.00	0.03	+ 0.03	0.25	1.40	+ 1.15
AVERAGES	41.61	41.82	+ 0.21	48.18	50.48	+ 2.30

We observe a general deterioration in the quality of working cattle employed (for the reasons already stated the small allotment farms are not taken into account), and the *greatest deterioration* is observed in the *group of medium peasant farms.* In this group, the percentage of those who were obliged to employ *cows* as well as other cattle for field work, and the percentage of those who had to employ *cows only, increased most of all.* At the present time, more than one-third of the medium peasant farms employing working cattle are obliged to employ cows for field work (which of course leads to the deterioration of tilling and, consequently, to the diminution in the yield of the harvest and the yield of milk from the cows)—and more than one-fifth are obliged to employ only cows for field work.

If we take the number of cattle employed for field work, we shall find an increase in the number of cows in all groups (except the small allotment farms). The changes in the number of horses and oxen employed were as follows:

NUMBER OF HORSES AND OXEN EMPLOYED FOR FIELD WORK
(In thousands)

	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease
0 to 2 hectares	62.9	69.4	+ 6.5
2 to 5 hectares	308.3	302.3	— 6.0
5 to 20 hectares	1,437.4	1,430.5	— 6.9
20 to 100 hectares	1,168.5	1,155.4	— 13.1
100 and more hectares	650.5	695.2	+ 44.7
TOTALS	3,627.6	3,652.8	+ 25.2

With the exception of the small allotment farms, an increase in the number of working cattle proper is observed *only* among the big farms.

Consequently, the general conclusion to be drawn from the changes in the methods of farming in regard to the animal and mechanical power employed for field work is as follows: *An improvement* has taken place among the big farmers, deterioration has taken place among the rest, while the *greatest deterioration* has taken place among the *medium peasant farms.*

The statistics for 1895 enable us to divide the medium peasant farm group into two sub-groups: from 5 to 10 hectares and from 10 to 20 hectares respectively. As was to be expected, in the first sub-group (numerically the largest), the conditions of farming in

regard to the employment of working cattle is incomparably worse than in the second. Of the total number of 606,000 farms of 5 to 10 hectares, 90.5 per cent employ working cattle (as compared with 393,000 farms of 10 to 20 hectares, which is equal to 95.8 per cent of that sub-group) and of this 90.5 per cent, 46.3 per cent employ cows for field work (as compared with 17.9 per cent of the sub-group of 10 to 20 hectares). The number employing only cows, represent 41.3 per cent (as compared with 4.2 per cent of the sub-group of 10 to 20 hectares). And it is precisely this sub-group of 5 to 10 hectares that is particularly badly off in regard to the employment of working cattle, and shows in the period 1882-1895 the *greatest increase* both in regard to number of farms and the area of cultivated land occupied by them. Here are the figures illustrating this:

Per Cent of the Total

	Farms			Area under cultivation			Area under agricultural cultivation		
Hectares	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease
5 to 10	10.50	10.90	+ 0.40	11.90	12.37	+ 0.47	12.26	13.02	+ 0.76
10 to 20	7.06	7.07	+ 0.01	16.70	16.59	— 0.11	16.48	16.88	+ 0.40

In the sub-group of 10 to 20 hectares the increase in the number of farms is quite insignificant; the proportion of the total area under cultivation occupied by them has even diminished, while the proportion of the area under agricultural cultivation occupied by them has increased to a less extent than that of the sub-group of 5 to 10 hectares. Consequently, the increase in the middle peasant farm group has taken place mainly (and partly even exclusively) in the sub-group of 5 to 10 hectares, *i. e.*, in the very sub-group in which the conditions of farming in regard to the employment of working cattle are particularly bad.

We see, therefore, that the statistics irrefutably reveal the real significance of the notorious increase of medium peasant farms: it is not an increase in prosperity but *an increase in poverty;* not the progress of small farming but *its degradation.* If the conditions of farming have deteriorated *most* among the medium peasant farms, and if these have been obliged to resort more extensively to the employment of cows for field work, then it is not only our right but

our duty, on the basis of this aspect of farming alone (for it is one of the most important aspects of farming as a whole) to draw our conclusions in regard to all the other aspects of farming. If the number of horseless (to use a term familiar to the Russian reader and which is quite applicable to the present case) farms has increased, if the quality of the working cattle employed has deteriorated, then there cannot be the slightest doubt that the quality of cattle generally, the methods of tilling the soil, and the standard of living of the farmers have all deteriorated also, for, as is generally known, in peasant farming the harder the cattle are worked and the worse they are fed, the harder the peasant works and the worse he is fed, and *vice versa*. The conclusions we drew above from Klawki's detailed investigations are fully confirmed by the voluminous statistics concerning all the small peasant farms in Germany.

IX

DAIRY FARMING AND AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES IN GERMANY. THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IN GERMANY DIVIDED ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC POSITION

We have dealt in such detail with the statistics of working cattle because these are the only statistics (apart from those dealing with machinery which we have already examined) which enable us to obtain an interior view, as it were, of agriculture, of its equipment and organisation. All the other statistics—of the area of land (which we have already quoted), and the number of cattle (which we shall quote below), merely describe the external aspects of agriculture, treating as equal values what are obviously unequal, for the tilling of the soil and, consequently, the differences in yield of the harvest and the quality and the productivity of the cattle are different in the different categories of farms. Although these differences are well known, they are usually omitted from statistical calculations, and we have therefore only the statistics of machinery and working cattle to enable us, to some extent, to form some judgment of these differences and to decide for ourselves which group is better off. If the big farms to a greater extent than the rest, employ the particularly complex and costly machines, which alone are taken into consideration by statistics, then we are justified in assuming that the other types of agricultural implements, which statistics ignore (ploughs,

harrows, waggons, etc.), are of better quality, and are used in larger numbers on the big farms (because they are conducted on a larger scale). The same thing applies to cattle. The small farmer must make up for the lack of these advantages by greater industry and thrift (he has no other weapons in the struggle for existence), and for that reason it is not an accident that these qualities distinguish the small farmer in capitalist society, because it is an inevitable result of the conditions of that society. Bourgeois economists (and the modern "critics" who, on this question, as in all others, drag at the tail of the bourgeois economists) describe these qualities as virtue, thrift, perseverance, etc. (*cf.* Hecht and Bulgakov), and regard them as the peasants' merits. The Socialist calls it surplus work (*Ueberarbeit*) and under-consumption (*Unterkonsumption*) and points out that it is one of the evils of capitalism and tries to open the eyes of the peasantry to the deception practiced by those who deliver Manilov orations * picturing social degradation as a virtue, and thereby strive to perpetuate this degradation.

We shall now deal with the statistics showing the distribution of cattle among the various groups of German farmers in 1882 and 1895. The following is the main summary of these statistics:

Per Cent of Total

	Of all kinds of cattle (according to cost)			Horned Cattle			Pigs		
Hectares	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease	1882	1895	Increase or Decrease
0 to 2	9.3	9.4	+ 0.1	10.5	8.3	— 2.2	24.7	25.6	+ 0.9
2 to 5	13.1	13.5	+ 0.4	16.9	16.4	+ 0.5	17.6	17.2	— 0.4
5 to 20	33.3	34.2	+ 0.9	35.7	36.5	+ 0.8	31.4	31.1	— 0.3
20 to 100	29.5	28.8	— 0.7	27.0	27.3	+ 0.3	20.6	19.6	— 1.0
100 and more...	14.8	14.1	— 0.7	9.9	11.5	+ 1.6	5.7	6.5	+ 0.8
TOTALS	100	100		100	100		100	100	

Thus, the share of the total of all kinds of cattle owned by the large farms has diminished, while that of the medium peasant farms has increased most. We speak of the number of all kinds of cattle notwithstanding the fact that the statistics give only their value, for the reason that the statisticians' assumption that the value of the cattle

* Manilov is a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* who is sentimental and dreams of impossible things.—*Ed.*

is equal for all groups is obviously incorrect. By throwing all kinds of cattle into one heap, these statistics do not show the distribution of cattle according to their real value at all; they indicate merely their distribution according to quantity; (the same result could have been obtained by expressing all the cattle in terms of large horned cattle, but this would have entailed fresh calculations on our part, and the conclusions would not have altered the case materially). As the cattle belonging to the big farmers is of better quality, and in all probability improve faster than that of the small farmers (judging by the improvement in their implements, etc.), these figures considerably minimise the real superiority of large-scale farming.

In regard to the various kinds of cattle it must be said that the diminution of the share of the large farms is entirely due to the decline in commercial sheep rearing: from 1882 to 1895 the number of sheep diminished from 21,100,000 to 12,600,000, *i. e.*, by 8,500,000 of which the number of sheep on farms of 20 hectares and over declined by 7,000,000. As is known, stock-breeding for the dairy and meat markets is one of the developing branches of commercial stock-breeding in Germany. For that reason, we took the figures of horned cattle and pigs, and we found that the *greatest* progress in these two branches of stock breeding has been made on the large farms of 100 hectares and over: the share of these large farms of the total quantity of horned cattle and pigs has increased most. This fact stands out more prominently for the reason that the area of stock-breeding farms is usually smaller than that of agricultural farms, and for that reason one would expect a more rapid development on the medium capitalist farms rather than on the big capitalist farms. The general conclusion to be drawn (in regard to the number and not the quality of cattle) should be the following: The big farmers were most severely affected by the sharp decline of commercial sheep-rearing, and this was only partly compensated by a more considerable (compared with the small and middle farms) increase in the breeding of horned cattle and pigs.

In speaking of dairy farming, we must not ignore the extremely instructive, and as far as we know, unutilised material on this question to be found in German statistics. But this is a subject that concerns the general question of combining agriculture with technical production, and we are obliged to deal with it because of the manner in which Mr. Bulgakov again amazingly distorts the facts. As is known, the combination of agriculture with the technical work-

ing up of agricultural products represents one of the most outstanding symptoms of the specifically capitalist progress of agriculture. Already in *Nachalo*, Mr. Bulgakov declared: "In my opinion, Kautsky exaggerates this combination to the last degree: if we take the statistics we shall find that the amount of land connected with industry in this way is absolutely negligible" [No. 3, p. 32]. The argument is an extremely weak one, for Mr. Bulgakov would not dare to deny the technically progressive character of this combination, and he completely ignores the most important question, *i. e.*, as to whether large-scale production or small-scale production are the vehicles of this progress. And as the statistics give a very definite reply to this question, Mr. Bulgakov in his book resorts . . . *sit venia verbo!* . . .* to a subterfuge. He quotes the percentage of farms (of farms as a whole, and not according to groups) that are combined with technical production in one form or another, and remarks: "It must not be supposed that they are combined principally with large farms" (Part II, p. 116). The very opposite is the case, most worthy professor! This is precisely what must be supposed, and the table you quote (which does *not* show the percentage of farms combined with technical production in relation to the total number of farms in *each* group) merely deceives the uninformed and inattentive reader. Below we give the combined figures (we have combined all the figures, in order to avoid making this page bristle with statistics) of the number of farms combined with sugar refining, distilling, starch-making, brewing and flour milling. Consequently, the totals will show the number of *cases* in which agriculture is combined with technical production.

Hectares	Total Number of Farms	Number of cases in which agriculture is combined with technical production	Per Cent
0 to 2	3,236,367	11,364	0.01
2 to 5	1,016,318	13,542	1.09
5 to 20	998,804	25,879	2.30
20 to 100	281,767	8,273	2.52
100 and over	25,067	4,006	15.72
TOTALS	5,558,323	63,064	1.14
1,000 hectares and over	572	330	57.69

* If we may be allowed to say so.—*Ed.*

Thus, the percentage of cases in which agriculture is combined with technical production is negligible in small farming and reaches marked dimensions only in large farming (and enormous dimensions on the latifundia of which *more than half* enjoys the benefits of this combination. If this fact is compared with the statistics we have quoted above concerning the employment of machines and working cattle, it will be understood what pretentious nonsense Mr. Bulgakov utters when he talks about the "illusion fostered by conservative" Marxists "that large-scale farming is the vehicle of economic progress and that small-scale farming is that of decline" [Part II, p. 260].

"The great bulk (sugar beets and potatoes for distilling alcohol) was produced on the small farms," continues Mr. Bulgakov.

But the very opposite is the case: *it was precisely on the big farms* that the great bulk was produced, as the following table shows:

Hectares	No. of farms cultivating beets	Per cent of total No. farms	Area under beets (in hectares)	Per cent	No. farms cultivating potatoes for industrial purposes	Per cent of total No. of farms
0 to 2	10,781	0.33	3,781	1.0	565	0.01
2 to 5	21,413	2.10	12,693	3.2	947	0.09
5 to 20	47,145	4.72	48,213	12.1	3,023	0.30
20 to 100	26,643	9.45	97,782	24.7	4,293	1.52
100 and over	7,262	28.98	233,820	59.0	5,195	20.72
TOTALS	113,244	2.03	396,280	100	14,023	0.25
1,000 and over	211	36.88	26,127	——	302	52.79

Thus, we see again that the percentage of farms cultivating beets and potatoes for industrial purposes is quite negligible in the small farm group, considerable on the big farm group, and very high in the latifundia. The great bulk of the beets (83.7 per cent) judging by the area under beets, is produced on the big farms.*

* Mr. Bulgakov's assertion concerning industrial production is so strangely inappropriate that involuntarily the thought arises as to whether it was not prompted by the fact that in quoting the tables from the German investigation, Mr. Bulgakov *failed to observe* that they do not show the percentage of farms

Similarly, Mr. Bulgakov failed to calculate the "share large-scale farming" has in dairy farming [Part II, p. 117], and yet this branch of commercial stock-breeding is one of those that are developing with particular rapidity over the whole of Europe, and represent at the same time one of the symptoms of the progress of agriculture. The following figures show the number of farms selling milk and dairy produce in the cities:

Hectares	Number of such farms	Per cent of total *	Per cent of total number of farms in this category	Number of cows	Per cent of total	Number of cows per farm
0 to 2	8,998	21.46	0.3	25,028	11.59	2.8
2 to 5	11,049	26.35	1.1	30,275	14.03	2.7
5 to 20	15,344	36.59	1.0	70,916	32.85	4.6
20 to 100	5,676	13.54	2.0	58,439	27.07	10.3
100 and over	863	2.06	3.4	31,213	14.46	36.1
TOTALS	41,930	100.00	0.8	215,871	100.00	5.1
Farms of 1,000 and over	21	——	3.7	1,822	——	87.0

Thus, here too, large-scale farming is in advance of the rest: The percentage of farmers engaged in the milk trade increases in proportion as the size of the farms increase and is highest in the latifundia ("latifundia degeneration"). For example, the large farms (one hundred hectares and over) sell milk to the cities twice as often (3.4 and 1.5 per cent) as the medium sized farms (five to twenty hectares).

The fact that the large (in area) farms also engage in large-scale dairy farming is confirmed also by the figures showing the number

connected with industrial production *in relation to the total number of farms in the given group.* On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine a strict scientist like him committing such a stupid error (and make such proud assertions in the bargain) in his "investigations." On the other hand, the identity of Mr. Bulgakov's table with that in the German investigation [pp. 40-41] is beyond doubt. . . . Oh, those "strict scientists"!

* We have included this column in order that the reader may get a clear idea of the methods employed by Mr. Bulgakov, for it is to this column alone that Mr. Bulgakov refers in proof of his conclusions.

of cows per farm, which is thirty-six per farm with one hundred and more hectares, and even eighty-seven in the latifundia. Generally speaking, the obviously capitalist farms (20 hectares and over) possess 41.5 per cent of the total number of cows, the milk of which is sold in the cities, notwithstanding the fact that the number of farmers owning these cows represent a small percentage of the total number of farmers (5.52 per cent), and a very small percentage of the number of farmers who sell milk to the cities (15.6 per cent). The progress of precisely the capitalist farms and the capitalist concentration of this branch of commercial stock breeding therefore lies beyond the shadow of doubt.

But the concentration of dairy farming is by no means fully brought out by the statistics of farms grouped according to area. It is clear *a priori* that there must be farms equal in area but unequal in the number of cattle generally, and of dairy cattle in particular, owned by them. First of all, we shall compare the distribution of the *total number* of horned cattle among the various groups of farms, with the distribution of the total number of cows, the milk of which is sold to the cities:

Hectares	Percentage of all horned cattle	Percentage of cows whose milk is sold to cities	Increase or decrease
Up to 2.....	8.3	11.6	+ 3.3
From 2 to 5	16.4	14.0	— 2.4
From 5 to 20	36.5	32.8	— 3.7
From 20 to 100	27.3	27.1	— 0.2
From 100 and over	11.5	14.5	+ 3.0
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	

Again we see that it is *the medium peasant farms that are worse off*: Out of the total of all horned cattle, this group utilises the smallest share of those utilisied for the urban milk trade (*i. e.*, of the most profitable branch of dairy farming). On the other hand the big farms occupy a very favourable position and utilise a relatively large proportion of the total number, of cattle for the urban milk trade.* But the position of the smallest farms is most favourable of all, for they utilise the *largest* proportion of horned cattle for the milk trade with the cities. Consequently, in this group of

* This difference is not to be explained by the fact that the proportion of oxen to the total number of horned cattle is unequal, for the percentage of oxen on the large farms (at all events those employed for field work) is higher than that on the medium peasant farms.

farms special "milk" farms are developing on which agriculture is forced into the background, or even abandoned altogether (out of 8,998 farms in this group which sell milk to the cities 471 devote no land whatever to agriculture, and these farmers possess a total of 5,344 cows, *i. e.*, 11.3 cows per farm). We shall obtain a very interesting picture of the concentration of dairy farming within a given group occupying the same area of tilled land, if, with the aid of German statistics we separate the farms with one and two cows each:

FARMS SELLING DAIRY PRODUCE TO THE CITIES

	Number of farms with one and two cows	With one cow	With two cows	With three cows and more			Total number of cows
				Number of farms	Total number of cows	Cows per farm	
0 to 50 ares	1,944	722	372	850	9,789	11.5	11,255
50 ares to 2 hectares	7,054	3,302	2,552	1,200	5,367	4.5	13,773
0 to 2 hectares	8,998	4,024	2,924	2,050	15,156	7.4	25,028
2 to 5 hectares	11,049	1,862	4,497	4,690	19,419	4.3	30,275

Among the farms cultivating an absolutely negligible quantity of agricultural land (0 to ½ hectare) we observe an enormous concentration of dairy farming: Less than one-half of these farmers (850 out of 1,944) concentrate in their hands almost nine-tenths of the total number of cows in that group (9,789 out of 11,255), with an average of 11.5 cows per farmer. These are by no means "small" farmers—they are farmers having a turnover amounting in all probability (especially of those near to the large cities) to several thousand marks per annum, and it is doubtful whether they dispense with hired labour. The rapid growth of the cities caused a steady increase in the number of these "dairy farmers" and, of course, there will always be found Hechts, Davids, Hertzes and Chernovs (and in order not to offend France, also Maurices, of whom we shall speak later) to console the mass of the small peasants who are crushed by poverty with the example of these isolated cases of their

fellow farmers who have "made good" by means of dairy farming, tobacco cultivation, etc.

In the group of farms from one-half to two hectares, we observe that less than one-fifth of the total number of farmers (1,200 out of 7,054) concentrate in their hands more than two-fifths of the total number of cows (5,367 out of 13,773); in the group from two to five hectares, less than one-half of the farmers (4,690 out of 11,049) concentrate in their hands more than three-fifths of the total number of cows (19,419 out of 30,275), etc. Unfortunately, German statistics do not enable us to pick out the groups having a larger number of cows.*

But even the figures quoted fully confirm the general conclusions that *the concentration of capitalist agriculture is in reality much greater* than the statistics of the area of farms alone would lead us to suppose. The latter combine in one group farms small in area and grain production with farms which produce dairy produce, meat, grapes, tobacco, vegetables, etc., on a large scale. Of course, all these branches take second place compared with the production of grain, and certain *general* conclusions hold good even in regard to statistics of area. But, in the first place, certain special branches of

* Or to be more correct, the manner in which the statistics *are analysed* do not enable us to do so; for the authors of the investigation had the figures for each farm separately (in the replies given to the questions on the enquiry form sent out to the farmers). In passing, we would state that this practice of collecting information from each farm separately adopted by German agricultural statistics is superior to the French method and apparently also to the English and other methods. Such a system enables us to pick out the various types of farms not only according to area, but also according to the extent of employment of machinery (dairy farming, for example), degree of development of industrial production, etc. But this system requires a more comprehensive analysis of the information obtained. First of all, the farms must not be grouped only according to one single feature (area of farms), but according to several features (number of machines, cattle, area of land, special crops, etc.), and, secondly, each area group must be further divided into sub-groups, according to area, to the number of cattle, etc. The statistics on peasant farming compiled by the Russian Zemstvo can serve as a model in this respect. While German government statistics are superior to Russian *government* statistics in their completeness and comprehensiveness, uniformity and exactness, rapidity of preparation and publication, our *Zemstvo* statistics are superior to the European partial enquiries and investigations because of the remarkable completeness, detailisation and analysis of certain special statistics. Russian Zemstvo statistics have long ago consisted of investigations of individual farms, and have been presented in a variety of group tables and sub-group tables, such as we have already mentioned. A close study of Russian Zemstvo statistics by Europeans would no doubt give a strong impetus to the progress of social statistics generally.

commercial agriculture are growing with particular rapidity in Europe, and this is a strongly marked feature of its process of *capitalist* evolution. Secondly, the circumstances referred to are frequently forgotten in reference to certain methods or to certain districts and this opens a very wide field for petty-bourgeois apologetics, examples of which were presented by Hecht, David, Hertz and Chernov. The latter referred to tobacco cultivators who, judged by the size of their farms, are *echte und rechte Kleinbauern*,* but if judged by the extent of their tobacco plantations are by no means "small" farmers. Moreover, if we examine the figures of tobacco cultivation especially, we shall find capitalist concentration in this branch. For example, the total number of tobacco cultivators in Germany in 1898 was estimated at 139,000 who cultivated 17,600 hectares of tobacco land. But of these, 88,000, *i. e.*, 63 per cent together owned not more than 3,300 hectares, *i. e.*, only one-fifth of the total area of land under tobacco cultivation. The other four-fifths were in the hands of 37 per cent of the tobacco cultivators.**

The same applies to vine-growing. As a general rule, the size of the "average" vineyard in Germany is very small: 0.36 hectares (344,850 vine-growers and 126,109 hectares of vineyards). But the vineyards are distributed as follows: 49 per cent of the vine-growers (having vineyards up to 20 ares each) have only 13 per cent of the total number of vineyards; the middle vine-growers (from 20 to 50 ares), representing 30 per cent of the total, hold 26 per cent of the total area of vineyards, while the large vine-growers (one-half hectare and over), representing 29 per cent of the total, hold 61 per cent of the total number of vineyards, *i. e.*,

* Genuine small peasants.—*Ed.*

** *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jrhd., Berlin*, 1900, p. 60. This is a rough calculation based on the fiscal returns. For Russia, we have the following figures of the distribution of tobacco cultivation in three counties in the province of Poltava: Of the total of 25,089 peasant farms cultivating tobacco, 3,015 farms (*i. e.*, less than one-eighth) have 74,565 desyatinas of land under grain out of a total of 146,774 desyatinas, *i. e.*, more than one-half, and 3,239 desyatinas of land under tobacco out of a total of 6,844 desyatinas, or nearly one-half. By grouping these farms according to the area of tobacco plantations, we get the following: 324 farms (out of 25,089) have two or more desyatinas of land under tobacco, comprising a total of 2,360 desyatinas out of 6,844 desyatinas. These are the big capitalist tobacco planters, whose outrageous exploitation of the workers is so notorious. Only 2,773 farms (a little more than one-tenth) had over one-half of a desyatina each under tobacco, comprising altogether 4,145 desyatinas out of 6,844 desyatinas under tobacco. See *A Review of Tobacco Cultivation in Russia*, Vols. II-III, St. Petersburg, 1894.

more than three-fifths.* Market gardening (*Kunst und Handelsgärtnerei*) which is rapidly developing in all capitalist countries as a result of the growth of the large cities, big railroad stations, industrial districts, etc., is incomparably more concentrated in Germany than in any other country. The number of market gardening enterprises in 1895 was estimated at 32,540, occupying an area of 23,570 hectares, or an average of less than one hectare each. But more than one-half of this area (51.39 per cent) is concentrated in the hands of 1,932 market gardeners, or 5.94 per cent of the total. The size of the market gardens, and the area of the rest of the land utilised for agriculture held by these big farmers, can be judged from the following figures: 1,441 market gardens ranging from two to five hectares have on an average 2.76 hectares each, comprising a total of 109.6 hectares; 491 market gardens of five hectares and over have an average of 16.54 hectares, comprising a total of 134.7 hectares.

We shall now return to dairy farming, the statistics of which will enable us to judge the significance of co-operation, which Hertz regards as a panacea for all the evils of capitalism. Hertz is of the opinion that "the principal task of Socialism" is to support these co-operative societies [pp. 21 and 89], and Chernov who, as may be expected of him, bruises his forehead against the ground in zealous worship of the new gods, has invented a theory of the "non-capitalist evolution of agriculture" by the aid of co-operation. We shall have a word or two to say below concerning the theoretical significance of this remarkable discovery. For the moment, we shall observe that the worshippers of co-operation are always eager to talk about what it is "possible" to achieve by co-operation. (See the example quoted above). We, however, prefer to show what is actually achieved by the aid of co-operation under the present capitalist system. The agricultural census in Germany in 1895 registered the number of farms and occupations belonging to dairy farm co-operatives (*Molkereigenossenschaften und Sammelmol-*

* It is of interest to note that in France, where vine-growing is developed ever so much more than in Germany (1,800,500 hectares), the concentration of vine-growing is also more considerable. However, we have only the statistics of the general area of land under vine cultivation to enable us to judge it, for in France information is not collected from each separate vineyard and consequently the actual number of vine-growers is unknown. In Germany, the number of farmers owning ten or more hectares of land represents 12.83 per cent of the total number of vine-growers. In France, however, that category represents 57.02 per cent.

kereien), and also the number of cows from which each farmer obtains milk and milk products for sale. As far as we know, these are the only *mass* statistics which strictly define, not only the extent to which farmers of various categories belong to co-operative societies, but also, and this is particularly important, the, so to speak, economic extent of this membership, *i. e.*, the dimensions of the particular branch of each farm that enters the co-operative society (the number of cows providing produce for sale organised by co-operative societies). Below we quote the figures divided into the five principal groups according to area of farms.

FARMS BELONGING TO CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES FOR THE SALE OF DAIRY PRODUCE

Hectares	Number of such farms	Per cent of farms in given category	Per cent of farms in all categories *	Number of cows in co-operative farms	Per cent of total number of cows		Average number of cows per farmer
0 to 2	10,300	0.3	6.95	18,556	1.71		1.8
2 to 5	31,819	3.1	21.49	73,156	6.76		2.3
5 to 20	53,597	5.4	36.19	211,236	19.51		3.9
20 to 100	43,561	15.4	29.42	418,563	38.65	72.02	9.6
100 and more ..	8,805	35.1	5.95	361,435	33.37		41.0
TOTALS	148,082	2.7	100.00	1,082,946	100.00		7.3
Farms of 1,000 and over	204	35.6	—	18,273	—		89.0

Thus, only an insignificant minority (3 to 5 per cent), of the small farmers belong to co-operative societies—in all probability a smaller percentage than the percentage of capitalist farms even in the lower groups. On the other hand, the percentage of the avowedly capitalist farms which belong to co-operative societies is from three to seven times larger than that of even the medium peasant farms. The percentage of the latifundia is larger than all.

* Mr. Bulgakov stated: "The share of large-scale farming in this will be seen from the following figures" (Part II, p. 117), and he quoted *only* these figures, which do not show "the share of large-scale farming." Unless compared with other figures, they rather serve to *obscure* it.

We are now able to judge of the unbounded naïveté of the Austrian Voroshilov, Hertz, who, in replying to Kautsky, states that the "German Agricultural Co-operative Wholesale Society (*Bezugsvereinigung*) with which the biggest co-operative societies are affiliated, represents 1,050,000 *farmers*" [p. 112, Hertz's italics], and argues that *this means* that not only do big farmers (holding more than 20 hectares and numbering 306,000), belong to these co-operative societies, but peasants also! Had Hertz pondered a little over the assumption he himself makes, he would have realised that the affiliation of all big farmers to co-operative societies *implies that a smaller percentage* of the rest belong to them—which in its turn means that Kautsky's conclusion concerning *the superiority of large-scale farming over small-scale farming even in regard to co-operative organisation* is fully confirmed.

But still more interesting are the figures showing the number of cows furnishing the products the sale of which is organised by the co-operatives. The *overwhelming majority* of these cows, *almost three-fourths* (72 per cent) belong to big farmers engaged in *capitalist dairy farming* and owning ten, forty and even eighty (in the latifundia) cows per farm. And now listen to Hertz: "We assert that *co-operative societies bring most benefit to the small and smallest farmers . . .*" [p. 112, Hertz's italics]. The Voroshilovs are alike all over the world. When the Voroshilovs in Russia and in Austria beat their breasts and say vehemently: "We assert," we can be quite sure that they are saying something that is the very opposite to the truth.

To conclude our review of German agrarian statistics we shall briefly examine the general situation in regard to the distribution of the agricultural population according to their position in the industry. Of course, we take agriculture proper (A1 and not A1 to 6 according to the German nomenclature, *i. e.*, we do not include fishermen, lumbermen, and hunters), and then we take the figures showing the number of persons for whom agriculture is the *principal occupation.* German statistics divide this population into three main groups: (*a*) Independent (*i. e.*, farmer-owners, tenant-farmers, etc.); (*b*) Employees (managers, foremen, supervisors, office clerks, etc.); and (*c*) Labourers, which group is divided up into the following sub-groups: *c* [1] "Members of families employed on the farm of the head of the family: of the father, brother, etc.", in other words, these are labourers who are members of the family as

distinct from hired labourers to which all the other sub-groups of group *c* belong. Clearly, therefore, in order to study the social composition of the population (and its capitalist evolution), these labourers who are members of the family must be grouped, not with the hired labourers, as is usually done, but with the farmers in group *a*, for these labourers who are members of the family are in fact the farmers' partners enjoying the right of inheritance, etc. Then follow the sub-groups c^2 agricultural labourers—men and women (*Knechte und Mägde*); and c^3 "agricultural day-labourers and other labourers (shepherds, herdsmen, etc.) owning or renting land." Consequently, these represent a group of persons who are at one and the same time farmers and wage labourers, *i. e.*, an intermediate and transitional group which should be placed in a special group. Finally, there is the sub-group c^4 "also—neither owning nor renting land." In this way, we obtain three main groups: I. Farmers—owners of land and the members of their families. II. Farmers—owners of land and at the same time wage labourers. III. Wage labourers not owning land (clerks, labourers and day-labourers). The following table illustrates the manner in which the rural population * of Germany was distributed among these groups in the years 1882 and 1895:

	Active (occupied) population engaged in agriculture as their principal occupation (in thousands)			
	1882	1895	Increase or decrease	Per cent
a Farmer owners	2,253	2,522	+ 269	
c^1 Members of farmers' families	1,935	1,899	— 36	
I	4,188	4,421	+ 233	+ 5.6
c^2 Labourers occupying land (II)	866	383	— 483	— 55.8
I + II	5,054	4,804	— 250	
b Clerks	47	77	+ 30	
c^3 Labourers	1,589	1,719	+ 130	
c^4 Labourers not occupying land	1,374	1,445	+ 71	
III	3,010	3,241	+ 231	+ 7.7
TOTAL	8,064	8,045	— 19	— 0.2

* We speak only of the "active" population, as it is called in French, or *Erwerbsthätige*, as it is called in German, *i. e.*, those actually engaged in agriculture, but not including domestic servants and those members of families

Thus, the active population has diminished, although only slightly. Among this population we observe a diminution of the land-owning section (I-II) and an increase in the landless section (III). This clearly shows that *the expropriation of the rural population is proceeding*, and that it is precisely the small landowners who are being expropriated; for we know already that the wage labourers owning small allotments of land belong to the group consisting of the smallest farmers. Furthermore, of the persons owning land the number of farmer-labourers is diminishing, while the number of farmers increases. We see, therefore, *the disappearance of middle groups and the growth of the extreme groups:* the intermediary group disappears, *capitalist contradictions are becoming more acute.* There is an increase in the number of labourers who are entirely expropriated, while the number of those owning land has diminished. The number of farmers directly owning enterprises has increased, while the number of those employed in the enterprises of heads of families has diminished. (In all probability, the latter circumstance is connected with the fact that working members of peasant families in the majority of cases, receive no pay whatever from the head of the family, and for that reason are more inclined to migrate to the cities.)

If we take the figures of the population for whom agriculture represents a *subsidiary* occupation, we shall see an increase in this (active or occupied) population from 3,144,000 to 3,578,000, *i. e.*, an increase of 434,000. This increase is almost entirely due to the increase in the number of working members of families which increased by 397,000 (from 664,000 to 1,061,000). The number of farmers increased by 40,000 (from 2,120,000 to 2,160,000); the number of labourers owning land increased by 51,000 (from 9,000

who are not properly and permanently engaged in agricultural work. Russian social statistics are so undeveloped that they have not yet invented a special term like "active," *Erwerbsthätige,* "occupied." Yanson, in his analysis of the statistics of the occupied population of St. Petersburg [*St. Petersburg According to the Census of 1890*] employs the term "independent," but this is not a suitable term, for by that is usually implied masters, and consequently, division according to participation or non-participation in industry (in the broad sense of the term) is confused with division according to the position occupied in industry (say, a single worker working on his own account). The term "productive population" may be employed, but even that would be inexact, for the military, rentier, etc., classes are not at all "productive." Perhaps the most suitable term to employ would be the "trading" population, *i. e.*, those engaged in some sort of "trade" or other (for gain) as distinct from those who live at the expense of those who "trade."

to 60,000), while the number of landless labourers diminished by 54,000 (from 351,000 to 297,000). This enormous increase from 664,000 to 1,061,000, *i. e.*, by 59.8 per cent in the course of 13 years is further proof of the growth of proletarianisation—the growth in the number of *peasants*, members of peasants' families, who already regard agriculture merely as a *subsidiary* occupation. We know that in these cases the principal occupation is working for wages (next in importance being petty trading, handicraft, etc.). If we combine the numbers of all working members of peasant families —those for whom agriculture is the principle occupation, as well as those for whom it is merely a subsidiary occupation, we shall get the following: 1882—2,559,000; 1895—2,960,000. This increase may very easily provide a pretext for erroneous interpretations and apologetic conclusions, especially if compared with the number of wage labourers which, on the whole, is diminishing. As a matter of fact, the general increase is obtained by the *diminution* in the number of working members of peasant families, for whom agriculture is the principal occupation, and by the *increase* in the number of those for whom it is a subsidiary occupation, so that the latter in 1882 represented only 21.7 per cent of the total number of working members of peasant families, whereas in 1895 they represented 35.8 per cent. Thus, the statistics covering *the whole* of the agricultural population quite distinctly reveal to us the two processes of proletarianisation to which orthodox Marxism has always pointed, and which opportunist critics have always tried to obscure by stereotyped phrases. These processes are: The growing landlessness of the peasantry, the expropriation of the rural population, who either migrate to the towns or become converted from land-owning labourers into landless labourers on the one hand, and the developments of "subsidiary employments" among the peasantry, *i. e.*, the combination of agriculture with industry, which marks the first stage of proletarianisation and always leads to increased poverty (longer working day, worse food, etc.) on the other. Regarded only from their external aspects both these processes, to a certain extent, appear to be opposite processes: An increase in the number of landless labourers and an increase in the number of working members of peasant landowner families. For that reason, to confuse these two processes, or to ignore either of them, may very easily lead to the crudest blunders, a fine example of which we shall see later when we examine the conclusions Mr.

Bulgakov draws from the French statistics. Finally, the statistics of occupations reveal to us a remarkable increase in the number of office employees * from 47,000 to 77,000, *i. e.*, an increase of 63.8 per cent.

Simultaneously with the increase in proletarianisation, there is a growth of large-scale capitalist production, which requires office employees to a degree rising in proportion to the increase in the employment of machinery and the development of technical production.

Thus, notwithstanding his praise of "details" Mr. Bulgakov completely failed to understand the German statistics. In the statistics of occupations, he merely observed an increase in the number of landless labourers and a diminution in the number of land-owning labourers, and took this to be an index of the "change which is taking place in the organisation of agricultural labour" [Part II, p. 106]. But this change in the organisation of labour in German agriculture as a whole has remained for him an absolutely casual and inexplicable fact in no way connected with the general structure and evolution of agricultural capitalism. As a matter of fact, it is only one of the aspects of the process of capitalist development. Mr. Bulgakov's opinion notwithstanding, the technical progress of German agriculture is first and foremost, the progress of large-scale production, as has been irrefutably proved by the statistics of the employment of machinery, of the percentage of enterprises having working cattle, and of the kind of working cattle, of the development of industries connected with agriculture of the growth of dairy farming, etc. Inseparably connected with the progress of large-scale production is the growth of the proletarianisation and expropriation of the rural population, the increase in the number of small allotment farms and in the number of peasants whose principal source of livelihood are subsidiary occupations, increased poverty among the middle peasant population whose farming conditions have deteriorated most of all (the largest increase in the percentage of horseless farms and the largest percentage of those using cows for field work) and, consequently, whose general conditions of life and the quality of land have deteriorated most of all.

* In regard to this fact, Mr. Bulgakov gave utterance in *Nachalo* to a very flat joke. He talked about "the increase in the number of officers in a dwindling army." A vulgarised view of the organisation of labour in large-scale production!

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AT THE "UNITY" CONGRESS ON OCTOBER 4, 1901 [108]

1. Do all the three organisations accept in principle the resolution of the June Conference?

2. Is it the intention of the League of Russian Social-Democrats and will it be able so to organise literary activity as to render impossible unprincipled and opportunistic deviations from revolutionary Marxism, which create confusion of mind so dangerous for our movement, and abandon all flirting with tacit and avowed revisionism and servility towards the elementary forms and spontaneity of the movement, which must inevitably lead to the labour movement being converted into an instrument of bourgeois democracy?

First printed December, 1901, in the pamphlet, *Documents of the "Unity" Congress.*

FIGHTING THE FAMINE-STRICKEN

WHAT astonishing concern our government is displaying towards the famine-stricken! The Minister of the Interior has issued an amazingly long circular letter (of August 17) to the governors in the famine afflicted districts. It is quite a literary production, of more than sixteen pages, written by Mr. Sipyagin, explaining the whole of the government's food policy. Apparently, the publication of this document was calculated to impress the "public," as if to say: See how solicitous we are, see how we hasten with measures of relief, how we prepare and organise food institutions and all forms and aspects of their activity! It must be confessed that the Minister of the Interior's "circular" did indeed create an impression, not only by its bulk, but also (if one has the patience to read it to the end) by its contents. A frank elucidation of the government's programme always places a valuable instrument in our hands for agitation against the tsarist government, and while expressing our profound gratitude to Mr. Sipyagin, we make so bold as to recommend the other cabinet ministers to speak more frequently of their programmes in circulars to be published for the general information of the public.

We have said: If one has the patience to read Mr. Sipyagin's circular to the end. But one must have a good stock of patience, for three-fourths of this circular, nay more, nine-tenths of it, consists of the usual official banalities. It repeats, over and over again, things that have been known for years and have been said a hundred times even in the "Code of Laws." It is written with the circumlocution and detail of a ceremonial meeting between Chinese mandarins, and in the grand style of state chancelleries, with periods thirty-six lines long, in a "jargon" that makes the heart ache in pity for our native Russian language. It reeks of the musty walls and the all-pervading stench of a Russian police-station, in which the officials personify in their appearance and bearing the most case-hardened bureaucracy, while in the courtyard, gloomy buildings loom reminiscent of the torture chamber.

Three main points in the government's new programme attract particular attention: First, all the power vested in the persons of

officials; the care taken that the bureaucratic spirit and service discipline should be strengthened and protected from any breath of fresh air; secondly, the fixing of the scale of relief for the famine-stricken, *i. e.*, the regulation laying down the manner in which the quantity of bread to be given to the "needy" family shall be calculated: and thirdly, the desperate horror that is expressed at the fact that "disloyal" persons, capable of rousing the people against the government, are rushing in to help the famine-stricken, and the timely measures taken against this "agitation." We shall deal with each of these points in detail.

Only a year ago, the government deprived the Zemstvos of the right to manage food affairs and transferred it to the Zemstvo chiefs and county congresses (the act of June 12, 1900). Now, even before they managed to put this act into operation, they repeal it by a mere circular. It was sufficient for a number of provincial governors to report to the government to convince the latter that the act was already unsuitable! This illustrates better than anything else the worthlessness of the laws that are turned out like pancakes in the government departments in St. Petersburg, without being seriously discussed by people really informed and able to express an independent opinion, and without serious intention to create a more satisfactory state of affairs, but which are dictated merely by the ambition of some swindling cabinet minister eager to make a career and to display his loyalty. The Zemstvo is disloyal—take the control of food affairs out of its hands! But barely had they managed to do so when it was found that the Zemstvo chiefs, even the county congresses consisting exclusively of officials, seem to argue too much. Apparently some of these Zemstvo chiefs have been stupid enough to call famine famine, and were simple enough to think that it is necessary to fight against the famine and not against those who really desire to help the famine-stricken; and in all probability in the county congresses, there are officials, not subordinate to the Minister of the Interior, who also have failed to understand the real tasks of "home politics." And so, by a mere circular of a cabinet minister a new "Central County" . . . no this is not a printer's error: "A Central County Administration of Food Affairs" is set up, the whole purpose of which is to prevent the penetration of disloyal persons, of disloyal ideas, and the commission of imprudent acts in the administration of food distribution. For example, the Minister of the Interior considers it to be im-

prudent and prohibits the "premature" (*i. e.*, not immediately before the distribution of bread) drawing up of lists of the famine-stricken—this rouses "exaggerated hopes" among the population! The Central County Administration of Food Affairs is concentrated in the hands of *a single person*, and the Ministry of the Interior recommends that the *county marshal of the nobility* be appointed to that post. Indeed, so closely is that official connected with the provincial government, and he performs so many police functions that no doubt is entertained as to his ability to understand the true spirit of the food policy. Moreover, he is a big local landlord, respected and trusted by all the landlords. A man like that will certainly understand, as no one else will, the Minister's profound ideas concerning the "demoralising" effects of the relief given to persons "able to dispense with it." As for the authority of the provincial governor, the Minister of the Interior refers to it at the very beginning of the circular, and repeats over and over again that the governor is responsible for everything, that every one must be subordinate to the governor, that the governor must be able to take "special" measures, etc. Even as it is, a Russian provincial governor to this day is a regular satrap upon whose pleasure the existence of any and every institution, and even of every individual, in the province "in his charge" depends; but now a real "state of war" has been established. Extraordinarily increased strictness—in connection with famine relief! This is perfectly Russian!

But increased strictness, increased surveillance demand increased expenditure on the bureaucratic machine; and the Minister of the Interior has not lost sight of this. Messrs. the county marshals of the nobility, or other persons directing the Central County Administration of Food Affairs will be granted "a special sum" to cover their expenses, "concerning the approximate amount of which" adds the circular in its "special" jargon, "Your Excellency will make special application to me." In addition, further sums are granted as follows: 1,000 rubles for county council "office expenses"; 1,000 to 1,500 rubles for expenses of the provincial governor's office. It is the offices that will do most of the work; the whole of the work of famine relief will consist of office routine—Can the offices be left without the necessary funds with which to carry on the work? First of all supply the offices, and what is left can go to the famine-stricken.

Mr. Sipyagin displays remarkable persistence and resource in devising measures for *cutting down* relief for the famine-stricken. First of all, he calls upon the provincial governors to discuss which counties "have been affected by the failure of the harvest" (the final decision of this rests with the Minister of the Interior himself, even provincial governors cannot be trusted to avoid "exaggeration"!) And then follows a list of conditions which is to serve as a guide in deciding which counties *are not* to be regarded as affected areas: 1. If only not more than one-third of the volosts * are affected by the famine; 2. When a shortage of grain is usual, and grain is usually purchased each year with earnings from subsidiary employments; 3. When local resources are sufficient to grant relief. Here we have an example in miniature of a bureaucratic solution of the food problem—one measure for all! What is the size of the population in one-third of the volosts? How seriously are they affected? Have not the usual "earnings" dropped considerably in this year of serious industrial crisis?—all these are idle questions after the resolute "rescript" of the Minister of the Interior! But these are only the blossoms, the fruit is yet to come. The whole point is: Who is to be regarded as being in distress and how much relief should be granted? Mr. Sipyagin recommends the following "approximate calculation" which "has not been found to be to any extent exaggerated." (The thing we fear most is exaggeration; we fear exaggerated hopes, we fear exaggerated loans! Famine, unemployment—all these are simply "exaggerations": this is the idea that clearly stands out from the Minister's reasoning). In the first place, the test yield is defined as the "*average* yield per desyatina in each village," and then the area sown by each farmer. Why not also determine the yield of the harvest of the farmers according to category? The harvest of the poor peasant is smaller and the term "average" is palpably disadvantageous precisely to those in distress. Secondly, those who collect not less than forty-eight poods of grain per family per annum (counting twelve poods for three adults, and six poods for two children) are not regarded as being in distress. This is the kind of calculation that the most hardened kulak would make: In an ordinary year, even the poorest peasant family consumes, not forty-eight poods but eighty poods per family of five to six persons. As is known from investigations into peasant farming, the average peasants in an ordinary year con-

* Townships.—*Ed.*

sume 110 poods per family of five persons. Consequently, the tsarist government cuts down the amount of grain actually required for food *by half*. Thirdly, the circular says: "This quantity" (*i. e.*, forty-eight poods per family) "is reduced by half, in view of the fact that the worker element represents about fifty per cent of the population." The government stubbornly insists upon its rule that the working population must not receive loans, because, it argues, they can earn wages. But the Minister of the Interior has already ordered that those counties in which the population is usually engaged in subsidiary employments shall not be regarded as affected areas. Why then should he exclude the working population from receiving relief *a second time*. It is notorious that not only are there no means of earning extra wages this year, but even ordinary earnings have declined owing to the crisis. Has not the government itself transferred tens of thousands of unemployed workers from the cities into the country-districts? The experience of previous famine years has shown that the exclusion of the adult working population from relief, results only in the inadequate loans granted for the relief of children being divided among the children and the adults! No, the proverb "You cannot take two skins from one ox" does not apply to the Minister of the Interior, who in a twofold way excludes from the lists of distressed all those capable of working! Fourthly, this relief, already cut down by half, and totally inadequate, is still further *cut down* by one-third, one-fifth and one-tenth, "in accordance with the approximate number of well-to-do farmers who have stocks left over from last year or other kinds of material resources!" This is the third skin taken from a single ox! What kind of a stock can a peasant have who has collected not more than forty-eight poods of grain per family? All other earnings have already been taken into account twice, moreover, even a Russian peasant cannot live by bread alone, in spite of the poverty to which he has been reduced by the policy of the government and the exploitation of the capitalists and landlords. In addition to bread, he requires fuel, clothes, and other food; he must make repairs on his house. Even in ordinary years, as is known from scientific investigations into peasant farming, the poorest peasant spends *more than one-half* of his income on other requirements besides bread. If all these things are taken into account, it will be found that the Minister of the Interior calculates the relief to be granted *at one-fourth to one-fifth* of what is actually required. This is not

fighting famine, it is fighting those who really desire to aid the famine-stricken.

And the circular concludes by proclaiming a regular crusade against private charity. It has not infrequently become revealed, thunders Mr. Sipyagin, that certain philanthropists strive to rouse among the population "discontent with the present system, and to prompt them to make totally unjustifiable demands upon the government," that they conduct "anti-government agitation," etc. As a matter of fact, this charge is absolutely *false*. It is well known that in 1891, leaflets were distributed by "friends of peasants" [109] in which the people were quite justly told who their real enemy was; probably other attempts at agitation were made in connection with the famine! But there was not a single case in which revolutionaries carried on agitation under the guise of philanthropy. The great majority of the philanthropists were undoubtedly philanthropists *and nothing more*, and when Mr. Sipyagin states that many of them were "persons whose political past is not irreproachable," we ask, who among us nowadays has an "irreproachable past"? Even "highly placed" persons in their youth paid tribute to the general democratic movement! Of course, we do not wish to say that to carry on agitation against the government in connection with the famine is a reprehensible or even an undesirable thing. On the contrary, such agitation is always necessary, and particularly necessary in times of famine. We merely wish to say that Mr. Sipyagin *is prevaricating* when he tries to make it appear that his fears and anxieties are based on past experience. We wish to say that what Mr. Sipyagin says goes to prove an old truism: The police-government is afraid of the slightest contact being established between the people and the independent and honest intelligentsia, it fears every true and bold utterance addressed directly to the people, it suspects —and rightly suspects—that the mere concern for the genuine (and not fictitious) satisfaction of the needs of the people is tantamount to agitation against the government; for the people see that private charity sincerely desires to help them, while the tsarist officials hamper and cut down relief, minimise the extent of the distress, place obstacles in the way of opening food kitchens, etc. Now the new circular demands that all contributions and appeals for contributions, and that the opening of food kitchens shall "be under the control of the authorities"; it demands that all relief workers arriving in the affected areas shall "report" to the provincial gov-

ernor, that they may invite assistants to help them only with his consent, and that they must submit a report to him of their activities!! Those who desire to help the famine-stricken must submit to the police officials and to the police system of curtailing relief and shameful cutting down of relief rates! Those who refuse to submit to this despicable system must not be allowed to carry on relief work, this is the essence of the government's policy. Mr. Sipyagin howls that "politically unreliable persons are eagerly taking advantage of the famine to pursue their criminal aims under the guise of helping their neighbours," and this cry is taken up by the whole of the reactionary press (for example, *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti*). How horrible! To take advantage of a national calamity for "political" purposes! As a matter of fact what is horrible is exactly the opposite, that in Russia every kind of activity, *even* philanthropic activity most remote from politics, inevitably brings independent-minded people into conflict with police tyranny and with measures of "prevention," "prohibition," "restriction," etc., etc. What is horrible is that the government, under the cloak of considerations of high politics, carries out a Judas policy—of taking the bread from the starving, cutting down relief to one-fifth, prohibiting every one except police officials to approach the people who are dying of starvation! We repeat the call that was already issued in *Iskra* [110]: Organise a campaign of exposure against the police government's food policy; expose in the uncensored free press the outrages committed by the local satraps; expose the avaricious tactics of cutting down relief, the miserable and inadequate relief that is granted; expose the despicable attempt to minimise the extent of the famine, and the shameful struggle that is being conducted against those who desire to help the famine-stricken! We advise all those who have at least a grain of sincere sympathy for the people in their dire distress to take measures to bring to their knowledge the true sense and significance of the Minister of the Interior's circular. It is only because of the infinite ignorance of the people that *such* circulars do not immediately call forth an outburst of general indignation. And the class-conscious workers, who stand closest to the peasantry and to the less enlightened urban masses, must take the initiative in this work of exposing the government!

Iskra, No. 9, October, 1901.

A REPLY TO THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE [111]

Rabochaya Mysl, the organ of the St. Petersburg Committee (League of Struggle), in its issue No. 12, published an article replying to a note published in No. 1 of *Iskra* on the split in the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Unfortunately, this reply carefully *evades* the most important points in this controversy; such methods of discussion will not help to make the case clear. We have insisted, and still insist, that a *split* has taken place in the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, that the League *broke up* into two sections when, at the congress in 1900, a considerable minority, including the Emancipation of Labour group, which established the League, and which formerly edited all its publications, left the congress. Now that the split has taken place, neither of the two sections can occupy the place formerly occupied by the old League as a whole. The St. Petersburg Committee *does not attempt* to refute this opinion when (for some unknown reason) it speaks only about Plekhanov and not about the organisation "Social-Democrat" and when it lets its readers indirectly know that the St. Petersburg League of Struggle apparently denies *the split* and continues to regard one of the sections of the late League as the whole League.

What is the use of entering into a controversy if the desire is lacking to discuss the opinion of one's opponent and to frankly express one's own?

To continue. We have insisted, and insist now, that the principal cause (not pretext, but cause) of the split was a difference of opinion concerning principles, namely, a difference between revolutionary and opportunist Social-Democracy. For this reason alone, the event that took place in the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad cannot be regarded as anything else than a split in the League. We ask: How does the St. Petersburg Committee regard the matter? Will it dare to deny that profound differences in principle exist between the two sections of the late League? We do not know, because the St. Petersburg Committee contrived to write a "reply" which *does not contain a single word* about the main question. And we again ask the St. Petersburg comrades—and not only

the St. Petersburg comrades—whether there is not the danger of a controversy which evades the essential points of the argument degenerating into an extremely unpleasant exchange of abuse. Is it worth while starting a controversy at all, if there is no desire, or if it is regarded as premature, to examine the essentials of the question and to express one's opinion quite definitely and without any evasions?

Iskra, No. 9, October, 1901.

PARTY AFFAIRS ABROAD

THE foreign branch of the *Iskra* organisation has united with the revolutionary organisation Social-Democrat abroad, and has formed a single organisation under the name of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democrats Abroad.[112] As will be seen from its declaration, the new organisation proposes to publish a number of propaganda and agitational pamphlets. The League is the representative of *Iskra* in foreign countries. Thus, the organisation of revolutionary Social-Democrats abroad, led by the Emancipation of Labour group, has completely merged with the organisation grouped around our paper. As hitherto, the Emancipation of Labour group will directly participate in the editing and management of our publications.

The unification of Russian revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations abroad was accomplished after the attempt of these organisations to combine with the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (which issues *Rabocheye Dyelo*) had failed. At the beginning of the summer, a conference of representatives of the three organisations was held at which an agreement was drafted. The basis of this agreement was provided by a number of resolutions which called for the complete abandonment by the League of all flirting with Economism and revisionism, and the recognition of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. There was reason to hope that unity would be accomplished, for up to that time the only obstacle that stood in the way of rapprochement was the instability of principles of the League and of its organ *Rabocheye Dyelo*. These hopes were not justified, since No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* published recently, contained an editorial article openly directed against the very resolutions that were drawn up at the conference in conjunction with the League's delegation.[113] Apparently, the League has again turned towards the Right Wing of our movement. In fact, at the conference of the three organisations, the League moved "amendments" to the above-mentioned resolutions, which clearly showed that it was reverting to its previous errors. The other organisations felt obliged to leave the conference, and in fact did so. Apparently, our comrades of the League do not

yet sufficiently realise the danger of the intermediary position their organisation occupies between revolutionary Socialism and opportunism, which is playing into the hands of the liberals. We hope that time and bitter experience will convince them of the error of their tactics. The effort observed everywhere in the party not only to work for the expansion of our movement, but also to improve its quality, is a guarantee that the much-desired unification of all our forces will be accomplished under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy, which our paper serves.

Iskra, No. 9, October, 1901.

PENAL SERVITUDE REGULATIONS AND PENAL SERVITUDE SENTENCES

ANOTHER "provisional regulation" has been passed!

This time, however, it is not disobedient students that are affected, but peasants who are guilty of the crime of starving.

On September 15, a "Provisional Regulation Concerning the Participation of the Population in the Famine Affected Areas in the Works Carried out by the Order of the Departments of Communications, Agriculture and State Property," received the imperial sanction and was immediately promulgated. When the Russian muzhik becomes acquainted with these regulations (not from the newspapers, of course, but from personal experience), he will obtain further confirmation of the truth that has been dinned into his ears by age-long subjection to the landlords and the officials, namely, that when the officials solemnly declare that the muzhik "is to be allowed to participate" in any large or small affair, either the buying out of the landlords' land, or in public work organised for the relief of the famine-stricken, some new Egyptian plague must be expected.

As a matter of fact, the whole content of the Provisional Regulations of September 15 give the impression of being a new penal law, a supplementary regulation to the Penal Code. First of all, the very organisation and management of public work is hemmed in with such profound "caution" and so much red-tape as to give the impression that rebels or convicts rather than the famine-stricken peasants were being dealt with. One would imagine that the organisation of public work was the simplest thing in the world: All that is required is that the Zemstvos and other institutions be provided with funds, and then employ workers to build roads, carry out afforestation work, etc. Under ordinary circumstances, this is how such work is carried out. Now, however, a new system is introduced. The chief of the Zemstvo suggests what kind of work is to be done, the provincial governor gives his opinion on it, which is transmitted to the special committee on Food Affairs in St. Petersburg, which is composed of representatives of various government departments, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Minister of

the Interior. Moreover, the general management of this work is invested in the Minister, who may appoint special representatives to act on his behalf. The St. Petersburg Committee will even fix the maximum pay for the workers, that, no doubt, means that it will see to it that the muzhik is not "corrupted" by excessive pay! Apparently, the object of the Provisional Regulations of September 15 is to *hinder* the carrying out of public work on a large scale in exactly the same way as the Sipyagin circular of August 17 *hindered* the granting of relief to the famine-stricken.

But still more important and pernicious are the special regulations governing the engagement of peasants for public work.

If the work is carried on "outside the district in which they reside" (which will naturally be the case in the overwhelming majority of cases) the workers must form special *artels* * *to be under the surveillance of the chief of the Zemstvo,* the latter is to confirm the selection of the elder, who in his turn is responsible for maintaining order. Starving peasants must not dare to elect their elder themselves, as workmen usually do. They are placed under the command of the Zemstvo Chief, armed with the birch! The names of the members of artels are to be entered in a special list, which *takes the place of* the legal *identity certificate.* . . . Instead of separate passports, there will be lists of artel members. What is the purpose of this change? The purpose is to *restrict* the muzhik who, if he had a separate passport, could make better arrangements for himself in his new place of work, and could leave it more easily if he was dissatisfied with it.

Further, the preservation of proper order along the route during the conveyance of consignments of workers and their delivery to the works managers is entrusted to officials especially appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. Free workingmen are given travelling allowances; serfs are "shipped" in *consignments* according to a bill of lading, and "delivered" to special officials. Are not the peasants right in regarding "public" and state work as a new form of serfdom?

Indeed, the law of September 15 reduces the starving peasants to the position of serfs, not only because it deprives them of the freedom of moving from place to place, but also because it gives the

* Gangs, or groups. Wages are paid to the group as a whole, and then distributed among the members.—*Ed.*

officials the right to *deduct part of their wages* to be sent to their families "if the provincial officials in the place in which the worker's family resides" consider it necessary. The money the workers earn will be disposed of without their consent! The muzhik is stupid, he cannot look after his family himself. The authorities can do that ever so much better. Who indeed has not heard how well they cared for the families of the muzhiks in military settlements? The unfortunate thing is, however, that the muzhik now is not so submissive as he was in the period of the military settlements. They may demand ordinary passports, and protest against deductions being made from their wages without their consent! Hence, it is necessary to tighten up the law, and so a special clause provides for this. "The preservation of order among the workers in those places where work is carried on, is entrusted by the order of the Ministry of the Interior, to the local Zemstvo Chiefs, the officers of the special corps of gendarmerie, police officials, or persons, especially appointed for that purpose." Apparently, the government *a priori* regards the starving peasants as "rebels," for in addition to the general surveillance of the whole of the Russian police force to which all Russian workers are subjected, it establishes an especially strict surveillance. It is decided *beforehand* to keep the peasants in an iron grip for having dared to "exaggerate" the famine, and put forward (as Sipyagin expressed himself in his circular) "totally unjustified demands on the government."

And in order to avoid having dealings with the courts, in the event of the workers giving expression to discontent, the Provisional Regulations give the officials power to place workers under arrest *for a period not exceeding three days without trial* for disturbing the peace, for failing to perform their duties conscientiously, and for failing to obey orders!! A free workingman must be brought before a magistrate before whom he can defend himself, and against whose sentence he can appeal; but a starving peasant may be imprisoned without trial! The only penalty that can be inflicted upon a free workingman for refusing to work is dismissal, but according to the new law "for persistently refusing to work" the muzhik *may be sent back to his home under guard,* together with thieves and robbers!

The new Provisional Regulations are in fact penal regulations for the famine-stricken; they are regulations which sentence them

to hard labour and deprivation of rights for having dared to importune the officials with requests for aid. The government was not satisfied with depriving the Zemstvos of the management of the distribution of food, with prohibiting private persons from organising food kitchens without the permission of the police, and with cutting down the relief grants to one-fifth, but it deprives the peasant of his rights, and orders him to be punished without trial. To the constant penal servitude of a starving existence is now added the threat of penal servitude on state work.

These are the measures taken by the government in regard to the peasants. As for the workers the punishment meted out to them is more strikingly described in the "Indictment" which appeared in our last number, in connection with the unrest in the Obukhov Works last May. *Iskra* has already dealt with these events in its June and July issues.[114] The legal press was silent about the trial, probably remembering how even the most loyal *Novoye Vremya* "suffered" for the attempt to write on this subject. A few lines appeared in the newspapers to the effect that the trial took place at the end of September, and later one of the Southern newspapers casually reported the verdict: Two were sentenced *to penal servitude*, eight were acquitted, the rest were sentenced to imprisonment and detention in the houses of correction, for terms ranging from two to three and a half years.

Thus, in the article, "Another Massacre" (*Iskra*, No. 5),* we underestimated the vengefulness of the Russian government. We believed that in the struggle it resorted to punishment by armed force as a last resort, fearing to appeal to the courts. It turns out, however, that it managed to combine the two: After beating up the crowd, and killing three workers, they seized thirty-seven men out of several thousand, and sentenced them to draconic punishment.

We are able to judge to some extent of the manner in which they were seized and tried from the indictment. Anton Ivanovich Yermakov, Ephraim Stepanovich Dakhin, and Anton Ivanovich Gavrilov were charged with being the ringleaders. The indictment states that Yermakov had leaflets at his house (according to the evidence of Mikhailova, an assistant in a government liquor store, *who, however, was not called to give evidence at the trial*), that he talked about the struggle for political liberty, and that on April 22 he

* See p. 117 of this book.—*Ed.*

walked along the Nevsky * with a red flag in his possession. Further it is emphasised that Gavrilov also had in his possession and distributed leaflets calling for a demonstration on April 22. In regard to another of the accused, Yakovleva, it is also stated that she took part in certain secret gatherings. It is clear, therefore, that the prosecutor strove to pick out as ringleaders precisely those persons whom the secret police suspected of being political workers. The political character of the case is apparent also from the fact that the crowd shouted: "We want liberty!" and from its connection with the First of May. It should be said in parentheses that the dismissal of the twenty-six men for "losing time" on the First of May started the whole conflagration, but the prosecutor, of course, did not say a single word about the *illegality* of these dismissals!

The case is clear. Those who were suspected of being political enemies were prosecuted. The secret police submitted a list of names, and the police, of course, "certified" that these persons were in the crowd, threw stones and were more prominent than the rest.

The trial was used as a screen to cover the second (after the massacre) act of political vengeance, and it was a most despicable screen. Politics were mentioned in order to make the case appear more serious, but the political circumstances connected with the case were not allowed to be explained. The men were tried as criminals according to Article 263 of the Criminal Code, *i. e.*, on the charge of "overt rebellion against the authorities appointed by the government" and, moreover, a rebellion by armed persons (?). The charge was a *faked one.* The police instructed the judges to examine only one side of the case.

We would point out that according to Articles 263-5 of the Code, a sentence of penal servitude may be imposed for participation *in any kind* of demonstration. A charge of "overt rebellion for the purpose of preventing the execution of the orders and measures prescribed by the government," can be brought even if the "rebels" were not armed, and even if they did not commit any overt act of violence! Russian laws hand out sentences of penal servitude with a free hand! And it is time we saw to it that every such trial is *converted* into a political trial by the accused themselves, so that

* Nevsky Prospect—the main street in St. Petersburg, now Leningrad. The street has been renamed Prospect of October 25th, commemorating the day of the overthrow of the Kerensky Government and the assumption of power by the Soviets—October 25 (November 7), 1917.—*Ed.*

the government shall not dare in future to conceal its political vengeance by a criminal farce!

And what "progress" indeed is to be observed in the administration of justice as compared with 1885 for example! At that time the weavers in the Morozov mills were tried before a judge and jury.* Full reports of the trial appeared in the press. At the trial, workers came forward as witnesses and exposed the outrageous conduct of the employer. But now—a court consisting of officials, sitting with representatives of the estates with no voice, a trial behind closed doors. The press maintains a dumb silence, hand picked witnesses: Factory officials, the factory watchmen, police, who were beating the people, and soldiers, who shot down the workers. What a despicable farce!

Compare the "progress" made in punishing workers from 1885 to 1901 with the "progress" made in fighting the famine-stricken from 1891 to 1901, and you will obtain some idea of how rapidly popular indignation is spreading in width and depth, how the government is beginning to get desperate, "tightens restraint" upon both private philanthropists and the peasants, and terrorises the workers with penal servitude. But threats of penal servitude will not terrify workers whose leaders feared not to die in open street battles with the tsarist *oprichniki.*** The memory of these heroes and comrades killed and tortured in prison will increase the strength of the new fighters ten-fold. It will rouse thousands of helpers to come to their aid, and like the eighteen-year-old Martha Yakovleva, they will openly say: "We stand by our brothers!" In addition to inflicting punishment by the police and the military on those who took part in demonstrations, the government intends to

* Reference is made here to the prosecution of workers who led the first organised strike in Russia, that of the textile workers in the Morozov mills in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, in the province of Vladimir, near Moscow. About 8,000 workers participated in this strike which was directed primarily against the system of fines imposed upon the workers by the management and which amounted to about 300,000 rubles a year or up to 40 per cent of the wages. Although this strike was defeated by the intervention of military forces and the persecution of the leaders, the government was forced to revise the labour code the following year allowing a number of the demands made by the workers in this strike. See p. 166 of this book.—*Ed.*

** The name by which the special guard of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, known for its cruelties committed against the population, was called and which was applied to the police and the Cossacks.—*Ed.*

institute prosecutions against them for rebellion; we shall retaliate by combining our revolutionary forces, and winning over to our side all those who are oppressed by the tyranny of tsarism, and by systematically preparing for an uprising of the whole people!

Iskra, No. 10, November, 1901.

APPENDIX

EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. The idea of publishing a Russian newspaper—the future *Iskra*—occurred to Lenin while he was still in exile. Lenin advocated the publication of a party organ that should "appear regularly and maintain close contact with all local groups" in the articles he wrote in 1899 for No. 3, *Rabochaya Gazeta*. That issue did not appear, as is explained below, and the articles were published only in 1925 (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II). Lenin developed the same idea in his correspondence with L. Martov and A. N. Potresov, who had agreed to participate in the new literary venture ("The Triple Alliance"). He discussed it also in conference with his immediate friends and fellow workers in the movement in St. Petersburg, the League of Struggle and also with his friends in exile (N. Krupskaya, G. Kryzhizhanovsky and others). It was proposed to publish the paper abroad in close co-operation with the Emancipation of Labour group, led by G. Plekhanov. On his return from exile, Lenin took up temporary headquarters in Pskov, prior to his departure abroad, and there he undertook practical steps in preparation for the publication of the newspaper. He conducted negotiations with the comrades who had remained in Russia concerning support for the paper, the sending of correspondence, the raising of financial support, etc. One of these measures was the convening of the so-called Pskov Conference of Iskraists (Lenin, Martov, Potresov, Radchenko) and the Legal Marxists (Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky). At this conference, a draft made by Lenin of a declaration by the editorial boards of the two proposed publications—a newspaper and a magazine—was submitted and discussed. The magazine referred to was the future *Zarya*. The articles written by Lenin in 1899 contain no reference to the publication of a magazine simultaneously with the newspaper. In all probability the idea of publishing the *Zarya* arose later, perhaps a little while before the Pskov Conference. Further details of this period may be found in L. Martov's *Memoirs of a Social-Democrat*.—p. 13.

2. The name given to the document written by E. Kuskova in 1899 and published by a group of extreme revisionists and opportunists in Russia in which they explained their views on the Russian labour movement, and urged the adoption of a purely Liberal programme for the movement. A copy of the *Credo* was sent to Lenin, then in exile in Siberia, and it immediately called forth a sharp protest from him in the form of a statement entitled "A Protest of Russian Social-Democrats" (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II). This protest was supported by all revolutionary Social-Democrats.—p. 14.

3. A newspaper appearing from October, 1897, to December, 1902, of which Nos. 3-11 and No. 16 were published in Berlin. The rest were published in St. Petersburg. This paper was the most consistent organ of Economism and concentrated its attention on the strictly industrial struggle as against the political struggle, which it claimed did not enter into the tasks of the working class. It venerated the spontaneous elements of the movement, was opposed to the establishment of a centrally organised party, and was hostile towards the intelligentsia. Nos. 1 and 2 were printed on a mimeograph (500 copies each).

The second number was received abroad before the first. The contents of this number did not enable the Emancipation of Labour group to judge properly of the *Rabochaya Mysl's* real tendencies, and being regarded as the product of local "workers'" initiative, was warmly received. When No. 1 of *Rabochaya Mysl,* containing the programme of the paper, which bore markedly Economist features, was received, no doubt remained as to its purely opportunist character. A critical analysis of this programme is contained in Lenin's pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, reprinted in Book II of this volume.—p. 15.

4. In one of the chapters of his *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (published in English under the title *Evolutionary Socialism*), Bernstein, in his controversy with Plekhanov, wrote:

In order to reveal Plekhanov's methods of controversy in their true light, I must remind the reader that a large, if not the largest section of the Russian Social-Democrats working in Russia, including the editorial board of the Russian labour newspaper, very strongly holds a point of view approximate to mine, and that several of my "vapid" articles have been translated into Russian and distributed in different editions (p. 170, first German edition).

In a number of Russian editions of Bernstein's book this passage is omitted or curtailed. It is also omitted from the English translation. It is not known what "Russian labour newspaper" Bernstein referred to. In all probability he referred to *Rabochaya Mysl.*—p. 15.

5. A Social-Democratic organisation formed in September, 1883, by G. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Zasulich, L. G. Deutsch and V. I. Ignatov, all of whom had emigrated abroad. The group continued in existence until the second congress of the party, in August, 1903, at which a united party was formed and the group dissolved. This Marxist group played an exceptionally important rôle in the development of the theory and tactics of Russian Social-Democracy. —p. 15.

6. The organ of the Kiev Social-Democrats. Only two numbers were published, No. 1 in August, 1897, and No. 2 in November of the same year. Both were printed in Kiev. The first congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party held in 1898, recognised the *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the central organ of the party, but efforts made to revive the paper failed.—p. 15.

7. The leadership of the League of Russian Social-Democrats passed out of the hands of the Emancipation of Labour group and into the hands of the "Young" Social-Democrats, who inclined towards Economism. After coming to an agreement with the Bund,—the Jewish Labour League in Poland, Lithuania and Russia,—it commenced an agitation at the beginning of 1900 in favour of convening a second party congress. For this purpose representatives of the League (P. F. Teplov and T. Kopelson) were sent to Russia to visit all the local organisations. The purpose of the congress was to restore the Central Committee, which had been broken up by the arrest of the previous members, and to resume the publication of the central organ of the party,—the *Rabochaya Gazeta.* It was proposed to place the editorship of *Rabochaya Gazeta* in the hands of the *Iskra* group (Lenin, Martov, Potresov) of whose literary plans the League was informed. The idea of convening the second congress was supported by several local committees as well as by influential organisations like the Yuzhny Rabochy, in Yekaterinoslav.

The *Iskra* group, however, regarded the convening of the congress as premature and were apprehensive of the growth of Economism. As, however, there was every possibility of the congress taking place, the *Iskra* group wrote to the Emancipation of Labour group, suggesting that the former represent the latter at the congress. To this the Emancipation of Labour group agreed and gave Lenin its mandate to represent it. It was proposed to convene the congress in Smolensk on May 6, 1900. Only five persons (V. N. Razanov and T. Kopelson, representing the League of Social-Democrats; N. Portnoy and D. Katz, representing the Bund, and A. Ginsberg, representing the *Yuzhny Rabochy*) arrived on the appointed date, however, and so the conference was not held. No delegate of the *Iskra* arrived. Lenin deals with the attitude of the *Iskra* group towards the second congress in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, reprinted in Book II of this volume.—p. 16.

8. Lenin here refers to the "Draft Programme of Our Party" which was intended for publication in No. 3 of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, which, as has been stated above, did not appear. This Draft represented a continuation of a work commenced by Lenin in 1895–6 entitled "A Draft and Explanation of the Programme of the Social-Democratic Party" (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. I), which found definite formulation in the proposals Lenin put forward in 1902 when the Editorial Board of *Iskra* was engaged in drafting the programme of the party (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. V).—p. 17.

9. A quotation from P. B. Axelrod's pamphlet *The Present-Day Tasks and Tactics of Russian Social-Democracy*, Geneva, 1898, p. 28.—p. 19.

10. The passage in Marx's introduction to the Provisional Rules of the International Workingmen's Association—the First International, written in 1864.—p. 19.

11. The term applied by P. B. Axelrod to Lenin's pamphlet, *The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats*, in his introduction to the first edition of that pamphlet, dated Autumn, 1898.—p. 20.

12. A pamphlet written by L. Martov in 1899 while he was in exile in Siberia and published in the same year by the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. The pamphlet bore an introduction "By the Editors" in which the following passage occurs: "The pamphlet popularly explains the principal demands of the Russian labour movement, from the most elementary demands to the fundamental aims of Social-Democracy."—p. 20.

13. The *Iskra* was the leading organ of the Russian Social-Democracy from 1900 to 1903. It was founded upon Lenin's initiative who occupied the position of theoretical leader and practical organiser of the paper. It was edited by V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich.

Up to the second party congress (August, 1903), forty-five numbers of the *Iskra* had been published. At the second party congress, which split into a majority (Bolsheviks) and a minority (Mensheviks), the editorial board was made up of Lenin, Plekhanov (of the majority), and Martov (of the minority). Axelrod, Zasulich and Potresov, who joined the minority, were not elected to the Editorial Board by the congress. Martov refused to join the Editorial Board, so that Nos. 46-51 of the *Iskra* appeared under the editorship of Lenin

and Plekhanov. On November 1, Lenin resigned from the *Iskra* as a result of differences of opinion with Plekhanov who had been moving closer to the Mensheviks in his policy of reconciliation with them. No. 52 appeared under the sole editorship of Plekhanov who then co-opted Martov as well as Axelrod, Potresov and Zasulich who had been rejected by the party congress, on the Editorial Board.

From No. 53 on, the *Iskra* appeared formally as the central organ of the party, but in reality it was the organ of the Mensheviks, which it remained up to its last number (No. 112, October, 1905). After the *Iskra* passed into the hands of the Mensheviks, it lost its former revolutionary character, taking up the struggle against the tactical and organisational ideas which had been propagated in the columns of the *Iskra* under Lenin's guidance and had constituted the basis of the activity of the revolutionary Social-Democracy. "Between the old and the new *Iskra* lies an abyss"—the Mensheviks announced through the lips of L. Trotsky, one of its prominent supporters at that time.

For the purpose of reorganising the party, the *Iskra* under Lenin's leadership created a cadre of "agents," "professional revolutionists" who, in the course of three years of work, succeeded in securing the recognition of the *Iskra* principles by the overwhelming majority of the organisations, and who thereby prepared the ground for the convocation of the second party congress and the rehabilitation of the party as a united organisation.

In the text of "How the Spark Was Nearly Extinguished," several sharp expressions used by Plekhanov in regard to the Jewish Bund—five lines altogether—were omitted, the omission being indicated by dots.—p. 23.

14. This refers to the "split" which took place between the Emancipation of Labour group and the majority of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad; at the second congress of the League in April, 1900. The difference between the first, which had adopted the point of view of orthodox Marxism and the League became so wide at that time that the group and its followers were obliged to leave the congress, break off all organisational connections with the League and establish a new revolutionary organisation known as Social-Democrat.—p. 23.

15. It is not known what incident Plekhanov referred to when he said that he had received "orders" (from Lenin) "not to shoot" at Struve. Lenin had pointed to Struve's deviation from orthodox Marxism when the latter still called himself a Marxist and long before Struve's transformation into a bourgeois democrat had become apparent to all, including Plekhanov. Already in the early part of 1894 Lenin, in his *Friends of the People* expressed his disagreement with some of the views outlined by Struve in his article "On the Question of the Development of Capitalism in Russia," published in *Sozialpolitisches Zentralblatt*, No. 1, October, 1893. "I must say that I disagree with some of the postulates laid down by him," *i. e.*, Struve, Lenin wrote (see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. I).

When Struve's *Critical Remarks* appeared in September, 1894, Lenin subjected it to a critical analysis in a paper he wrote on "Marxism as Reflected in Bourgeois Literature." This paper served as the basis for an article Lenin wrote in 1894 entitled "The Economic Content of Populism and Struve's Criticism," and published in a compendium entitled *Materials for the Characterisation of Our Economic Development*, which was published in 1895, but was destroyed by the censor. Plekhanov, on the contrary, in his book, *The Development of the Monistic Conception of History*, published at the end of 1894,

failed to reveal the revisionist tendencies of Struve's book and instead of repudiating him, actually took him under his wing. For that reason it was quite impossible for the order "not to shoot" at Struve to come from Lenin. Possibly Plekhanov had A. Potresov in view. The latter was also a prominent representative of the St. Petersburg organisation and went to Switzerland to visit Plekhanov in 1895.—p. 24.

16. *Novoye Slovo*, conducted by S. N. Krivenko, began to appear in 1894 as the organ of the Narodniks. In 1897, commencing with the April number, the magazine passed into the hands of the "Legal Marxists" and notwithstanding the severe censorship, it managed to exist until the end of the year. The last number, issued in December of that year was confiscated, and the magazine was prohibited by the government. Among the editors were P. Struve (pseudonym, P. S. Novus), M. Tugan-Baranovsky, A. M. Kalmykova, V. Posse, and among the contributors were G. V. Plekhanov (pseudonym, N. Kamensky), V. I. Zasulich (pseudonym, V. Ivanov), V. I. Lenin (pseudonym, K. T.-n), L. Martov (pseudonym, A. Yegorov), S. Bulgakov (pseudonym, Nemo), M. Gorky, V. Veresayev and others. In the September number of the magazine, Struve had an article entitled, "The International Congress on Labour Legislation," in which, commenting on an article by Engels, he stated that the Marxian theory, which arose in the forties, "far from corresponds to present conditions," and that the "social cataclysm" which, "because of the objective material conditions prevailing in the forties appeared so imminent at that time, is now not only prophesied for a future date but has altogether disappeared from the realistic horizon in the same way as ideas about geological cataclysms have disappeared from the science of geology." Although Plekhanov was a contributor to *Novoye Slovo* he made no reply to Struve's views in that magazine. Plekhanov's silence astonished Lenin, who was in exile in Siberia at that time, and in a letter to Potresov, dated June 29, 1899, he wrote: "There is one thing I cannot understand and that is how could Kamensky allow Struve's and Bulgakov's articles against Engels in *Novoye Slovo* to remain unchallenged. Can you explain this to me?" (See *Lenin Collection*, IV.)—p. 24.

17. In his *Vademecum*, a handbook written for *Rabocheye Dyelo* in 1900 and directed against the Economists, Plekhanov, among other documents, published two letters, which although strictly speaking were private letters, nevertheless dealt with questions of principle. One was from M. M. (E. D. Kuskova, the author of *Credo*) and the other from G. (the Bundist T. Kopelson who at that time was a prominent member of the League of Russian Social-Democrats). Both of these letters clearly revealed the revisionist views of their authors. In the main, Lenin endorsed Plekhanov's *Vademecum* and stated so officially in the press and in his correspondence with the *Iskra* group.—p. 24.

18. "Our third man" was L. Martov, who was in the south of Russia during the negotiations between Lenin, Potresov, Plekhanov and the other members of the Emancipation of Labour group and arrived in Munich, where the editorial office of *Iskra* was set up, only in March, 1901.—p. 25.

19. The Bund—the Jewish title of the Jewish Labour League in Poland, Lithuania and Russia, which carried on its activities among the Jewish workers. It was established in 1897 at a congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. The principal publications of the Bund were the *Arbeiter Stimme* (*Voice of Labour*) which was published illegally in Russia and the *Yidisher*

Arbeiter (*Jewish Worker*) which was published by the Foreign Committee of the Bund in Geneva. In 1901 the Bund began to publish an information bulletin called *Latest News* of which 256 numbers were published up to January, 1906. In its tactics and policy the Bund stood closer to the Economists than to the *Iskra* group.—p. 25.

20. P. B. Struve.—p. 26.

21. Apparently this refers to L. I. Axelrod (pseudonym, Orthodox), who later became a well-known Marxian authoress of works on philosophical problems. She contributed articles to the symposiums: *Philosophical Outlines*, 1906; and *Against Idealism*, 1922. An article of hers entitled, "Why We Do Not Desire To Go Back" (against Berdyaev), was published in *Zarya*, Nos. 2-3, and another against Struve entitled, "The Philosophical Exercise of Certain Critics," was published in No. 4 of that magazine.—p. 27.

22. A theoretical magazine published by the German Social-Democrats between 1883 and 1922. Up to the World War this magazine was edited by Karl Kautsky and among the contributors were August Bebel, Edward Bernstein, H. C. Cunow, Paul Lafargue, William Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, E. Vandervelde, A. Labriola, Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, Plekhanov, Parvus, V. Adler and others.

In 1897 Edward Bernstein began to publish in the *Neue Zeit*, without comment by the editor, his revisionist "Probleme des Sozialismus" (Problems of Socialism). One of the articles, in the first series, was severely critical of the theory of the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and of the Social Revolution (*Zusammenbruchstheorie*). This attitude was strongly attacked by Parvus, who pointed to it as a symptom of the rise of German Social-Democratic revisionism. After the publication of Bernstein's second series of articles ("Das realistische und das ideologische Moment im Sozialismus"—The Realistic and Ideological Elements in Socialism) in Nos. 34-39 of the *Neue Zeit*, 1897–1898, the editor was obliged to open a discussion in the pages of the magazine in view of Bernstein's undisguised revision of all the fundamental postulates of Marxism. The first article to be published against Bernstein was Plekhanov's "Bernstein und der Materialismus" (Bernstein and Materialism) in No. 44 of the *Neue Zeit*, Vol. XIX, 1898, which was followed up by other articles by Plekhanov against Conrad Schmidt who, as Bernstein himself had confessed, largely influenced the latter to abandon materialism in favour of Kantian philosophy. These articles were: "Conrad Schmidt gegen Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels" (Conrad Schmidt against Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) in No. 5, November, 1898; and "Materialismus oder Kantianismus" (Materialism or Kantism) in Nos. 19-20. In the same year Plekhanov addressed an open letter to Karl Kautsky in which he reproved him for not taking up a sufficiently definite position in the controversy between the orthodox Marxists and the revisionists. Subsequently, the *Neue Zeit* refused to publish any more of Bernstein's articles and the latter published them in a separate book which later became the bible of revisionism: *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, Dietz-Verlag, 1899.—p. 27.

23. The revolutionary Social-Democrat Organisation was formed after the split in the League of Russian Social-Democrats which took place at the second congress (Geneva, April, 1900). It consisted of the Emancipation of Labour

group and of a number of individuals (Blumenfeld, Lindov, Goldenberg-Meshkovsky, Koltsov and others) who supported the group in its struggle against the majority of the League and who left the second congress with it. At first it was proposed to call it The Russian Social-Democratic League. It existed up to October, 1901, when, in conjunction with the *Iskra* and *Zarya* group it formed the League of Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. The Social-Democrat published Martov's *The Red Flag in Russia*, Plekhanov's *Extracts from a Diary of a Social-Democrat*, and several translations of other pamphlets.—p. 28.

24. N:—Nürnberg, where Lenin stayed on his way from Geneva to Munich after the congress of the *Iskra* and Emancipation of Labour groups.—p. 37.

25. No copy of this draft agreement, written by Lenin at the beginning of September, is extant. In the Archives of the Lenin Institute there is a later, typewritten draft dated October 6, which apparently, in the main, is the work of Lenin. The following is the text of this agreement:

1. The Compendium *Zarya* and the newspaper *Iskra* shall be published and edited by the Russian Social-Democrat group with the editorial participation of the Emancipation of Labour group.
2. The editorial board shall submit all articles dealing with principles and which are of a particularly serious nature to all the members of the Emancipation of Labour group if editorial and technical conditions permit of that being done.
3. The members of the Emancipation of Labour group shall vote on all editorial questions,—personally, if they are present at the place of publication of the journal and if not, in writing on the articles being submitted to them.
4. In the event of differences arising with the Emancipation of Labour group, the editors undertake to publish in their entirety the opinions of the group as a whole, or of each member individually.
5. Only the first point of this agreement shall be made public.—p. 37.

26. This document is known under the title of *Announcement of the Publication of Iskra*, and it was under this title that it was published in the first edition of Lenin's writings. The author himself in his correspondence always refers to this document as the *Declaration*, and this is the title we have retained in this edition. The original text of this declaration (see page 13 of this book) simultaneously outlined the programmes of two publications: the magazine and the newspaper. The declaration here referred to emanates only from the editorial board of *Iskra*. It was proposed to explain the tasks of *Zarya* in a special article in the first number of that magazine, but owing to circumstances over which the editors had no control this proposal was not carried out.—p. 38.

27. A small and uninfluential group which was organised in St. Petersburg in the Autumn of 1898 and was suppressed by the secret police in April of the following year. The group was led by D. V. Gurary, K. A. Popov and V. A. Kozhevnikov, and in its ideas approximated to the Economists and the *Rabochaya Mysl*.—p. 39.

28. The organ of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was published in place of the *Listok Rabotnika*, after the Emancipation of Labour group, at the congress of the League in 1898, had refused to undertake the editorship of the League's publications. The paper was edited by B. Krichevsky, Siberyak (pseudonym of P. Teplov), and V. Ivanshin. Later A. Martynov (pseudonym of Pikker) became the editor. Only 12 numbers of the paper were

issued (in 9 volumes) of which 3 were double numbers; Nos. 2 and 3; 4 and 5, and 11 and 12. The first issue came out in 1899 and Nos. 11 and 12 came out in February, 1902. The *Rabocheye Dyelo* also published a supplement *Listki Rabochevo Dyelo* (eight numbers during 1900-1901) and a mimeographed bulletin entitled *Materials Received by the Editors* (1902). After the *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the *Listki* ceased publication, the League published three numbers of *Krassnoye Znamya* (*Red Flag*), November, 1902-January, 1903.—p. 39.

29. A pamphlet compiled by O. A. Yermansky. It was one of the first items of correspondence received by *Iskra,* before the publication of the first number, as a practical result of the arrangements made by Martov and other followers of *Iskra* in Russia with the various Social-Democratic organisations to supply copy for the new venture.—p. 44.

30. At least two leaflets were distributed on the eve of the first of May in Kharkov. One was signed by the Kharkov Committee of the R. S.-D L. P. and entitled *First of May—(April 18, 1900) The International Labour Holiday.* (In view of the difference of thirteen days between the Julian calendar in force in tsarist Russia and the Gregorian calendar in force in Western Europe, the Russian workers celebrated May Day April 18, the same day that it was celebrated in all other countries.) The second was printed in the printing plant of the Yuzhny Rabochy. It was signed: "The Committee of the R.S.-D.L.P.," and contained the following introduction: "First of May–April 18. On this labour holiday of the First of May the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party sends its fraternal greetings to the working men and working women of the whole of Russia." The demand for the convocation of the National Assembly, to which Lenin refers, was contained in the second leaflet and was expressed in the following form: "We must bring it about that the state shall be governed, that laws shall be passed and that taxes be collected and spent, not by the decision of the Tsar and his officials, who are the servants of the capitalists, but on the decision of the representatives of the people, who shall be elected by all citizens."—p. 49.

31. In printing this article in *Iskra,* the printers accidentally left out a few lines and attention was drawn to this on the back page of *Iskra.* The article was written by Lenin in November, 1900, not later than the 16th of the month. Axelrod expressed himself very favourably concerning this article in a letter to Lenin written November 17, 1900.—p. 53.

32. Members of the Narodnaya Volya, which was formed in 1879 as a result of a split in the Zemyla i Volya party. Narodnaya Volya was the strongest and most heroic of the organisations set up by the extreme revolutionary wing of the Russian intelligentsia. The theoretical views of this party reflected the general immaturity of class relationships that existed in Russia in the eighties. They were imbued with eclecticism in which were combined Narodnik or Populist (petty-bourgeois) Socialism and a striving towards political liberty frequently of a very modest form. Narodnaya Volya, it is true, repudiated the non-political anarchism of the revolutionary organisations of the Russian intelligentsia that preceded it, but, being unable to combine Socialism with the political struggle, it put its Socialist tasks into the background.

The methods adopted by Narodnaya Volya was that of terrorism, which was carried out by a strictly centralised and secret organisation controlled by an executive committee. Its aim was to overthrow the government by con-

spiracies and rebellion. The party had contacts among the intelligentsia, among the students and the officers in the army and carried on propaganda also among the more progressive strata of the workers. The party published two numbers of *Rabochaya Gazeta.*

The Executive Committee of the party consisted of A. Zhelyabov, Sophia Perovskaya, N. Morozov, Zundelevich, A. Mikhailov, Vera Figner, L. Tikhomirov (who later became a renegade) and others. It carried on a strenuous terroristic struggle against the autocracy. Terroristic acts followed one after another, culminating in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1 (14), 1881. The party, however, could not find the road to the broad masses and its terroristic struggle was not accompanied by any mass revolutionary movement. This enabled the government, by savage persecution, executions and provocation, to break it up in 1885. Having exhausted its strength in the unequal battle against the autocracy, the Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volya was never revived again and the party left the historical stage. The party published a social-revolutionary review called the *Narodnaya Volya* (from October, 1879, to October, 1885, twelve numbers were issued), *Listok Narodnoy Voli* and a paper published abroad called *Vestnik Narodnoy Voli* (*Narodnaya Volya News*) Nos. 1-5.

In 1886 a terroristic group was formed, led by A. I. Ulyanov (Lenin's brother) and B. Y. Shevyrev, which took over the traditions of Narodnaya Volya and made preparations for an attempt on the life of Alexander III. The group was discovered, however, and its active members were executed.—p. 54.

33. Lenin quotes here the concluding words of the speech delivered by Peter Alexeyev at his trial in St. Petersburg on March 10, 1877. Peter Alexeyev and forty-nine other textile workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk were arrested and charged with sedition for leading a strike of textile workers.—p. 58.

34. In connection with this article, written not later than December 7, 1900, Plekhanov wrote to the Editorial Board of *Iskra,* then in Munich, requesting that the word "accusation" (against him) be substituted by the words "false rumours" and "if it is possible, to strike out the words about the services rendered by *Rabocheye Dyelo.*" The changes suggested by Plekhanov were not made. Axelrod also passed some remarks concerning this article and Lenin, in a letter to Axelrod dated December 11, wrote: "I have made the alterations you have suggested except that I cannot strike out the reference to the services of *Rabocheye Dyelo.* I think to do so would be unfair to an opponent whose record is not only one of committing offences against Social-Democracy." (See *Lenin Collection,* Vol. III.) *Rabocheye Dyelo,* in its issue (No. 9), announced that it intended in a future number to reply to Lenin's statements concerning the split, but in view of the negotiations that were commenced between the adherents of *Iskra* and *Rabocheye Dyelo* the matter was allowed to drop.—p. 65.

35. The Fifth International Socialist Congress took place in Paris from September 23 to 27, 1900. About 800 delegates were present. The Russian Social-Democrats were represented by a disproportionately large delegation of twenty-four.

The principal question that occupied the attention of the congress and around which a very lively discussion took place was that of the conquest of power by the proletariat and whether it was permissible for Socialists to accept seats in bourgeois cabinets. The latter question was a particularly acute one because of

the so-called "Millerand Affair." Millerand, a Socialist Deputy in the French Parliament, on the pretext of defending the Republic against a monarchist conspiracy, in June, 1899, accepted the post of Minister of Commerce in the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet, one of the members of which was the notorious General Galliffet, who brutally suppressed the Paris Commune. Notwithstanding the protests of the revolutionary wing of the French Socialist Party, particularly the Guesdists and the Blanquists, he continued to remain in the government even after it ordered the workers on strike in Chalons and Martinique to be shot down. Jaurès, the leader of the French opportunists, supported Millerand.

On this question the congress passed the following "compromise" resolution proposed by Kautsky:

In modern democratic states, the conquest of political power by the proletariat cannot be achieved simply by a *coup de main* [*eines blossen Handstreiches*], but can only be the outcome of a long and laborious effort towards the political and economic organisation of the proletariat, of its physical and moral regeneration and the gradual conquest of electoral seats in municipal councils and legislative bodies.

Where, however, state power is centralised, the conquest of political power cannot be accomplished by degrees. The entry of an individual Socialist into a bourgeois cabinet cannot be regarded as a normal beginning of the conquest of political power and can never be more than a temporary and exceptional makeshift in an unavoidable situation.

The question as to whether such an unavoidable situation prevails in any given case is a question of tactics and not of principle. This, the congress is not called upon to decide. In any case, however, this dangerous experiment can be useful only when it is approved by a united party organisation and when the Socialist Minister is and remains the representative of his party.

Where the Socialist Minister becomes independent of his party, where he ceases to be the representative of his party, his entry into the Cabinet becomes transformed from a means of strengthening the proletariat into a means of weakening it; from a means of facilitating its conquest of political power into a means of hindering it from doing so. The congress declares that a Socialist must resign from a bourgeois cabinet when the party organisation declares that the latter has manifested its partiality in the struggle between labour and capital.

The resolution as proposed by Guesde and which obtained only a minority of votes read as follows:

The Fifth International Congress gathered in Paris declares that by the conquest of political power by the proletariat is meant the peaceful or the violent political expropriation of the capitalist class.

This conception of the conquest of political power permits of the acceptance of only such electoral posts as the party wins by the exertions of its own efforts, *i. e.*, the efforts of the workers organised in a party defending its class interests, and therefore prohibits the participation of Socialists in bourgeois governments towards which Socialists must remain in permanent opposition.

Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich voted in favour of Guesde's resolution. At this congress also the International Socialist Bureau was established, with headquarters at Brussels.—p. 65.

36. This refers to the negotiations that were commenced in Munich on December 29, 1900, between *Iskra* (Lenin, Potresov, Zasulich) and the "Democratic Opposition," represented by P. Struve, concerning Struve's and his group's co-operation with the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The Democratic Opposition was the embryo of the Russian Liberal bourgeois political organisation which subsequently founded the *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation), and

later the Constitutional Democratic Party. The negotiations continued throughout the whole of January, 1901, and in the middle of the month P. Axelrod and G. Plekhanov came to Munich for a few days to discuss the terms of the agreement.

Struve, who had considerable contacts with the bourgeois intelligentsia, from whom he could obtain all sorts of material against the autocracy, refused to act merely as a contributor to *Iskra*, and made the proposal for the publication of a third organ, the *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* (*Contemporary Review*), in addition to *Zarya* and *Iskra*. Lenin did not object in principle to entering into a bloc with Struve or to the publication of the *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* as a *supplement* to *Zarya*, but he insisted upon the right of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* to use freely all the material obtained for the supplement, also for *Iskra*, and also that the *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* should not appear more frequently than *Zarya*. In this way he hoped to retain the leadership in this bloc in the hands of the Social-Democrats and to deprive Struve of the possibility of propagating his political line at the expense of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. Struve's plan, however, was precisely to remove the Social-Democrats from the predominant position on the editorial board and to impose on the Editorial Board of *Iskra* a number of technical functions connected with the publication of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*.

On January 30, 1901, a conference took place in Munich, at which Lenin, Potresov, Zasulich, Axelrod, Struve, and his wife, N. A. Struve, were present. At this conference a majority of the *Iskra* group—Lenin voting against—expressed themselves in favour of an agreement with Struve on the latter's terms. Lenin formally protested against this decision and appealed for support to Plekhanov, who was not present at the conference, and suggested that relations with Struve be broken off. Plekhanov, however, refused to support Lenin, and associated himself with the other members of the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. The negotiations with Struve continued up till March, and both sides drew up drafts of statements that were to explain the co-operation between *Zarya* and the Democratic Opposition. The declaration of the Editorial Board of *Zarya*, which was drawn up by Plekhanov, stated *inter alia:* ". . . The Editorial Board of *Zarya* has undertaken the publication of a political supplement which will be edited jointly by the editors of *Zarya* and the representatives of the Democratic Opposition. . . ." Owing to chance circumstances, Plekhanov's and Struve's declarations were not published in proper time and after a little while the negotiations with Struve were broken off, and Struve and the revolutionary Social-Democrats went their different ways.—p. 67.

37. P. B. Struve.—p. 67.

38. Vera Zasulich.—p. 67.

39. Struve's wife, N. A. Struve.—p. 67.

40. M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky.—p. 68.

41. In the early part of 1899 a series of students' strikes broke out in all the higher educational establishments in Russia in protest against the existing university regulations. The government retaliated by expelling the students from the universities, beating them up in the streets by the police, etc. In July, the government issued the "Provisional Regulations" referred to, drafting these expelled students into the army. The promulgation of these Provisional

Regulations in the *Official Gazette* of July 31, 1899, was followed by the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the student disorders, at the head of which was the ex-Minister of War, Vannovsky.—p. 70.

42. The vow taken by Hannibal, the leader of the Carthaginian forces, not to cease the war against Rome until it was utterly destroyed. In this case, it is used as a metaphor to imply unshakable determination to fight against the autocracy to the end.—p. 73.

43. A conservative, monarchist daily newspaper published in Kharkov, which carried on a crusade against every manifestation of the movement for liberation. It was founded in 1880 and was published and edited by the reactionary, A. A. Yozefovich.—p. 74.

44. The only source from which Lenin could have obtained materials for his article on the murder of the peasant Vozdukhov by the police was the *Russkiye Vyedomosti* of January 24 and 26, because the conservative newspapers refrained from publishing any reports of the case. Lenin could have received the *Russkiye Vyedomosti* on the second or third day after publication and this enables us to fix approximately the date on which Lenin wrote this article,—the end of January or the early part of February.

The materials for Chapter II of *Casual Notes*, namely "Why Accelerate the Vicissitude of Time?" (p. 90), Lenin obtained from the *Orlovsky Vestnik* (*The Oryol Messenger*), October 11, 1900. M. A. Stakhovich delivered the speech with which Lenin deals, on October 7. The suggestion that the nobility be given appointments as excise officers was made in the speeches of Yazykov, Tsurikov, Naryshkin, and Stakhovich. The materials for the third chapter, entitled: "Objective Statistics" (p. 95), were obtained from *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti*, January 20-27, 1901.—p. 76.

45. This passage is taken from an article written by the well-known Russian publicist, Gleb Uspensky, entitled "Feodor Mikhailovich Reshetnikov."—p. 89.

46. A Social-Democratic, scientific magazine devoted to science and politics, published in Stuttgart and edited by G. Plekhanov, Lenin, P. Axelrod, J. Martov, V. Zasulich, and A. Potresov.

Only three numbers of *Zarya* were published: No. 1, April, 1901, Nos. 2-3, December, 1901, and No. 4, August, 1902. The magazine contained the following articles by Lenin: "Casual Notes," "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism," "The Critics in the Agrarian Question," "Review of Internal Affairs," "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy"; and the following articles by Plekhanov: "Socialism and the Political Struggle Once Again," "A Criticism of our Critics," "Cant against Kant." Articles were also written by Potresov, Martov, Zasulich, Kautsky, Parvus, Lindov (pseudonym, Leiteisen), Ryazanov, Steklov, Deutsch, and others.

Differences arose within the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* in 1902 and Plekhanov proposed that *Zarya* be separated from *Iskra*, he to retain the editorship of the former. But this proposal was not agreed to and the joint editorial board for both publications was continued.—p. 100.

47. Expressing his opinion concerning No. 3 of *Iskra* and particularly Lenin's article, "The Labour Party and the Peasantry," P. Axelrod, in a letter to the editors of *Iskra* in the beginning of May, 1901, wrote: "Our child

made an excellent impression on our brother [Plekhanov] and myself. . . . The principal articles are splendid, nay, positively brilliant; they are cleverly written; their appreciation and characterisation of events and of the situation, etc., are irreproachable, *das ist selbstverständlich* (that goes without saying)." (See *Lenin Collection*, III.)—p. 101.

48. Lenin began to take up programme questions in 1895 and 1896, while he was in prison in St. Petersburg. There he drafted a programme for the Social-Democratic Party with a commentary. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. I.) During his exile in Siberia he again returned to the work and in the spring of 1899 wrote for the *Rabochaya Gazeta* a second draft of "The Programme of Our Party." This is the draft to which Lenin refers in his footnote. In 1901 the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, on Lenin's initiative, took up the question of drafting a programme for the party and the draft referred to above was taken as material for this work. For further discussion regarding the programme and, particularly the conflict which ensued between Lenin and Plekhanov, see V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. V.—p. 107.

49. Axelrod, one of the editors, had not read the manuscript or the proofs of this article, the organisational and tactical ideas of which were afterwards developed in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* After the article appeared, Axelrod informed Lenin that had he seen the article he would have expressed certain *Bedenken* (considerations) against the outline of the programme, but immediately added: "I was very much pleased with the article on the whole." The pamphlet referred to by Lenin is *What Is To Be Done?*.—p. 109.

50. The *Rabocheye Dyelo*, in a pamphlet entitled *A Reply to P. Axelrod's Letter and G. Plekhanov's Vademecum* (Geneva, 1900), had argued that the difference between the "young" Social-Democrats and the Emancipation of Labour group centred exclusively around organisational questions and were not in the least concerned with "anti-political tendencies" (*i. e.*, Economism). However, *Rabocheye Dyelo* was obliged to admit the existence of differences of a "programmatic and tactical character." It urged, however, that these were only secondary questions. Among these allegedly secondary questions was the point about the struggle of the working class against the autocracy. The programme of the Emancipation of Labour group, published in 1885, formulated the tasks of the proletariat in this connection as follows: "Hence, the struggle against absolutism is obligatory also for those workers' circles which now represent the embryo of the future Russian workers' party. The overthrow of absolutism is their primary political task." This postulate was severely criticised by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which tried to give it a distinctly opportunistic interpretation. "In our opinion," they wrote, "the overthrow of absolutism cannot be the primary political task of the workers' circles. The workers' circles are incapable of taking up political tasks in the real practical sense of the word, *i. e.*, in the sense of an expedient and successful, practical struggle for political demands."—p. 109.

51. The correspondence on the unrest and the May strikes in St. Petersburg was published in *Iskra*, No. 5, June, 1901, under the heading, "The First of May in Russia."—p. 119.

52. The events at the Obukhov Works were not reported in the Official Gazette, as was usually done with events of this kind, but were reported in an

obscure place in the big newspapers, as for example in *Novoye Vremya*, May 9, 1901, without any indication of the source of the information. The reports commenced with the words: "We have received the following reports," and then followed the text from which Lenin quotes. The report, of course, was sent to the press by the Police Department.—p. 119.

53. In 1895, Frederick Engels published Marx's *The Class Struggles in France from 1848 to 1850*, which consisted of a series of articles written by Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1850. Engels wrote an introduction to this pamphlet, dated March 6, 1895, in which he formulated the tactics of the working class. The opportunists seized upon these formulas and endeavoured to interpret Engels' point of view as the abandonment of the revolutionary methods advocated by Marx, and as a denial of the utility of armed uprising and barricade fighting when universal suffrage prevailed. As his correspondence with Lafargue and Kautsky shows, Engels immediately protested against any attempt at interpreting his introduction in the spirit of revisionism and reformism and at picturing him as a "peaceful worshipper of legality *quand même* (under all circumstances)." The fact is that the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party, fearing that the strong opinions expressed by Engels would provide the government with a pretext for prosecuting the party, had, without Engels' knowledge, struck out a number of the more militant formulas contained in his introduction with the result that the most important points were distorted and, in the words of Engels, created a shameful impression. Engels died soon after without succeeding in getting the complete original text of his introduction published while the German Social-Democrats failed to carry out Engels' desire expressed in his will to publish his work in the form the author desired. The unexpurgated text of Engels' Introduction was published for the first time in 1924 in an article by D. Ryazanov in the *Marx-Engels Archiv*, Vol. I (Russian edition).—p. 121.

54. The publication of Lenin's article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" in *Zarya* was preceded by the following note, entitled: "A Secret Document," published in *Iskra*, No. 5, of June, 1901, possibly written by Lenin:

We draw the reader's attention to the publication by Dietz of Stuttgart of a memorandum by Witte which had appeared in *Zarya*. This memorandum is directed against the project advanced by the ex-Minister of the Interior, Goryemykin, for extending the Zemstvo system to other provinces, and it is interesting as a document which shamelessly exposes the innermost desires of our rulers. We hope in a future number to deal in detail with this remarkable document as well as with the preface written for it by R.N.S. [Struve]. While this preface reveals that its author understands the political significance of the labour movement, in all other respects it betrays the usual immaturity of political thought characteristic of our liberals.

Iskra did not publish any articles on this subject, but instead Lenin's big article, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo, etc.," appeared in *Zarya*.

This article gave rise to a very animated discussion on the Editorial Board of *Iskra* in the course of which two points of view regarding the attitude of revolutionary Socal-Democracy towards Liberalism were revealed. Lenin, Martov, Potresov, and Parvus—who though not a member of the *Iskra* group was regarded as a strong sympathiser and to whom Lenin showed the article—on the one hand, and Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich on the other. The latter objected to the severity of the tone adopted in the article towards the Liberals. Lenin accepted their suggestions for modifying the tone towards the Liberals

in general, but insisted on retaining the sharp tone of criticism against Struve. —p. 122.

55. A journal published in London by A. E. Herzen and N. P. Ogaryov, by the free Russian Press, founded by Herzen in 1853, where the *Polyarnaya Zvesda* (*The Northern Star*), leaflets, and other literature were published. The *Kolokol* appeared regularly for ten years commencing with July 1, 1857. During the first years of its publication the *Kolokol* exercised considerable influence in Russian society and had a large circulation among the nobility, government officials, the intellectuals and partly also in Court circles, principally because it exposed the corruption of political life in Russia. It pursued a moderately Liberal policy with a tinge of Slavophilism: emancipation of the peasantry with a grant of land, freedom of speech, the preservation of the monarchy and the federation of all Slav peoples.

With the collapse of Herzen's hopes in the government of Alexander II, after the introduction of the peasant reforms, the *Kolokol* adopted a more radical position, but it never supported the revolutionary and Socialist programme. This change of attitude, however, caused the *Kolokol* to lose influence, because the progressive radical democratic youth was no longer satisfied with its moderate Liberal programme and began to take their views from the *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*), published by Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov. On the other hand, the Liberal nobility and officials who represented the main body of readers of the *Kolokol* shrank from Herzen, because of the support he gave to the Polish rebellion, and found the expression of their anti-Polish views in the patriotic and nationalist *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti*, edited by M. N. Katkov. The *Kolokol's* ties with Russia became weakened and in order to re-establish its former position Herzen, in May, 1865, transferred it to Geneva, nearer to the Russian student circles that were organised by the exiled students. Its influence, however, continued steadily to decline and finally it ceased publication on July 1, 1867. In the beginning of 1868 publication was resumed, but in the French language, with a "Russian" supplement. The last number of the *Kolokol* was issued on December 1, 1868, No. 14-15. In 1869 fifteen numbers of the *Supplement du Kolokol* were issued.—p. 124.

56. A magazine published in Paris in 1829 originally as an organ of art and literature, but later also published articles on philosophy and politics. During the period of the Second Empire (1852–1870) the magazine adopted an attitude of mild opposition to the government of Napoleon III. The article referred to is that by Charles de Mazade, "La Russie sous l'Empereur Alexandre II" (Russia in the reign of the Emperor Alexander II), Vol. XXXIX, pp. 769-803. —p. 124.

57. A secret society organised in 1861 with a moderate constitutional programme, which in the latter half of 1861 published three numbers of a magazine entitled *Velikoruss*, printed at a secret printing shop in Russia. The gendarmes never discovered the members of the society and they are unknown to this day. In its leaflets *Velikoruss* appealed to the "educated classes" and demanded "a good solution of the serf problem." (Emancipation of the peasants without compensation) "a truly constitutional monarchy," separation of Poland from Russia, right of self-determination for the Ukraine, juridical and administrative reforms, freedom of conscience and the abolition of the estates. No. 3 of *Velikoruss* published a draft petition and the "Committee" recommended that signatures be collected for it.—p. 124.

58. A manifesto drawn up in moderate liberal tones dated April, 1862, was distribted in St. Petersburg in the spring of that year and later reproduced in Herzen's *Kolokol*, No. 139, July 15, 1862. This manifesto announced the formation of the Zemskaya Duma Party, the aim of which was to emancipate the peasantry, who were to be given grants of land; the convocation of a Zemskaya Duma or a National Assembly to be elected by all the estates, which was to pass a law for the emancipation of the peasantry and the compensation of the landlords. Appealing to all "honest and right thinking men," the manifesto expressed the conviction that the government would have to concede to the "legitimate demands of the people." The membership of the party and the authors of the manifesto are unknown.—p. 124.

59. A secret society organised in 1862 by N. A. Serno-Solovyevich. This is not the Zemlya i Volya society formed in the seventies. Among the members of the society were A. A. Sleptsov, N. I. Utin, and contact was maintained with the society by P. Lavrov. The society issued a manifesto signed by the "Russian Central People's Committee" appealing to the "educated classes" to refuse to support the government of Alexander II which was adopting a reactionary policy. It also issued a manifesto to "the officers of the whole army" and two numbers of a leaflet *Svoboda*, in which it appealed to the educated classes to join the inevitable popular rising against the autocracy "and thus avoid, or, at all events diminish the bloodshed which the government will cause by its further existence." The society ceased to function in 1863.—p. 124.

60. In 1862 at the time of the big fires in St. Petersburg and a little while before the arrest of N. Chernyshevsky, a revolutionary circle organised by P. G. Zaichnevsky and P. Argiropulo in Moscow issued a manifesto signed by the "Central Revolutionary Committee." In it the Russian people were divided into two parties: The Imperial Party—the landlords and the merchants—and the people. It called upon the latter to make a "bloody and implacable revolution" against the propertied classes and especially for the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty. In its agitation for revolution, Young Russia advised the revolutionary elements to seek support especially among the youth, in the army and among the "old believers." Its programme was as follows: The revolutionary government that was to emerge as a result of the revolution was to have dictatorial powers to carry out measures for the establishment of a federal republican system with national and regional assemblies, election of judges, public factories and shops, complete emancipation of women, the introduction of an income tax, the abolition of the standing army, and establishment of a national guard. Written in very striking, revolutionary terms, the manifesto bore all the traces of Jacobin and Socialist ideas. It caused great excitement in the Russian press at the time and was condemned by Herzen and even by Bakunin. Argiropulo died in prison while Zaichnevsky was sent to penal servitude in Siberia.—p. 124.

61. A literary compendium published by the Narodniks in commemoration of the forty years of literary activity of N. K. Mikhailovsky (1860–1900). The compendium contained articles by A. Peshekhonov, N. Karyshev, V. Semyevsky, S. Uzhakov, A. Chuprov, P. Milyukov, V. Chernov ("The Peasant and the Worker as Categories of the Economic System") N. Annensky, V. Myakotin and others.—p. 125.

62. A magazine of politics and literature founded by A. S. Pushkin and P. A. Pletnev in 1836. In the sixties it was edited by M. Nekrasov and A. Pypin.

Among the contributors to the magazine were Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, Panayev and A. Tolstoy. It was suppressed in 1866.—p. 126.

63. A magazine of literature and politics founded in 1859. It had a large circulation and was influential particularly in the period 1862–1866. Edited by G. E. Blagosvyetlov and N. A. Blagoveshchensky.—p. 126.

64. A weekly newspaper published in Moscow between 1861–1865 by the Slavophile E. S. Aksakov. It was closed down for several months by the authorities for its oppositional tendencies. Ceased publication altogether in 1865.—p. 126.

65. The Estates General—an assembly of the representatives of the estates which existed in France from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. It was convened for the last time in 1789 on the eve of the great French Revolution. Apart from the Estates General the king also used to call an assembly of notables representing the privileged estates which had merely advisory powers. —p. 127.

66. During the great French Revolution the Convention suppressed the counter-revolution by mass terror. In some cases the Commissars of the Convention engaged in suppressing the counter-revolutionists in districts adjacent to rivers ordered many of them to be drowned.—p. 127.

67. Lenin here re-translated from the German edition of this correspondence. —p. 128.

68. The ex-Minister of the Interior—Count P. A. Valuyev.—p. 129.

69. A daily newspaper, official organ of the Ministry of the Interior. Founded in 1862 in place of the *Journal of the Ministry of the Interior*. It ceased publication in 1868.—p. 130.

70. This passage is quoted from *Severnaya Pochta*, No. 13 of January 17, 1867, from an announcement of "His Majesty's order closing down the present Zemstvo Assembly in St. Petersburg and also suspending the operations of the Zemstvo Institutions in the Province of St. Petersburg."—p. 132.

71. Reference is made here to K. D. Kavelin's letter to his sister S. Korsakova, dated March 20, 1865.—p. 134.

72. This was a loosely organised secret organisation of Zemstvo Liberals which existed in the seventies and beginning of the eighties which reflected the revolutionary and oppositional temper in the country at the time. It demanded a moderate constitution and extension of powers of the Zemstvos and strove to exercise its influence through the members of the provincial and county assemblies. An attempt was made by the Zemstvo Liberals to publish their organ abroad, in Galicia, but it failed. They managed, however, to publish a pamphlet explaining their programme entitled *Immediate Tasks of the Zemstvo*. In 1879, a secret conference of the Zemstvo Liberals was held in Moscow at which sixteen Zemstvos were represented. The congress passed resolutions of a moderately Liberal character. In 1880, during the period of Loris-Melikov's "Dictatorship of the Heart," the League instructed its members to agitate in

favour of the Zemstvos presenting petitions. In the same year they began to publish two legal weekly newspapers, *The Zemstvo* and *Poryadok* (*Order*), and a magazine *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*). At a congress of the Zemstvo Liberals, held in Kharkov on March 1, a programme was adopted demanding the convocation of the Imperial Duma. At the same time a resolution was passed condemning the terrorist activity of the Narodnaya Volya. Soon after the reaction set in and the government began to persecute the Zemstvos. The newspaper *Zemstvo* was suppressed. Negotiations were then entered into with M. P. Dragomanov, a former Professor of the Kiev University who was then in exile abroad, for the purpose of converting the paper he edited, *Volnoye Slovo* (*Free Word*), into the organ of the Zemstvos. This he agreed to do and the *Volnoye Slovo* continued to be published as the organ of the Zemstvo Liberals, until it was closed down in 1883. See also the following note dealing with same period.—p. 135.

73. After March 1, 1881 (the assassination of Alexander II), the idea occurred to the government to establish a secret society for the purpose of protecting the life of Alexander III against the terrorists and for combating the revolutionary movement, particularly the Narodnaya Volya and its Executive Committee. Thus, the *Dobrovolnaya Okhrana* (Volunteer Guard), later known as the *Svyashchenaya Druzhina* (Holy Guard), was organised, which had very wide ramifications, with a membership consisting of secret service agents as well as a number of high officials, generals and St. Petersburg notables. Among these were Pobyedonostsev, Shuvalov, Count Vorontsov—Dashkov, Katkov and others. The organisation was dissolved at the end of 1882 when it was felt that the autocracy was sufficiently secure. One of the measures taken to combat the revolutionaries was to found a newspaper, the *Volnoye Slovo*, referred to above, which was edited by Malshinsky who was afterwards exposed as a police agent. The paper was subsidised by Count Shuvalov. Professor Dragomanov, referred to above, who was a well-known Ukrainian constitutionalist, was on the editorial staff of this paper; but he was in complete ignorance as to its origin. He was firmly convinced that the *Volnoye Slovo* was the organ of the Zemstvo League, a member of which the editor, Malshinsky, pretended to be. This misunderstanding is to be explained by the fact that the Volunteer Guard, in negotiating with revolutionary organisations abroad, pretended to speak in the name of the Zemstvo League. At first the paper advocated the establishment of Administrative County Councils and published articles of various tendencies including the terrorists as well as the Chernoperedelsty (Black Land Distributors). At one time P. Axelrod contributed to the paper. In 1882 the paper announced that it had become the organ of the Zemstvo League. In 1883, Dragomanov became the editor, but the paper ceased publication later in the same year.—p. 135.

74. These words are taken from an article entitled "A Description of Loris-Melikov," published by *Listki Narodnoy Voli*, No. 2, August 20, 1880, the author of which was N. K. Mikhailovsky.—p. 136.

75. A literary and political review issued abroad between 1890 and 1892 by the Emancipation of Labour group. Among the principal contributors were G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich. Only four volumes were published. The passage quoted is from an article by V. I. Zasulich, entitled. "Revolutionists from Among the Bourgeoisie," No. 1, February, 1890. —p. 139.

Chernov and others. It was supported also by N. K. Mikhailovsky, V. Korolenko and A. Bogdanovich. This party abandoned the struggle for Socialism and considered its immediate task to be the unification of all oppositional revolutionary forces for the fight against autocracy and for political liberty. The party published a manifesto and a pamphlet by Bogdanovich entitled *Our Immediate Problems*. It was suppressed by the government in April, 1894. The majority of the members subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionist Party and the People's Socialist Party. Lenin discusses this party in articles in Vols. I and II of *Collected Works*.—p. 162.

85. The passage here paraphrased by Lenin from Marx's *Class Struggles in France from 1848–1850* and represents the first three paragraphs.—p. 162.

86. The circular issued by the Department of the Press of May 11, 1901, is reproduced in *Iskra*, No. 6, July, 1901. The circular was issued to all editors of newspapers and magazines after the article "The Labour Disorders" had appeared in *Novoye Vremya*.—p. 164.

87. The oldest newspaper published in Russia. First published in 1756 by the Moscow University in the form of a broadsheet. From the middle of the last century it became the organ of the most reactionary serf-owning nobles. From 1863 it was edited by Katkov, the bitterest enemy of progress at that time and later by Gringmut, who encouraged and supported every measure adopted by the government to strengthen the autocracy and suppress all social movements. The paper existed right up to the November Revolution.—p. 166.

88. The facts concerning longer hours of work were obtained by *Iskra* from correspondents in Ivanovo-Voznessensk—*Iskra*, No. 4, May, 1901; and the substitution of backward workers for progressive workers is mentioned in an item in *Iskra*, No. 2, February, 1901, entitled "Unemployment" which reproduces the facts mentioned in *Yuzhny Rabochy*, No. 3, November, 1901.—p. 175.

89. The official title of this Act was: "His Most-Gracious Majesty's Command Concerning the Granting of State Lands in Siberia to Private Persons, Approved June 8, 1901." The law was published in the *Official Gazette*, No. 157, July 30, and reproduced in *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti*, No. 210, August 15. —p. 176.

90. Published by B. P. Meshchersky in the seventies and edited by G. D. Gradovsky and F. M. Dostoyevsky. At first it bore a moderately conservative character with a slavophile tinge and in the nineties and onwards it was the organ of extreme aristocratic reaction.—p. 179.

91. The first nine chapters of this pamphlet were written in 1901,—the first four were written between July and September and published in *Zarya*, Nos. 2-3, for December, 1901, under the title of "The Messrs. 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question—First Part." These four chapters were republished legally in 1905 by the Burevestnik Press in the form of a pamphlet, with the title *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx."* The cover bore the inscription: "Permitted by the Censor. Odessa, July 23, 1905." This new title was retained for subsequent editions of this pamphlet as well as for the pamphlet as a whole. Chapters 5-9 were first published in the legal magazine *Obrazovaniye*, No. 2, February, 1906, without the first four chapters with the

following foreword by the author: "The present outlines were written in 1901. The first part was published in Odessa last year as a pamphlet by the Burevestnik Press. The second part is here published for the first time. Each part represents a more or less complete work. The general theme is an analysis of the criticism which is now being directed against Marxism in Russian literature."

Chapters 5-9 were provided with sub-headings which was not the case when they were published in *Zarya*. This work was published as a separate book, *The Agrarian Question*, Part I (1908), with the addition of two more chapters, 10 and 11. A twelfth chapter was also written, but was *accidentally* left out of the volume and was published separately in the compendium *Current Life*, 1908. Chapters 10, 11 and 12 will be found in other volumes of *Collected Works*.

In some of the statistical tables there are some slight errors of calculation which in all probability were printers' errors not corrected by the author. Where the mistakes are obvious they have been corrected, but in several cases it has been found impossible without the manuscript to correct them, especially in figures of proportions and percentages worked out by Lenin himself. These have been left as they were found in the originally published text.—p. 181.

92. A popular monthly literary, scientific and political magazine first published in 1892 in place of the magazine *Zhenskoye Obrasovaniye* (*Woman Education*). Among the contributors were V. Bogucharsky, V. Lvov-Rogachevsky, Tan, N. Yordansky, S. Prokopovich, P. Berlin, A. Lunacharsky, P. Maslov, V. Friche, A. Yablonovsky, N. Rubakin, and others. Four chapters (5-9) of Lenin's *Agrarian Question* were published in this magazine, No. 2, 1906. —p. 181.

93. A monthly magazine which passed into the hands of the Narodniks at the beginning of the nineties and became their principal organ in the fight against Marxism. In 1906 the magazine was suppressed but was issued under other titles: *Contemporary Notes*, and *Contemporary*, edited by V. A. Myakotin. In 1914 it was published as *Russian Notes*. It ceased publication in 1918.

The magazine grouped around itself the radical Narodnik intelligentsia which in the period of the 1905 Revolution organised the People's Socialist Party and partly also the Socialist-Revolutionist Party. In his *Agrarian Question*, Lenin criticises the following articles by V. N. Chernov, published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* in 1900: "Types of Capitalist Agrarian Evolution," Nos. 4, 7, 8 and 10, and "Capitalist Agrarian Evolution" in No. 11.—p. 183.

94. The organ of legal Marxism, edited by M. Tugan-Baranovsky and P. Struve. It was published in place of the suppressed *Novoye Slovo*, but only four volumes of the magazine (five numbers) were published. The April number was confiscated by the authorities and several articles from the January-February double number and the May number were deleted by the censor. Later on it was discovered that M. Gurovich, who financed the magazine, was a secret service agent, who had financed the paper for provocative purposes. In addition to articles by the Legal Marxists the magazine also published articles by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov (under the pseudonym of A. Yegorov), A. Potresov and others. Lenin published in it one chapter of his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (*Collected Works*, Vol. III) entitled the "Squeezing out of Serf Economy by Capitalist Economy." The magazine was suppressed by the government after the publication of the May

number. The article by Bulgakov to which Lenin refers was published in Nos. 1, 2, and 3, for January-February and March entitled "The Capitalist Evolution of Agriculture."—p. 183.

95. The third attempt on the part of the legal Marxists headed by Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky to publish a legal Marxian magazine, after the *Novoye Slovo* and *Nachalo* were suppressed. The magazine was issued from 1899 to 1901 when it was suppressed by the government. The evolution of legal Marxism into bourgeois Liberalism had proceeded very far then and found its expression in the marked revisionist tinge of this magazine. In this magazine were published Lenin's articles that were intended for *Nachalo*, namely, "Capitalism in Agriculture" and "A Reply to P. Nezhdanov." The official editor of *Zhizn* was V. A. Posse. After the magazine was suppressed in Russia it was transferred abroad where six numbers appeared. The same editor also published twelve numbers of *Listki Zhizni* (*Zhizn Leaflets*), as a "non-factional Social-Democratic organ."—p. 184.

96. The passage quoted by Lenin that was incorrectly translated by Bulgakov reads in the German text of part II, Vol. III of *Capital* as follows: "Vom Standpunkt der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise findet stets relative Verteuerung der Produkte statt, wenn, um dasselbe Produkt zu erhalten, eine Auslage gemacht, etwas bezahlt werden muss, was früher nicht bezahlt wurde." (*Das Kapital*, Vol. III, Part II, 1894 edition, pp. 277-278.)—p. 193.

97. In the text of the *Agrarian Question* as published in *Zarya* and also in subsequent editions (1904 and 1908) instead of the figure "3,179 work days" as is stated in Lenin's quotation from Bensing, there was the figure "2,608 work days." This mistake was also made by S. Bulgakov in his *Capitalism and Agriculture*, Part I, p. 32. This is due to the fact that on page 42 of Bensing's work are given two tables showing the number of work days in the three systems of economy described in the text, each applying to different conditions, thus:

I	712	I	262
II	1,615	II	1,199
III	3,179	III	2,608

By mistake, the third figure of the second column was taken for the third figure of the first column.—p. 205.

98. The principal organ of the Revisionists founded in Berlin in 1897. Among the contributors were: E. Bernstein, Conrad Schmidt, Fr. Hertz, E. David, Wolfgang Heine, M. Schippel and others.—p. 207.

99. The abbreviated title of: *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* (*The Archive of Social Legislation and Statistics*), edited by Heinrich Braun in 1904. After 1904 it was edited by Werner Sombart and Max Weber. At the present time it is edited by Lederer.—p. 213.

100. The anti-Socialist laws were in operation in Germany from 1878 to 1890. Fearing the growing influence of Social-Democracy, the German government, of which Bismarck was the head at that time, using as a pretext the attack made upon the life of Wilhelm I, secured the passage of a law through the Reichstag which deprived the German working class and the German Social-Democrats of political rights enjoyed by other political parties in

Germany. Under this law Social-Democratic organisations were suppressed. Those suspected of belonging to the party were arrested and tried, the party newspapers were suppressed, many known Social-Democrats were imprisoned and banished and a number of towns were even placed under martial law. The law was introduced as a temporary measure, but as it failed to have the desired effect of crushing the Social-Democratic movement, Bismarck compelled the Reichstag to extend its operation year after year. The Social-Democratic movement, however, managed to adapt itself to the conditions created by the operation of the law. The central organ of the party, the *Social-Democrat,* was transferred first to Switzerland and then to London, the party congresses were also held abroad. Notwithstanding governmental persecution the influence of the Social-Democratic Party spread rapidly among the workers and the anti-Socialist law was finally repealed in 1890; the vote cast for the party in the ensuing elections increased from half a million to one and a half millions.

Eugen Richter, to whom Lenin refers, was a Liberal bourgeois who bitterly hated the Social-Democrats and in his pamphlet referred to, he drew a caricature of Socialism in order to frighten the petty bourgeoisie. The pamphlet was entitled *Sozialdemokratische Zukunftsbilder* (*Social-Democratic Pictures of the Future*), 1891.—p. 221.

101. The central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party commenced publication in 1876 under the editorship of Liebknecht and Hasenclever. Previous to the *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the party, was the *Volksstaat* (*People's State*), the latter, however, was suppressed on the introduction of the anti-Socialist law and the *Vorwärts* took its place. The *Vorwärts* also had to cease publication in Germany and was transferred abroad under the title of *Social-Democrat.* The paper resumed publication in Germany in January, 1891, after the repeal of the anti-Socialist law. Although, as the official organ of Social-Democracy, it took a stand on the basis of orthodox Marxism *Vorwärts* also gave space to articles by Revisionists.—p. 222.

102. Lenin refers here to the passage in Marx's and Engels' *Manifesto of the Communist Party,* Chapter I:

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.—p. 225.

103. Lenin here refers to the following passage from Engels' *Zur Wohnungsfrage,* 1887, pp. 66-67:

The abolition of the antithesis between town and country is no more and no less utopian than is the abolition of the antithesis between capitalists and wage workers. It is day by day becoming more and more the practical demand of industrial and agricultural production. No one has given utterance to this demand more loudly than has Liebig in his works on agricultural chemistry in which his first demand always is that man restore to the land that which he receives from it and in which he shows that only the existence of cities and particularly large cities prevents this. When one sees how, here in London alone, a greater mass of refuse, than is produced in the whole Kingdom of Saxony, is dumped into the sea every day at enormous costs, and what colossal outlays are made necessary in order to prevent this refuse from poisoning all of London, then the utopia of abolishing the antithesis between town and country acquires a remarkably practical basis. And even comparatively insignificant Berlin has been suffocating for the last thirty years in its own excrements. —p. 226.

104. The central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party from 1870–1876. It took the place of the *Demokratisches Wochenblatt* (*Democratic Weekly*) the official organ of the party on the decision of the Eisenach Congress in 1869, at which the Social-Democratic Party was definitely formed. The paper was published in Leipzig and edited by Wilhelm Liebknecht. Marx and Engels collaborated on the paper.—p. 229.

105. The work of G. Auhagen, quoted by Kautsky and Hertz, bears the following title: *Ueber Grossbetrieb und Kleinbetrieb in der Landwirtschaft* (*Large and Small Enterprises in Agriculture*) and was published in 1896 in Thiel's *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher* (*Agricultural Year Books*).—p. 238.

106. Founded in 1873 by G. Schmoller for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in favour of state interference in the struggle between capital and labour by the legislative improvement of the conditions of the workers. The League united mainly the adherents of so-called Socialists of the chair (professors) and pursued the aim of counteracting the influence of the Social-Democratic Party upon the working class.—p. 248.

107. Sprenger's book, which Lenin had not yet read at the time he wrote this pamphlet, was entitled *Die Lage der Landwirtschaft in Baden*, Karlsruhe, 1884 (*The State of Agriculture in Baden*).—p. 255.

108. In the summer and autumn of 1901 negotiations were carried on between the Social-Democratic organisations abroad (the League of Russian Social-Democrats, the Social-Democrats, the Foreign Committee of the Bund, *Iskra, Zarya*) with a view to establishing unity. The members of the Borba group acted as mediators in these negotiations which resulted in the so-called "Unity Congress" being convened on October 4 and 5, 1901. At this congress, however, a complete rupture occurred between the *Iskra* and the opportunist wing of Russian Social-Democracy. The Unity Congress was preceded by a preliminary conference, referred to in these questions by Lenin, which took place in Geneva in June. This conference was called on the initiative of the Borba group, and was attended by Krichevsky and Akimov, representing the League; B. A. Ginsburg-Koltsov, representing the Social-Democrats; Kossovsky, Kremer and Mill representing the Foreign Committee of the Bund; E. L. Gurevich-Danevich and J. Steklov-Nevzorov representing the Borba group and Martov representing *Iskra* and *Zarya*. After six days' discussion the conference drew up a resolution which was accepted by all those present as a basis for agreement and joint work. The resolution condemned Economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism and other deviations from Marxism. This agreement was taken to imply that the union of Russian Social-Democrats had abandoned their Economist views and was regarded as a serious step towards *rapprochement* with the revolutionary wing of Social-Democracy. The *rapprochement* was to have received the formal endorsement of all the organisations to be represented at the Unity Congress in October, 1901. However, the relapse of the League and the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* into the views condemned by the June conference revealed that it was impossible for unity to be established between the followers of *Iskra* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*. The evidences of this relapse were: The articles published in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, of September, 1901, by B. Krichevsky, "Principles, Tactics and the Struggle"; and Martynov's "Revelation Literature and the Proletarian Struggle" and also the alterations and amendments to the June resolution that were adopted at the

third congress of the League that took place on the eve of the Unity Congress. At the Unity Congress, Lenin used the name of Frey.—p. 290.

109. These leaflets, issued in 1892, bore the title, *The First Letter to the Starving Peasants* (1,800 copies). They were issued by the Narodnaya Volya group which was formed in St. Petersburg in 1891 and which had its own secret printing press. They were written by N. M. Astyrev. In the spring of 1894 the group was discovered by the police and broken up, but the printing press was not found. At a later date the group was revived and operated under the name of Lakhtinskaya group. The group also had a press. It was at this press that Lenin's pamphlet, *An Explanation of the Fines Act*, was printed in 1895. This printing press was discovered by the police in 1896. The Narodnaya Volya group of the second period later began to incline towards Marxism.—p. 296.

110. Reference is made here to the article, "Famine is Coming," published in No. 6 of *Iskra*, July, 1901. The author of this article, according to certain evidence, was L. Martov.—p. 297.

111. In reply to Lenin's article "The Split in the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad" (see p. 65 of this book), the St. Petersburg League of the Struggle, which at that time was under the influence of the Economists wrote to *Rabochaya Mysl*, No. 12, July, 1901:

Iskra, No. 1 published an editorial note on the League of Russian Social-Democrats to which we feel obliged to reply. *Iskra* stated that it does not recognise the right of the League to represent the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party abroad—a right that was granted to the League at the first congress of the party—and recommends that Comrade Plekhanov act as its representative on the International Secretariat. At the same time *Iskra* states that it thinks it superfluous to give any reasons for its decisions or to discuss the differences between the League abroad and the Emancipation of Labour group.

Having studied the reports and documents concerning the dispute over the infringement of the rules, the St. Petersburg Committee has come to the conclusion that the accusation made by Comrade Plekhanov to the effect that the majority of the League have violated the rules and by that have lost the right to call themselves the League, is absolutely unfounded. Hence, the St. Petersburg Committee considers that the decision of the first congress remains in force and regards the League of Russian Social-Democracy, as hitherto the sole representative of the party abroad.

The St. Petersburg Committee joins in the request made by the comrades abroad to the committees and party groups operating in Russia to study all the documents concerning the controversy and to express their opinion on the question. Only by a speedy and fair settlement of this controversy can we remove anarchy in the party.—p. 298.

112. Founded in the autumn of 1901 after the failure of the Unity Congress. The League originally consisted of the Social-Democrat Revolutionary Organisation (which also included the Emancipation of Labour group) and the foreign branches of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. The aims of the League were to spread the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and to help to establish a militant Social-Democratic organisation by uniting the revolutionary forces on the principles of the manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Lenin suggested the establishment of the League in the spring of 1901, in his letter to Axelrod of the 25th of April as a means of organising the activities

of the sympathisers of *Iskra* who were exiles abroad and who desired an outlet for their literary and organisational activities. It was intended that the new organisation should have the right independently to publish pamphlets. Lenin's suggestion found application after the failure of the Unity Congress. After the second congress, the League became transformed into a stronghold of Menshevism abroad. The League published a number of pamphlets including one by Lenin entitled *To the Village Poor* (1901–1902). It also issued three numbers of a mimeographed *Bulletin*.—p. 300.

113. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, of September, 1901, published two articles bitterly attacking *Iskra* and the aims for which it stood. One was by B. Krichevsky, "Principles, Tactics and Struggle," and the other by A. Martynov, "Revelation Literature and the Proletarian Struggle." These articles are subjected to destructive criticism in *What Is To Be Done?*.—p. 300.

114. Reference was made to the incidents at the Obukhov Works in *Iskra*, No. 5, for June, in an article by Lenin entitled "Another Massacre" (see p. 117 of this book), and also in a news item in the same issue under the heading of "First of May in Russia." In the July number of *Iskra*, No. 6, there was a news item in the factory correspondence column entitled "The Obukhov Works."—p. 305.

END OF BOOK ONE